

DEVELOPING A SCALE OF CITIZENSHIP PERCEPTIONS IN TERMS OF
RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY

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ABSTRACT

DEVELOPING A SCALE OF CITIZENSHIP PERCEPTIONS IN TERMS OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN CONTEMPORARY TURKEY

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This thesis approaches the concept of citizenship from the angle of citizens by focusing on the citizenship perception of the citizens in Turkey. It has been aimed to measure citizenship perceptions in terms of the balance between both total rights and duties, and also in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship. Liberal and civic republican conceptions of citizenship have been employed as the ideal-standard models against which it is attempted to measure the citizenship perceptions, because it is consensually agreed that the Turkish notion of citizenship is based on a civic republican understanding which emphasizes duties over rights. For this purpose a scale for citizenship rights and another one for citizenship duties have been developed on the basis of a questionnaire. Additionally, in order to measure people's opinions concerning the possible effects of Turkey's EU membership on citizenship issues a scale of "EU membership and citizenship" has been developed. In addition to the questionnaire study which was applied to unionized workers, employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers, focus group meetings and interviews were conducted. The results of the scale study revealed that all occupational groups shared a republican perception of citizenship as far as the total right and duty items are considered. However, in terms of political and social elements of citizenship, occupational groups displayed different perceptions. In terms of political elements, while workers, employers and bureaucrats emphasized the

political rights, with respect to social elements workers assigned more weight to social rights. The EU membership and citizenship scale results indicated that all occupational groups shared a pro-EU perspective with respect to its effects on citizenship.

Keywords: Citizenship perception; civil, political and social rights and duties; liberal versus republican citizenship.

ÖZ

MODERN TÜRKİYE’DE HAKLAR VE ÖDEVLER AÇISINDAN YURTTAŞLIK ALGILAMASI ÖLÇEĞİ GELİŞTİRİLMESİ

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Bu çalışma, Türkiye’de yurttaşların yurttaşlığa ilişkin algılamalarına odaklanarak yurttaşlık kavramını yurttaşların bakış açısıyla ele almaktadır. Yurttaşlık algılamaları toplam hak ve ödevler arasındaki ilişki yanında yurttaşlığın medeni, siyasi ve sosyal ve unsurları açısından da ölçülmeye çalışılmıştır. Türkiye’deki resmi yurttaşlık anlayışının görev ağırlıklı cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modeline dayandığı konusunda genel bir görüş birliği olduğu için yurttaşlık algılamalarını ölçmede liberal ve cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık kavramları ideal-standart referans modelleri olarak kullanılmıştır. Bu amaçla, bir anket çalışmasına dayanarak yurttaşlık hakları ve ödevleri için birer ölçek geliştirilmiştir. Ayrıca, Türkiye’nin Avrupa Birliği’ne tam üyeliğinin yurttaşlık üzerine muhtemel etkilerine ilişkin yurttaşların görüşlerini ölçmek amacıyla da bir ‘AB üyeliği ve yurttaşlık’ ölçeği oluşturulmuştur. Sendikalı işçiler, işverenler, bürokratlar ve emekli subaylardan oluşan bir örnekleme uygulanan ankete ek olarak odak grup görüşmeleri ve mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Ölçek çalışmasının sonuçlarına göre, toplam yurttaşlık hak ve ödevleri açısından tüm meslek grupları cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsemektedir. Öte yandan, siyasi ve sosyal yurttaşlık unsurları itibariyle meslek gruplarının yurttaşlık algılamalarında farklılıklar olduğu gözlenmiştir. Siyasi unsurlar açısından işçiler, işverenler ve bürokratlar siyasi haklara ağırlık verirken, sosyal unsurlara göre işçiler sosyal haklara öncelik veren bir yurttaşlık algılamasına sahiptir. AB üyeliği ve

yurttařlık leęi sonularına gre ise, tm meslek grupları Trkiye'nin AB yelięinin yurttařlık zerinde olumlu etkileri olacaęını dřnmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Yurttařlık algılaması; medeni, siyasi ve sosyal haklar ve devler; liberal ve cumhuriyeti yurttařlık.

To Volkan and Can, the sunshines of my life

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Citizenship in the modern world typically denotes the legal status (mixture of entitlements or rights of participation and a series of attendant obligations or duties) of a person as a member of a nation-state (Turner, 1993; Janowitz, 1994; Pierson, 1996; Yeğen, 2004). However, as Faulks (2000) suggested citizenship is a “dynamic identity” and in the course of time the two basic aspects of citizenship as *status* and *membership* have been in a continuous process of change. Especially, since the 1990s as a result of several social, political and economic developments which are manifestations of two phenomena defined as postmodernization and globalization, the boundaries and the meaning of modern citizenship have been challenged (Isin and Wood, 1999:6).

On the one hand, as an outcome of globalization the increasing interdependency across international borders led to reconsider the sovereignty principle of nation-states which are the sources of authority of citizenship rights and duties. On the other hand, as a result of postmodern fragmentation, various groups that have been marginalized and excluded from modern citizenship because of their ethnic, racial, ecological and sexual concerns have articulated demands for the expansion of citizenship to include group-differentiated rights (Isin, 2002:122-123). Hence, as Isin and Turner emphasized “extent (rules and norm of inclusion and exclusion), content (rights and responsibilities) and depth (thickness or thinness) of citizenship have been redefined and reconfigured.” (Isin and Turner, 2002: 2) In other words, by the end of the twentieth century, “who will be eligible for citizenship rights and obligations, what should be the citizenship rights and obligations and how deep should be the citizenship” have been the main questions on the agenda of

citizenship. In response to these demands several new modalities of citizenship have been discussed and suggested.

Turkey, especially since the late 1980s, is also witnessing debates over citizenship in aspects similar to those of the international context. There has been a growing consensus that the notion of Turkish citizenship should be revised and redefined. The main driving forces framing the challenge against the official understanding of Turkish citizenship are the demands of women, some ethnic, religious and sectarian groups for the expression of their gender-related, Kurdish, Islamic and Alawite (Alevi) identities (İçduygu et al., 2000: 187-188; Kadıoğlu, 2005: 107). The presence of such differences that were earlier confined to the private sphere started to appear in the public sphere during the political climate of the late 1980s and 1990s and “the absolute, homogeneous and all-encompassing category of Turkish citizenship” began to be challenged (Kadıoğlu, 2005: 107).

The relations of Turkey with the European Union should be mentioned as another significant factor that urges the revision and re-conceptualization of the Turkish citizenship. Particularly since the Helsinki Summit of December 1999, where the EU decided to include Turkey as a candidate for future enlargement, the questions of citizenship and democracy constitute the leading issues in EU-Turkey relations.

Consequently, as İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık suggested, the recent citizenship debate in Turkey is essentially centered on the forces of ethnicity, religion and migration challenge (İçduygu et al., 2000: 188). The eager and ambitious desire of the recent Turkish governments to become a full member of the EU which calls for a redefinition of citizenship, can also be mentioned as another force.

Accordingly, since the late twentieth century, citizenship has become one of the most fashionable areas of interest in the humanities and social sciences as

manifested by hundreds of books, thousands of articles and theses related with citizenship studies.¹

However, from the standpoint of this thesis it should be noted that the recent citizenship debate both in Turkey and elsewhere has centered on the structural or institutional side of citizenship and not on “the identity and conduct of individual citizens, including their responsibilities, loyalties and roles” (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994: 353). Thus, as İçduygu overtly puts it:

.. the nation-state or its societal context has been the primary core subject of the debate on citizenship. The centrality of citizens to the whole citizenship concept is often neglected. More importantly, the reciprocal relationship between these two main actors in the arena of citizenship has been even more neglected. .. we are now more than ever in need of rethinking both the theoretical and empirical interrelatedness of the nation-state and its citizens, and of doing so in full consciousness of taking the dynamic link between these two in consideration. The position of citizens has become more, not less, in need of central attention in citizenship debates, and this position is more, not less, important in the related political and social theories. (İçduygu, 2005: 196)

It should further be pointed out that the sociological definition of citizenship advanced by Turner (1993) emphasizes the idea of *practices* and is distinguished from the juridical definition of citizenship as merely a collection of rights and obligations. According to Turner:

Citizenship may be defined as that set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups. (Turner, 1993: 2)

It is within this context of social practices that the citizens and their own perceptions and experiences of citizenship are the central themes of this thesis. It is aimed to approach the concept of citizenship from the angle of citizens by focusing on the citizenship perception of the citizens in Turkey. Thus, in line with the terminology used by İçduygu (2005), the study attempts “an individual-level analysis” of

¹ For example, Isin and Turner confirms that as of 2001, a search in Canada’s largest research library yielded more than 2600 books, manuscripts and reports mentioning citizenship. Similarly, The Dissertation Abstracts Index, which covers the majority of North American theses, lists more than 1000 theses in the 1990s, related with citizenship. (Isin and Turner, 2002: 9-10) As for Turkey, according to the website of High Education Council (www.yok.gov.tr) 102 theses about citizenship were written in Turkish universities between 1997 and 2007.

citizenship. It is expected that an analysis of perceptions of citizens based on their practices will have repercussions on the broader context of citizenship studies and will open up new dimensions to theoretical discussions on the relations between the nation-state and its citizens.

The starting point of this thesis is to explore how people in Turkey relate themselves to the state. Towards this end, it is proposed that the characteristics of citizenship perception of the Turkish citizens can be identified by employing citizenship rights and duties as concepts embracing all the spheres where the citizens interact with the state.

According to the citizenship debate in Turkey, there is a consensus that in terms of rights and duties Turkish citizenship reflects a republican understanding (which emphasizes duties rather than rights) and not a liberal one (which accentuates rights). It has also been suggested that, as mentioned earlier, since the late 1980s the republican understanding which was prevalent in the formation of Turkish citizenship, began to be challenged by identity claims of various groups (Kadioğlu, 1999; Soyarık, 2000; Üstel, 2002; Baban, 2005; Kahraman, 2005). It should be underlined that, all these significant studies are grounded on documentary analyses of constitutions, laws, legal documents, training materials and the like, and not based on a study from the viewpoint of citizens' own perceptions.² It should further be noted that citizenship in Turkey has mainly been studied within the framework of political science theories.

It is hoped that the main contribution of the present thesis to the theoretical debates on citizenship in Turkey is to be able to provide a sociological perspective based on empirical evidence for the viewpoint of the citizens in relation to the perceived balance between citizenship rights and duties. The main motive behind this research is to let the citizens define citizenship in terms of rights and duties,

² The only study -to my knowledge- which elaborates on "citizenship from the angle of citizens" is a recently published book of Birol Caymaz (2007). As discussed in the next chapters, Caymaz argues in his book on the basis of a qualitative study conducted to 60 citizens that the citizens interviewed have an understanding of citizenship which prioritizes the state over the individual and refers mainly to duties.

and in consequence, to capture the deviations from the official definition of citizenship tailored by the founders of the Republic of Turkey. Thus, by examining opinions and attitudes of citizens in relation to their own practical experiences, it is aimed to understand whether the citizenship perceptions of the citizens match the official republican understanding of citizenship with respect to both total rights and duties, and in terms of civil, political and social citizenship. Furthermore, through designing a comparative study it is expected to find out differences or similarities in citizenship perceptions of citizens from different social groups.

The thesis is organized in ten chapters. The second chapter is reserved for the theoretical and conceptual framework of citizenship. The literature on theoretical framework of citizenship has been selectively reviewed. The main sociological approaches to the content, historical development and the reasons for the emergence of citizenship have been briefly analyzed in order to explain the theoretical background of the research study conducted for developing an understanding of citizenship perception of the citizens of Turkey. Citizenship studies maintain that modern citizenship which is a socio-political consequence of the French and industrial Revolutions is closely related with modernization. In other words, citizenship as an institution is directly linked to the development of modern industrial secular capitalist society. As a consequence of secularization brought about by modernization, citizenship was developed as a modern alternative to the binding force of religion. Accordingly, in classical sociology citizenship was implicitly studied within social order theories which aim to explain the new bases of social order and stability in modern societies. Broadly speaking, sociological explanations of social order argue that modern industrial societies can maintain social coherence through a system of general values and a set of institutions, such as citizenship, linking the individual to society.

At the other pole of this discussion, conflict theories, or as generally referred as Marxist theory, argue that societies cannot achieve social stability, because they are in fact divided into conflicting and competing social classes. According to this tradition, citizenship as ‘equal status of membership’ is nothing but a disguised form

of inequality caused by the capitalist mode of production and to be withered away with the abolition of the state apparatus. Thus, Marx was skeptical of the emancipatory potential of citizenship and was suspicious of the citizen-state relationship. However, although Marxist theory conceives citizenship as a temporary condition, the ideas of two Marxist thinkers, Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser offer theoretical instruments that bring about different perspectives to state-citizen relations. Gramsci's account of civil society and his concept of *hegemony* along with the analysis of Althusser on *state apparatuses* are briefly mentioned as they provide the possibility of viewing the state policies in shaping its citizens from a different perspective.

T.H. Marshall's account on citizenship is regarded as the bridge between social order and Marxist traditions. T.H. Marshall by extending citizenship (civil and political) rights to incorporate social rights intended to employ citizenship against the inequalities of the capitalist market. In the chapter, T.H. Marshall's tripartite pattern of citizenship which is of extreme importance for all students of citizenship including myself, is discussed in some detail.

Apart from T.H. Marshall who used a historical approach in studying the development of citizenship rights in Britain, the historical comparative analyses of citizenship evolution in some Western countries proposed by Bryan S. Turner and Rogers Brubaker are discussed as they provide useful reference typologies for the analysis of the Turkish experience during the processes of state-formation and nation-building.

In addition to the above analyses two philosophical approaches to citizenship are elaborated. Based on the development of western thought that shapes the conceptions of the nature of the individual and of the social bonds existing between individuals two philosophical approaches to citizenship can be identified as the *classical* or *civic-republican* and the *liberal* or *liberal-individualist* conception of citizenship (Oldfield, 1994; van Gunsteren, 1998; Heater, 1999). These two conceptions of citizenship are used as the ideal-standard models which constitute the reference

point against which it is attempted to measure the citizenship perceptions of the citizens. While in the civic-republican conception of citizenship, duties have the priority over rights, the liberal-individualist understanding accentuates rights (Oldfield, 1994). In the liberal conception, the social bonds between individuals are contractual. However, in the civic-republican conception of citizenship, the social bonds are based upon sharing and determining a way of life, and “it is shared commitment to the practice which makes individuals citizens” (Oldfield, 1994: 189). For the purposes of this thesis it is crucial to note that in terms of the social elements of citizenship, republican and liberal traditions may take identical stands as opposed to their perspectives towards civil and political elements of citizenship. Within the liberal tradition there are different strands of thinking regarding social citizenship. While *neo-liberalism* (or libertarian liberalism) objects to the provision of social rights by the state on the grounds that they interfere with market mechanisms; *social liberalism* (or egalitarian liberalism) supports the provision of social rights arguing that without them citizenship cannot be achieved in its fullest sense. On the other hand, according to the republican tradition in general, and its contemporary version which is communitarianism, in particular, social rights are mainly privileges which undermine the moral basis of the civic order and to achieve a correct balance between individual autonomy and the common good social rights should be restricted to a basic level (Etzioni, 1995). Accordingly, in terms of social rights the republican approach shares the same standpoint with the neo-liberal approach, but on totally different grounds. The republican understanding objects to the provision of social rights because of its negative effects on the moral basis of public order, whereas neo-liberal understanding’s objection stems from an economic concern that social rights negatively influence the functioning of the market mechanism.

The second chapter is ended by a critical revision of the literature on rights and duties of citizenship in order to formulate the analytical framework of indicators for citizenship rights and obligations to accomplish the main task of this thesis which is measuring citizenship perception from the angle of citizens. In determining the indicators, the analysis of Thomas Janoski (1998) on the balance between rights and obligations in social-democratic, traditional and liberal state regimes has been a key

reference for this thesis. He lists the range of citizenship rights and corresponding obligations by employing T.H. Marshall's tripartite typology (to which he adds a fourth element of participation) of citizenship. The importance of Janoski's work lies in the fact that the proposed theoretical range of citizenship rights includes not only the universally agreed individual rights but also group-differentiated rights. These lists served as a perfect reference in analyzing citizenship rights and duties in Turkey.

Therefore, in this study, based on the conceptualization provided in the literature survey, citizenship is handled within the theories of social order and within this tradition, ideas of Durkheim on social solidarity form the backbone of the theoretical stand of this thesis, because Durkheim's ideas had been very influential in framing the role of citizenship during the processes of state-formation and nation-building of the modern Turkey. Furthermore, liberal and civic republican conceptions of citizenship have been employed as the ideal-standard models against which it is attempted to measure the citizenship perceptions of the citizens of Turkey, because it is consensually agreed that the Turkish notion of citizenship is based on a civic republican understanding which emphasizes duties over rights. In other terms, the principal task of the thesis is to find out if citizens in Turkey have a duty-surplus or right-surplus perception of citizenship. In attempting to analyze citizenship rights and duties, the tripartite form of citizenship proposed by T.H. Marshall is used. Hence, the research study attempts to identify the citizens' perception of citizenship not only with respect to the balance between total rights and duties but also in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship. It should again be underlined that since this study desires to identify the citizens' perception of citizenship practices in Turkey, the extended range of citizenship rights to incorporate group differentiated rights as proposed by Janoski on the basis of T.H. Marshall's three elements of citizenship provides an excellent conceptual tool for the purposes of this research.

The third chapter examines the state-formation, nation-building and citizenship-construction processes of the modern Turkey. It is intended to explore the origins of the prevailing official understanding of citizenship in Turkey through a survey of the

historical trajectory of the ‘making’ of modern Turkey, supported by theoretical explanations. The main idea of the chapter is to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the citizenship understanding of the Turkish state which will serve as a reference point from which the deviations of the perceptions of citizens are to be measured. As Kahraman notes citizenship “has always functioned in the service of the nation-building process as a cultural and legal code for the historical and discursive construction of the Turkish national identity” (Kahraman, 2005: 70). The nation-building process in Turkey aimed not only at the creation of an independent nation but also the modernization of it through Westernization. Thus, the foundation of Turkish citizenship is analyzed within the historical development of Turkish modernity which dates back to 1839 when *Gülhane Verdict* was proclaimed. After reviewing the main regulations and policy implementations aimed at modernization during the late Ottoman period in terms of their influence on the processes of state-formation, nation-building and citizenship construction of the Republic of Turkey, the intellectual developments that influenced the founding elite of the Turkish Republic are briefly discussed. The three strains of thought of Westernism, Islamism and Turkism that framed the comprehensive debate on modernization problems are analysed by giving a special emphasis on the ideas of Ziya Gökalp. The ideas of Gökalp who was influenced by Durkheim, on nation, civilization and national solidarity are elaborated because of their substantial impact on the state formation and nation building processes of Turkey which went hand-in-hand with the project of modernization.

Following the revision of the Ottoman legacy the defining characteristics of the notion of Turkish citizenship in the early years of the Republic are discussed. First, the idea of the state envisaged by Atatürk is elaborated. The Republican state was designed as a republican secular state based on the economic principle of etatism and on the societal organization of populism and nationalist solidarity and aimed ‘to reach the level of contemporary civilizations’. This state ‘in search of its nation’ (Kadıoğlu, 1999) had to construct the citizens who would incorporate the will to civilization. Thus, the Turkish citizenship was defined from above by the republican elite on the basis of a republican model which prioritizes duties over rights and its

distinguishing characteristics were defined as ‘civilized’ to achieve the goal of progress and ‘patriotic’ to ensure the social order. In the chapter the basic tenets of citizenship education are elaborated to trace this civic-republican understanding of citizenship.

After a brief overview of the legal foundations of Turkish national identity, the developments regarding the issues on citizenship in the post-1980 period are summarized. In the aftermath of the 1980 military coup, with the adoption of the 1982 Constitution the ‘militant’ citizen discourse of the early Republican period was re-defined with reference to ‘the emergency state conditions’. An important differentiating aspect of the post-1980 period with regard to citizenship conception is the employment of religion as an element of national solidarity. However, as already mentioned, since the end of 1980s the republican understanding of citizenship has been challenged through the “language of rights” and an increasing gap was created between the strong-state tradition and the changing society (Keyman and İcduygu, 2005: 9). Within this context, being an important factor in shaping the urge to redefine Turkish conception of citizenship, a brief account of the impact of EU-Turkey relations on citizenship is provided. Following the Helsinki summit, to achieve harmonization with the political system of the EU, in the summer of 2002 Turkey initiated a set of legal, constitutional and institutional reforms. These reforms were followed by new ones designed to improve the rights of citizens and to conform to the EU criteria for Turkey’s accession to membership. However, despite the reforms, EU Commission reports still manifest the insufficiency of the Turkish model of citizenship in enlarging group and individual rights (Vardar, 2005: 86-98). Vardar argues that Turkey’s full accession to the EU depends on its attempt to transform the republican model of citizenship into a more liberal, democratic and constitutional understanding of citizenship.

Related with this discussion, in a separate section, the debates on the concept of constitutional citizenship are reviewed. The concept of constitutional citizenship to which some scholars refer as “multicultural constitutional citizenship” was first mentioned in 1992 by the then president Süleyman Demirel. According to Keyman

and İçduygu, constitutional citizenship by articulating identity-claims to citizenship rights will provide “not only a legal and political membership in a nation-state but also an articulating principle for the recognition of group rights” (Keyman and İçduygu: 2005: 19). In the last section of the chapter, in order to properly formulate the citizenship items to be used in measuring citizenship perception of citizens, studies which elaborate on the exercise of rights and duties in Turkey are briefly reviewed. Then, the current Constitution (1982) is critically analysed to see the main legal framework of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey.

The fourth chapter explains the methodology of the thesis. As repeatedly stated, the thesis aims to explore the citizenship perceptions in terms of rights and duties of the citizens in Turkey from different social groups. In attempting to understand citizenship conceptualizations of citizens in relation to their citizenship practices as individuals from various social groups, both quantitative and qualitative tools of research are employed. Since the thesis mainly aims to *measure* opinions and attitudes of citizens concerning citizenship rights and duties, a measurement instrument is required. Scaling is the consensually agreed technique for that purpose (Oppenheim, 1992, DeVellis, 2003). In the citizenship literature within my knowledge, I could not have encountered to any scale developed to measure citizenship perception. Consequently, the main methodological task that this thesis set forth is to construct attitude scales for measuring citizenship perception in terms of rights and duties.

For the sampling of the research, social groups have been determined on the basis of occupational organizations located in different spheres of the society. Senior bureaucrats (medium and upper-level directors) and retired military officers have been chosen as the representatives of the state sphere, and unionized workers and employers have been selected as the representatives of public and market spheres, respectively. In order to find the items for citizenship rights and duties in Turkey, first a pilot study to 40 persons was conducted in Ankara. Then, on the bases of the results of the pilot survey and the findings of previous studies a questionnaire has been prepared. In accordance with the comments obtained from the respondents of

the pilot survey and in line with the advices of the examining committee members, some items have been revised and another section about “citizenship and Turkey’s accession to EU” has been added to the survey. In consequence, the questionnaire is finalized to include items to be used in constructing three scales: a scale of citizenship rights, a scale of citizenship duties, and a scale of “EU membership and citizenship” which measures people’s opinions concerning the possible effects of Turkey’s EU membership on citizenship issues. The questionnaire has been applied to 392 unionized workers, 73 employers, 110 bureaucrats and 50 retired military officers which made up a total of 625 respondents. The chapter explains the process of scale development in detail. Following the evaluation of the constructed scales, to support and refine the quantitative research findings, focus group meetings with unionized workers, bureaucrats and retired military officers, and interviews with employers have been performed.

It should be mentioned that the data collection for the scales has been completed within a two-year period, between September 2004 and September 2006, and the focus group meetings and interviews have been performed on December 2006 and January 2007. Since it has been a while ago, it might be useful to remind the political and economic conjuncture of the country in those days. Following the national election held on November 3rd, 2002 the Justice and Development Party (JDP) constituted a single-party majority government by gaining 66% (that is 363 of 550 seats) of the parliamentary seats. The Republican People’s Party (RPP) became the main and single opposition party with 178 seats. Thus, until the next election of July 22nd, 2007 Turkey was ruled by a two party system-based parliamentary democracy. On the economic arena, following the 2001 economic and financial crisis the Turkish economy was radically restructured on the basis of the “strong economy program” prepared with respect to IMF’s structural adjustment program. The JDP government continued to pursue the IMF program but emphasized the importance of social justice (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 14-16). As a result of JDP’s economic program which Keyman and İçduygu (2005: 15) describe as a *communitarian-liberal synthesis* it is fair to state that during the period of data collection the Turkish economy was rather stable in comparison to the aftermath of the 2001 crisis. As for

the EU-Turkey relations, the JDP presented itself not as Islamic but as a right-center party and voiced its full support for Turkey's integration into the EU as a full member. As discussed in some detail in Chapter III, the governments initiated at full speed a series of constitutional reforms between 2001 and 2005. Despite the JDP government's declaration about the uninterrupted pursuance of the reform process, since 2005 a slowdown in reforms has been observed. It can be argued that the discouraging attitude of the EU concerning its comments on the problems in the implementation of the reforms contributed to the deceleration of the EU reforms.

The presentation of the findings and results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses is organized in five chapters. In Chapters V, VI and VII the survey sample's perceptions of civil, political and social elements of citizenship are evaluated by employing the results of total scores and items for civil, political and social rights and duties, respectively. In these chapters first the total score results are evaluated by using statistical tools, then, the results for each item of the scales for citizenship rights and duties are interpreted by employing the survey findings and the qualitative data obtained from the focus group meetings and interviews. Then, the perception of citizenship as a whole is analysed in Chapter VIII. In this chapter, the perception of citizenship rights and duties as a whole is analyzed on the bases of total scores of all citizenship rights and duties of those citizens participated in the questionnaire survey. Additionally, the resulting scores of the relevant items in the Part IV of the questionnaire about the 'general practice of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey' together with the results of the last part on 'the duties of the state' are employed in interpreting the citizenship perception. Then, the hypotheses set in the Methodology Chapter are verified.

The results presented in chapter V through VIII imply that all occupational groups shared a republican perception of citizenship as far as the total right and duty items are considered, but in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship the occupational groups displayed different perceptions. In terms of *civil* elements all the four groups shared the same perception of civil citizenship based on a republican understanding. In terms of *political* elements, the retired military officers perceive

political citizenship in line with the republican notion of citizenship. On the other hand, despite different levels of approval for some items, the workers, employers and bureaucrats share a liberal understanding of political citizenship. On the basis of item-level results, it is possible to conclude that employers display more liberal attitude towards political elements of citizenship in comparison to workers and bureaucrats because they accord relatively more significance to some political rights (cultural and language rights of ethnic groups). With respect to *social* elements, the workers who assigned more significance to social rights were defined to adopt a social liberal perception of social citizenship. The bureaucrats and retired officers put more emphasis to social duties compared to social rights and thus they were considered to share a republican understanding. Employers, on the other hand, despite the total balance of their social citizenship scores in favour of duties were not considered to adopt a republican understanding, but rather because of their market interests they were described to pursue a neo-liberal perception of social citizenship.

The qualitative data, on the other hand, proved to be extremely useful not only in providing further explanations to the survey results but also in underlining the fact that there are different types of perceptions or varying degrees of the same type of perception within an occupational group.

Grounded on the results, it can be proposed that this thesis brings a new perspective to the debate on Turkish citizenship arguing -in simplified terms- that the official civic-republican understanding has been challenged since the 1990s and it has started to be evolved into a liberal understanding. The present analysis of citizenship perception in terms of civil, political and social elements provides a more comprehensive illustration of the current situation of citizenship in Turkey by clarifying the changing perceptions in terms of specific rights. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the survey sample embraces the official republican understanding of citizenship in general terms but they assign more importance to political rights related with political representation of a broader spectrum of ideas, gender related political participation, cultural and language rights of ethnic groups. It is substantial to note that the results should not be considered as representing the general

citizenship perceptions of the citizens in Turkey, because the survey sample with an education level well above the country average is not representative of the society.

Following citizenship perceptions, the attitudes and opinions of the sample concerning the possible impact of Turkey's EU accession on citizenship issues based on the total scores and items of the scale are elaborated in Chapter IX. According to the scale results all occupational groups of the sample agreed that Turkey's EU accession will have positive consequences on citizenship practice. Thus, the sample had a pro-EU perspective regarding citizenship issues.

Consequently, it can be argued that the findings of this research provides quantitative, qualitative and comprehensive evidence to support and refine the debates on citizenship in Turkey and as a novelty it brings forth the perception of citizenship from the standpoint of citizens themselves. In terms of its methodology, by developing scales for citizenship rights and duties, this study can be considered as a pioneering work in initiating the use of a statistical tool in understanding citizenship perception in Turkey. It is desired and hoped that the sociological perspective of the thesis which highlights the citizen side of citizenship will pave the way for further analysis on citizenship issues in Turkey.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL OF FRAMEWORK OF CITIZENSHIP

The notion of citizenship has been a key aspect of social and political theory because it provides a perspective to political philosophy on justice, rights and obligations, social contract, and to sociological theory on social rights, welfare issues (e.g. poverty, social commitment, benefits), political membership, social identity and study of race relations and nation-building (Turner, 1993: ix-x). Depending on the context whether it is political, legal, philosophical or sociological the language of citizenship is used in many different ways (Dwyer, 2004: 3). So, citizenship is not a clear-cut analytical concept. It is also a confusing and dynamic concept because it is modified in political practices and accommodated to changing historical situations (Giesen and Eder, 2001: 3-4). Thus there are several definitions of citizenship.

Keith Faulks identifies three main types of citizenship definitions: i) *legal* definitions which define the rights and duties of citizens in relation to the nation-state, ii) *philosophical* definitions which are concerned with normative questions on models of citizenship and, iii) *socio-political* definitions which emphasize citizenship as a status denoting membership of a society that involves a set of social practices (Faulks, 1998: 2-3). Tomas Hammar adds another element and delineates four interrelated meanings of citizenship; *legal*, *political*, *social and cultural*, and *psychological*. In a purely *legal* sense, citizenship is a person's formal membership of a state and serves as the basis for a set of rights and duties. Citizenship as a *political* status is the basis for the state and in this meaning citizenship involves loyalty to the state; support for its fundamental principles of government and basic

shared values. *Social and cultural* meaning of citizenship signifies membership of a nation. Finally, *psychological* dimension of citizenship indicates an expression of individual identification. (Hammar, 1989:85)

While Hammar considers citizenship as an expression of identity, Rainer Bauböck defines citizenship as “the basic relation of membership that connects individuals to states, and structures their interactions by generalized legal rights and obligations” (Bauböck, 2000:93). Similarly, B. Giesen and K. Eder describe citizenship as “an interface relating the state and civil society, government and the people, the territorial political organization and its members” (Giesen and Eder, 2001). According to the most agreed definition from the perspective of political philosophy, modern citizenship is the legal status in terms of a set of rights and duties which defines a person as a competent member of a political community (Janowitz, 1994; Pierson, 1996; Yeğen, 2004). Bryan S. Turner, on the other hand, argues that this definition of citizenship is narrow from a sociological point of view. Then, he provides a sociological definition of citizenship which emphasizes the idea of practices and defines citizenship as “that set of practices (juridical, political, economic and cultural) which define a person as a competent member of society, and which as a consequence shape the flow of resources to persons and social groups” (Turner, 1993:2)

In almost all these definitions citizenship is described on the bases of two aspects: *membership* and *status* in terms of rights and duties. Turner’s preference for the term *practices* instead of *status* underlines the importance of the dynamic social construction of citizenship. In other words, Turner points out the significance of social forces which determine the content of citizenship status. Although the membership and status aspects are consensually accepted as the two pillars of citizenship there is a wide range of differing theoretical explanations concerning the content and the development of these aspects. This is mainly related with the fact that citizenship is a dynamic concept which changes according to historical and political conditions. Thus, as many scholars (Barbalet, 1988; Turner, 1993; Janoski, 1998) complained it is not possible to talk about an adequate theory of citizenship.

But rather than a general citizenship theory, several theoretical approaches to citizenship, that analyze the historical development and content of citizenship in terms of membership and status aspects, have been proposed and discussed.

I will argue that in general terms theoretical approaches to citizenship can be classified according to their responses to the three essential questions of what, how and why. The questions may be formulated like the following: What is (and should be) the content of citizenship status in terms of rights and duties? What kind of membership is (and should be) citizenship about? How was citizenship developed? Why was it developed in that particular way, which factors influenced this evolution?

Accordingly, theoretical studies are reviewed within the framework of these questions. First the theoretical approaches that aim to explain ‘how’ citizenship was developed are examined. Secondly, theoretical explanations for the reasons of the emergence and development of citizenship which search answers to ‘why’ question are viewed. Then, the general theoretical perspectives on the content of citizenship which deal with ‘what’ questions are elaborated. It should be noted that as there is a tremendous amount of literature on citizenship studies this study is selective in its theoretical survey by giving more weight to sociological perspectives.

2.1. Theoretical Perspectives on the Historical Development of Citizenship

Concerning the historical development of citizenship there are two points of consensus; i) the practice of citizenship found its first institutional expression in the Greek polis and, ii) modern citizenship is a product of the French Revolution and its aftermath. Apart from these two facts, scholars who study the history of citizenship tend to divide the development of citizenship into different specific phases. Derek Heater, for instance, identifies five distinct stages in the historical development of the idea of citizenship: “the Greek city-state, the Roman Republic and Empire, the medieval and Renaissance city, the nation-state and the idea of cosmopolis” (Heater, (2004b:164). Peter Reisenberg, on the other hand, from a more general viewpoint

defines two citizenships. In his terms “the first citizenship” refers to that form of citizenship lasted from the Greek city-state until the French Revolution and “the second citizenship” has been in existence since then (Reisenberg, 1992). On the other hand, Turner (1994:3) claims that the concept of citizenship is an essentially modern one and argues that “citizenship is both a constituent of modernity and an effect of the processes of modernization.” Therefore, it is directly related to the emergence of the modern industrial capitalist society and presupposes urbanization, secularization, industrialization and the modernization of culture. He explains that:

The claim to citizenship’s modernity is based on the assumption that the evolution of citizenship participation is founded on a number of structural and cultural preconditions: a city culture, secularization, the decline of particularistic values, the emergence of the idea of a public realm, the erosion of particularistic commitments and the administrative framework of the nation-state. (Turner, 1993: vii)

As Turner himself mentioned his claim to citizenship’s modernity can be criticized basically on two grounds. Firstly it can be objected for being ethnocentric, and in particular as orientalist because of its implication that citizenship can only emerge in the West³. Secondly it denies the common assumption that democratic notions of citizenship had their origins in the Greek polis. I take the position of agreeing with these objections but I believe that modern conception of citizenship which emerged after the French Revolution is quite different from the notion of citizenship practices in the Ancient Greek polis and the Roman Empire. This study mainly focuses on modern citizenship which is the core subject of the recent debates on citizenship and thus what is at stake here is the theoretical explanations for the emergence and development of citizenship and not the historical development of citizenship per se. But before reviewing the theory on modern citizenship, it is preferred to provide a brief account of the idea and practice of citizenship in the Greek polis and in the Roman Republic and Empire because of their influence on the modern concept of citizenship.⁴

³ For a discussion of the orientalist perspective of the Western conception of citizenship see E.F. Isin, 2002 and 2005.

⁴ For a detailed analysis of the historical development of citizenship D. Heater’s *A Brief History of Citizenship*, 2004 (Edinburgh University Press) provides an excellent source.

2.1.1. Ancient Citizenship

The earliest written discussion of citizenship was found in Aristotle's *Politics* which defines the citizen as one who both rules and is ruled. In the ancient Greek *polis* citizens collectively make decisions where each decider respects the authority of the others and they are charged with obeying the decisions they have made (Pocock, 1998: 33). Good government is guaranteed by the principle of public spirited virtue which specifies that the wider public interest has the priority over any personal matters (Dwyer, 2004: 21). According to Aristotle one who does not take part in the running of the community's affairs is either a beast or a God and to be truly human one had to be a citizen. He declared that the human was "a creature formed by nature to live a political life" (Pocock, 1998: 35). Hence citizenship was obligation-based rather than rights-based. However, since the Greek *polis* was a small-scale, organic community the public-private dualism of modern citizenship did not exist and the obligations of citizenship were not perceived as purely public matters but rather as opportunities to be virtuous and to serve the community (in the form of military obligation and political participation). The government institutions provided many facilities for the exercise of this civic virtue (Faulks, 2000: 16-18). The value system supposed that "political action was a good in itself" and citizenship is "the way of being free itself" (Pocock, 1998: 34-35). To the Greek citizen, civic virtue was the primary source of honour and respect, and thus central to his sense of self-worth and purpose. (Faulks, 2000: 18)

However, the status of citizenship in the Greek city-state was highly exclusive. Although all citizens were set equal in participation and obedience to laws access to citizenship was restricted to a selected group of men as patriarchs, warriors, landowners and those of known lineage (Peyrou, 2006: 6).

Roman citizenship had strikingly different features compared to the Greek one. At the time of the Roman Republic citizenship, similar to the Greek *polis*, was a privileged status, reserved only to those participating politically. But, in the imperial age citizenship gradually became less inclusive and served as "a tool of social

control and pacification” (Faulks, 2000: 19). There were various grades of Roman citizenship the nature and availability of which was determined by legislation. Even slaves could have opportunities to become citizen (Heater, 2004a: 30). It may be argued that granting citizenship to the peoples of the empire advocated the legitimization of the Roman rule in the eyes on the conquered. (Faulks, 2000: 19; Dwyer, 2004: 21) The extension of citizenship in the Roman Empire abandoned the commitment to public participation which had been integral to the idea of citizenship in the Greek polis. (Linklater, 1998: 184)

The status of Roman citizenship meant that the life of the individual was guided and protected by Roman law. This legal status affects his whole life, both public and private, irrespective of his interest in political participation. (Heater, 2004: 31) Thus the citizen as a political being was changed to the citizen as a legal being (Pocock, 1998: 36).

In the Roman citizenship duties were balanced by rights. The duties were basically military service and paying taxes. In terms of rights, Heater remarks the existence of the distinction between the private and public spheres of life. For private rights he lists the right to marry into another citizen family and the right to trade with another Roman citizen. Public or political rights of citizenship were; to vote for members of the Assemblies and for candidates to political office, to sit in the Assemblies and to become a magistrate. (Heater, 2004a: 31-32) ⁵

2.1.2. Citizenship in Medieval and Early Modern Periods

After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, in medieval Europe -except for some Italian city-states- citizenship became relatively less important. As a result of the spread of Christianity, in the medieval period the search for personal salvation replaced the pursuit of honour through the practice of

⁵ Heater notes that Roman citizens never had the political power as Athenian citizens had in their Assembly. At the time of the Republic power belonged to the Senate and Consuls and in Imperial times to the Emperor. Rome never had a democratic era. (Heater, 2004: 32)

citizenship. Consequently, instead of the political community the church became the core of loyalty and moral guidance. (Faulks, 2000: 20)

In the thirteenth century while the works of some scholars prepared the theoretical grounds to restore the secular interpretation of citizenship, the development of money economy and industrial activity provided the practical background for its revival (Heater, 2004a: 43-45).

As a matter of fact, by the eleventh century citizenship was starting to flourish in the economically developed European city-states where the merchants demanding more freedom for commercial reasons. In the Italian city-states such as Florence and Venice, northern cities such as Lübeck and Hamburg, central German cities such as Magdeburg and Nürnberg, Flemish cities such as Bruges and Gent a communal, republican spirit and a constitutional frame for citizenship were developed. These city-states are commonly regarded as “the institutional seedbed” for the idea of modern citizenship. (Eder and Giesen, 2001: 248) But in this small- scale municipal or city-state context it should be mentioned that most individuals were excluded from citizenship. In that non-universal and hierarchical citizenship property ownership was the major criteria in determining the range of citizenship rights. It is only with the development of liberalism that the modern notion of citizenship which is universal and egalitarian was emerged (Faulks, 2000: 21).

2.1.3. Modern Citizenship

As mentioned earlier, modern notion of citizenship is generally regarded as the offspring of the French Revolution, but several other political social and economic developments, which marked the period of modernity in Western history from the sixteenth century onwards, laid the foundations for “the transition from a monarch-subject relationship to a state-citizen relationship” (Heater, 1999: 4). According to Anthony Giddens modernity is associated with: i) the idea that the world is open to transformation by human intervention, which had its origins in the Enlightenment ideology, ii) a complex of economic institutions, especially industrial production

and a market economy, which were realized through the Industrial Revolution and mechanization, iii) a certain range of political institutions including the nation-state and mass democracy, the foundations of which were established through a series of revolutions and military conflicts. (Giddens and Pierson, 1998:94)

All these factors that are framing the period termed as modernity also shaped the evolution of the modern citizenship. While the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) established the modern international system of independent nation-states following the English Civil War (1642-1651) and the Glorious Revolution (1688) feudalism in Great Britain was replaced by modern constitutional monarchy. Later the American and French Revolutions created the first modern republics where self-governance by citizens took place within nations (Smith, 2002: 107). The liberal tradition founded by Thomas Hobbes and developed by John Locke provided the theoretical instrument for these developments. Locke advanced a right-based theory of citizenship which is based on the idea of the egalitarian individual's direct relationship with the state (Faulks, 2000: 23). His theory played a key role in providing the ideological justification for both the American and French Revolutions.

However, as Heater puts it, "it was the French Revolution that first established the principle and practice of citizenship as the central feature of the modern socio-political structure" (Heater, 1999: 4). The French Revolution linked the idea of citizenship rights with the debate about human equality and allied citizenship with the notion of community in the principle of social fraternity. With the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen* the conventional perspective on individual rights was set within the broader framework of universality as requiring both equality and community (Turner, 1986: 19). The Revolution also used the concept of the nation in a progressive and secular way and 'the monarchy as sovereign' was substituted with 'the people as sovereign', and the sovereign people came to be identified with the nation (Faulks, 2000: 31) The French Revolution contributed to the development of the state as a separate entity with specific subjects called citizens. Furthermore, it joined citizenship to the search for political liberation. This new conception of

national citizenship and liberation had great influences on nationalist movements. (Turner, 1986:19) Consequently, nationalism served as a useful device for refocusing people's loyalty away from the monarch and evoking emotional attachment (Heater, 2004b:58).

As a result of the French and Industrial Revolutions the legitimacy of the old social and political order, which was dominated by aristocracy and Church, was undermined. As an alternative means of stability the concept and status of citizenship was required. Since the nineteenth century several developments such as strengthening of capitalism, combined processes of urbanization and industrialization, modernization of the state, steady secularization of the society and reduced political influence of the Church assisted the evolution of modern citizenship. (Heater, 2004b: 170-173)

2.2. Theoretical Explanations for the Emergence of Citizenship

As indicated earlier, this study focuses mainly on sociological theories and in reviewing the fundamental sociological explanations by adopting the approach used by Turner (1993), I prefer to place citizenship as social membership within the wider context of social solidarity and social order in modern societies.

2.2.1. Theories on Social Order

In classical sociology citizenship as social membership is discussed within the context of social order and social solidarity. It was implicitly elaborated while analyzing the changing basis of social membership in the process of modernization (Turner, 1998: 4). As it will be explained in the next chapter, during the state-formation and nation-building processes of the Republic of Turkey citizenship was utilized as a powerful device of social stability and order. Thus, by examining the development of citizenship within the debate of social order it is hoped to understand the social construction of citizenship which in turn determines the citizenship perceptions of citizens. In this section, ideas of Weber, Durkheim,

Toennies, Parsons and Marx on the emergence and development of citizenship are briefly reviewed.

Weber argued that the development of citizenship is directly related with the military organization. He claimed that “the Western city is in its beginnings first of all a defense group, an organization of those economically competent to bear arms, to equip and train themselves” (Weber: 1998: 44). He also pointed to the importance of the Christian religion which enabled the development of the urban commune as a political entity based on a common faith instead of common tribal or local membership. When these features were combined in a single institution in the independent cities of European society, citizenship started to develop “as an important part of the very social structure of modern capitalist civilization” (Turner, 1998: 4).

Durkheim in *The Division of Labour in Society* explained social order in terms of the social position of labour and a new set of general social values. By focusing on the division of labour he argued that traditional societies were based on mechanical solidarity where individual differences were minimized, whereas in modern societies the highly complex division of labor resulted in organic solidarity. As a consequence of different specializations in employment and social roles people became dependent upon each other. Additionally, while in traditional societies collective consciousness subsumes individual consciousness, in modern societies as a result of increasing division of labour, individual consciousness emerges distinct from collective consciousness and often tend to conflict with the latter. (Durkheim, 1960) Durkheim mainly focused on “the problem of how modern societies could secure a spontaneous social order when strong collective moral sentiments come to be replaced by an ethic of individualism” (Saunders, 1993: 71). According to Durkheim, neither political society nor the state is able to end the anomy brought about by the specialized division of labour, because economic life is beyond the scope of their competence and action. Thus, he argued:

An occupational activity can be efficaciously regulated only by a group intimate enough with it to know its functioning, feel all its needs and able to follow all their variations. The only one

that could answer all these conditions is the one formed by all the agents of the same industry, united and organized into a single body. This is what is called the corporation or occupational group. (Durkheim, 1960: 5)

Durkheim maintained that corporations must “include all the members of the occupation scattered over the territory, for in whatever region they are found, whether they live in the city or the country, they are all solidary, and participate in a common life” (Durkheim, 1960: 24). He viewed corporations as “the source of occupational ethics and law” and emphasized that “in each occupation a body of laws [must] be made fixing the quantity of work, the just remuneration of the different officials, their duties toward each other, and toward the community, etc.” (Durkheim, 1960: 30) The regulations must prioritize corporative interests to individual one and he argued that “the subordination of private utility to common utility always has a moral character.” (Durkheim, 1960: 13) Accordingly, for Durkheim, corporations are indispensable not because of the economic services they can render, but because of the moral influence they can have both on individuals and on society as a whole.

In addition to the idea of corporations as a means of social solidarity, Durkheim, in a later work, *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals* suggested that citizenship could function as a basis of secular solidarity which might replace the religious foundation of collective feelings in traditional societies (Turner, 1993: 4). In his discussion of civic morals, it is possible to identify the early idea of global citizenship apart from the notion of national citizenship as implied by Turner: “Durkheim perceived that the framework of secular commitment could either be set within the context of a national conception of social identity or citizenship might develop as the moral framework of some larger social entities such as humanity itself” (Turner, 1993: 4).

Similarly, Toennies’s distinction between community (*gemeinschaft*) and association (*gesellschaft*) was about the nature of social membership. If the historical evolution of European societies had been from community to association, then citizenship can be considered “as a secularized version of the more primordial bonds of tradition, religion and locality” (Turner, 1993: 5).

Parsons analysed the emergence of the modern societies through a synthesis of the works of Weber, Durkheim and Toennies. According to him Greek democracy, Christian individualism and urban political culture were the main factors for the development of modern society. He defined modernity as a transition from status to contract by arguing that modern society was differentiated into autonomous sectors and a set of values emerged which permits a general commitment of the individual to society on the basis of universalistic and achievement criteria. Parsons “located the roots of social stability in the existence of a system of common values and common patterns of socialization and internalization” (Turner, 1986: 1). Just as Durkheim proposed professional altruism in response to the egoistic values of the marketplace, so Parsons advanced citizenship as an antidote to the traditional particularistic forms of commitment to society. On the basis of Parson’s theory Turner notes that “citizenship is the set of social practices which define social membership in a society which is highly differentiated both in its culture and social institutions, and where social solidarity can only be based upon general and universalistic standards” (Turner, 1993: 5).

Consequently, it can be argued that in this line of tradition, based mainly on the works of Durkheim and Parsons, citizenship is implicitly elaborated within the set of institutions and system of values that link individual to society in order to ensure the stability of societies despite various internal conflicts and deviances.

Against this tradition, Marxist sociology asserted that human societies cannot be claimed to be stable because they are divided into conflicting and competing social classes and social groups. Marxist analysis argues that the individual’s socio-political conscious and identity are determined by his class, not by his relationship to the state. (Heater, 2004b: 115) In any case, according to Marxist theory, the state is a bourgeois construct as an instrument of the dominant class and is to wither away, thus citizenship must be considered as a subjective and temporary condition (Heater, 2004b:180). Marx by distinguishing between civil society and political state and giving more weight on the former, argued that the individual as a member of a civil society pursues his own economic interests. To Marx, “it is this civil society

that has the greater reality” (Heater, 2004b:75). In the state, on the other hand, “he is an imaginary participant in an imaginary sovereignty; he is robbed of his real life and filled with an unreal universality.” (Marx, 1843) Thus, Marx was skeptical of the emancipatory potential of citizenship. For Marx the danger of universal citizenship was its false promise of equality masked by the formal equality accorded to the status of citizen (Rasmussen and Brown, 2002: 176). He believed that the inequalities created by the capitalist mode of production cannot be solved by this status of citizenship which is a cloak for the citizen’s impotence. In this line of thinking, Antonio Gramsci’s ideas on civil society and his concept of hegemony should be mentioned as they provide different interpretations to the state-citizen relations. Even though Gramsci did not directly study on citizenship, he differentiated civil society from both the economy and the state against the economic reductionism of Marx and resultantly he maintained that the reproduction of the existing system occurs through hegemony which is built by using coercion and generating consent. It is this concept of hegemony which offers the possibility of viewing the state policies in shaping its citizens from a different perspective. Accordingly, Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is employed in interpreting the citizen formation process of modern Turkey. Similarly, Louis Althusser’s account on state apparatuses which he developed on the basis of Gramsci’s ideas provides another useful theoretical instrument in analyzing the role of the cultural institutions in founding and reinforcing the citizenship understanding. Thus, it is possible to conclude that although Marxist theory conceives citizenship as a temporary condition, it offers a theoretical framework that brings about different perspectives to state-citizen relations.

It was T.H. Marshall’s account on citizenship which is regarded as the bridge between these two traditions. His analysis of the development of citizenship in Britain can be considered as a liberal response to the problem of the inequalities of capitalism. Since Marshall’s approach to citizenship is a key instrument for the purposes of this study a separate subsection is reserved for his analysis.

2.2.2. T.H. Marshall's Account of Citizenship

T.H. Marshall's theory of citizenship, which is generally regarded as the first sociological theory of citizenship, provides an important point of departure for any debate about the relationship between citizenship and the nature of contemporary capitalism.

The initial idea for his account of citizenship was developed in a lecture on Citizenship and Social Class that was delivered during the Alfred Marshall Lectures in Cambridge in 1949. In this seminal work he proposed a typology of citizenship rights (in Britain), that are civil, political and social rights and balanced them with citizenship obligations -taxes, military service and other service to the nation. Civil or legal rights (such as the rights of property) developed in the seventeenth century in response to absolutism and were institutionalized in the growth of law courts and individual legal rights to a fair trial. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, political citizenship developed with the evolution of modern parliamentary democracy. These political rights included the right to vote, rights of association and the right to participate in the central organs of government. The political rights were institutionalized in the parliamentary political system of competing parties. Finally, in the twentieth century, social rights were further expanded to include social entitlements, such as unemployment benefit and provision for health and education. These social rights were institutionalized in the welfare state. (Marshall, 1963; Turner, 1992; 1993) It can be concluded that for Marshall the three essential elements of modern citizenship were "the Rule of Law, Liberal democracy and the welfare state" (Saunders, 1993: 61).

Turner notes that Marshall, who was intellectually influenced by the works of James Mill and John Stuart Mill in the liberal tradition, analysed citizenship in relation to a specific problem in liberal theory: "how to reconcile the formal framework of political democracy with the social consequence of capitalism as an economic system, that is how to reconcile formal equality with the continuity of class divisions" (Turner, 1993:6). According to Marshall, through the incorporation of

social rights into the concept of citizenship social inequalities caused by the capitalist market system became more acceptable (Nash, 2000; Giddens, 1996). In other words, the basic argument of Marshall's analysis was that the welfare state of the twentieth century could solve the problem of capitalism versus democracy⁶.

Turner neatly summarizes the Marshallian paradigm of citizenship in the following lines:

Citizenship, once inscribed in the institutions of the welfare state, is a buffer against the vagaries of the marketplace and the inequalities of the class system, because citizenship is a method of redistribution of resources to those who are unable to provide for their own needs as a consequence of some contingent feature of their life-circumstance. (Turner, 1993: xi)

Marshall's account of citizenship has been criticized on several grounds. Firstly, it was criticized as being English-centered and could not be generalized to other countries. Secondly, his evolutionary model lacked emphasis on the role of social class or social struggles in the development of citizenship rights. Thirdly, many commentators have noticed that Marshall's analysis contains significant omissions as women and the family; persons lacking in self-determination; the very poor; racial and ethnic minorities (Rees, 1996; Bulmer and Rees, 1996; Heater, 1999). Fourthly, it has been argued that Marshall failed to recognize that social rights are different in kind from the civil and political rights. While civil citizenship establishes rights against the state, social citizenship rights are provided by the state. Since the provision of social rights requires expenditure, a considerable level of taxation is necessary, but "taxation invades civil rights in their capitalist form of the sanctity of property" (Heater, 1999: 21). In a similar argument, Ramesh Mishra (1981) indicates that "social rights are concerned with the distribution of the social product, whereas civil and political rights set the rules of the game" (quoted in Janoski, 1998: 44). So, social and civil elements of citizenship are not complementary as Marshall argued, but they are in conflict with each other. Furthermore, it has been advanced that his analysis was not clear on the exact relationship between citizenship and capitalism. His theory did not precise whether citizenship contradicts or supports capitalism. In expressing this problem Turner

⁶ Giddens notes that when Marshall wrote his analysis it seemed to almost everyone that the welfare state would continue its upward trajectory (Giddens, 1996: 67).

proposes that citizenship can either be regarded as a radical principle of equality which may generate conflicts or as a basis of social solidarity in a differentiated social system. He further notes that these two perspectives need not to contradict each other because “it could be both the case that citizenship creates solidarity and generates political conflicts by raising expectations about entitlements”(Turner, 1993: 8).

Despite the criticisms, Marshall’s analysis, especially his distinction of legal, political and social elements of citizenship still have a robust usefulness, as it is the case for this present thesis. The analysis of citizenship perception of the citizens in Turkey has been grounded on Marshall’s tripartite notion of citizenship by examining citizenship rights and duties in terms of civil, political and social elements.

2.2.3. Other Historical Approaches to the Development of Citizenship

Apart from T.H. Marshall who used a historical approach in studying the development of citizenship rights in Britain, the historical comparative analyses of citizenship evolution in some Western countries proposed by two other scholars, namely, Bryan S. Turner and Rogers Brubaker are worth mentioning for the purposes of this study.

Brubaker compares the process of nation building and citizenship in France and Germany. According to Brubaker, in the French tradition the nation has been conceived in relation to the institutional and territorial frame of the state. In other words, French nationhood is constituted by political unity, not shared culture, but it is expressed in the aspiration for cultural unity. The universalist theory and practice of citizenship have depended on the assimilatory workings of school, army and centralized administration. He clarifies the distinction between French and German nationhood models in a striking way:

It is one thing to want to make all citizens of Utopia speak Utopian, and quite another to want to make all Utopiphones citizens of Utopia. Crudely put, the former represents the French, the

latter the German model of nationhood. Whether juridical (as in naturalization) or cultural, assimilation presupposes a political conception of membership and the belief, which French took over from the Roman tradition, that the state can turn strangers into citizens, peasants –or immigrant workers- into Frenchmen. (Brubaker, 1992:8)

Hence, while the French conception of citizenship evolved in a universalist, rationalist, assimilationist and state-centered manner, the German conception acquired a particularistic, organic, differentialist and Volk-centered character. The German idea of the nation was not originally a political one nor was it linked with the idea of citizen, because national feeling developed before the nation-state. This German nation “in search a state” was conceived as an organic, cultural, linguistic or racial community. German nationhood is constituted by ethno-cultural unity and expressed in political unity. (Brubaker, 1998: 139) Correspondingly, the French model of citizenship acts on the basis of the principle of *jus soli*, that is, citizenship embedded in a spatial territoriality, and the German citizenship is based on the *jus sanguinis* principle which privileges the criterion of descent (Brubaker, 1992: 81).

Brubaker’s two nationhood models based on French and German experiences provide useful reference typologies that are used in analyzing the Turkish experience during the processes of state-formation and nation-building.

Turner, on the other hand, compares citizenship development in the West in terms of two dimensions. The first dimension is the passive-active contrast depending on whether citizenship grew from above or below. The second dimension is the tension between a private realm of the individual and the family in relationship to the public arena of political action. Then by combining these two aspects he develops a typology of citizenship which is applied to specific cases in the following manner:

Citizenship		
below	above	
Revolutionary contexts (France)	Passive democracy (England -17 th century)	Public space
Liberal pluralism (America)	Plebiscitary authoritarianism (Germany)	Private space

Source: Turner; 1992: 45

According to Turner, revolutionary citizenship combines demands from below with an emphasis on the public arena. For this typology he gives the citizenship experience in France where a revolutionary conception of active citizenship was combined with an attack on the private space of the family, religion and privacy. Passive democracy recognizes the legitimate function of representative institutions, the courts and a welfare system but struggling for citizenship rights is not an established tradition. Turner exemplifies this category by the passive democracy of England during the seventeenth century settlement, where citizenship was handed down from above and the citizen appears as a mere subject. In liberal pluralism there are movements for rights from below but the emphasis is on the rights of the individual for privatized discord. American liberal democratic regime is an example of this category where positive democracy emphasizes participation, but this is often contained by a continuing emphasis on privacy and the sacredness of individual opinion (Turner, 1992). Under the plebiscitary democracy as in Germany, the state manages the public space and “the individual citizen is submerged in the sacredness of the state which permits minimal participation in terms of the election of leaders, while family life is given priority in the arena of personal ethical development.” (Turner, 1992: 55-56)

Turner’s typology of citizenship offers another valuable theoretical framework to be used in studying the experience of Turkish citizenship.

2.2.4. Philosophical Approaches to the Content of Citizenship

Based on the development of western thought that shapes the conceptions of the nature of the individual and of the social bonds existing between individuals two philosophical approaches to citizenship can be identified as the *classical* or *civic-republican* and the *liberal* or *liberal-individualist* conception of citizenship (Oldfield, 1994; van Gunsteren, 1998; Heater, 1999). It should be noted that the categorization of citizenship into two notions of civic-republican and liberal is in many ways a rude dichotomy and within each category a range of standpoints exists. Thus, each conception of citizenship should be considered as an ideal type or a model which

helps to clarify important differences and facilitates understanding. (Dwyer, 2004: 19; Oldfield, 1994: 188) It should also be added that while Adrian Oldfield has deliberately used the terms *civic-republican* and *liberal-individualist*, the general tendency in the citizenship studies is to refer to these two conceptions as simply *republican* or *liberal* understanding of citizenship.

2.2.4.1. Liberal Citizenship

Liberal understanding of citizenship began to emerge in the late seventeenth century. This conception of citizenship which is linked to the development of capitalism and nation-state has a conception of citizenship as *legal status* and focuses on 'rights'. According to this conception the rights inhere in individuals, because individuals are both logically and morally prior to society and the state, and one of the primary purposes of the state is to secure and protect these natural rights. The state is useful to the citizen as a 'nightwatchman' (Heater, 1999:7) and it is expected "to render service to individual interests and purposes, to protect citizens in the exercise of their rights, and to leave them unhindered in the pursuit of whatever individual and collective interests and purposes they might have" (Oldfield, 1998: 76).

In return for the protection of their rights by the state the citizens have some duties, but compared to the republican conception, liberal citizenship is much less demanding of the individual (Heater, 1999: 4). The duties of the individuals, who are sovereign and morally autonomous beings, are to respect the similar rights of other citizens, to pay their taxes and to defend the polity when it is under threat. They have obligations only to the society that they freely enter into on the basis of contract. Thus, the social bonds between individuals are contractual as Oldfield explained in the following passage:

Any form of public involvement, any political activity is their [citizens'] choice, and citizens may seek no more than to be left alone as far as possible by society or the state, may do no more than enjoy the privilege and freedom of their status in a relatively private realm. Taken on its own, this conception of citizenship generates no social bond, beyond that of contract. It neither creates nor sustains any social solidarity or cohesion, or any sense of common purpose. Apart from the immediate network of familiar faces, the world is composed of

strangers, to whom, as Aristotle put it, one can feel 'goodwill', but no more. (Oldfield, 1994: 190)

Another important aspect of liberal individualism is that "it does not postulate any one conception of the good life." (Oldfield, 1998: 77) As individuals are viewed as autonomous beings they pursue their own versions of the good life for themselves within the institutional framework with necessary procedures and rules maintained by the political unit.

For the purposes of this thesis it is crucial to note that there are different strands of liberal thinking with respect to their account of social rights of citizenship. According to *neo-liberalism* (Heater, 1999) or *libertarian liberalism* (Dwyer, 2004) social rights undermine citizenship to a significant degree by stripping away the autonomy and freedom of the citizen. F.A. Hayek (1944), R. Nozick (1995) and M. Friedman (1962) argue that the function of the state is "to ensure basic limited civil and political rights [particularly the rights to own property and conclude contracts], but beyond this it should not intervene and attempt to promote or sustain any particular idea of a just society" (Dwyer, 2004: 24). Social rights provided by the state with the aim to secure social justice merely interfere with market mechanisms which are seen as the key source to individual liberty.

The other standpoint within the liberal tradition which is *social liberalism* (Heater, 1999) or *egalitarian liberalism* (Dwyer, 2004) asserts that without the social rights citizenship cannot be achieved in its fullest sense. According to T.H. Marshall and his followers, poverty prevents the citizens from using fully their civil and political statuses, and thus the welfare state is necessary to improve the condition of the poor so that they can enjoy the citizenly condition of full autonomy, freedom and participation (Heater, 1999: 25). John Rawls contributed to this strand of liberalism by his theory of *justice as fairness* which he discussed in his books, *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and later, *Political Liberalism* (1993). Rawls proposes the following two principles of justice which are necessary for enabling citizens "to participate in society viewed as a system of fair cooperation for mutual advantage" and for realizing the values of liberty and equality:

1) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with a similar scheme for all. 2) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society. (Rawls, 1998: 56)

Therefore, according to Rawls once civil and political rights are safeguarded, the social rights of the least-advantaged should be provided in order to construct a just society of free and equal citizens (Shafir, 1998: 7).

2.2.4.2. Civic-Republican Citizenship

In the civic-republican conception of citizenship, the emphasis is on *practice*, activity. This understanding has its roots in the Ancient Greek political philosophy and is mainly inspired from the ethical and political thought of Aristotle who defined the citizen as “the individual who shares in the civic life of ruling and being ruled in turn.”(Janowitz, 1980: 2) It was reinforced and modified by a succession of political thinkers from Machiavelli to Rousseau and beyond (Oldfield: 1998:79).

Civic republicanism has a conception of individuals different from that of liberalism: individuals are not considered as being logically prior to society, and they have no sovereign or overriding moral priority (Oldfield, 1994: 191). It is by performing their duties, by public service of fairly specific kinds, that individuals demonstrate that they are citizens. This emphasis on practice gives rise to a language of ‘duties’. Since individuals are only citizens as members of a community it is a communally based conception of citizenship. The social bonds between citizens are not contractual, but based on sharing and determining a way of life. It is a shared commitment to the practice which makes individuals citizens and through the practice of citizenship the social solidarity and cohesion of the community is maintained (Oldfield, 1994: 189).

Oldfield asserts that individuals have to be molded and shaped for their role as citizens, and he explains this citizen formation process as follows:

[T]his is the task of education in its broadest sense, but education needs to be supported and reinforced by a prevalent set of mores and practices conducive to sustaining the civic ideal. This may entail a civil religion, a profession of faith in the community. The practice of citizenship means that much more of one's life is lived publicly than is the case in the modern world. It is not that one has no private life; it is rather that to be a citizen is to be politically active, and political activity takes place in the public domain. (Oldfield: 1998: 81)

Although citizenship requires more activity in public realm, Oldfield warns that citizenship is not about altruism, which is the response of one human being to another; but citizenship is rather about “acknowledging the community's goals as one's own, choosing them, and committing oneself to them” (Oldfield, 1998: 81). It is this commitment that creates citizens, and at the same time, creates the sense of community.

In sum, from the republican point of view, citizenship has an ethical as well as a legal dimension, because citizenship is linked to “an ideal of civic virtue involving a passionate commitment to political activity and a willingness to subordinate personal interests to the common good” (Philp, 2000: 165).

Richard Dagger argues that the ethical dimension of republican citizenship provide an ideal of what a citizen should be. But he notes that like other ideals, republican citizenship can take more or less demanding forms. At its most extreme form, republican citizenship demands unquestioning loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizens. Following the remark of Dagger regarding the distinction drawn by Dennis Thompson (1976) between Rousseau's ‘patriotic’ and John Stuart Mill's ‘enlightened’ conception of citizenship, Rousseau's ‘patriotic’ conception of citizenship which demands a whole-hearted devotion to duty can be cited as an example of this form of republicanism. According to Rousseau the true citizen puts the good of the community above all other considerations. In less demanding forms, “the republican conception acknowledges that even good citizens should not forsake self-interest altogether” (Dagger: 2002: 150). Tocqueville explains this position by the doctrine of ‘self-interest properly understood’ which may not inspire heroic sacrifices, but:

every day it prompts some small ones; by itself it cannot make a man virtuous, but its discipline shapes a lot of orderly, temperate, moderate, careful, and self-controlled citizens.

If it does not lead the will directly to virtue, it establishes habits which unconsciously turn in that way. (Tocqueville, 1969: 526-527 quoted in Dagger, 2002:150).

John Stuart Mill's 'enlightened' conception of citizenship is a less demanding form of republicanism and describes good citizens as those who develop their faculties through active engagement in public life (Dagger, 2002: 151).

Dagger points to the possibility of making distinctions between citizens on the bases of legal and ethical dimensions of republican citizenship:

The legal dimension of citizenship inclines us to think of citizenship in categorical terms: either one is a citizen of a certain polity or one is not. From the ethical perspective, however, one can be more or less of a citizen – a 'real' citizen, a citizen 'in name only', or something in between. (Dagger, 2002: 152)

Dagger argues that pursuing the 'enlightened' citizenship notion of Mill it is possible to transform the nominal citizen into a real citizen by encouraging him/her to participate in public life. Thus by undertaking public responsibilities 'a citizen in name only' may learn to weigh interests other than his own and may start to act by the desire to promote the common good. (Dagger, 2002: 152)

2.2.4.3. Communitarianism and Citizenship

It was liberal conception of citizenship which dominated the Anglo-American thinking on the subject since the seventeenth century. But since 1980s there has been a revival of interest in the civic-republican style of citizenship thought and practice because of the belief that the liberal concept of citizenship had overemphasized the autonomy and rights of the individual. This line of thinking is consolidated into the new theory of *communitarianism*, which provides "a more contextualized concept of citizenship as the expression of community" (Delanty, 2002: 162). Following the emergence of communitarian studies, republican theories of citizenship are started to be considered as a particular version of communitarian thinking. As explained above, in republican citizenship the single community which is placed at the center of the political life is the public community, and individuality can appear by serving the public community (van Gunsteren, 1998: 21). Thus as

proposed by Dwyer, communitarianism can be seen as “the lasting legacy of civic republicanism” (Dwyer, 2004: 26). It is also possible to consider communitarianism as the contemporary version of civic-republican conception of citizenship.

Despite a wide array of differing views and debates within the communitarian thinking, originally the communitarian thesis has been closely associated with the works of Charles Taylor, Michael Sandel, Michael Walzer and Alisdair MacIntyre⁷. Additionally, Dwyer (2004) refers to scholars as Galston Etzioni and David Selbourne as new communitarian writers. Andrew Heywood describes communitarianism as “the belief that the self or person is constituted through the community, in the sense that individuals are shaped by the communities to which they belong and thus owe them a debt of respect and consideration; there are no ‘unencumbered selves’.” (Heywood, 1997: 136) Communitarians define community as “a body with some common values, norms and goals in which each member regards the common goal as her own” (Avineri and de-Shalit, 1995: 7). It has been argued that the citizens, by sticking to the required codes of conduct, will ensure the continued existence of the community and avoid mutual destruction (van Gunsteren, 1998:19).⁸

At this point, the communitarian standpoint towards social citizenship should be elaborated. As discussed previously social citizenship rights which are ‘claims’ to the state are different from civil and political rights which are negative rights or freedoms from state. However, since social elements of citizenship have not been studied under the civic-republican tradition, but rather analyzed within the framework of its contemporary version which is communitarianism, it is necessary to examine the communitarian perspective of social citizenship. According to Selbourne (1994) who writes from a new communitarian angle:

⁷ The main works that established the foundations of communitarianism are: A. MacIntyre (1981) *After Virtue*, London: Duckworth; M. Sandel (1982) *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; M. Walzer (1983) *Spheres of Justice*, New York: Basic Books and C. Taylor (1989) *Sources of the Self*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (cited in Delanty, 2002).

⁸ For more on communitarian thinking see *Communitarianism and Individualism* (1995, Oxford: Oxford University Press) edited by S. Avineri and A. de-Shalit.

Publicly provided welfare benefits and services should not be viewed as part of the package of rights that inform a universally held status of 'citizen', but that they should be seen as potential privileges that a society may bestow on dutiful members who meet their responsibilities and behave in a manner deemed appropriate by the wider community. (cited in Dwyer, 2004: 67-68)

Likewise, Etzioni argues that “a functional communitarian community is dependent on achieving the correct balance between the two key components of *individual autonomy* (that is, rights) and the *common good* (an agreed order that recognizes the importance of shared responsibilities)” (Dwyer, 2004:68). Accordingly he defends that society has a limited responsibility to provide welfare but only at a basic level and he adds that by limiting the right to publicly provided social welfare, financial costs will be lowered, welfare dependency will be reduced and “the balance within welfare away from rights and back towards responsibility” will be restored (Dwyer, 2004: 69).

It is interesting to observe that as far as the social rights are considered new communitarianism share much common ground with the libertarian liberalism (or neo-liberalism). They both advocate restricting publicly provided social rights but on different grounds.

In sum, because of the fact that communitarianism is based heavily on the civic republican ideals, while discussing the research results, social elements of citizenship have been evaluated with reference to the liberal and communitarian viewpoints.

Herman van Gunsteren, on the other hand, suggests a new conception of citizenship that he terms as *neo-republican citizenship* which includes elements of communitarian, republican and liberal-individualist thinking (van Gunsteren, 1998). He defines the characteristics of the neo-republican citizen as: autonomous, loyal, capable of sound judgement and fulfilling the double role of governor and governed. His/her autonomy is guaranteed by the republic, his/her sound judgement emerges mainly in competent treatment of plurality and his /her loyalty is directed

towards the public organization of plurality itself, the republic (van Gunsteren, 1994:46-47).

In the present study, liberal and civic-republican conceptions of citizenship are used as the ideal-standard models which constitute the reference point against which it is attempted to measure the citizenship perceptions. Although these conceptions have several defining characteristics with respect to the nature of the individual and society, and the social bonds between individuals, the analysis of the thesis essentially addresses to these two conceptions' understanding of citizenship with respect to rights and duties. To put it more precisely, it is aimed to measure whether the citizens of Turkey have a perception of citizenship based more on rights or on duties, where the former is assumed to represent a liberal and the latter a civic-republican (or republican) understanding of citizenship.

2.2.5. New Modalities of Citizenship

Since the 1990s as a result of several social, political and economic developments which are manifestations of two phenomena defined as postmodernization and globalization, the boundaries and the meaning of modern citizenship have been challenged (Isin and Wood, 1999; Turner, 1993; Faulks, 2000).

On the one hand, the progressive erosion of the Fordist-Keynesian welfare state in the liberal-democratic Western countries resulted in increased unemployment and poverty and thus led to question the balance between the rights and duties of citizens according to the demands of labor market (Little, 1998; Peyrou, 2006). On the other hand, as an outcome of globalization the increasing interdependency across international borders led to reconsider the sovereignty principle of nation-states which are the sources of authority of citizenship rights and duties. With the increasing importance of supra-national organizations like the European Union and its institutions as the European Court of Human Rights and other international organizations and agencies such as Amnesty International the nation-state is no longer the sole authority of extending rights and duties to its citizens (Isin, 2002: 123). Another outcome of globalization which is increased international migration

raised the issues of dual or multiple citizenship and the problem of citizenship rights and duties of aliens, immigrants and refugees (Soysal, 1994).

Furthermore, postmodernization which may be defined as ‘fragmentation’ causing the formation of group identities and postmodern discourses the dominant strategy of which is characterized by ‘difference’ also influenced the configuration of modern citizenship. Various groups that have been marginalized and excluded from modern citizenship because of their ethnic, racial, ecological and sexual concerns have articulated demands for the expansion of citizenship to include group-differentiated rights. These claims for recognition challenged the universality of citizenship principle of modernization (Isin, 2002:122-123).

Hence, as Isin and Turner emphasized “*extent* (rules and norm of inclusion and exclusion), *content* (rights and responsibilities) and *depth* (thickness or thinness) of citizenship have been redefined and reconfigured.” (Isin and Turner, 2002: 2) In other words, by the end of the twentieth century, “who will be eligible for citizenship rights and obligations, what should be the citizenship rights and obligations and how deep should be the citizenship” have been the main questions on the agenda of citizenship. In response to these demands several new modalities of citizenship have been discussed and suggested.

Regarding the content of citizenship, as a result of various political and social struggles of recognition and redistribution, the modern conception of citizenship has been contested and extended to include several other rights than those studied by Marshall, such as cultural rights (Turner, 1993), human rights (Soysal, 1994), identity rights (İşin and Wood, 1999), minority rights (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000) and sexual rights (Richardson, 2000; Lister, 2002). Accordingly, new forms of citizenship have been suggested, such as multicultural citizenship (Young, 1994), differentiated citizenship (Young, 1994), radical-democratic citizenship (Mouffe, 1992), and sexual citizenship (Lister, 2002).

Besides the above mentioned approaches which analyze citizenship within the context of a nation-state, there exist a great deal of recent studies that point to the emergence of a new form of membership transcending the boundaries of the nation-state (see for instance, Soysal, 2000; Habermas, 1992; Feldblum, 1997; Benhabib, 1999; Urry, 1998; Derek, 1999; Eder and Giesen, 2001). Within these approaches new modalities such as global citizenship (Falk, 1994), ecological citizenship (van Steenbergen, 1994; Curtin, 2002), constitutional or European citizenship (Habermas, 1992), post-national citizenship (Soysal, 1994), transnational citizenship (Bauböck, 1994), multinational citizenship (Harty and Murphy, 2005) and cosmopolitan or world citizenship (Linklater, 2002) have been introduced to confront the contested sovereignty principle of nation-states.

As İşin and Turner correctly remark these new modalities are related with claims of distinct groups and cultures for the extension of citizenship to include rights based on identity and difference (whether sexual, racial, ethnic, diasporic, ecological, technological or cosmopolitan) (Isin and Turner, 2002: 1-2).

As mentioned in the Introduction and discussed in more detail in the next chapter, since 1990s Turkey is also witnessing debates over citizenship related with the claims for the recognition of identities based on gender, ethnicity and religion. Therefore, the analysis of citizenship perceptions of citizens in Turkey in terms of rights and duties should include group-differentiated rights in addition to the universally agreed individual rights. Even though the general framework for rights and duties is drawn upon T.H. Marshall's tripartite form of citizenship (civil, political and social) it should be expanded to include group-differentiated rights. For this purpose, in the following section, studies on citizenship rights and duties are briefly reviewed in order to lay out a comprehensive framework for citizenship rights and duties to be used in the research study.

2.3. Citizenship Rights and Duties (Obligations)

As stated earlier, modern citizenship typically refers to the legal status in terms of a set of rights and duties which defines a person as a member of a nation-state. Modern citizenship rights generally include civil, political and social rights. Although the content and the precise combination of rights depend on the historical trajectory of a nation-state it is expected that a modern democratic state should uphold a combination of citizenship rights and obligations (Isin and Turner, 2002:3). In fact, modern citizenship and its attendant rights and duties have always taken varying forms in different historical and national contexts.

As discussed previously, civil, political and social rights are considered to be quite different from each other. Civil and political rights that safeguard freedom of thought, speech, assembly and association are ‘a form of power’ and allow citizens to organize for defending their own interests and identities. Thus, these rights are against the state, whereas social rights are claims to benefits guaranteed by the state. (Foweraker and Landman, 1997: 15) Similarly, Adrian Little remarks that unlike negative civil and political rights, social rights have a positive dimension by implying an obligation for the state to ensure the well-being of members of society (Little, 1998: 70).

The notion of citizenship obligations or duties is relatively neglected compared to the debate on rights. T.H. Marshall in his account of citizenship mentions some obligations as paying taxes and insurance contributions, educating one’s family, military service and “promoting the welfare of the community” (Marshall, 1963). However, since the mid-1980s citizenship duties have received an increasing attention, on totally different grounds, through the works of neo-conservative and communitarian thinkers. While neo-conservatives pointed to the lack of responsibility in the welfare state by claiming that welfare recipients do not fulfill their obligations to search and find work (Mead, 1986), communitarians were critical of a society where citizens demand rights but despise duties (Etzioni, 1995; Galston, 1991).

Thomas Janoski in *Citizenship and Civil Society* argues that there is a need for a more developed theory of citizenship in order to clarify the nature of citizenship rights and obligations, to identify how societies and citizens balance rights and obligations in systems of restricted and generalized exchange and to explain domestic and external membership in the nation-state. His study is extremely useful for the purposes of this thesis, because he provides comprehensive lists of citizenship rights and obligations. The list of citizenship rights is presented in Table 2.1.

In outlining the items of rights Janoski's reference point is T.H. Marshall's typology of citizenship rights, but he extends citizenship rights to include a fourth right of *participation* by arguing that Marshall's tripartite schema is not adequate to include rights such as collective bargaining, workers councils, codetermination, workplace protest and client rights to control bureaucracies and organizations.

It should be underlined that for the purposes of this thesis, the importance of Janoski's work lies in the fact that the proposed list of citizenship rights includes not only the universally agreed individual rights but also group-differentiated rights. Under political rights he states 'the enfranchisement rights of gender and ethnic/racial groups', 'refugee rights' and 'minority rights to fair and equal treatment'. Thus, the theoretical range of rights proposed by Janoski which incorporates claims for group rights into the modern interpretation of universal citizenship rights emerges a perfectly suitable tool that can be used in measuring citizenship perceptions of citizens.

Table 2.1: Four Types of Citizenship Rights

Legal(civil) rights	Political rights	Social rights	Participation rights
<p><i>A. Procedural rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Access to courts and counsel 2. Rights to contract 3. Equal treatment under the law 4. Right of aliens to immigrate and citizens to emigrate 	<p><i>A. Personal Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Enfranchisement of the poor, gender groups, ethnic/racial groups, age categories and immigrants 2. Rights to run and hold office 3. Rights to form and join a political party 	<p><i>A. Enabling and Preventive Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Health services 2. Family allowances 3. Personal and family counseling 4. Physical rehabilitation 	<p><i>A. Labor market intervention Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Labor market information programs 2. Job placement programs 3. Job creation services
<p><i>B. Expressive Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom of speech 2. Freedom of religion 3. Choice of friends, companions and associates 	<p><i>B. Organizational Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Political lobbying 2. Political fund raising 3. Legislative and administrative consultation 4. Political bargaining 	<p><i>B. Opportunity Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pre-primary education 2. Primary and secondary education 3. Higher education 4. Vocational education 5. Educational assistance for special groups 	<p><i>B. Firm and Bureaucracy Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Job security rights 2. Workers councils or grievance procedure rights 3. Client participation in bureaucracy or self-administration 4. Affirmative action and comparable worth 5. Collective bargaining rights
<p><i>C. Bodily Control Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Freedom from assault and unsafe environment 2. Medical and sexual control over body 	<p><i>C. Naturalization Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Right to naturalize upon residency 2. Right to information on naturalization process 3. Refugee rights 	<p><i>C. Distributive Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Old age pensions 2. Public assistance 3. Unemployment compensation 	<p><i>C. Capital Control Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Codetermination rights 2. Wage earner and union investment funds 3. Capital escape laws 4. Anti-trust laws 5. Regional investment and equalization programs
<p><i>D. Property and Service Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Hold and dispose of property and services 2. Choice of residence 3. Choice of occupation 	<p><i>D. Oppositional Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Minority rights to equal and fair treatment 2. Political information and inquiry rights 3. Social movement and protest rights 	<p><i>D. Compensatory Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Work injury insurance 2. War injury pension 3. War equalization 4. Rights infringement compensation 	
<p><i>E. Organizational Rights</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Employee org. 2. Corporate org. 3. Political party org. 			

Source: Janoski, 1998:31.

Janoski classifies the legal, political, social and participation rights into further sub-categories. Legal rights which he uses as being synonymous with civil rights include procedural (rights to access the court system and receive fair treatment therein); expressive (freedoms of speech, religion and privacy, and rights to choose friends, spouses and companions); bodily control (freedoms of sexual practices and control over medical interventions into internal bodily processes, rights to be protected from physical assaults from other persons and assaults from the environment -pollution and environmental accidents-); property and service (rights to property and choices about residential location, occupation, and social mobility) and organizational rights (to form unions, businesses and political parties) (Janoski, 1998: 30).

He also divides political rights into four sub-categories as personal rights (voting and participating in the political process); organizational rights (raising campaign funds, consulting with legislators on proposals, nominating political candidates, lobbying); naturalization rights (protections for aliens and refugees, access to a reasonable naturalization process) and oppositional rights (rights to protect minorities, to protest and demonstrate, to obtain government information).

Janoski describes social rights as “public interventions into private spheres to support citizens’ claims to economic subsistence and social existence” (Janoski, 1998: 32). He again divides social rights into four parts: enabling rights (health and family services that assure the basic functioning of citizens); opportunity rights (elementary, secondary and higher education to get the necessary skills for work and cultural participation); distributive rights (old age pensions, public assistance and unemployment compensation to assure citizens’ economic subsistence) and compensatory rights (compensation payments to disabled veterans, injured workers). Finally, participation rights involve the state’s creation of rights in market or public organizations. According to Janoski these rights include labor market intervention rights, firm and bureaucracy rights and capital control rights (Janoski, 1998: 32-33).

In a later study Janoski and Gran (2002) provided a slightly different set of rights as presented in Table 2.2.

Table 2.2: The Theoretical Range of Citizenship Rights

Legal(civil) rights	Political rights	Social rights	Participation rights
<i>1. Personal Security</i> Illegal disappearances Torture protection Capital punishment Abortion Invasion of privacy	<i>1. Personal Political</i> Vote Stand for office Freedom of information Right to protest	<i>1. Enabling Rights</i> Health care Old age pensions Rehabilitation Family counseling	<i>1. Labor Market Rights</i> Labor market information Job placement programs Job creation services Discrimination protection Job security
<i>2. Justice- access and Process</i> Legal representation Free legal aid Waive legal fees Confront witnesses Jury trial Rights to contract	<i>2. Organizational Rights</i> Form political party Form trade/economic unions Social movement opposition Group right to assemble and protest Cultural/minority rights	<i>2. Opportunity Rights</i> Pre-primary education Primary and secondary education Higher education Educational counseling	<i>2. Advisory/Determinative Rights</i> Works councils or grievances Collective bargaining Co-determination (human resources decisions) Ethnic/indigenous Councils
<i>3. Conscience and Choice</i> Free speech Free press Freedom of religion Martial choice Occupational choice Gender/ethnic choice	<i>3. Membership Rights</i> Immigration and denizen rights Naturalization rights Asylum rights Cultural rights	<i>3. Re-distributive and Compensatory Rights</i> Work injury insurance War injury pension Low income rights Unemployment compensation Rights violation compensation	<i>3. Capital Control Rights</i> Wage earner funds Central bank controls Capital escape laws Anti-trust laws Regional investment decisions Co-determination (strategy decisions)

Source: Janoski and Gran, 2002: 15.

By comparing the two tables about citizenship rights it is possible to argue that the authors simplified the first classification of rights. Although there are some different rights in the second table it can be said that the range of rights was updated according to recent developments. For example, following the international awareness and public sensitivity concerning human rights issues, illegal disappearances, torture protection and capital punishment items were added under the civil rights category.

Janoski then details the citizenship obligations⁹ which range from respecting others' opinions to state-enforced civil duties as presented in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3: Four Types of Citizenship Obligations

Legal (civil) obligations	Political obligations	Social Obligations	Participation obligations
<p><i>A. Interpersonal obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Respect other's rights to liberty, free speech, religion and property 2. Respect laws of contract, association and equal treatment 	<p><i>A. Interpersonal obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Vote and participate in politics 2. Be informed and exercise the franchise wisely 3. Respect democracy and not make unreasonable demands 	<p><i>A. Enabling and preventive duties</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pursue prudent health care 2. Raise a loving family 3. Maintain a safe and clean environment 	<p><i>A. Labor market obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Duty of those receiving services to actively pursue work 2. Duty of employers to cooperate with government and unions to provide programs
<p><i>B. Organizational duties</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Organizational duty to promote the general welfare 2. Respect individual rights 3. Respect laws duly made by government 	<p><i>B. Organizational duties</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Cooperate with other groups in the operation of politics 2. Follow political laws and regulations 	<p><i>B. Opportunity obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Pursue education to best of one's ability 2. Pursue career to the benefit to society 3. Tolerate social diversity 	<p><i>B. Firm/bureaucracy obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ensure equity and productivity in the organization 2. Safeguard firm competitive information 3. Respect all groups in participatory process
<p><i>C. Enforcement and implementation obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide resources for the legal system 2. Assist in assuring the domestic tranquility (militas) 3. Respect and cooperate with police in assuring legal rights 	<p><i>C. Enforcement and implementation obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide resources to protect and operate democratic system 2. Protect nation from threats by active service in the military (draft) 3. Protest and overthrow governments that violate rights 	<p><i>C. Sustenance /economic obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Recipients of unemployment or public assistance should look for work 2. Respect other's social rights and the need for transfer payments 	<p><i>C. Capital participation obligations</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Protect and promote the economy 2. Provide for capital funds through savings
		<p><i>D. Enforcement and implementation</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide resources for social rights 2. Help less fortunate by voluntary government and association service 	<p><i>D. Enforcement and Implementation</i></p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Provide resources for programs 2. Invest in national industries

Source: Janoski, 1998: 55

⁹ Janoski first suggests that the list of obligations corresponds to the list of rights outlined earlier, but as Barbalet remarks in his review of Janoski's book, in a later chapter he drops this position which cannot be sustained (Barbalet, 1999: 307).

Similar to the rights Janoski classifies the four types of duties into further sub-groups. While he classifies legal and political rights under three parts as interpersonal, organizational and enforcement and implementation obligations, social obligations are listed under four categories: enabling and preventive duties, opportunity obligations, sustenance/ economic obligations, and enforcement and implementation obligations. Participation obligations, on the other hand, are detailed under four sub-headings as labor market obligations; firm/bureaucracy obligations; capital participation obligations and again enforcement and implementation obligations.

Janoski warns that these obligations outlined in the table may conflict with each other. For instance, the obligations to respect liberties (i.e. freedom of person) may contradict political obligations to protect the society from foreign threats (i.e. military conscription) (Janoski, 1998: 56).

Janoski's main concern is to find out the relationship between the state regime type and the degree of citizenship rights and duties in practice. He groups 18 countries according to regime types as; i) social-democratic, ii) traditional, iii) liberal and iv) mixed countries. However, in order to determine the extent of rights and duties in 18 advanced industrialized countries Janoski prefers to employ some indicators for rights and duties rather than directly using these lists of citizenship rights and obligations. He checks the practice of citizenship rights in these countries through the following indicators: For measuring the violation of legal rights he employs the homicide rate per 100,000 persons and number of prisoners per 100,000 persons. While for a measure of political rights the percentage of the electorate voting in major elections (1980s) is used, the level of social rights is measured by the percentage of GNP spent on social security programs. He checks the presence of workers councils and codetermination (in 1990) for measuring participation rights. As for measuring obligations Janoski makes use of two indicators: taxes as percentage of GNP and national service variable which is a standardized index of the basic length of compulsory service in months and conscripts as percentage of the Armed Forces.

Based on the balance between rights and duties Janoski's resulting argument is as follows: traditional regimes have high rights and high obligations; social democratic regimes have moderately high rights and moderately high obligations; liberal regimes have a low level of rights and obligations.

In addition to Janoski's analysis of citizenship rights and duties, there is a recent study on citizenship perception in terms of social rights and duties which is worth mentioning. The study performed by Chack-kie Wong and Ka-ying Wong (2005) aims to check out the differences between expectations and practice of social citizenship rights and duties. It draws on empirical evidence from an attitude survey conducted to citizens in a Chinese society (Hong Kong). The fact that the authors confined themselves to social citizenship does not lessen the significance of the study for the purposes of this thesis, because it also analyzes citizenship from the viewpoint of citizens. According to the findings of the paper in terms of the perceived balance between rights and responsibilities, "the respondents have greater expectations of social responsibilities than they do of the enjoyment of social rights." Concerning the practice of social citizenship "the respondents perceive that they are fulfilling their social responsibilities to a greater extent than they are claiming their social rights." (Wong and Wong, 2005: 29) Therefore, the sample of the research have a 'duty-surplus' perception both at the idealized level and in practice.

As stated above, although Janoski does not prefer to use the detailed lists of citizenship rights and obligations he outlined, this thesis will use these frameworks as a useful starting point for analyzing the citizenship rights and duties in Turkey. However, the theoretical range of rights and duties that Janoski provides is mainly designed for advanced industrialized countries. In that case, a one-to-one application of these lists for Turkey will not be appropriate. Then, following an analytical description of the historical trajectory of Turkish citizenship, studies on citizenship rights and duties in Turkey together with the current constitutional legislation should be surveyed to explore the range of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey, and these are the tasks of the next chapter.

2.4. Concluding Remarks

In this chapter the literature on theoretical framework of citizenship has been selectively reviewed. The main sociological approaches to the content, historical development and the reasons for the emergence of citizenship have been briefly analyzed in order to explain the theoretical background of the research study conducted for developing an understanding of citizenship perception of the citizens of Turkey. In this study citizenship is handled within the theories of social order which argue that modern industrial societies can maintain social coherence through a system of general values and a set of institutions, such as citizenship, linking the individual to society. Within this tradition, ideas of Durkheim on social solidarity form the backbone of the theoretical stand of this thesis. Durkheim's ideas reached to the founding elite of the Turkish Republic through Ziya Gökalp who was an admirer of Durkheim, and as to be evaluated in the next chapter, had been very influential in framing the role of citizenship during the processes of state-formation and nation-building of the modern Turkey.

Furthermore, liberal and civic republican conceptions of citizenship have been chosen as the ideal-standard models against which it is attempted to measure the citizenship perceptions of the citizens of Turkey, because it is agreed that the Turkish notion of citizenship is based on a civic republican understanding which emphasizes duties over rights.

As mentioned in the Introduction and as tried to be described -in general lines- in this chapter, the recent citizenship debate has centered on the structural or institutional side of citizenship and not on conduct of individual citizens. In other words, while the state or policy-makers side of citizenship has been under consideration, the citizen side has been neglected. Thus, in addition to the citizenship theories, the literature has also been surveyed in order to formulate the analytical framework of citizenship rights and obligations to accomplish the main task of this thesis which is measuring citizenship perception from the angle of citizens. The result of the survey has shown that the theoretical range of rights and duties items provided by Thomas

Janoski serves as a perfectly suitable point of departure. As explained in the chapter, he incorporates the claims to group rights into the tri-partite pattern of citizenship (civil, political and social) proposed by T.H. Marshall. Correspondingly, this theoretical range of extended citizenship rights and duties provides an appropriate conceptual tool for the purposes of this study which desires to identify the citizens' perception of citizenship practices in Turkey with respect to not only universally agreed citizenship rights and duties, but also in terms of differentiated rights on the basis of identity claims.

CHAPTER III

CITIZENSHIP IN TURKEY

*Türküm, doğrucuyum, çalışkanım.
Yasam küçüklerimi korumak, büyüklerimi saymak,
yurdumu, milletimi özümden çok sevmektir.
Ülküm; yükselmek ileri gitmektir.*

Ey Büyük Atatürk!

*Açtığın yolda, gösterdiğin hedefe durmadan yürüyeceğime and içirim.
Varlığım Türk varlığına armağan olsun.
Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!*

*I am Turk, just and honest, and hard-working.
My law is to protect the younger and respect the elder,
to love my motherland and my nation more than myself.
My ideal is to advance and make progress.*

O Great Atatürk!

*I vow that I will march unhesitatingly along the road you opened, towards the goal you showed.
Let my existence be a gift to the Turkish existence.
How happy is the one who says I am a Turk!*

-Daily oath of Turkish primary school students-¹⁰

As explained in the previous chapter citizenship developed as a result of several cultural and structural conditions which may be peculiar to the West, however, as Turner argues “many societies outside the West have, either as a consequence of conquest or as a result of modernization or both, adopted Western constitutions and constitutional principles” (Turner, 1993: vii). Turkish society since the beginning of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 is one of these societies which adopted fundamental principles of Western modernity. During the nation-building process citizenship involved not only a legal status, but more importantly, a sociological and cultural

¹⁰ This ‘oath’ is told by the Turkish primary school students on every school day since 1933. The original text which was written by the then Minister of Education Reşit Galip was shorter and did not include the lines of address to Atatürk. In 1972 the following lines were added: ‘O Grand Atatürk who made our present day possible; I vow that I will march unhesitatingly along the road you opened, on the ideal you established, toward the target you showed. How happy is the one who says I am a Turk!’ In 1997 the wording of the additional lines were changed a little and since then it is read as written here. (Hüseyin Hüsnü Tekişik, “Milli Eğitim Bakanı Dr. Reşit Galip’in Öğrencilere 23 Nisan Armağanı Olan And” at <http://www.cagdasegitim.org>)

practice to transform the society into a modern, rational and secular one (Kahraman, 2005: 70). As argued by Foweraker and Landman, viewed positively, citizenship may actually empower citizens and widen their degrees of freedom, but at the same time, citizenship proved to be an effective means of securing national identity. Thus, citizenship rights serve to mediate the process of state construction. (Foweraker and Landman, 1997: 10-11) In line with this remark, it can be argued that citizenship may be used for the interests of the citizens or be manipulated to serve the interests of the state. The following analysis of the citizenship construction in modern Turkey aims to underline that during the process of the state-formation, the state elite of the Republic of Turkey employed citizenship as a means of securing national identity, and not as a means of empowering citizens.

Since the main task of this thesis is to comprehend how the citizens of Turkey perceive citizenship, first of all the origins of the prevailing official understanding of citizenship should be analyzed. For this purpose, the construction of citizenship in the early period of modern Turkey (1923-1946) is reviewed. Then, the developments regarding citizenship in the post-1980 period are discussed. During the period between 1946 and 1980, the transition to multi-party system and the adoption of the 1961 Constitution brought about some changes to the official conception of citizenship, but as Nalan Soyarik (2000) notes it is considered as a transitory period. Similarly, Füsün Üstel argues that while the early Republican period signifies the construction of the nation-state, the post-1980 period attests the re-consolidation of the nation-state (Üstel, 2004: 328). Taha Parla adds that Kemalism, which was the prevailing ideology during the single-party period, became the official ideology with the adoption of the 1982 Constitution and the Law of Political Parties (Parla, 1993: 216). In line with these arguments, it is believed that an inclusive survey of the foundation process of Turkish citizenship will be of assistance in grasping the essence of the citizenship debate that Turkey witnesses since the 1980 military intervention and the aftermath.

But before discussing the Republican period it should be retained that the origins of the notion of Turkish citizenship are embedded in the modernization efforts started in

the late Ottoman period. Therefore, the Ottoman legacy in terms of the legislative regulations concerning citizenship and the main intellectual foundations that framed the notion of Turkish citizenship is briefly reviewed¹¹.

3.1. The Ottoman Legacy

3.1.1. Modernization Attempts

The history of Turkish modernity goes back to the eighteenth century with the first systematic attempts of modernizing the Ottoman military system (Berkes, 1978). Following the recommendations of French military advisors, disciplined troops were tried to be established in order “to replace the janissaries that had become an organic part of the state rather than its instrument” (Kadioğlu, 1996b: 180). In the *Tanzimat* (Reform) period (1839-1876) which started with the announcement of a charter known as the *Gülhane Hatt-ı Hümayunu* (Imperial Rescript of Gülhane) in 1839, reforms were introduced in areas other than the military. With the Charter the sultan accepted limitations to his sovereign power and promised the enforcement of laws that would ensure the protection of life, property and honor of its subjects (Berkes, 1978; Ahmad, 1993). As a complementary legislation to the Gülhane Charter in 1856 the Ottoman government issued another edict known as *Islahat Fermanı* (Reform Edict) which mainly aimed to equalize Muslim and non-Muslim subjects and introduced the term *vatandaş* (citizen) for the first time (Tanör, 1999; Berkes, 1978; Soyarık, 2000). However, Niyazi Berkes remarks that the notion of *vatandaş* is different from the French *citoyen* and it must have been used in reference to *tebaa* (subject) (Berkes, 1978: 211). Later in 1869 the first legislation regarding Ottoman nationality *Tabiiyet-i Osmaniye Kanunnamesi* (Law on Ottoman Nationality) was issued. Rona Aybay notes that this law was mainly designed for preventing the non-Muslim subjects who adopted nationality of Western states in order to benefit from the capitulations against the interests of the Ottoman Empire (Aybay, 1998: 38). In 1876 the first Ottoman constitution *Kanun-u Esasi* which was based on the idea of

¹¹ For comprehensive analyses of the historical trajectory of Turkish citizenship since the late Ottoman period see Soyarık (2000) and Üstel (2004).

Ottomanism was promulgated. What is important for the purposes of this thesis is that the constitution legitimized the basic individual rights and attempted “a transition to secular, fixed and objective rules in state affairs” (Soyarık, 2000: 65).

Soyarık points out that the notion of Ottoman citizenship which emerged as a reaction to nationalistic movements and nation-state formations totally contradicts with the western notion of citizenship which is used with reference to nation-states. She argues that it was “an attempt to hold the multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and multi-lingual population of the Empire together under a new identity that would surpass the other identities and serve the survival of the state” (Soyarık, 2000: 73). Similarly, Metin Heper notes that through the equality principle of all ‘citizens’ it was hoped that “the people would now identify with their state, would not rebel, that the economy would develop, and that the revenues of the state would thereby increase” (Heper, 1985: 39). Thus, both modernization efforts and attempts to build a common identity aimed preventing the Empire from collapsing. Feroz Ahmad argues that the *Tanzimat* state which began to be shaped through the reforms involving civilian matters aimed to create a totally new social structure, in other words, its purpose was ‘social engineering’ (Ahmad: 1993: 26-27). We shall see that the Turkish Republican state continued this role of social engineering throughout the processes of nation-building and the construction of citizenship.

The first constitutional regime was short-lived and shelved by Sultan Abdülhamid until the constitution was restored in 1908. Sina Akşin argues that the second period of constitutional monarchy (*II. Meşrutiyet*) was “the Turkish equivalent of the French Revolution, a period that catapulted the Turks into the modern age, and which greatly influenced subsequent Turkish history” (Akşin, 2007: 53). Similarly, Bülent Tanör notes that the proclamation of the Second Constitution was brought about by a bloodless and peaceful ‘national uprising’ and came to be realized through long years of struggles in civil movements and organizations. According to him it was a joint movement of Muslim and non-Muslims on a democratic and liberal consensus and because of this reason the prevailing ideology of this constitutional period was Ottomanism (Tanör, 1999:177). However, the Ottomanism ideology was failed and

nationalistic sentiments started to emerge among Turks. The main contributions of this constitutional period that influenced the nation building and state formation processes can be stated as; the emergence of the idea of economic and political independence; transition from a feudal ideology to a national-secular ideology; emergence of the theses of national society, national state and national sovereignty (Tanör, 1999: 219-220).

The significance of the Second Constitution and its aftermath with reference to the notion of citizenship was aptly analyzed by Üstel. She remarks that:

Political modernization envisaged by the Second Constitution necessitated a new understanding of a political-public sphere as a consequence of the transition from mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity and, the 'citizen' as the actor of this new public space. The rules of the legal-political relationship between the 'citizen' as the new political subject and the state were regulated by a series of legislations issued after the announcement of the Second Constitution. (Üstel, 2004: 27)

Particularly, legislations about membership to associations paved the way for civil and political participation of the citizen. Furthermore, in addition to the religious *bayram* (holidays), new secular holidays were 'invented' in order to underline the existence of a 'secular' composite public space and to make the citizens as parts of a whole. The new holidays that functionally served to build up the morale of Ottomans who were experiencing harsh war conditions as well as to rejuvenate the belief of citizens in the state regime are as follows: Ottoman National Day celebrated as the anniversary of the proclamation of the Second Constitution; Inauguration Day of the National Parliament; Students Day (*Mektepliler Bayramı*) which started to be celebrated since 1915; Children Day and Physical Exercise Day (*İdman Bayramı*) which were started in 1916 (Üstel, 2004: 29). In addition to these developments, the political elites of the Second Constitution put a special emphasis on two institutions: military and school. While military service made obligatory for all citizens of the Empire, courses on citizenship education were put into the primary school curricula. Therefore, during the Second Constitution period and its aftermath a modern notion of citizenship was tried to be constructed and at the same time the project of educating the child-citizen through school was started to be implemented (Üstel, 2004: 29-32).

It is evident that modernization experience of the Ottoman period was an instructive model for the republican elite. Tarık Zafer Tunaya has described the second constitutional period as ‘a political laboratory’ because many of the policies came to maturity during the republican era had already been under discussion during that period (Akşin, 2007: 53). However, Ayşe Kadioğlu remarks that while modernization attempts of the Ottoman Empire aimed “progress for order”, for the republican elite of the modern Turkey the “will to civilization” had the priority and thus they aspired after “order for progress” (Kadioğlu, 1999: 24-29).

Up to this point, the main regulations and policy implementations aimed at modernization during the late Ottoman period were reviewed in terms of their influence on the processes of state-formation, nation-building and citizenship construction of the Republic of Turkey. Now the intellectual developments that influenced the founding elite of the Turkish Republic are briefly discussed.

3.1.2. Intellectual Background: Westernism, Islamism and Turkism

Since the initiation of the *Tanzimat* reforms the dilemma of achieving a balance between the materiality of the West and the spirituality of the East occupied the agenda of Turkish intellectuals and politicians. During the *Tanzimat* period, the Young Ottomans which first emerged as a new literary movement mainly focused on the extent of the ongoing modernization and its compatibility with Islam (Kadioğlu, 1996b:180). The members of this group had various thoughts ranging from “constitutionalist liberalism to modern Islamism, even to the seeds of Turkism and socialism” (Ortaylı, 1985: 1702-1703). Namık Kemal, a leading Young Ottoman first used the notion of *vatan* in connotation to fatherland and advocated the idea of Ottomanism as a common identity of all members of the Empire. But as mentioned above, this idea of Ottomanism did not work and the patriotism of the Young Ottomans caused the birth of another group known as Young Turks. Although there were different factions within the group, they consensually believed in a parliamentary system and became influential in the restoration of the Second

Constitution. As the movement lacked a common ideology, in the aftermath of the Second Constitution its members chose different patterns (Mardin, 1983). While liberals gathered around Prince Sabahattin, the others officially established the Committee of Union and Progress in 1906 and came to power between 1908 and 1918. Masami Arai argues that although nationalism of Young Turks was very different from the Republican nationalism, the former facilitated the latter “as a result of the efforts made for raising national consciousness and pride of Turkishness among the Ottoman Turks who had lost these features long time ago” (Arai, 1994: 146).

The decade between 1908 and 1918 witnessed the birth of Westernism, Islamism and Turkism as the three strains of thought that framed the comprehensive debate on modernization problems. Berkes argues that these schools of thought emerged as a result of different interpretations of the Second Constitution. Their main point of divergence was concentrated on the defining characteristic of the revolution whether it should be oriented towards Westernism, Islamism or Turkism (Berkes, 1978: 404).

According to the supporters of Westernism, total westernization in all aspects of life including system of values would solve the problems of the Empire. They believed that Westernization would not be possible without adopting the cultural and intellectual foundations of the West (Soyarık, 2000: 68-69).

For the Islamists the problem was the improper application of sharia (*şeriat*) and they opted for a social reconstruction by reversion to the Islamic law. While they were in favour of taking advantage of Western science and technology they were strongly against the adoption of Western mores and moral values by arguing that Western countries were morally degenerated (Berkes, 1978: 411).

Turkism which emerged later than Westernism and Islamism utilized both ideologies and reached a synthesis. Ziya Gökalp is considered as the most coherent representative of this school of thought. He focused on two ideas: ‘nation’ and ‘civilization’. He adopted the Durkheimian idea of the superiority of society over

individual but he replaced the society by *nation* (Zürcher, 1999: 191-192). He argued that the individual and his reason could not be a criterion for social reconstruction and accepted “the transcendental reality of society identified with nation” (Kadioğlu, 1996b: 183; Zürcher, 1999: 192). Berkes notes that Gökalp’s conception of nation is different from those of the previous thoughts (e.g. Ottoman nation of Namık Kemal or Muslim *ümmet* (community) of Islamists or *Turan* race of Russian Turkists) and is closest to its modern meaning (Berkes, 2002: 90). Gökalp considers nation as a natural social and political unit and defines it as follows:

The nation is not a community defined either by race, nor tribe, nor geography, nor politics nor will. The nation is a community that has a language, religion, morality and aesthetics common to all members, that is, it is a community composed of individuals who had the same education. (Gökalp, 2001a: 18)

Concerning the idea of civilization, Gökalp argued that the West has two different aspects as ideology and technology. He believed that the “Western mind” and the technology it produced should be incorporated without hesitation, because technology is identical with civilization and adapting Western civilization is the only solution:

.. there is only one road to salvation, namely, to advance in science, industry and in military and legal institutions like Europeans, that is to be equal to them in civilization. There is only one way of achieving this: to completely adapt ourselves to the European civilization. (Gökalp, 2001a:56-57)

Gökalp formulated the relation between culture and nationalism by differentiating *culture (hars)* from *civilization (medeniyet)*. He argued that while civilization is universal, culture is national and that there are many civilizations but each nation has its own culture (Gökalp, 2001a: 47). He described culture as “the latent pattern of values, beliefs and institutions which defined a people” and stated that specific cultural values of Turks “had receded into the background when they had established the Ottoman Empire” (Mardin, 1981: 207). Therefore, while adopting Western civilization, the Turkish nation should preserve its own culture. As to Islam, Gökalp maintained that some aspects of Islam such as the commands associated with the proper Islamic organization of society in fact belonged to Arabic culture which had

nothing to do with pure Islam (Mardin, 1981: 207). On the basis of these interpretations of Westernism, nationalism and Islam he argued that:

“As there are no contradictions between the ideals of Turkisation and Islamisation, these two do not contradict with the need for westernization. .. Thus, we should accept all these three aims after specifying their borderlines; in other words, we should create ‘a modern Muslim Turkishness’ (*Çağdaş bir İslam Türklüğü*) by comprehending that these thoughts are in fact different facets of the same need”. (Gökalp: 2001b: 19)

Therefore, as Şerif Mardin succinctly puts it: “Gökalp’s blueprint for the future was to draw out the latent Turkish culture of the Turkish nation, to establish a Turkish state based on it, to accept Western civilization and to make Islam a matter of conscience, a private belief” (Mardin, 1981: 207).

Ziya Gökalp’s ideas about the West were highly influential on Atatürk in framing the modernization project. However, while Atatürk agreed with Gökalp that *the* civilization that should be adopted for creating a modern nation is Western civilization, for him, as Enver Ziya Karal notes, civilization did not mean only moral or material advancement and he did not separate culture from civilization, which is clear in his own words: “When we say culture, we understand all that a society can perform in the political life, in thought and in its economy as well. This is nothing more than civilization.” (quoted in Karal, 1981: 32) As a matter of fact, as to be discussed later, Turkish nationalism contained both elements of civilization and culture. As for Gökalp’s approach to Islam as a private belief, it is evident that Atatürk totally agreed with him as revealed by his secularizing reforms.

Another important contribution of Gökalp to nation-building was his ideas about ‘national solidarity’. He was again influenced by Durkheim who asserted that in modern societies, different specializations in employment and social roles create organic solidarity that ties people to one another, because people cannot count on filling all of their needs by themselves. As discussed in the previous chapter, he also maintained that the occupational groups or corporations were indispensable in ensuring solidarity because of their moral influence on individuals and on society. In line with Durkheim’s philosophy, Gökalp indicated that solidarity can be achieved

through division of labour in a society which had a common collective consciousness. The second condition for achieving national solidarity is that “professional groups should be organized as national associations and each of these associations should conduct according to a certain work ethic related to its occupation” (Gökalp, 2001a: 83-84). According to Gökalp “national solidarity is the foundation of social order and progress and of national freedom and independence” (Gökalp, 2001a: 84).

Taha Parla in his important work on the thought of Ziya Gökalp explains that solidarism of Gökalp (and of Durkheim) is one of the two sub-categories of corporatism, and the other one is fascist corporatism. He argues that corporatism, of which both categories are anti-Marxist and anti-socialist, aims to provide a theoretical and moral basis for an anti-liberal approach to capitalism. Corporatism views the society as an organism composed of interdependent organs (occupational groups) which harmoniously complement each other. Hence, it rejects the individualism of liberalism along with the existence of social classes and class conflicts. According to this view, the total sum of corporative interests, which are realized within the triad of state-employer-worker, makes up an integrated ‘public interest’ and ‘national interest’. While solidaristic corporatism is more pluralist and moderate; etatist, fascist corporatism is monist and totalitarian. (Parla, 2005: 7-8) Parla also argues that for Ziya Gökalp *nationalism ideal* was the source of social solidarity in times of crisis, whereas the *ideal of corporations* provide solidarity during the periods of stability. (Parla, 2005: 116)

Gökalp’s ideas on national solidarity constitute the foundation of the idea of ‘populism’ which was later formulated as one of the founding principles of Kemalism. This point will be elaborated below.

3.2. Anatomy of Turkish Citizenship in the Early Republican Period

In defining the foundation process of the Republic of Turkey there is no better word than ‘making’ proposed by Feroz Ahmad and repeatedly cited by many scholars. In

the opening pages of *The Making of Modern Turkey*, Ahmad notes that “Turkey did not rise phoenix-like out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire. It was ‘made’ in the image of the Kemalist elite which won the national struggle against foreign invaders and the old regime.” (Ahmad, 1993: ix)

In this study it is not aimed to overview the historical events starting with the War of Independence followed by the inauguration of the National Assembly, proclamation of the Republic and the succeeding reforms. These periods are neatly elaborated by several scholars. Likewise, it is not intended to go over the ‘citizenization’ process in the Republican period which was skillfully analyzed by Soyarık (2000) and Üstel (2004). What is attempted here is to highlight the essential characteristics of the notion of citizenship designed by the founders of the Republic of Turkey. By doing so it is hoped to understand the role of citizenship within the state-formation and nation-building processes which go hand-in-hand with the modernization process.

First of all, the idea of the state envisaged by Atatürk as the founder of the Republic needs to be analyzed, because the defining features of the state will uncover its perception of the civil society and citizens.

3.2.1. The Founding Principles of the State of Modern Turkey

Atatürk developed his ideas on state by observing the reasons of the decline of the Ottoman Empire. According to him, the Ottoman state was identified with the personal rule of the sultan and because of this reason the people remained indifferent, even hostile towards the government. Therefore, there was a need for a state where sovereignty did not belong to the sultan. Although the state was to be the people’s state, “Atatürk was trying to substitute not a *popular*, but a *national*, sovereignty for a dynastic one” (Heper, 1985: 49). Before leaving the sovereignty to the people, the state had to execute some reforms. Similar to Ziya Gökalp, Atatürk was also influenced by the ideas of Durkheim and believed that every society has a collective consciousness but it is the role of the state as the organ of rationality to discover the “real orientations and the collective conscience of the people” (Atatürk, quoted in

Heper, 1985: 50). In the mind of Atatürk, the consciousness should be “rooted in science (Western civilization)” (Mardin, 1981: 211) and thus, the basic mission of the republican state was “elevating the people to the level of contemporary civilization” which is the Western modernity (Heper, 1985: 50). Therefore, it was an obligation on the part of all elites “to enlighten the people and help them make progress” and thus, “reforms needed to be imposed from above” (Heper, 1985: 50-51). Only after this mission was completed, that is, the collective consciousness of people reached a certain level of civilization, then ‘the sovereignty would belong to the people without any qualifications and conditions’.

In line with Heper’s observations H. Bülent Kahraman points out the transcendental power of the state espoused by Atatürk. He indicates that the adoption the Swiss Civil Code was intended to construct a civil society based on the notion of rights that would convey to citizenship. However, the secular state by acting as “the supplier of all the rights and the organizer and regulator of the political realm fulfilled the role of the transcendental power” and in turn, “hindered the development of a civil society and an emancipated notion of citizenship” (Kahraman, 2005: 76-77).

Kadioğlu approaches the republican state’s role in constructing the citizens from a different angle and remarks another important defining characteristic of the republican state in relation to the sequence of the emergence of state and nation in Turkey. With reference to the French and German models of nationhood provided by Brubaker, Kadioğlu argues that in the case of the modern republican Turkey, unlike the German experience, it is possible to refer to a state preceding a nation, that is, “a state in search of its nation” (Kadioğlu, 1999: 57). The republican elite constructed the Turkish nation by means of certain measures. Thus, the Turkish citizenship was defined from above by the republican elite and its distinguishing characteristics were formulated by the six principles of nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, etatism and revolutionism (Kadioğlu, 2005: 111). These principles were adopted during the Third Party Congress of the Republican People’s Party (RPP)¹² in 1931

¹² In September 1923 the party was formed by Mustafa Kemal as the People’s Party and renamed Republican People’s Party in 1924. It eventually emerged as “the only legitimate organ of political articulation in the Republic” (Mardin. 1981: 210).

and became the six arrows of the symbol on the party's emblem. In 1937 they were incorporated into the constitution as the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. (Ahmad, 1993: 63)

A quick glance at these principles will provide a further understanding of the portrait of the Turkish citizen envisaged by the republican elite.

Republicanism is the fundamental principle of the new Turkish state. Karal notes that “republicanism was a turning point in the political philosophy of Turks” because, while the previous Turkish states had been dynastic, “the new Turkish republic was a state founded by the Turkish nation, on its own account, on its own land” (Karal, 1981: 16). Through this principle the modern concept of national sovereignty was introduced.

Nationalism is also a principle in the political, social and cultural life of Turkey. The definition of Turkish nationalism in Afet İnan's 1930 dated citizenship textbook, *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler* (Civic Information for the Citizen)¹³ is significant because it reflects the views of Atatürk. Although the book was written by Afet İnan, it was Atatürk who asked her to prepare a textbook for citizenship education in schools, and as İnan mentions, the book was inspired by Atatürk's ideas and comments. (İnan, 1998: 7) In the book Turkish nationalism is described as “to keep pace with modern nations on the road to order and progress and in matters regarding international relations, but at the same time to maintain and protect the particular traits and self-contained identity of the Turkish society.” (İnan, 1998: 25) Karal notes the humanism aspect of Turkish nationalism by referring to Atatürk's words: “The Turkish nation regards itself as a prized and honourable member of the human family. Turks love all humans and have no feelings of hostility unless the country's national pride or interests are violated” (quoted in Karal, 1981: 19).

¹³ In 1969 Afet İnan added the manuscripts of Atatürk to the *Civic Information for the Citizen* book and it was republished with the title of *Civic Information and the Manuscripts of M. Kemal Atatürk* by the Atatürk High Council of Culture, Language and History. The quotations used in this study are from the 1998 (third) edition of this work.

Kadıoğlu (1996b) compares Turkish nationalism to the French and German nationalism models. She reminds the distinction made by Hans Kohn (1967) between Western and non-Western nationalisms. According to this distinction, French nationalism is representative of Western nationalism which is based on universalism and accepts civilization along with the material and intellectual premises of the European Enlightenment. German nationalism on the other hand, acquired an ethnic and cultural character with anti-Western, anti-Enlightenment and Romantic premises. According to Kadıoğlu, Turkish nationalism which embraces both civilization and culture displays the characteristics of both models. Although it is most of the time similar to the civic French nationalism, there were periods when organic and ethnic ties were more pronounced as in the case of German nationalism (Kadıoğlu, 2005: 111). Ahmet Yıldız (2001) in his study on the formation of Turkish nationalism between 1919 and 1938 notes that the fundamental references of Turkish nationalism evolved from religious (1919-23) to secular (1924-29) themes and during the 1929-1938 period ethno-cultural motifs became dominant. The citizenship practices evolved in accordance with these themes.

Populism principle was explained in the official programme of the RPP in the following manner:

It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic, not as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions according to the requirements of the division of labour for the individual and social life of the Turkish people. .. The aims of our party, with this principle [of populism], are to secure social order and solidarity instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. (quoted in Ahmad, 1993: 65)

As the above lines clearly demonstrate populism principle is in fact the reflection of the solidarism theory of Gökalp on the basis of Durkheim's ideas. As discussed earlier, according to the solidarism theory "there was no necessary conflict between classes in modern society. What was important was the way social institutions and the contributions of all professional groups made a society a going concern." (Mardin, 1981: 212) Parla notes that the unsuccessful attempt of a constitutional corporatism in 1920-21, the 1923 İzmir Economics Congress and 1927 Grand Economics Council (*Âli İktisat Meclisi*) and some other secondary regulations are all

representatives of solidaristic corporatism¹⁴. (Parla, 2005: 216) Çağlar Keyder also indicates that during the 1930 Industry Congress the government advised the industrialists to be organized according to the sectors (Keyder, 1989: 137). Thus, what was intended by the principle of populism is that people who are organized in professional associations rather than in conflicting and competing classes would work in solidarity to achieve the common goal of civilization. According to the work ethic doctrine of the professional groups, as a result of the complex division of labour in the society, occupation groups are dependent on each other and therefore, there is no conflict of interests and working in harmony will ensure social order. Keyder notes that the state tried to dominate the area of social organization by encouraging professional associations which are under the direct control of the central government (Keyder, 1989: 137).

Etatism was officially adopted as the new economic policy in 1931. Although it was not defined clearly it refers to an obligation on the part of the state to establish and operate the industries that the private sector, which was underdeveloped and short of capital, could not afford. (Zürcher, 1999: 286) In other words, the state will be the major actor in production and investment in order to help the private sector to grow and mature (Ahmad, 1993: 97). In line with etatism planned, import-substitution industrialization was adopted. Ehteshami and Murphy indicate that many countries in the Middle East and North Africa following their national independence movements embraced nationalist and populist regimes. Then, they moved towards import-substitution industrialization strategies for development in order to break away from dependence on exporting cash crops and commodities and concentrated instead on domestic industrialization and product diversification. (Ehteshami and Murphy, 1996: 753) Keyder notes that etatism together with populism which aims to create a corporatist social model by denying class conflicts can be achieved within the framework of a national solidarity ideology (Keyder, 1989: 150).

¹⁴ Although some authors like Andrew Mango (1994: 7) argue that “fascist corporatism served as a model in Turkey in the 1930s” Parla (2005) asserts through his comprehensive analyses that despite some Kemalists’ inclination towards fascism, Kemalism as an ideology remained within the limits of Gökalp’s solidaristic corporatism.

Secularism (or laicism) refers to the official ideology of the new republican regime. According to this principle the state takes no role in religious life because religion is a matter of private conscience (Mardin, 1981: 210). In the 1931 statutes of the RPP it was stated that:

The Party has accepted the principle that all laws, regulations and procedures used in the administration of the state should be prepared and implemented in order to meet the needs of this world and in accordance with the foundations of and the forms provided by science and technology in modern times. (quoted in Mardin, 1981: 210)

Thus, secularism means not only the separation of religion from the state but also the freedom of mind. Atatürk who placed freedom of conscience among the most natural and crucial individual rights stated that: “Each person has liberty to think and believe freely, to possess a political view of his own fulfillment, and to act in any way to suit himself as far as the regulations of any religion are concerned.” (quoted in Karal, 1981: 22-23)

Revolutionism principle is “the philosophy, guarantee and source of future hope” of the other five principles. (Karal, 1981: 23) According to Sina Akşin “Kemalist Revolution is a means of spreading enlightenment to the whole of Turkey and to all of its people through effective policies for the realization of integral development.” (Akşin, 2007: 230) He argues that revolutionism is a long-term goal not yet reached and until it will be achieved it will remain on Turkey’s agenda.

Consequently, the Republican state was designed as a republican secular nationalist state based on the economic principle of etatism and on the societal organization of populism and aimed ‘to reach the level of contemporary civilizations’. This state ‘in search of its nation’ had to construct the citizens who would incorporate the will to civilization. But, a means of social cohesion was needed to construct the civilized citizens, and since Islam no longer served this purpose, the promotion of national identity was adopted for “the orientation of the individual towards social ideals” (Mardin, 1981 211).

Fuat Keyman notes that secularism and revolutionism (reformism from above) principles “served to construct a national identity compatible with republicanism, nationalism, and etatism, and at the same time to concretize populism and its appeal to organic unity into the identity of the individual subject” (Keyman, 2005: 277). He adds that:

They were also central to the practice of inclusion/exclusion, that is, to the determination of who is included in and who is excluded from the organic unity. It is through secularism that Kemalist nationalism initiated its boundary-producing performance between the self and the Other, thereby giving a concrete form to its populist-based creation of the national identity. Hence, the national identity was meant to be an organic unity of the secular non-class based identity which necessarily involved the subjugation of its other, i.e. the Kurdish identity, Islamic identity and various minorities. (Keyman, 2005: 277)

Kadıoğlu notes that political unity served as the constitutive element of the national identity and accordingly, “the indivisibility of the Turkish nation-state with its nation, and the irreversibility of the holy borders constitute the cornerstone of the Turkish national identity” (Kadıoğlu, 2005:111).

Correspondingly, this national identity was linked to a definition of citizenship based on a civic-republican model which demanded that the citizens “accord normative primacy to the national interest over individual freedoms, to duties over rights, and to state sovereignty over individual autonomy” (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 6) and within this notion of citizenship “the Other was expected to accord primacy to citizenship over difference” (Keyman, 2005: 277).

This notion of citizenship was tried to be effectuated by means of several symbols and rhetoric (such as ‘Turkish history thesis’ and the ‘sun-language theory’) and in particular, through the state-based secular education system. The promulgation of the Law of the Unification of Education (*Tevhid-i Tedrisat*) in 1924, the commencement of citizenship education courses in schools in the same year and, in the beginning of 1932 the foundation of People’s Houses (*Halkevleri*) which functioned ‘to elevate the citizenship consciousness of people’¹⁵ were the main measures taken by the state

¹⁵ For a comprehensive account on the role played by the People’s Houses in citizenship education see Soyank, 2000: 102-111.

elite for creating the Turkish citizen. In the following section the basic tenets of citizenship education are elaborated to trace this civic-republican understanding of citizenship.

3.2.2. There is No Right but Duty (*Hak Yok Vazife Vardır*)

Reinhard Bendix notes that “in the nation-state each citizen stands in a direct relation to the sovereign authority of the country” and, therefore “a code element of nation building is the codification of the rights and duties of all adults who are classified as citizens” (Bendix, 1964: 74). In the founding years of the modern Turkey the rights and duties of citizens were codified by the state elite within the civic-republican tradition, by emphasizing duties over rights. While the famous motto of Ziya Gökalp ‘*there is no right but duty*’ provides a general idea of a duty-based citizenship approach, the civic-republican understanding is best traced in the indoctrination of citizenship education.

Benedict Anderson argues that the construction or ‘imagination’ process of a nation is carried out through the use of printed material or through school education (Anderson, 1993). Turkish experience was no exception to this practice. Following the promulgation of the Unification of Education Law citizenship education started in 1924 just after the proclamation of the Republic. Ömer Çaha argues that although the law of the Unification of Education was previously intended to modernize the traditional education system, it was mainly employed “to create identical citizens who have the same patterns of behaviour, the same ideology, whose hearts beat for the same desires and, are dressed in the same way”, in short, to make the citizens “a united whole with the country, nation and the state” (*vatani, milleti ve devletiyle tek yürek*) (Çaha, 1998-9: 96-97). It is obvious that such an understanding of a uniform citizenship will leave no space for the articulation of individual rights, particularly for differentiated group rights. This point of ‘denial of difference and enforcement of homogeneity’ as a feature of republican conception of citizenship is put by Iris Marion Young in the following way:

[I]n so far as he is a citizen every man leaves behind his particularity and difference, to adopt a universal standpoint identical for all citizens, the standpoint of the common good or general will. In practice republican politicians enforced homogeneity by excluding from citizenship all those defined as different. (Young, 1990: 117 quoted in Dagger, 2002: 154)

According to the 1926 Primary School Syllabus the main objective of primary schools is “to bring up good citizens by making the young generations accommodated (*intibak*) to their fatherland and nation” (Üstel, 2004: 131). Üstel argues that the aim of ‘accommodating to the fatherland and nation’ is an indication of the expectation of the state elite from the school system, which is to integrate the citizens to the modernization project and correspondingly to make the future citizens internalize the required norms, values and especially the duties (Üstel, 2004: 132).

A citizenship education book *Yurt Bilgisi* (Information about Motherland) written by Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı (*Muallim Abdülbaki*) and used as a textbook in the primary schools during the academic year of 1927-1928 is noteworthy to reveal the state elite’s understanding of rights and duties. In the book, the rights of the citizens under a Republican regime are listed as follows:

In the Republic nobody can treat another oppressively. No one harm another person’s life or property. Tax collection cannot be done illegally. If one is treated badly by the government officers he can complain them to their superior officers. The courts are independent and they are only for claiming rights. But it should be known that there is one interest which is superior to all other interests and it is the interest of the nation, the concern of independence. While using our rights, always considering the independence of the country and the independence of the nation is our main and general duty. (Gölpınarlı, 2007: 46)

The above idea that national interest or the common good is more important than individual rights is a clear indication of a civic-republican understanding of citizenship. Another example of this citizenship understanding based on duties can be given from another textbook written by Mehmet Emin in 1926 which states that: “The rights of citizens exist to fulfill the duties that they are responsible.” (quoted in Üstel, 2004: 181)

In the previously mentioned citizenship education book of Afet İnan, *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler*, the rights and duties of the citizen are also outlined. According to the book there are two types of individual freedoms (and rights); those based on

material interests and those related to the intellectual life. Right to travel and residence, right to domiciliary inviolability, right to private property, right to work and trade are mentioned under the first individual rights and freedoms. Under individual rights related to intellectual life; freedom of conscience, freedom of gathering, right to publish books or articles in the newspapers (*matbuat hürriyeti*), right to organize and right to education are placed. In terms of Marshall's terminology, while the first category of individual rights refer to civil rights, the rights under the second one, with the exception of education right, refers to political rights, and education right is a social right. However, İnan emphasizes that individual rights are not political rights, because political rights refer to citizenship participation to governance (the most important of which is voting), and only some citizens are allowed to enjoy these rights, whereas individual rights belong to all citizens. (İnan, 1998: 64-65) She put this remark because when the book was written, women had the right vote only in local elections and later in 1934 they were granted the right to full participation in general elections as well.

In İnan's book under the heading of 'duties of citizens toward the state' voting, tax payment, and military service are listed. However, the following sentence which was stated under the title of 'the duties of the state towards the citizen' indicates that citizens have more responsibilities than the mentioned duties: "For ensuring public order and for the defense of the country, the state needs citizens who are healthy, robust and having a high level of understanding, national sentiments and love for the country" (İnan, 1998: 45). Thus, taking care of one's own health and being nationalist and patriotic citizens are other duties that citizens are expected to fulfill.

In fact, Üstel's (2004) comprehensive survey of the textbooks used in citizenship education courses in primary and secondary schools in Turkey reveals that citizenship duties aim to regulate the whole life of the citizen by giving him responsibilities in areas ranging from making physical exercise to entertaining in the 'appropriate' way. Particularly, physical education of citizens was given a special emphasis, and on June, 1938 the Law of Physical Education was enacted. According to the law "physical education is composed of all kinds of gymnastics, sports and

games that facilitates the development of the citizens' capabilities in accordance with the national and revolutionary objectives" and thus, playing sports was defined as an obligation especially for the youth (Soyarık, 2000: 112). In a citizenship education textbook used in schools in 1927-1928, leisure activities of peasants are stated under the title of 'entertainment in villages'. The book first maintains that "it is a right to have fun for those who work" and then it is indicated that the entertainment should be 'decent and morally upright'. In line with this remark the appropriate leisure activities listed are: javelin (*cirit*), wrestling; playing *zeybek* and *horon* as national folk dances; playing *kemençe* (fiddle); and in winter, hunting and sledging, playing snowball and proverb game at home (Üstel, 2004: 205-206).

Another important citizenship duty is 'working' which is regarded as a virtue and a form of moral existence. Üstel argues that this understanding of work/study which is described on the basis of 'responsibility/work ethic' enables to disregard the class conflicts in line with the prevailing corporatist doctrine, and at the same time refers to the lazy who is the 'other' of the Republic in economic terms. In this context, within the Republican discourse there is no unemployed but those who do not work or who are lazy (Üstel, 2004: 190). In a similar way, Mardin points out that Kemalist education set forth a theory of citizenship based on solidarity. Accordingly, it was expected that "the businessman, the schoolmaster and the politician who, working together under the shield of solidaristic redistribution, were to make up an integrated nation". (Mardin, 1981: 212)

Based on her analyses of citizenship education books Üstel underlines that the citizenship understanding in the early years of the Republic of Turkey was based on duties. She argues that the main objective of the citizenship education was the achievement of 'civilization' and the inculcation of 'patriotism'. While the codes of conduct indoctrinated through the textbooks aim to shape the civilized aspect of the citizen, s/he is also expected to be patriotic. According to Üstel, the most important dimension of Republican patriotism is related with the discourse of duties and 'duty patriotism' is formulated in terms of a continuous altruism which may even go far to sacrifice one's life for the homeland (*yurdunu canından çok sevmek*- loving one's

motherland more than her/his life) (Üstel, 2004: 196). Üstel by borrowing the term ‘*militant* (activist)’ used by Jean Leca (1990)¹⁶ argues that towards the ends of civilization and patriotism, ‘militant’ citizens were burdened with duties. The obligations of the militant citizen were strengthened by referring to a perceived threat to the Republic by the ‘other’. The internal ‘others’ were the sultanate or the collaborators of the *ancienne régime* or smugglers, burglars and as mentioned earlier the lazy as the economic other, whereas the Greeks were the external ‘others’. Thus, the theme of a real or perceived threat based on the description of the ‘other’ had the function of reinforcing the national solidarity and integrity (Üstel, 2004: 209). In other words, by way of assigning several obligations the militant citizen was formulated as “both the object and bearer of the Kemalist will to civilization” (Keyman, 1997: 100-101).

Kadioğlu analyzes another aspect of Turkish citizenship in terms of the citizenship typologies suggested by Turner (1992). As explained in the previous chapter, Turner classifies four types of citizenship based on two dimensions of active/passive (from above/below) and the extent of its definition within the public realm. According to Kadioğlu, Turkish conception of citizenship has some characteristics of both the French and the German case but it is not identical to any of them. It seems akin to the French tradition since there is an attack on the private space of the family and religion, but different from it because Turkish citizenship was defined from above and thus is passive. It is similar to German model because a successful liberal revolution and participation was not present. Turkish citizenship was defined by the state elite “within an exaggerated public space which smothers the individual and invades the private space of the family and religion.” (Kadioğlu, 2005: 115) As explained above through Üstel’s study, the private realm was tried to be supervised and regulated by defining the codes of conduct for almost every aspect of the

¹⁶ Leca in terms of membership and involvement criteria proposes two types of citizenship as activist (military) versus civil citizenship. According to him the basic traits of activist citizenship are exclusive membership of the city, full public commitment and dominant obligation towards the city as a state. On the contrary, civil citizenship “involves non-exclusive membership of the city, moderate and autonomous public commitment, and dominant obligation towards the city as an association, and which is combined with reservations concerning social conventions”. (Leca, 1990: 151)

citizen's private life to make sure that the citizens share a certain life style and serve the common good of civilization.

According to Kadioğlu, another point that distinguishes the Turkish conception of citizenship from the French one is the absence of 'enlightenment' in the Kantian sense, that is, "man's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity", prior to the establishment of citizenship. In this sense, Turkish notion of citizenship was constructed prior to an enlightened, free individual capable of producing demands, and such a notion signifies steering the common lives of immature beings by means of duties. The citizens are expected to follow without resorting to reason. (Kadioğlu, 2005: 116) She also remarks that while in Western Europe, the notion of the individual appeared in philosophical writings prior to the emergence of modern citizenship; in Turkey the citizen precedes the individual. (Kadioğlu, 2005: 117)

Furthermore, it is possible to specify the stringency level of the Turkish notion of republican citizenship with reference to the explanations of Richard Dagger which was discussed in Chapter II. It should be recalled that at its most stringent level republican citizenship demands unquestioning loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizen, and Rousseau's 'patriotic' conception of citizenship is an example of such austerity. Thus, in the light of the above analysis of Turkish citizenship it can be concluded that the Republican elite aimed to create and shape the ideal Turkish citizen with a republican understanding akin to Rousseau's patriotic conception of citizenship which requires a whole-hearted devotion to the good of the community. And in the case of Turkey the common good was to achieve civilization.

To recapitulate the function of the Turkish notion of citizenship based on a civic-republican model in the process of state-formation, I would like to quote the following passage written by Keyman and İçduygu:

The republican model of citizenship serves for the state, first as a "link" between state and society on the basis of the principle of national unity, second as an "articulatory principle" that connects people with different religious, ethnic and cultural origins under the rubric of modernity as civilization, and third as an effective ideological device by which the state attempted to disseminate its will to civilization throughout the society. (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 6)

3.2.3. Legal Foundations of Turkish National Identity

Ahmet Yıldız argues that the construction of Turkish national identity has two aspects; legal (objective) and political (subjective). The political aspect is the determining factor and represents the Kemalist dogma, whereas the legal aspect has a secondary nature with a limited power in daily practice (Yıldız, 2001: 139). In the above section the political side of the process of the Turkish national identity construction has been evaluated. Here, the legal aspect which was defined by the 1924 Constitution, the 1928 Turkish Citizenship Law and the 1934 dated Law on Settlement¹⁷ will be briefly reviewed.

According to the Article 88 of the 1924 Constitution “the people of Turkey regardless of their religion and race are Turkish in terms of citizenship” (Soyarık, 2005: 126). Concerning the citizenship rights (which were listed in İnan’s *Civic Information for the Citizen* as discussed above) Tanör (1999:308) argues that the Constitution has a liberal and individualist approach. However, since the rights are not regulated by necessary legislation they can be considered as a simple delineation of rights without any guarantee for implementation (Soyarık, 2005: 127).

The 1928 Turkish Citizenship Law adopted both descent (*jus sanguinis*) and territory (*jus soli*) principles. Accordingly, the children of the Turkish citizens, even if they were abroad, or born out of wedlock, were granted Turkish citizenship. Additionally, the conditions for the admission into Turkish citizenship of the children of foreigners or stateless people settled in Turkey were clarified (Soyarık, 2005: 128).

Yıldız (2001: 140) argues that the 1934 dated Law on Settlement paved the way for different policy implementations by clarifying the distinction between ‘the Turks who are not Turkish citizens’ and ‘the Turkish citizens who are not Turks’. The law was intended to serve “the assimilation of those who regard themselves as non-Turkish or who lost Turkish identity” (Soyarık, 2005: 129). According to the Law

¹⁷ In fact, the law on settlement along with the law on family names which was adopted in 1934 may be interpreted as legal documents to reinforce the political definition of Turkish national identity. For more on the law on family names see Soyarık, 2000: 122-124.

among the people who migrated to Turkey for settlement purposes, only those of Turkish descent or those close to Turkish culture would have the possibility of being admitted to Turkish citizenship and with a *muhacir* status they would resettle in the places shown, whereas those who do not adhere to Turkish culture, would be deported. Soyarik (2005: 130) remarks the significance of this law for the process of Turkification by dispersing non-Turkish population over the country so as to be absorbed by the Turkish culture.

At this point, I would like to attempt to summarize the state-formation and citizenship construction processes during the early years of the Republican Turkey by employing the terminology used by Antonio Gramsci in expressing his concept of hegemony. The starting point for Gramsci's concept of hegemony is that "a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion" (Simon, 1982: 21). As argued by Keyder (1989) since in the early years of the Republic the working class and peasantry were not organized nor strong enough to influence the political struggle the power relations were mainly determined by the conflicts between the bureaucracy (civil and military) and the bourgeoisie or their fractions. In founding the Turkish nation-state, the bureaucratic elite, first of all, achieved a 'passive revolution', because according to Gramsci "a passive revolution is involved whenever relatively far-reaching modifications are made to a country's social and economic structure from above, through the agency of the state and without relying on the active participation of the people." (Simon, 1982: 25) Then, by using secularism, nationalism, populism and etatism ideologies as the founding principles of the state, the bureaucratic elite tried to establish a nation and maintain social order not just through violence and political and economic coercion, but also creating consent through a hegemonic culture in which the Kemalist values are to become the 'common sense' values of all citizens.

In retrospect, despite some religious (e.g. Menemen Incident) and ethnic upheavals (e.g. Sheik Said Rebellion) which were suppressed through coercive measures, it seems that during the single party years of the Republican regime (1923-1945) the hegemony of the state elite was almost consensually approved by the public.

Actually, it can be stated that until the late 1980s the hegemonic discourse of republican citizenship was not met by any significant objections. In the 1950s protests of the political actors which targeted the hegemony of the state elite but not its republican notion of citizenship, were alleviated by the *coup d'état* of 1960. The military intervened by claiming that “the government’s commitment to democratic procedures had seriously declined” and that “the Democrat Party leaders betrayed the Atatürk Revolution” (Heper, 1985: 84-85). The adoption of the 1961 Constitution brought about a more liberal understanding of citizenship which extended the range of political rights and articulated social rights. However, this period of Turkish political history which acknowledges the importance of the individual rights and liberties did not last long and with the enactment of the 1982 Constitution most of those rights were held back. Heper argues that by enlarging the scope of rights and liberties the state elite of the early 1960s hoped to have immunity from ‘the absolutism of the majority’ but they “found that the new order they wished to clamp upon the Turkish polity could not be sustained” (Heper, 1985: 90). According to Heper the failure of the elite in strengthening the state hegemony in 1960s and 1970s is related with the “significant social and structural changes caused by economic development, rural immigration and urbanization which led to ideological polarization and political fragmentation” (Heper, 1985: 90). As a consequence of these developments Turkey faced with a crisis manifested by economic breakdown, civil violence and open challenges to secularism. Then, another military intervention occurred in 1980. As explained in the first communiqué issued on the morning of the coup the military elite aimed, among other goals, to re-establish the hegemony of the state:

The aim of the operation is to safeguard the integrity of the country, to provide for national unity and fraternity, to prevent the existence and the possibility of civil war and internecine struggle, to re-establish the existence and the authority of the state, and to eliminate the factors that hinder the smooth working of the democratic order. (quoted in Heper, 1985: 131)

This overriding concern for a sovereign state is also expressed by General Kenan Evren on several occasions, notably in his opening speech before the Consultative Assembly in October 1981:

.. While trying to enhance and protect human rights and liberties, the state itself also has certain rights and obligations as far as its continuity and future is concerned. We do not have the right to put the state into a powerless and inactive position. The state cannot be turned into a helpless institution to be governed by private associations. .. Citizens should know that freedom of thought and conscience exist. There are, however, limits to these freedoms; there is also a state founded by the individuals that together make up a collectivity. The state in question protects the individuals. This state, too, has a will and sovereignty of its own. Individual freedoms can be protected to the extent that the will and the sovereignty of the state are maintained. If the will and the sovereignty of the state are undermined, then the only entity that can safeguard individual freedoms has withered away. (quoted in Heper, 1985: 131)

3.2.4. Developments in the post-1980 Period

In line with the above explanations on the goals of the coup, the 1982 Constitution which was drafted by the Consultative Assembly whose members were wholly determined by the military and finalized by the National Security Council, aimed at the re-consolidation of the nation-state. With this Constitution the rights of the individual-citizens and society vis-à-vis the state were constrained, in other words, according to the Constitution “the subject of the right, before everything else, is the state” (Üstel, 2004: 279). Correspondingly, the ‘militant’ citizen discourse of the early Republican period was re-defined with reference to ‘the emergency state conditions’. Against the threats and dangers directed to the nation and the state regime, the citizens were expected to respect the national unity and solidarity; to be at alert against destructive and separatist activities; and to adhere to the Turkish society, Turkish national values and culture.

An important development in the aftermath of the 1980 coup is the establishment of the Board of Higher Education (YÖK) through which the military planned to control not only appointments and promotions but also the day-to-day working of the universities. The Law on Higher Education (No: 2547 dated: November 4, 1981) can be interpreted as an indication of the state elite’s intention of continuing to shape the citizens during their higher education in addition to the citizenship courses in the primary and secondary schools. Because Article 4 of this law stipulates the aims of higher education as:

- a) To educate students so that they:
 1. will be loyal to Atatürk nationalism and to Atatürk’s reforms and principles,
 2. will be in accord with the national, ethical, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish Nation and conscious of the privilege of being a Turk,

3. will put the common good above their own personal interests and have full devotion to family, country and nation,
 4. will be fully conscious of their duties and responsibilities towards their country and will act accordingly,
 5. will be objective, broad-minded, and respectful of human rights,
 6. will develop in a balanced way, physically, mentally, psychologically, morally, and emotionally,
 7. will prove to be good citizens contributing to the country's development and welfare and at the same time acquire the necessary knowledge and skills for their future vocations.
- b) To enhance the welfare of the Turkish State as a whole, conducive to national and territorial indivisibility; to implement programs contributing to and accelerating the economic, social and cultural development of the country; and to ensure that students are constructive, creative and outstanding participants in contemporary civilization.
- c) As higher educational institutions, to carry out studies and research of high academic level, to promote knowledge and technology, to disseminate scientific findings to assist progress and development at the national level, and, through cooperation with national and international institutions, to become recognized members of the academic world and contribute to universal, contemporary progress. (at <http://yok.gov.tr/english/law>)

This long quotation strikingly reveals that 'being good citizens who are loyal to Atatürk's principles, devoted to nation and put the common good above their individual interests' has priority over 'carrying out research, promoting knowledge and technology, and disseminating scientific findings'. Hence, through higher education based on these goals the consent of the educated youth on the hegemonic discourse of republican citizenship is tried to be reinforced.

Another differentiating aspect of the post-1980 period with regard to citizenship conception is the employment of religion as an element of national solidarity. Aylin Kılıç Oğuz (2007) in her recently published book, examines the citizenship education textbooks used in Turkey during the period 1970-1990 and remarks that in a 1984 dated citizenship textbook, Islam, for the first time, was mentioned among the 'bonds that ties Turks to each other' (Kılıç Oğuz, 2007: 87). Similarly, Üstel points out to the usage of religion in the citizenship education books of the post-1980 period, as a factor to reinforce the feelings of unity and solidarity among the citizen community (Üstel: 2004: 328). İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarık add that the state elite employed Islam "as a crucial antidote to communism and divisive movements" (İçduygu et al. 2000: 196-197). In conformity with the spirit of the 1982 Constitution the Özal government who came to power in 1983 employed a socio-economic program which integrated Islam as a cultural-moral value system within a strategy of a competitive, open-market economic model. Özal's program mainly aimed "to shift the public's

attention away from the old political-legal language (freedom of expression, equality and justice) to a business-technocratic one (liberalization, privatization and de-bureaucratization)” (Karabelias, 2008:10).

However, this official understanding of citizenship based on a civic-republican model has started to be challenged by identity claims of various groups and an increasing gap was created between the state-centric citizenship understanding and the changing society. Since the late 1980s the resurgence of Islam, the reemergence of Kurdish nationalism in organized form and the emergence of civil society by initiating strong challenges to the organic vision of society “have contributed to the process of the fragmentation of political culture in Turkey” (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 8). While identity claims based on Islam has challenged the secular foundation of organic society and national identity, Kurdish citizens’ claims for the recognition of ethnic identity has defied the assumed unity between state and nation. Additionally, with the development of competent civil society organizations “the language of rights and freedoms, the discourse of individualism, and the idea of participatory democracy” have been introduced into the Turkish society (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 8). As a result of these developments, societal calls and demands were voiced for the replacement of the civic-republican model of citizenship which prioritized duties over rights with a more liberal understanding of citizenship which privileges rights. Kadioğlu notes that these demands are outcomes of the globalization process which facilitated the transfer of images and populations across countries. As a consequence, the public realm was opened up to identity-based differences that were earlier part of the private sphere. (Kadioğlu, 2005: 107) Thus, the consensus culture in which citizens were expected to identify their own interests with the national interest has begun to be shattered.

3.2.4.1. Impact of EU-Turkey Relations on Citizenship Issues

Since the 1990s European Union has started to be seen by many civil society associations and in the business circles as a good anchor to revise and extend the definition of the official understanding of citizenship by articulating individual rights

and freedoms based on identity claims. In this context, the year of 1999 constitutes a turning point in the long history of the EU-Turkey relations which entered into a new phase following the 1999 Helsinki Summit where the EU decided to include Turkey (and Malta) as a candidate for future enlargement. On March 2001 the Council of Ministers of the EU issued the Accession Partnership Document for Turkey and the Turkish National Program for the adoption of the *acquis* was approved by the Turkish Parliament. In order to start the accession negotiations the EU demanded that the political principles of the Copenhagen criteria, which are; stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights enforcement and protection of minorities, should be met. In order to meet these criteria a major constitutional reform was adopted in October 2001 aimed at strengthening guarantees in the field of human rights and fundamental freedoms and limiting capital punishment. A new Civil Code which introduces changes in areas such as gender equality, freedom of association and child protection was adopted in November 2001. Three sets of reform packages were adopted in February, March and August 2002. Among the amendments adopted are the lifting of the death penalty in peace time, the possibility for Radio and TV broadcasting in Kurdish, the widening of freedom of expression and greater freedom for non-Muslim religious minorities.

The reforms started by the coalition government were continued during the single-party majority government of the Justice and Development Party (JDP) in the aftermath of November 3, 2002 elections. The JDP government declared its full support for Turkey's integration into the EU as a full member. Between 2003 and 2005 five major packages of political reform have been adopted, introducing changes to different areas of legislation, such as freedom of expression, freedom of demonstration, cultural rights and civilian control of the military. The state of emergency in all remaining provinces of the Southeast was lifted on 30 November 2002. A new Penal Code was adopted in September 2004, replacing the 80 years old existing Penal Code. In general, the Code adopts modern European standards in line with the recent developments of criminal law in many European countries. It strengthens sanctions against certain human rights violations and introduces new offences reflecting recent developments in international criminal law such as

genocide and crimes against humanity, discrimination and abuse of personal data. The Government has also taken steps to ensure effective implementation of the reforms such as the setting up a Reform Monitoring Group. Furthermore, the government declared a zero tolerance policy towards torture. However, according to the EU Commission's 2005 Progress Report of Turkey, in spite of some positive developments on the ground, the reforms have produced limited practical effects and implementation has been slow and uneven¹⁸.

This discouraging attitude of the Commission was reinforced by the Council's decision in December 2006 stating that negotiations will not be opened on eight chapters relevant to Turkey's restrictions regarding Cyprus. In the 2007 Progress Report 'Turkey's non-fulfillment of its obligation of full and non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement' was put as the official explanation for this decision, but some journalists argue that it was related with the pressures coming from France and Germany (e.g. Matthews, 2006). As a matter of fact, since 2004 the idea of a 'privileged partnership' instead of full membership for Turkey, which was first proposed by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has been supported by some other members, particularly France.

Deniz Vardar, on the other hand, elaborates on the EU's notion of citizenship and suggests a more objective view regarding the unsupportive approach of the EU towards Turkey. Vardar notes that the notion of European citizenship has come from above 'as an addendum to liberal democracy', and adds that "EU citizenship is based on a civic conception of citizenship as opposed to an ethnic one, and argues for the need for responsible individuals to make liberal democracies work" (Vardar, 2005: 95). She remarks that this notion of citizenship is compatible with the dominant civil-society based regimes of its member countries, but will cause troubles in a society like Turkey where the state-centric understanding of citizenship requires citizens who prioritize the national interest over individual rights and freedom. According to her, the main reason of the ambivalence in the relations between the EU and Turkey

¹⁸ Regular Progress Reports for Turkey prepared on an annual basis by the EU Commission can be reached at http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents.

lies in the Turkish political elite's perception of EU membership. For the state elite, Vardar argues, EU membership is a natural further step on its path towards modernity and civilization, but being a member does not necessarily entail constructing a fully democratic and liberal society (Vardar: 2005: 98). However, for the EU side, who believe in the measurability of democracy in terms of certain criteria, Turkey still had a lot to do to strengthen its democracy so as to "enable Turkish citizens progressively enjoy rights and freedoms commensurate with those prevailing in the European Union". (2002 Progress Report for Turkey: 46)

The JDP government, on the other hand, declares its determination to continue with the accession reforms as explained in a recent speech made by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during the Turkey-EU Advisory Committee meeting held in April, 2008. He said that "Turkey did not have any hesitations regarding its EU process, and that despite the problems experienced in 2007, the reforms are continuing at full speed and it is aimed at completing the obligations of membership by 2013". Despite his explanations, as illustrated by numbers in a daily paper, the government's implementation of the reforms remained far behind its targets. (Radikal, 12.4.2008) Actually, it will not be wrong to argue that the recent agenda of the government is focused on the decision to be given by the Constitutional Court concerning the dissolution of the JDP. On March 31, the Constitutional Court announced its decision to review a case about the dissolution of the JDP and banning 71 JDP officials (including Prime Minister Erdoğan and President A. Gül) from politics for five years. This uncertainty about the future of the JDP, to a certain extent, might be an excuse for not announcing the new Civil Constitution that the party has been drafting since June 2007. But whatever the explanation is, the government seems to lack its initial enthusiasm in implementing democratization reforms.

Nevertheless, the EU membership process despite its ups and downs serves as an important target in voicing the demands of the society and individuals against the state for the improvement of rights and freedoms. This idea is clearly expressed by a

leading businessman, Ferit Şahenk in an interview for an international weekly magazine (Newsweek, 18.2.2008):

Investors and people around the world want to see the country going forward, socially speaking. That anchor [of EU membership] kind of puts us onto the road. .. the EU for Turkey is a vehicle, or a set of values, and for us to be focused on this, we have to name that target and that is the EU. And as the days go by, I hope that this gets into the roots of Turkish society, where we really go for the values, rather than just the sole target of being a member of the EU. And I hope that one day, Turkey will have the luxury of saying yes or no to the EU. (at <http://www.newsweek.com/id/109545>)

In a similar fashion, Levent Gönenç argues that “the EU process provides an invaluable opportunity for the major actors in Turkish politics to work for consolidation of democracy” and adds that “even though the EU membership process ends with failure, consolidating reforms will be added to the list of assets of Turkish democracy” (Gönenç, 2006: 26).

Debates on the concept of constitutional citizenship as a new modality can be evaluated within the framework of the EU membership discussion. Scholars supporting constitutional or multicultural constitutional citizenship argue that Turkey’s full accession to the EU depends on its attempt to transform the republican model of citizenship into a more liberal, democratic and constitutional understanding of citizenship (Vardar, 2005; Keyman and İçduygu, 2005).

3.2.4.2. Debate on Constitutional Citizenship

Constitutional citizenship was originally used in 1970s by a German political scientist, Dolf Sternberger who proposed ‘constitutional patriotism’ concept as a vehicle of loyalty to the state. According to Sternberger, for Germany, the idea of ‘nation’ because of its connotations to the Nazi era was not an appropriate device for national solidarity, but a set of common values defined constitutionally could serve this purpose. The proper functioning of such a system requires a democratic state administration and also the confidence of people to the state. (Coşkun, 2007) However, it was Habermas who delivered the concept a worldwide popularity. He used the concept in reference to European citizenship at the outset of the European

Union. He argued that a common political culture of the European Union which is defined by constitutional principles enables the coexistence of different cultures and different forms of life. He notes that “examples of multicultural societies like Switzerland and the United States demonstrate that a political culture in the seedbed of which constitutional principles are rooted, by no means has to be based on all citizens sharing the same language or the same ethnic and cultural origins” (Habermas, 1992: 17).

Vahap Coşkun notes that there are two defining features of constitutional citizenship. Firstly, according to the notion of constitutional citizenship, citizenship cannot be defined in reference to any kind of ethnic, religious or cultural identities, and thus, no privileges can be granted to any of the differences existing in the pluralist structure of the society. Accordingly, the constitution embraces pluralist values and keeps the same distance from each of the groups in the society. Hence, all differences are protected by the constitution. Secondly, constitutional citizenship debars public agencies from implementing any policies for curbing or assimilating differences. In this approach, citizenship is not regarded as an instrument that homogenizes society, but on the contrary, it is considered as a protective shield which provides legal protection to differences among citizens. (Coşkun, 2007)

Constitutional citizenship entered into Turkey’s political agenda by the then President Süleyman Demirel who first used the term in 1992. In a speech given in Budapest during the plenary session of the International Press Institute he told that “for each individual who belongs to a state through constitutional citizenship, searching and protecting his own ethnical identity is his/her legal right as a citizen.” (Ekinci, 2006) However, since then no amendments have been introduced into the ethnicity based definition of citizenship in the 1982 Constitution. According to the press news, the new Civil Constitution Draft includes a proposal for the definition of citizenship which says “Everybody who belongs to the Republic of Turkey through membership bond is called Turk, regardless of race or religion” (Bila, 2007; Şahin, 2008). However, since the proposal also includes the term Turk, it has not been considered as amelioration and other definitions have been discussed. For example,

instead of ‘Turk’ Baskın Oran proposes ‘from Turkey’ (*Türkiyeli*) or Fazıl Hüsni Erdem suggests a new definition as “Everyone who belongs to the state through a citizenship bond is the citizen of the Republic of Turkey” (Coşkun, 2007).

To recapitulate, the concept of constitutional citizenship has still been discussed by many scholars, politicians and civil society organizations as a viable solution to problems related with the official state-centric understanding of citizenship. As Keyman and İçduygu argue, constitutional citizenship by articulating identity-claims to citizenship rights will provide “not only a legal and political membership in a nation-state but also an articulating principle for the recognition of group rights” (Keyman and İçduygu: 2005: 19). Similarly, İçduygu et al. remark that if constitutional citizenship implies loyalty to state rather than nation, then for a country like Turkey where identity-based conflicts endanger the sense of unity providing a constitutional base for citizenship rights of differentiated groups will have important implications (İçduygu, Çolak and Soyarı, 2000: 203).

Up to this point, the literature and recent debates on citizenship in Turkey has been surveyed to understand the emergence and evolution of the official understanding of citizenship in Turkey. But, in order to perform the task of analyzing citizens’ perspectives in terms of specific rights and duties, a more detailed survey of studies which elaborate on the exercise of rights and duties is required, and the next section provides the results of this survey.

3.3. Studies on Citizenship Rights and Duties in Turkey

First of all, it should be mentioned that there exist no studies -at least to my knowledge- that directly attempt to analyze the theoretical and practical range of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey. There exist some important studies that examine the legal status of citizenship rights and duties in the Constitutions and in other related legal documents (Soyarı, 2000) or citizenship rights and duties in the civic education books (Üstel, 2002 and 2004; Kılıç-Oğuz, 2007). While in these studies the state-side of the citizenship was analyzed, in a very recently published

book of Birol Caymaz (1997), *Türkiye’de Vatandaşlık (Citizenship in Turkey)*, the viewpoint of Turkish citizens about their rights and duties has been studied¹⁹. Caymaz by employing a deep-interview technique summarized the opinions of 60 persons living in different cities of Turkey under the headings of ‘connotations of citizenship’, ‘feeling of being a citizen’, and ‘rights and freedoms’. I shall return to the findings of this book in the next chapter.

In addition to the above mentioned studies on citizenship, there are several studies which examine the exercise of some rights, but not necessarily within a citizenship perspective. The rights mentioned in these studies, either directly or through some indicators, were put in the same table with the list of citizenship rights provided by Janoski. The comparison table is presented in Appendix A. The main idea behind such a comparison process is to find out the way citizenship rights were handled in order to properly formulate the citizenship items to be used in measuring citizenship perception of citizens. Now, the studies cited in the comparison table will be briefly reviewed with reference to citizenship rights.

In some studies the practice of political participation were analyzed in terms of membership to political parties, voting behaviour, patronage policies of political parties and partisanship (Özbudun, 1976; Ünsal, 1998; Heper, 1998). On the other hand, the status of women as citizens is discussed with reference to access to education, their place in business life and family, their legal rights according to the Civil Code and problems in implementation or their identity claims based on gender (Kadioğlu, 1996; Arat 1998; İlkcaracan and İlkcaracan, 1998). In addition, some articles focus on specific events, such as Bergama movement as an example of a citizen movement (Öncü and Koçan, 2005), or on citizenship experiences of particular groups such as non-Muslim minorities (Soner, 2005), demands of Islamic groups (Çolak, 2005) and Kurds in Southeastern Anatolia (İçduygu, Romano and Sirkeci, 1999). However, the survey revealed that most of the studies examine citizenship rights, particularly social rights, within the framework of the ties of kinship, family, sect and *hemşerilik* (relations between fellow townsmen) (Dubetsky,

¹⁹ I would like to thank to Nalan Soyark for informing me about this book.

1977; Baştuğ, 1977; Güneş-Ayata, 1991; Erder, 1996a, 1996b and 1998; Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu, 1998; Ayata-Ayata, 2000). Although these studies focus on different samples or settings (e.g. squatter housing areas, different quarters of the same city, urban poor, migrants), they agree that social networks, that is, the ties of kinship, family, sect and *hemşerilik* play a major role in the access of citizens to main social rights of housing, employment, education, health and social security. It is argued that since the state does not develop adequate social policies, individuals, especially those migrating from rural areas to big cities conceive social networks as efficient mechanisms to overcome the inefficiencies of the state institutions. Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu note that during the state-formation process of the Turkish Republic it was aimed to achieve a radical transformation in the society both at the institutional and at the socio-cultural level on the basis of Western rational mind and scientific reasoning, but while doing this, “particular features of existing social life, motivations, personal feelings, understandings and attitudes” were neglected (Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu, 1998: 70). Hence the reforms changed the institutions but cultural, religious, political and economic discrepancies continued to exist. Then, individuals by using traditional social network relations developed ‘alternative strategies from below’ which can also be considered as alternative means of social control and organization to cope with the inefficiencies of the state services. It is possible to interpret these social networks as ‘small platoons’, borrowing the term used by Edmund Burke. According to Burke, the small platoons of social life –home, family, neighbourhood and friendship networks, church and voluntary organization- are the indispensable blocks of social and moral order. (Saunders, 1993: 84)

On the other hand, the citizenship rights of Turkish emigrants, mostly workers in abroad are discussed within the framework of dual citizenship concept (İçduygu, Çolak, Soyarık, 2000; İçduygu, 2002; İçduygu, 2005).

Therefore, as far as the universal individual rights are concerned, the studies on citizenship rights in Turkey mainly focus on the exercise of social rights. Additionally, the identity claims of gender, ethnic and religious (non-Muslim

minorities and Islamic groups) groups have been discussed along with the dual citizenship issues of Turkish workers living abroad.

In addition to these studies, findings of two public opinion polls may provide some insights concerning citizen perceptions regarding rights and duties. The first one is a survey on 'Social, Political and Economic Values in Turkey' conducted in 1997 to 1907 persons as part of the 'World Values Research' project. Among the findings of the survey which was reported by Yılmaz Esmer (1999) there are; citizen behaviour regarding voting, participation to social movement and protests, trust to institutions, and tolerance to neighbours of different religion or ethnic origin. The results indicate that while voting rates are generally high in Turkey (ranges between 70 and 92%) participation to social protest movements (collective petition, manifests, protest meetings or strikes) is very low (the highest rate is 14% for collective petition). On the other hand, while the political parties are the least trusted institution (30%), the citizens have total confidence in the military (94%). Findings on respondents' tolerance to neighbours, which is a citizenship duty, show that 61% do not desire to have a Christian neighbour and 41% indicate that they do not want a neighbour of a different ethnic origin. Another important result concerns the expectations of citizens from the state which was formulated as "in your opinion what is the most important target of the country for the next year?" Four choices are presented as: to secure law and order; participation to decisions; controlling inflation; and protection of the freedom of expression. The results indicate that the most important target for respondents is the protection of public order (38%), whereas only 20% give priority to the protection of the freedom of expression.

The findings of another public opinion poll which was recently conducted within the framework of a research project on 'Conservatism in Turkey; Family, Religion and the West' under the supervision of Hakan Yılmaz (2006) are also important in displaying citizens' opinions towards rights. The poll was realized through face-to-face interviews with 1644 persons (over 18 years old) living in urban and rural areas of 15 cities during the period December 15, 2005 and January 6, 2006. Among other questions on conservatism interviewees were also asked to define the most

indispensable right. According to the answers ‘equality before the law’ is regarded by 50% of respondents as the most indispensable right. The other most indispensable rights are listed as freedom of religion (19%); right to elect and being elected (11%); organization and protest rights (7%) and right to property and contract (6%). Additionally, the respondents were required to indicate the rights that they think; a) cannot be constrained under any circumstances, b) can be totally constrained if necessary. The percentages of those who think that the following rights ‘cannot be constrained under any circumstances’ versus those who think that they ‘can be totally restricted if necessary’ are shown in parentheses respectively: right to hold free and fair elections (92% vs. 7%); equal treatment to all citizens regardless of their economic status, education background, gender, mother language, religion, family or birth place (91% vs. 7%); freedom of communication (91% vs. 7%); freedom to earn money, right to set up a business and hold property (89% vs. 7%); freedom of expression (89% vs. 9%); freedom of religious belief and practice (89% vs. 9%); freedom to choose not to believe in a religion (88% vs. 9%); right to elect and being elected (87% vs. 12%); right of political parties to fair competition (85% vs. 12%); right of non-Muslim citizens to practice their religions and protect their cultures (81% vs. 15%); freedom of the press and the media (76% vs. 21%); right of citizens whose mother language is not Turkish to speak in their native languages and protect their cultures freely (76% vs. 19%); right to affiliate with a union, association or similar NGOs (75% vs. 17%); right to not being tortured (74% vs. 23%); right to protest movements (66% vs. 28%); freedom to sexual choice (37% vs. 58%).

What has been presented up to here concerns the practice of citizenship. Now, the current Constitution (1982) should be reviewed in order to see the main legal framework of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey. In the Constitution the citizenship rights and duties are explained in the Chapters II, III and IV of the Part Two under the heading of ‘Fundamental Rights and Duties’. Chapter II stipulates legal (civil); Chapter III presents social and economic; and Chapter IV specifies political rights and duties. In addition, ‘the right of equality before the law’ is explained in Article 10 of the First Part of ‘General Principles’. The related articles of the Constitution corresponding to the rights listed by Janoski are indicated in the

comparison table of the Appendix A²⁰. As for the duties, the Constitution names only three duties. While education and military service are stipulated respectively as ‘the right and duty of training and education’ and ‘the right and duty of national service’, tax payment is explained under the title of ‘obligation to pay taxes’. However, the explanation made in Article 12 at the beginning of Part Two is striking to reveal the essence of the citizenship understanding of the state: “The fundamental rights and freedoms also comprise the duties and responsibilities of the individual to the society, his or her family, and other individuals.” This is a typical civic-republican understanding which accentuates duties and even considers duties as rights of citizens.

The restriction of fundamental rights and freedoms is regulated according to the provisions of Article 13, and the conditions for the suspension of the exercise of rights under state of emergency are stipulated in Article 15. However, as noted by Kemal Gözler (2001: 220-224), the ambiguous conceptualization (e.g. spirit of the Constitution) existing in Article 13 causes different interpretations:

Article 13 (as amended on October 17, 2001): Fundamental rights and freedoms may be restricted only by law and in conformity with the reasons mentioned in the relevant articles of the Constitution without infringing upon their essence. These restrictions shall not be in conflict with the letter and spirit of the Constitution and the requirements of the democratic order of the society and the secular Republic and the principle of proportionality.

In addition to these articles, Article 14 regulates the abusive exercise of rights:

None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, and endangering the existence of the democratic and secular order of the Turkish Republic based upon human rights.

Apart from these articles the Preamble of the Constitution specifies the general principles with which citizens should act in compliance while exercising their rights. According to the paragraph 5 of the Preamble “no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish national interests, the principle of the indivisibility of the

²⁰ I used the English translation of the Constitution which is available at the official website of the Prime Ministry Directorate General of Press and Information. (retrieved on December 2007 from <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm>)

existence of Turkey with its state and territory, Turkish historical and moral values or the nationalism, principles and reforms, and modernism of Atatürk". Thus, it is clear that duties of citizens are not limited to those of tax payment, military service and education.

Osman Can (2007) describes 1982 Constitution as a 'pragmatic' constitution which aims at "saving the state, transforming the society and creating the homo-economicus". It has been agreed that the Constitution prepared in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup had an authoritarian approach to rights and freedoms. (Soysal, 2007; Can, 2007) Can argues that the main target was to put fundamental rights and freedoms under control, because they could be turned into the most dangerous arm in the hands of persons who have evil intentions of dividing the Turkish state and harming the Turkish nation (Can, 2007:11). He maintains that particularly those rights related with communicative, collective and political actions were perceived as possible threats, but on the other hand, economic rights (rights to property and contract) were protected. Since 1987, fifteen Constitution amendments have been realized²¹. As a result of these amendments most of which was promulgated as part of the EU accession process, the Constitution evolved into a more libertarian document from an authoritarian one. However, Can argues that the Constitution became a 'paradox Constitution', because while the amendments diminished the authority of the legislative body to constrain the fundamental rights, the general restrictions defined by the essential principles of the Preamble have not been modified. (Can, 2007: 15)

3.4. Conclusion

In this chapter the state-formation, nation-building and citizenship-construction processes of the modern Turkey have been briefly discussed. It has been intended to explore the origins of the prevailing official understanding of citizenship in Turkey through a survey of the historical trajectory of the 'making' of modern Turkey,

²¹ These amendments (the last one being that of February 9, 2008) are listed by Kemal Gözler in the website: <http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1982ay.htm>.

supported by theoretical explanations. The main idea of the chapter is to identify the distinguishing characteristics of the citizenship understanding of the Turkish state which will serve as a reference point from which the deviations of the perceptions of citizens are to be measured.

As discussed in the previous chapter, citizenship is embedded in modernity, and in Turkey development of citizenship followed the same pattern as well, and the state-formation, nation-building and citizenship construction processes went hand-in-hand with modernization efforts which go back to the late Ottoman period.

Following the proclamation of Republic in 1923 the main task that the state elite set forth was to reach to the level of contemporary nations. Accordingly, the founding principles of the Kemalist state were defined by the six arrows of nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, etatism and revolutionism. Populism principle is in fact the reflection of the solidarism theory of Ziya Gökalp on the basis of Durkheim's ideas. What was intended by the principle of populism is that people who are organized in professional associations rather than in conflicting and competing classes would work in solidarity to achieve the common goal of civilization. In fact, in all principles it is possible to see the imprints of Ziya Gökalp's formulation for a state: 'establishing a Turkish state based on the culture of the Turkish nation, accepting Western civilization and making Islam a matter of conscience'. Consequently, the Republican state was designed as a republican secular state based on the economic principle of etatism and on the societal organization of populism and nationalist solidarity and aimed 'to reach to the level of contemporary civilizations'.

This state 'in search of its nation' had to construct the citizens who would incorporate the will to civilization. Thus, the Turkish citizenship was defined from above by the republican elite and its distinguishing characteristics were defined as 'civilized' and 'patriotic'. The ideal citizen should be 'civilized' to achieve the goal of progress and be 'patriotic' to ensure the social order. It is also possible to argue that a simple discourse analysis of the daily 'oath' of Turkish primary school

students, which was quoted in the beginning of this chapter, will reveal the ‘civilization’ and ‘patriotism’ duties of citizens. The child-citizen since the early years of the Republic is expected to devote herself/himself to civilization and to the Turkish nation. In sum, Turkish citizenship was defined from above within the civic-republican tradition by emphasizing duties over rights and in a way to cover not only public space but also the private life of the individual.

Since 1990s this state-centric understanding of citizenship has started to be challenged by identity claims of various groups. Since EU’s declaration of Turkey as a candidate in 1999 Helsinki Summit, the process of accession to the EU also contributed to the debate on the need to revise and redefine the official civic-republican understanding. In response to these demands ‘constitutional citizenship’ has been suggested and discussed as a means of articulating identity claims to citizenship rights.

Furthermore, the literature was surveyed with reference to rights and duties in Turkey. It has been observed that the citizenship studies focus not only on the universal individual rights but also the group-differentiated rights. The results of the survey will be used in the next chapter in formulating the items of rights and duties to be employed in the research study in order to understand the citizen side of the citizenship practice in Turkey.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The starting point of this thesis is to explore how people in Turkey relate themselves to the state. To this end, it is proposed that a research should be done to identify the kind of citizenship perception of the Turkish citizens by employing citizenship rights and duties as concepts embracing all the spheres where the citizens interact with the state. Essentially it is aimed to investigate the concept of citizenship in Turkey from the viewpoint of citizens, because as explained before “the position of citizens has become more in need of central attention in citizenship debates” (İçduygu, 2005: 196). It is expected that an analysis of perceptions of citizens based on their practices will have repercussions on the broader context of citizenship studies and will open up new dimensions to theoretical discussions on the relations between the nation-state and its citizens.

4.1. Research Questions and Hypotheses

Before describing the research questions some basic concepts of relevance to the research design should be revisited. As explained in the theoretical framework, based on two aspects of citizenship as *membership* and *status* in terms of rights and duties several approaches to citizenship with reference to i) the way it was developed, ii) the reasons of its emergence and evolution, and iii) its content (rights and duties) are distinguished. While the previous chapter explored the development of the concept of citizenship in Turkey along with the reasons underlying its construction process, the research analysis will focus on the content of citizenship. As to be recalled the content of citizenship is analysed on the basis of a philosophical dichotomy, namely, the *classical* or *civic-republican* versus the *liberal* or *liberal-individualist*

understandings of citizenship. While in the civic-republican conception of citizenship duties have the priority over rights, the liberal understanding accentuates rights. In addition, in liberal approach “individuals are both logically and morally prior to society and the state”, whereas in civic-republican approach “individuals are *not* thought as being logically and morally prior to society” (Oldfield, 1994: 189, 192). In civic-republicanism, the practice of citizenship entails a shared responsibility for the identity and continuity of a particular community. In contrast to this communally based conception of citizenship, in liberal-individualist conception the social bonds between individuals are contractual. (Oldfield, 1994: 189)

Following these reminding theoretical notes, the citizenship understanding in Turkey which was discussed in the previous chapter should be summarized. Chapter III has explained that within the modernity project of Turkey in the aftermath of the proclamation of the Republic, the Turkish notion of citizenship was defined by the state elite on the basis of a civic-republican tradition which accentuates duties and the superiority of nation over the individual. It has also been remarked that since the late 1980s this civic-republican notion of citizenship has been contested and several groups have started to raise their voices in search of more rights. Most of the studies are grounded on documentary analyses and mainly focused on the construction of Turkish citizenship at the state level. With the exception of a recent study (Caymaz, 2007) the concept of citizenship from the point of view of citizens in Turkey has not been elaborated. The study conducted by Caymaz concludes that the citizens interviewed have an understanding of citizenship which gives more weight to the state and refers to duties (Caymaz, 2007: 158). The results of this study will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. To recapitulate, in Turkey the state elite adopted a civic-republican citizenship understanding, and according to the results of the only available study citizens also embraced this view.

What is aimed to be done in this research study is to explore, on the basis of empirical evidence, whether citizens in Turkey embrace the citizenship understanding designed and imposed by the state elite or they have a perception of citizenship different from the official view. Since it is desired to identify the citizens’

perception of citizenship with respect to rights and duties, the two conceptions of citizenship as civic-republican versus liberal-individualist will be employed as the reference models. Thus, the research will be designed to explore whether citizens in Turkey have a civic-republican or liberal perception of citizenship. To put it more explicitly, the principal task of the thesis is to find out if citizens in Turkey have a duty-surplus or right-surplus perception of citizenship. Therefore, as mentioned earlier, the survey research is aimed to *measure* only the balance between rights and duties, but not other characteristics of these two traditions, such as the priority of the individual or the society, nor the distinguishing feature of the bonds between individuals. It should also be added that in analyzing citizenship rights and duties, the tripartite form of citizenship proposed by T.H. Marshall is used. Therefore, the research study attempts to identify the citizens' perception of citizenship not only with respect to the balance between total rights and duties but also in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship.

Thus, the basic research question of the study is: What kind of citizenship perception(s) do the citizens in Turkey have in terms of rights and duties? The related set of questions can be formulated in the following way: Do the citizens in Turkey have a citizenship perception based more on duties or on rights? In other words, is their understanding of citizenship can be identified as a civic-republican or a liberal-individualist one? Does the perception vary according to civil, political and social elements of citizenship? Do people from different social groups perceive citizenship differently? Do citizens representing the state sphere have differing perceptions than those representing the civil society?

On the basis of above research questions supported by theoretical background the following assumptions and hypotheses are advanced.

The primary assumptions are:

1. Citizenship perception can be measured through people's opinions and attitudes.

2. People's opinions and attitudes about citizenship rights and duties will provide the basic indicators to be used as a basis in developing a scale for measuring the citizenship perception.

The main hypotheses are:

1. There are differences in citizenship perceptions of people from various social groups based on occupational organizations.
2. The citizens in Turkey who are representatives of the state sphere have duty-based citizenship perceptions.
3. The citizens in Turkey from social groups based on occupational organizations representing the civil society prioritize rights over duties.
4. In terms of civil, political and social elements people from different social groups have dissimilar perceptions of citizenship.

In order to test these hypotheses a research should be designed to measure how citizens in Turkey from different social groups perceive their citizenship statuses in terms of rights and duties. The thesis focuses on the expectations of citizens from the state in terms of citizenship rights, and their responsibilities towards the state and other citizens in terms of citizenship duties. Therefore, if the opinions and attitudes of citizens concerning their rights and duties vis-à-vis the state and other citizens can be measured, then it will be possible to analyze the way people perceive citizenship. Thus, a methodological tool that can measure attitudes or opinions is needed. Scaling is the generally accepted measurement instrument for that purpose. Since in the literature I could not have encountered to any scale developed to measure citizenship perception, the main methodological task of this thesis will be an attempt to construct scales for measuring citizenship perception in terms of rights and duties.

4.2. Development of the Scale

According to the guidelines provided by Robert F. DeVellis (2003: 60-101) there are eight main steps in developing measurement scales:

1. determine clearly what it is you want to measure
2. generate an item pool
3. determine the format for measurement
4. have the initial item pool reviewed by experts
5. consider inclusion of validation items
6. administer items to a development sample
7. evaluate the items
8. optimize scale length

Since the methodological study of this thesis mainly aims to develop a measurement scale for citizenship perception, the organization of this chapter is based on the above guidelines. But, first of all the definition of a scale and an index should be given.

DeVellis defines a scale in the following way:

“Measurement instruments that are collections of items combined into a composite score and intended to reveal levels of theoretical variables not readily observable by direct means, are often referred to as *scales*. We develop scales when we want to measure phenomena that we believe to exist because of our understanding of the world, but that we cannot assess directly.” (DeVellis, 2003: 8-9)

He distinguishes between a scale and an index in terms of their items. For him a *scale* consists of items whose values are caused by an underlying construct, whereas an *index* is a set of items that determine the level of a construct.

Neuman (1992:146) on the other hand, points out the interchangeable use of the terms *index* and *scale*. He claims that for most purposes scales and indexes can be treated interchangeably. According to his definition “a scale is a measure in which a researcher captures the intensity, direction, level or potency of a variable construct. It arranges responses or observations on a continuum.” (Neuman, 1992: 146) He explains that scales are commonly used for measuring how an individual feels or thinks about something. According to Neuman scales are used for two related purposes. First, since the scales show the fit between a set of indicators and a construct they are helpful in the conceptualization process. Second, scaling produces quantitative measures to be used in testing hypotheses. (Neuman, 1992: 151)

Neuman defines an index as “a measure in which a researcher adds or combines several distinct indicators of a construct into a single score.” (Neuman, 1992: 146) He adds that if a researcher has several indicators that are scales then s/he can combine the features of scales and indexes in a single measure. By adding these indicators together to yield a single score the researcher creates an index.

In the light of these views I prefer to use the term *scale* to indicate the instrument to be developed on the basis of items to measure attitudes and opinions of people concerning citizenship rights and obligations.

4.2.1. Purpose of the Scale

The purpose of the scale to be developed is to measure what people think about citizenship in terms of citizenship rights and duties. In order to measure the level of their perception a benchmark typology is required. In other words, an ideal type of citizen-state relationship should be defined. In such an ideal relationship it is expected that both the state and its citizens act as responsible actors. By “responsibility” it is meant that both parties respect each other’s rights. Hence, the citizens being aware of their rights as citizens expect the state should ensure their civil, political and social rights, and in turn, they fulfill their duties toward the state. According to William Galston’s account, *responsible citizenship* requires four types of civic virtues:

- (i) general virtues: courage; law-abidingness; loyalty,
- (ii) social virtues: independence; open-mindedness,
- (iii) economic virtues: work ethic; capacity to delay self-gratification; adaptability to economic and technological change,
- (iv) political virtues: capacity to discern and respect the rights of others; willingness to demand only what can be paid for; ability to evaluate the performance of those in office; willingness to engage in public discourse (Galston, 1991, quoted in Kymlicka and Norman, 2000:7).

It can be safely argued that Galston’s description of virtues required for responsible citizenship have many aspects similar to the conception of Turkish citizenship based on a civic-republican understanding.

On the other hand, I will argue that a responsible state in this ideal case should provide the rights of its citizens and expect that citizens perform their duties.

It should be emphasized that this ideal responsible citizen-state relation is just a hypothetical construct which will serve as a measurement basis to be used in the scale development. It will be a reference point from which the deviations of the attitudes and opinions of the citizens (survey respondents) are to be measured. In this construct it is assumed that as of civil and political rights citizens are entitled to the universally accepted rights (e.g. freedom of speech, freedom of religion and conscience, enfranchisement). For the social rights, since the Republic of Turkey declares itself as a welfare state in its Constitution, the citizens expect the provision of a social citizenship status as they do in a welfare state. It is assumed that the welfare state of the hypothetical construct should have the basic features of a 'social-democratic welfare state' as defined by Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990). According to Esping-Andersen welfare states cluster into three distinct regime types as liberal, conservative/corporatist and social democratic. The social-democratic welfare state is "characterized by the principle of universal access, equality of provision between the social and occupational groups and a strong commitment social citizenship" (Rodger, 2000: 66). Esping-Andersen notes that a social-democratic welfare state which aims to emancipate both the market and the traditional family, grants transfers directly to children, and takes direct responsibility of caring for children, the aged and the helpless (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 28). Thus, it is assumed that in the ideal construct, the welfare state in conformity with social democracy principles will provide its citizens universal welfare benefits which enable them to be protected against illness, old age and unemployment in addition to a public provision of housing and education.

Accordingly, the underlying construct in this research is that in a hypothetical construct of an ideal reciprocal responsibility relationship between a social democratic welfare state and its citizens, the latter will think and react as responsible and respectful actors in the context of citizenship rights, duties, and expectations from the state or in their relations with other citizens. Therefore, by developing a

scale consisting of items measuring the attitudes and opinions of people about citizenship rights and duties I hope to measure the deviation of Turkish citizens' perceptions or perspectives from this hypothetical construct of responsible citizenship in a welfare state.

4.2.2. Finding the Items

In order to find the scale as explained in the previous chapter, in addition to the lists of citizenship rights and duties presented by Janoski, studies on rights and duties in Turkey are reviewed. The rights or relevant indicators for specific rights elaborated in these studies together with the rights stipulated in the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey were compared with the classification of rights by Janoski in a table which was given in Appendix A. The comparison table is useful to see the theoretical and legal range of rights but in order to properly formulate the items we need the opinions of 'the citizen on the street'. Thus, in order to have an initial idea about the conceptualization of citizenship by citizens it was decided to conduct a pilot survey.

4.2.2.1. Ankara Pilot Survey

A questionnaire was prepared to see people's opinions about citizenship rights and obligations. It contains 16 open-ended questions a copy of which is available in Appendix B. The questionnaire aimed to understand people's opinions about the concept of citizenship, citizenship rights and obligations, the duties of the state and their attitudes towards social problems as citizens.

The survey was conducted in August 2003 to randomly selected 40 persons (20 males, 20 females) living in different locations of Ankara with different occupations and educational backgrounds. I gave 6 of the surveys to colleagues and friends who completed and returned the questionnaires to me. For the majority of the surveys I went to parks, cafes, small shops (stationery and newspaper shop, beauty saloon) and taxi stops in popular and crowded regions of Ankara (Kızılay, Yüksel Caddesi, Sıhhiye, Yukarı Ayrancı) and asked persons if they are willing to be interviewed and

when accepted I directed the questions and noted down the responses. For a few of the surveys I went to the squatter house of the woman who cleans my house and interviewed her neighbours (in Yukarı Dikmen). For the remaining questionnaires I got appointments from people working at different professional levels in private corporations. The personal profiles of the interviewees are presented also in Appendix B.

Since the leading motive of this pilot survey has been to determine the rights and duties cited by citizens, the results of the pilot study were not evaluated systematically. But, an initial look at the findings shows that there is a close relation between the educational background of the interviewee and her/his conception of citizenship. While those having higher education levels possess a clear opinion about citizenship as a concept and have much to say about their rights and duties as citizens, those with less or no education experienced difficulties in conceptualizing citizenship. It is also observed that there exists a close relation between the socio-economic status of the individual and her/his opinion about her/his rights as a citizen in Turkey. However, since the pilot questionnaire did not contain any direct questions about the income level of the persons it may not be correct to explicitly claim that “socio-economic status” influences the perception of citizenship. Rather, it is fair to point out that if the person interviewed experiences financial difficulties s/he believes that s/he has no rights at all as a citizen in Turkey as observed in the following remarks of two interviewees:

A (male, 24, taxi driver): “I don’t think that I have a right at all. If you do not have money you cannot get any services of health, education and the like. In Turkey it is always the money that talks.”

“Hiçbir hakkım olduğunu düşünmüyorum. Sağlık, eğitim vb. paran yoksa faydalanamıyorsun, Türkiye’de her zaman para konuşuyor.”

B (male, 36, peddler): “We have no rights at all. Those in the upper classes have (rights) but those in lower classes do not have (any). As a simple citizen if I happen to deal with the police they will treat me as a second class citizen.”

“Hiçbir hakkımız yok. Üst tabakada yaşayanın var da alt tabakadakinin yok. Sade vatandaş olarak karakola düşsem ikinci sınıf vatandaş yerine konurum.”

As for the citizenship duties there is almost a consensus that military service, voting and paying taxes are the main responsibilities of the citizens.

4.2.2.2. AFP Project Pilot Survey

In addition to the above-mentioned pilot survey, there exists another pilot survey on ‘the relationship between the state and individuals and the perception of the citizenship concept in Turkey’ which had been conducted during the summer of 2001. This survey had been performed within the framework of a Research Fund Project (AFP) by the Department of Sociology, METU. The in-depth questionnaire of citizenship titled ‘Pilot Survey on State-Individual Relationship and Perception of the Concept of Citizenship in Turkey’ which contained approximately 100 questions, most of which are open-ended, was applied to 390 individuals (323 males, 67 females) from different socio-economic status groups in Ankara, İstanbul and İzmir. The results of this survey were also used to find the indicators for rights and duties to be employed in developing a citizenship scale. A copy of the questionnaire is available in Appendix C.

4.2.2.3. Comparison of the Pilot Surveys with Janoski’s Classification of Rights and Duties

The results of the AFP project survey and Ankara pilot study were compared with the classification of Janoski’s citizenship rights and obligations. The comparison table is submitted in Appendix D.

Results of the Ankara pilot survey show that people mainly complain about not being able to exercise their social rights. Another remarkable point is that there are some rights defined by Janoski such as *access to courts and counsel, refugee rights* or *compensatory rights* that were not mentioned by any of the interviewees. But without articulating any specific right people have a general opinion about their citizenship rights: they either think that they do not have any rights at all or they have all the constitutional rights but there are problems in practice.

The AFP project results indicate that in general people cannot benefit from their social rights, because of the inadequate services of the state and they prefer to use their social networks.

Concerning the citizenship duties, the results of the Ankara pilot survey indicate that people interviewed mention different obligations than those listed by Janoski. For instance, some people believe that “to protect the indivisibility of the fatherland and its territorial integrity and to object to any kind of opinion and action which violate the indivisible integrity of the country”; “loving the Turkish Republic” and “not being a traitor”; “raising a cultured, educated child who is beneficial to the fatherland and nation.”; “living in accordance with our mores and traditions, according to whatever we learnt from our parents”; “respecting the flag, the official representatives of the state such as the President and the Prime Minister” and “protecting the state” are all citizenship duties. It is clear that these duties bear the imprints of the discourse of a patriotic citizen. On the other hand, there are some people who think that they do not have any responsibilities towards the state because the state does not protect the rights of the citizen. Similarly, the AFP project results reveal that people commonly believe that the state does not perform its duties towards the citizens.

At this point, the findings of Birol Caymaz’s (2007) study on citizen perceptions should be reviewed. The study which was published long after the above pilot surveys has many similarities with the Ankara pilot survey. Caymaz employing a deep-interview technique directed questions on citizenship to 60 persons living in different cities of Turkey. He summarized the findings under three main headings: ‘what does citizenship reminds to citizens?’; ‘when do citizens perceive/feel their citizenship?’, and ‘rights and duties’. He concludes that citizenship is mainly conceived as a concept in which national feelings are dominant. Thus, most of the interviewees feel themselves as communally bonded to the state and national community rather than exhibiting an individual stance. In addition to this general evaluation he argues that three ideal types of citizens emerge as ‘citizen in himself’; ‘altruistic citizen’ and ‘citizen for himself’. The first type refers to those who are not aware of their citizenship statuses or rights and fulfill their duties involuntarily.

According to Caymaz this category is made up of the silent and crowded mass of the poor and the deprived. Altruistic citizen, on the other hand, is the citizen of the fatherland, nation and the state who does not take actions individually. This ‘militant’ citizen embraces communal ideals of national values and interests, and nation service, and approves and favors the state. Caymaz describes the last ideal type of ‘citizen for himself’ as the one who tries to consciously exercise his rights and freedoms, insists on his rights, perceives citizenship mainly as attachment to the place where he lives and feels responsibility not only to the state but also to the society in fulfilling his duties. (Caymaz, 2007: 110-111) Similar to the above pilot studies’ findings, concerning rights and duties, according to the interviewees while they do not have important problems in the exercise of civil and political rights, they encounter difficulties regarding access to social rights of health, education, and unemployment benefit. Additionally, Caymaz interprets the emphasis put by some citizens on their ethnic, cultural or religious differences as a reaction to the discriminative practices of the rulers despite their egalitarian discourses on rights. (Caymaz, 2007: 160)

4.2.2.4. Item Pool for Citizenship Questionnaire

By using the results of the above studies and surveys together with the framework of Janoski for citizenship rights and obligations an item pool was generated. The items are indicators of citizenship rights and obligations. In developing the items although the range of rights and obligations was mainly taken from Janoski (1998) and Janoski and Gran (2002), it was preferred to use the classical tripartite categorization of T.H. Marshall for rights and duties, namely, civil (legal), political and social rights and obligations, because as Işın and Turner (2002) suggested participation rights (and obligations) proposed by Janoski can be treated under the social rights (and obligations) category.

In total, 30 items for citizenship rights and 26 items for citizenship obligations were generated. Following these items which will constitute the indicators for citizenship scale two parts were added to the questionnaire. The first part includes 20 items

designed to capture people's opinions about the general practice of citizenship rights and obligations in Turkey. All the items were formulated on the basis of the Ankara pilot survey results. The last section of the survey is about the duties of the state, all of which were also stated by the respondents of the Ankara pilot survey. These two additional sections are designed to obtain complementary data to be used in evaluating perception of citizenship as a whole, and not with reference to specific rights and duties.

4.2.3. Format for measurement

In presenting the items, using a Likert scale was preferred. Thus, the items are presented as declarative sentences followed by 5 response options indicating varying degrees of agreement with the statement. The response options used are: "strongly disagree", "disagree", "neither agree nor disagree", "agree" and "strongly agree" where the third option indicates a neutral midpoint.

4.2.4. Revision of Items

After preparing the draft questionnaire with these items I made another pilot survey to a sample of 20 persons asking them to respond the questions together with their comments. In the meantime we held a thesis progress committee where I presented the items to the exam committee members for their critical evaluation. Based on the feedback from the respondents as well as the comments and proposals of the exam committee members I revised the wording of the items, discarded some of them and added new items. Furthermore, the committee members pointed to the importance of the EU for the citizenship debate in Turkey and advised me to add a new section on Turkey's accession to EU. By using these items another scale was decided to be developed in order to measure people's opinions concerning the possible effects of Turkey's EU membership on citizenship issues. The final questionnaire contains 32 items for citizenship rights and 25 items for citizenship obligations, 7 items for Turkey's EU membership, 20 items on general practice of citizenship rights and

duties in Turkey and 16 items for the duties of the state. A copy of the questionnaire together with its English translation is presented in Appendix E.

4.2.5. Sampling

The present thesis aims to be able to understand citizenship perceptions of Turkish people from different social groups. For practical reasons of easy access to respondents it is decided to select social groups on the basis of occupational organizations. In determining the occupational groups the breakdown of the society proposed by Janoski provided an excellent tool. By using Habermas's (1989) view of the public sphere and Cohen and Arato's (1992) reconstruction of civil society Janoski divides society into four spheres which may interact with each other in several ways: i) the private, ii) market, iii) public and iv) state spheres (Janoski, 1998: 12-17). Since these spheres are represented by several occupational organizations, a sample of people from the social groups determined by occupational organizations of each sphere will be a rather representative sample of the society. The components of these spheres and their interaction areas are presented in Figure 4.1.

The state sphere involves legislative (law making), executive (law-implementing) and judicial (law and constitution-evaluating) organizations. The private sphere consists of family life, networks of friends and acquaintances and the disposition of personal property. The existence of the private sphere relies on a right to privacy, but in modern times the market (through the position of private property), state (by implementing laws affecting families, such as child abuse laws) and public spheres (through media which publicize the private lives of some citizens or through social movements and public debates) have invaded the private sphere. (Janoski, 1998:13)




Figure 4.1: A Conceptual Diagram of the Public and Private Spheres that Locate Civil Society

Source: Janoski, 1998:13

While private and state spheres are easier to define, identifying the boundaries of the public and market spheres is rather complicated because of their intense interaction.

The market sphere consists of private and a few public organizations that are engaged in the instrumental creation of income and wealth through the production of goods and services. It includes private firms and corporations engaged in business activities, stock markets, employer federations, professional associations, consumer groups and trade unions. The consumer groups and trade unions are generally in the overlap area of the public and market spheres since they also perform self-regulatory or negotiation functions between groups (Janoski, 1998: 14).

In the public sphere there are voluntary associations which are mainly political parties, interest groups, welfare associations, social movements and religious bodies. The public sphere also includes some private organizations. A corporation would fall under the market sphere in the sense of an owner utilizing private property. However, the corporation enters the public sphere voluntarily when it seeks to mold public opinion or influence legislation, especially through interest groups representing business. In this sense, professional associations of employers are located in the public sphere. Finally, the media as private corporations or public agencies are in the public sphere, but they overlap with the market or state spheres. (Janoski, 1998: 15)

Since it is rather difficult to find proper representatives of the private sphere and since the first three spheres are represented by different social groups based on occupational organizations that are easy to reach, the sample of the survey is limited to the state, public and market spheres. Bureaucracy and the military are chosen as the representatives of the state sphere. These two groups are also chosen as the main decision making bodies in Turkey. The upper-level bureaucrats (Head of Departments and over) in the Ministries and other public administrations will constitute the sample of the bureaucracy. For the military, the priority will be given to the general staff officers, as they are the persons who take the strategic decisions.

For the public sphere, the professional employers associations, which are voluntary organizations, are chosen as the representative groups. It was decided to conduct the survey to the members of TÜSİAD (Türk Sanayicileri ve İş Adamları Derneği- Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen) and MÜSİAD (Müstakil

Sanayiciler ve İşadamları Derneği- Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen) as the representatives of the public sphere.

TÜSİAD which was founded in 1971 is the oldest employer association of Turkey. Although it has a small number of members (as of 2006 it has 566 members) its member companies constitute 43% of Turkey's value added in the manufacturing and service sectors. Its membership is composed of owners and managers of individual firms, groups of companies and holding companies that occupy prominent positions in the Turkish economy. TÜSİAD as a non-governmental organization (NGO) is highly influential in determining Turkey's political agenda. MÜSİAD, on the other hand, is a recent organization which was established in 1990. However, with 2000 members and 26 branches it is an active and strong NGO as well. It is also known that while TÜSİAD is considered to represent the Westernized, modern and secular businessmen, MÜSİAD is known for its Islamic and conservative identity. Additionally, since the members of TÜSİAD are large-scale companies that are mainly in Istanbul (and a few from other cities in the Marmara region), TÜSİAD is generally considered to represent the Istanbul capital. On the other hand, with its 2000 members that are generally small and medium enterprises located all over Anatolia, MÜSİAD represents the Anatolian capital. (Öniş, 2005) Thus, by interviewing both associations' members it is expected to cover a large range of opinions of Turkish businessmen.

Trade union federations are chosen as the representatives of the market sphere. It was decided to give the surveys to the members of two important trade union federations, namely, TÜRK-İŞ (Türkiye İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-Trade Union Confederations of Turkey) and HAK-İŞ (HAK İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu-HAK Trade Union Confederations). TÜRK-İŞ is the oldest and largest trade union federation of Turkey. It has 35 unions from different sectors. The total amount of workers that are members of these unions under TÜRK-İŞ is around 2 million and this constitutes 72 % of the unionized workers in the country. TÜRK-İŞ was founded in 1952 and since then it emphasizes that as a workers' organization they are devoted to the principles of Atatürk. HAK-İŞ, on the other hand, is the second largest

federation with 9 union members, which have 400,000 workers. Like MÜSİAD, HAK-İŞ which was founded in 1976 is also known for its Islamic and conservative preferences. Hence, by choosing respondents from these two unions almost the whole sample of unionized workers will be represented.

Accordingly, there will be four different social groups based on occupational organizations that represent three different spheres of the society. While the state sphere representatives will be from Ankara, market and public spheres will be represented by residents of different cities in Turkey.

Another reason to choose these groups is related with the fact that they represent the main agents of a production model. Owners of the capital are on one side, owners of labor are on the other and the bureaucracy and the military act as the mediating institutions within the society.

To calculate the size of the sample, the estimated population for each group is presented in the following table.

Table 4.1: Population Estimates for Sample Groups

Sample groups	Size of population (estimated)
Upper-level Bureaucrats	35,000
Military Officers	12,000
TÜRK-İŞ members	2,000,000
HAK-İŞ members	400,000
TÜSİAD members	566
MÜSİAD members	2,000
TOTAL SAMPLE	2,449,566

Sources: Ministry of Finance, websites of TÜSİAD, MÜSİAD, TÜRK-İŞ, HAK-İŞ (as of 2005)

According to Lin (1976: 448) the required sample size for 95 percent confidence level for population sizes over 500,000 is 384. Therefore a total of approximately 400 responses are sufficient. Since there are six sub-groups it is aimed to obtain 75-100 responses from each group which makes up a total of 450-600 persons.

As for the sampling type, non-probability sampling procedures were decided to be used. It would be difficult to implement random sampling procedures because of the

characteristics of the sample groups. Furthermore, representativeness of the sample is not critical for the purposes of the thesis. Snowball sampling, convenience sampling and purposive sampling techniques were chosen to be followed.

4.2.6. Problems in Data Collection

After finalizing the questionnaire and having decided on the sample I started to contact the institutions selected for survey sample.

First of all I obtained an appointment from the Second Chief of the General Staff (*Genel Kurmay İkinci Başkanı*) on May 2004. During our conversation with the General, I explained the objectives of the thesis and left a copy of the questionnaire for their evaluation. After a month I was called by a Major and told that the army is not willing to answer the questionnaire on the grounds that the survey contains sensitive political questions and the personal views of the military staff are to be evaluated as the view of the Turkish army which will create the image that the army engage in politics. Although I suggested the possibility that the questionnaires can be completed by omitting the questions they considered as sensitive I could not get a positive answer. Therefore, it was decided to exclude the military from the sample. But since in Turkey military is a very important decision making agent in state administration another solution was tried sought to obtain the military officers' opinion. Then, based on the assumption that military training and service generally provides a common paradigm which an officer continues to preserve and defend after his retirement from the armed forces, I decided to conduct the survey to retired military officers. But in this case I preferred to keep the size of the sample smaller than the other groups. In distributing the questionnaires I contacted my friends and colleagues who have relatives or acquaintances that retired from the army. Additionally, I went to the social clubs of military officers (*Orduevi*). During the period between January and June 2006 I got 50 questionnaires completed.

As for the bureaucrats I used my contacts to reach to the upper level bureaucrats from different Ministries and public administrations. However, I faced a lot of

difficulties in persuading the bureaucrats to complete the questionnaires. In general, they were reluctant to answer the questionnaire which they find quite long and because of their heavy work schedule they could not spare time. Moreover, despite the definite assurance of anonymity some bureaucrats refused to answer the survey claiming that it contains sensitive political questions. Thus, I used social network relations and requested several contact persons to be mediators in convincing the bureaucrats they know and I called them personally several times to remind the importance of their views for my thesis. I finally achieved to obtain 110 survey forms during the period between October 2005 and September 2006.

In data collection the easiest sample group was the unionized workers. On June 2004 I contacted the Training Expert of the TÜRK-İŞ Union Confederation and after explaining the purpose of the thesis and the required characteristics of the respondents I left the questionnaires to him. It was emphasized that the respondents should be all workers (not the executives or managers) from varying manufacturing sectors. I also requested to make the questionnaires completed by as many female workers as possible. Then, they had kindly sent the surveys to different branches of the union organized in different manufacturing sectors in several cities and called me back when they had got the responses. To my surprise I got 285 questionnaires fully completed (the total amount of surveys sent to me was 350 of which 65 was incomplete) at the end of September 2004. I should mention that I am very much grateful to all persons in TÜRK-İŞ who organized the data collection in such a short time period.

As for the other group of workers who are the members of the HAK-İŞ Union Confederation I was not that lucky. I contacted the training consultant of the Union again on June 2004 and gave him the survey forms. However, because of his time limitations I had to wait until February 2006 when I was able to obtain 107 questionnaires filled out by the members of HAK-İŞ Union working in different manufacturing sectors and living in several cities. Thus, the sample size of workers in total reached to 392 which are far ahead of our sample target size of 150-200.

The most troublesome part of data collection was to obtain data from the employers. On May 2004, I contacted the Ankara representative offices of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD both of which welcomed me and promised to reach not 100 but at least 50 employers to respond the questionnaire. However, things did not develop as planned. Because the members of these employer associations are businessmen with very busy time schedules it was almost impossible for them to spare some time for an academic survey. Following my repeated calls, as of February 2006 I could obtain only 32 questionnaires completed by members of MÜSİAD. This was a very low number to make up a meaningful sample. Meanwhile, since my conversations with the TÜSİAD representative in Ankara was not encouraging I was expecting a similar even smaller response rate for TÜSİAD members. Then while waiting for the TÜSİAD surveys I decided to give the survey to other employers in Ankara and Istanbul who are not members of an employer association. It was also a cumbersome process but through the help of friends, relatives and colleagues during a six months period (January-June 2006) 22 questionnaires were returned from independent employers. Finally, on July 2006 only 19 questionnaires were sent by TÜSİAD that were filled out by its members. To sum up, the responses obtained from these three subgroups of employers are 32 (MÜSİAD), 19 (TÜSİAD) and 22 (independent) none of which is sufficiently large to make up a sample in its own. Consequently, I had to revise my initial plans of using employer associations as the representatives of the public sphere. Although the employer associations take place in the overlap area of market and public spheres -as mentioned previously- TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD were chosen as the representatives of the public sphere because of their influence on public opinion. However since I could not obtain a sufficiently large sample to represent the views of these associations I decided to use the employers (both members and non-members of an employer association) as the representatives of the firms which are placed in the market sphere. Thus, the sample size of employers as the representatives of the market sphere will be 73 which suffice to constitute a meaningful sample.

Accordingly it was decided to evaluate the views of the workers who are members of union federations as the representatives of the public sphere and not those of the market sphere. The union federations like the employer associations are generally in

the intersection area of market and public spheres and TÜRK-İŞ and HAK-İŞ Union Confederations the members of which make up more than two thirds of the unionized workers in Turkey have also considerable influence –though not as influential as TÜSİAD- on public sphere. Furthermore, I believe that it is more appropriate to take commercial firms as the representatives of the market sphere than workers.

To recapitulate, the sample size turned out to be 392 for unionized workers, 73 for employers, 110 for bureaucrats and 50 for retired military officers which sum up to 625. The socio-demographic characteristics (age, gender, education, marital status, birth place, place of habitation, education level and occupation of parents) of the sample groups are presented in Appendix F. According to the personal profile of the respondents the sample is composed of well-educated and middle-aged citizens. While 37% of the respondents are high-school graduates, 33% are university graduates and approximately 10% of them had post-graduate degrees. On the other hand, the average age of the sample is 40.46 years old and 75% of the survey participants are younger than 46 years old. These and other socio-demographic characteristics will be taken into account while evaluating the results in the following chapters.

4.2.7. Evaluation of the Items

For data evaluation SPSS package program (version 13.1) was used. Since the scale is aimed to measure the citizenship perception of the respondents with reference to the hypothetically constructed ideal state-citizen relationship, highest scores are attributed to the attitude or opinion which reflects the ideal case. Thus, at the time of coding I changed scores for items worded in opposite directions. For example, for the item “It doesn’t disturb me to have a neighbour of a different religion” the highest score which is 5 is assigned to the last option (e) “strongly agree”. However, for the item “It is not appropriate that people express all their opinions freely” the highest score is assigned to the first option (a) “strongly disagree”. The whole list of the highest scores which defines the framework of the ideal construct is provided in the English translation of the questionnaire in Appendix E.

After entering the data, before evaluating the items I decided to weight the sub-samples. As explained above, although equal sample sizes were planned for bureaucrats, military officers, employers and unionized workers the collected data did not match the plans and I got different sample sizes for the four sub-samples. Then, by using the “weight cases” option of the SPSS, I weighted the cases so that the percent of the sub-samples in total sample would be as 30 % for each of the three sub-samples of bureaucrats, employers and workers and 10% for the sub-sample of retired military officers. The weight for the sample of retired military officers is kept smaller because, as mentioned earlier, the retired officers were used as some kind of a proxy sample for the military officers in service (*muvazzaf subaylar*) and for this reason I restricted the sample size as well. The resulting weighted frequencies for the weighted sample groups are shown in the following table.

Table 4.2: Weighted Frequencies of Sample Groups

	frequency	percent	Cumulative percent
Workers	188	30.1	30.1
Employers	187	29.9	60.0
Bureaucrats	187	29.9	70.0
Retired military officers	63	10.0	100.0
Total	625	100.0	

After weighting the samples, reliability of the scales was checked. As stated in the previous subsection, the questionnaire contains separate items for citizenship rights, duties and EU membership of Turkey which will make up the three scales we aimed to develop. Thus, the SPSS was run to perform the reliability analysis for each of these scales. Furthermore, since the sample contains four sub-samples the reliability analysis was conducted for each of these groups in addition to the total sample.

DeVellis (2003:27) defines scale reliability as “the proportion of variance attributable to the true score of the latent variable”. The most important indicator of a scale’s reliability is internal consistency which is the degree to which the items constituting the scale are all measuring the same underlying variable (Pallant, 2001:6). The relationships among items are expected to be logically connected to the relationship of items to the latent or underlying variable. If the items are strongly

related to their latent variable, they will have a strong relationship to each other (DeVellis, 2003: 28). Then, by measuring the correlation of items with each other the scale's reliability can also be measured. The most commonly used statistic is Cronbach's coefficient alpha which provides an indication of the average correlation among all the items of a scale (Pallant, 2001:6). Theoretically, Cronbach's alpha can take on values between 0.0 and 1.0. Different methodologists and investigators suggest different bounds for the acceptability of alpha. DeVellis argues that while the ideal value for alpha should be above 0.70, alpha value below 0.60 is unacceptable (DeVellis, 2003: 95). However, as noted by DeVellis it is not unusual to see published scales with alphas lower than 0.60 (see for example, Schagen, 2001; Wong and Wong, 2005).

Other attributes for scale items are item-scale correlations and item variances. Especially for short scales it may be more appropriate to report the mean inter-item correlation for the items (Pallant, 2001:85). Briggs and Cheek (1986, quoted in Pallant) recommend an optimal range for the inter-item correlation of 0.2 to 0.4. In SPSS, the Reliability procedure computes alpha, corrected item-scale correlations, inter-item correlations and item variances.

By looking at these statistics for each scale and for all sample groups I discarded some items from the scales to raise their reliabilities to acceptable levels. After running reliability tests for the total sample and for the sub-samples the scale items were determined. The finalized scale items together with their reliability values are presented in the following sections.

4.2.7.1. Citizenship Rights

For citizenship rights 20 items out of 32 which constitutes the resulting scale are presented in Table 4.3. As seen from the table the scale for citizenship rights include 8 items for civil rights; 5 items for political rights and 7 items for social rights.

Table 4.3: Scale Items for Citizenship Rights

CR	The deputies and certain public officials should have the right to immunity.
CR	It is not appropriate that people express all their opinions freely.
CR	It is absolutely right that both spouses have an equal right to the assets acquired during the marriage.
CR	In my view, it is right to abolish capital punishment.
CR	All citizens living in Turkey should have an opportunity to get recruited to and promoted in all kinds of jobs.
CR	Strict and robust measures should be taken against the foreign immigrants in Turkey.
CR	Immigration to metropolitan cities like Istanbul from other provinces should be restricted.
CR	Males and females should have equal rights in all spheres of the business life.
PR	All the political choices of citizens should be represented in the Parliament.
PR	Particular attention should be paid to ensure participation of a certain number of female members in the decision making bodies of political parties.
PR	One should decide to name his/her child in accordance with the rules of the state.
PR	The citizens must be informed about the practices of the state in all realms.
PR	The right to get education in mother languages other than Turkish in private classes should be secured.
SR	All the citizens should have free (of charge) access to the health facilities of the state.
SR	All levels of education should be free of charge.
SR	It is one of the major duties of the state to provide social security (in terms of health and pension rights) to the citizens.
SR	The state is not obliged to provide unemployment benefit.
SR	The state is obliged to provide low-cost mass housing to its citizens.
SR	All the workers should have the rights to collective bargaining, unionization and strike.
SR	The public investments should be made in order to tackle interregional inequalities.

Note: CR: Civil Rights, PR: Political Rights and SR: Social Rights.

Consequently, the scale indicators for civil citizenship rights are; immunity rights of deputies and public officers (right to equal treatment under the law), freedom of expression, capital punishment (right to live), get recruited to all jobs without discrimination (right to choose occupation), attitudes toward foreign immigrants and emigrants within the country (right of immigrants and rights to residence), equal distribution of assets between spouses and gender equality in professional life (civil rights of women). For political rights the scale indicators are; right to be represented politically in the Parliament, female participation in political parties (political rights of women), being informed about the practices of the state (right to inquiry), right to name one's child without being restricted and getting language education in mother languages other than Turkish (cultural rights of ethnic groups). The indicators for social rights are formulated as rights to free access to public services of health and education, rights to social security, unemployment benefit and housing provisions,

rights to collective bargaining, unionization and strike, and fighting interregional inequalities through public investments (right to regional investment and equalization programs). Thus, the scale items for citizenship rights include civil and political rights of women, and cultural and language rights of ethnic groups in addition to the universal individual rights.

On the basis of these scale items the calculated alpha values together with mean inter-item correlations for all sample groups are presented in table 4.4. As the table shows the reliability coefficients were spread between low (.557) and moderate (.661) levels.

Table 4.4: Reliability Indicators for Citizenship Rights

	alpha	alpha-std *	Mean inter-item correlations
Workers	0.634	0.626	0.090
employers	0.553	0.561	0.060
bureaucrats	0.647	0.661	0.089
Retired military officers	0.559	0.557	0.059
Total Sample	0.608	0.626	0.077

* Cronbach's alpha based on standardized items

4.2.7.2. Citizenship Duties

For citizenship duties out of 25 items the 20 items presented in Table 4.5 yielded the most reliable results. As seen from the list of items the scale consists 8 eight indicators for civil; 4 indicators for political and 8 indicators for social duties. According to the final scale items the indicators for civil citizenship duties are; respect of others' right to freedom of expression, performing one's job properly (duty to promote the general welfare), respect of others' right to religion, obeying the traffic rules (respect laws), opinions on general amnesty and tax amnesties (the duties of law-abidingness and of paying taxes), duty to cooperate with the police and opinion on not paying taxes (another indicator about the duty to pay taxes).

Table 4.5: Scale Items for Citizenship Duties

CD	I support that the other people, even if their thoughts are different than mine, express themselves freely.
CD	I believe the fact that performing my job in an honest and proper way will contribute to the country's welfare.
CD	It does not disturb me to have a neighbour of a different religion.
CD	If the road is clear, I cross/drive the street while the traffic light is red.
CD	It is not appropriate that the state grants frequent amnesty since such a practice bypasses the preventive function of the sanctions.
CD	Tax amnesties are not appropriate.
CD	It is a citizenship duty to help and cooperate with the police to ensure the peace and rest in the country.
CD	It is a crime against the society not to pay the taxes.
PD	I vote in the polls.
PD	I listen to the speeches of the chairperson of the political party for whom I intend to vote and analyze them.
PD	Those not voting should not be penalized.
PD	Those rejecting compulsory military service (conscientious objectors) might have their fair reasons.
SD	It is always preferable to provide education to the male offspring than to his female sibling.
SD	It is necessary to impose monetary penalties to the families not sending their children to primary school.
SD	All the citizens with adequate economic means should help the state by contributing to campaigns for supporting education.
SD	Those employers who do not pay the social security premiums of their employees might have good reasons.
SD	Using illegal electricity and thus not paying should not be considered as a crime.
SD	Preventing corruption is a responsibility not only of the state but the citizens as well.
SD	If there is a hole on the street or the water pipe explodes in my neighbourhood I contact the Municipality.
SD	I try to help those who are less fortunate than me by participating in voluntary actions such as teaching or instructing.

Note: CD: Civil Duties, SD: Social Duties

It should be mentioned that the scale length for the sub-sample of retired military officers was shortened (17 items) because three items (“I believe the fact that performing my job in an honest and proper way will contribute to the country’s welfare”; “It is a crime against the society not to pay the taxes” and “I vote in the polls”) were automatically removed from the scale. The reason for this is that the variances of these items for military officers were zero, i.e. they all gave the same response (totally agree) to these questions.

The results of reliability tests for the items of the citizenship duties scale are shown in the following table. The alpha values indicate a reliability range from low (.490) to

strong (.715) levels. The low level of reliability for the military sample might be related with using a shorter scale.

Table 4.6: Reliability Indicators for Citizenship Duties

	alpha	alpha-std	Mean inter-item correlations
Workers	0.579	0.664	0.090
employers	0.589	0.715	0.112
bureaucrats	0.524	0.516	0.051
Retired military officers	0.485	0.490	0.053
Total Sample	0.562	0.648	0.084

4.2.7.3. EU Membership and Citizenship

For EU membership and citizenship scale the seven items used in the survey provided a reliable scale. This scale aims to measure the perception of citizenship from a “pro-EU” perspective. In other words, highest scores indicate a perception of a positive impact of Turkey’s EU accession on citizenship practice in Turkey. The scale items are displayed in Table 4.7.

Table 4.7: Scale Items for EU membership and Citizenship

EU1	Accession to the EU will have a positive impact on the citizenship rights in Turkey.
EU2	If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, I think the state will provide fairer and more equal treatment to the citizens.
EU3	I do not believe that the EU membership will provide any benefits to me as a citizen.
EU4	If we access to the EU, our religious values will weaken.
EU5	Citizens of the EU member states are luckier than the citizens of Turkey in terms of freedom of expression and of religion.
EU6	If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, since the role of the military on the political arena will be restricted civil society will become stronger.
EU7	As a consumer in Turkey, I have all the rights that a citizen of an EU member state has.

The reliability tests for these items revealed that the reliability coefficients for all samples are in acceptable ranges (Table 4.8).

Table 4.8: Reliability indicators for EU membership and citizenship

	alpha	alpha-std	Mean inter-item correlations
Workers	0.601	0.616	0.186
employers	0.683	0.699	0.249
bureaucrats	0.754	0.764	0.316
Retired military officers	0.674	0.693	0.244
Total Sample	0.680	0.694	0.245

4.3. Qualitative Research

After completing the evaluation of the citizenship items in terms of the reliability criteria, in order to refine the results and to capture more details which cannot be obtained by quantitative analysis, I decided to employ *between-method* (or *inter-method*) *triangulation*, i.e. support the quantitative research results with qualitative methods. It is generally argued that triangulation allows the researcher “to use the strengths of each method to overcome the deficiencies of the other; to obtain a variety of information on the same issue and to achieve a higher degree of validity and reliability”. (Sarantakos, 1998: 169, also see Denzin, 1970:308)

Hence, based on citizenship rights and duties items of the survey I decided to organize focus group meetings with sub-sample groups. As argued by Sarantakos (1998:182) by employing focus group as a post-research method I hoped to be able to “explain trends and variances, reasons and causes through the views of the respondents”. Again using my personal relations I managed to arrange meetings with workers, bureaucrats and retired military officers. As to the employers I experienced problems of reluctance and busy time schedules. The most important problem was to find a common time period of at least two hours that perfectly suit to five businessmen. Since this was almost asking the impossible I decided to make deep interviews with five employers at their convenience.

After deciding on the design of the research a focus group meeting was done on December 1st, 2006 with five workers from Yol-İş Union (A member of TÜRK-İŞ Union Confederation). Focus group with four retired military officers was conducted

on December 8, 2006 and five bureaucrats from the Undersecretariat of Treasury accepted to participate in a focus group meeting on December 14, 2006. Between December 14, 2006 and January 17, 2007 I completed interviews with five employers. All interviews were recorded.

4.4. Conclusion

In this chapter the methodology of the research has been explained in detail. The thesis attempts to explore the citizenship perceptions in terms of rights and duties of the citizens in Turkey from different social groups. In order to be able to *measure* opinions and attitudes of citizens concerning citizenship rights and duties, a measurement instrument is required. Scaling is the consensually agreed technique for that purpose but since there has not been an existing scale of citizenship perception; the main methodological task set forth is to construct attitude scales for measuring citizenship perception in terms of rights and duties. The findings of the scaling procedure have been supported by qualitative research techniques of focus group meetings and interviews.

For the sampling of the research, social groups were determined on the basis of occupational organizations located in different spheres of the society. Bureaucrats (medium and upper-level directors) and retired military officers were chosen as the representatives of the state sphere, and unionized workers and employers were selected as the representatives of public and market spheres, respectively. In order to find the items for citizenship rights and duties first a pilot survey was conducted to 40 persons in Ankara. On the bases of the results of this pilot survey and a previous survey on citizenship a questionnaire was prepared. In accordance with the comments obtained from the respondents of the pilot survey and in line with the advices of the examining committee members, some items were revised and another section about “citizenship and Turkey’s accession to EU” was added to the survey. In consequence, the questionnaire was finalized to include items to be used in constructing three scales: a scale of citizenship rights, a scale of citizenship duties, and a scale of “EU membership and citizenship” which measures people’s opinions

concerning the possible effects of Turkey's EU membership on citizenship issues. The questionnaire was applied to 392 unionized workers (from Türk-İş and Hak-İş Trade Union Confederations), 73 employers (members of MÜSİAD, TÜSİAD and independent employers), 110 bureaucrats and 50 retired military officers which made up a total of 625 respondents. The survey was completed within a two-year period, between September 2004 and September 2006.

Following the reliability evaluation of the scales some items were discarded to increase the reliability of the scales, and consequently, the final scales for citizenship rights and duties have 20 items each, and the EU membership scale has 7 items. The scale items for citizenship rights contain indicators for group-differentiated rights (gender-based rights and cultural rights of ethnic groups) in addition to the universal individual rights and freedoms.

Furthermore, in order to support and refine the quantitative research findings, focus group meetings with unionized workers, bureaucrats and retired military officers, and interviews with employers were performed. During the focus group meetings and interviews which were performed on December 2006 and January 2007 detailed views and opinions of 19 persons were obtained.

The results of the quantitative and qualitative research studies are discussed in the next five chapters. Chapter V, VI and VII present the results of the survey and the findings of focus group meetings and interviews for the civil, political and social elements of citizenship. In these chapters, firstly on the bases of survey results the total scores of right and duty items for each citizenship element are evaluated, then item-level analyses are performed by employing both the survey results and qualitative research findings. Chapter VIII provides the results on the perception of citizenship as a whole. Finally, Chapter IX presents the evaluation of the scale results for the possible effects of EU membership of Turkey on the citizenship practice.

CHAPTER V

PERCEPTION OF THE CIVIL ELEMENTS OF CITIZENSHIP

As explained at the end of the previous chapter, it has been decided to present the results of the researches in five chapters. Since the results are analysed in terms of civil, political and social right and duties, and, at the same time, with respect to the four occupational groups of workers, employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers, it has been thought that presenting the findings of each element in individual chapters facilitates reading and comprehension. Thus, in the succeeding three chapters the perceptions of civil, political and social elements of citizenship are evaluated by employing the results of total scores and items for civil, political and social rights and duties, respectively. Then, the perception of citizenship as a whole is analysed in Chapter VIII. Hence, it can be said that the analysis follows an inductive approach.

In the present chapter, firstly the total scores of the survey respondents for civil rights and for civil duties are analysed by using the means of total scores, analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) and post-hoc comparisons. After examining the mean total scores for civil rights and for civil duties the type of perception for civil elements of citizenship are analysed on the basis of the difference between mean total scores of rights and duties. Then, the results for each item of civil rights and duties are evaluated by employing the survey findings and the qualitative data obtained from the focus group meetings and interviews. As to be remembered, three focus group meetings have been carried out with five workers from Yol-İş Union (A member of TÜRK-İŞ Union Confederation), with four retired military officers (three generals and a colonel) and with five bureaucrats from the Undersecretariat of Treasury, and five employers have been interviewed in order to acquire additional data for some of

the survey items. It should also be added that to check whether there are significant differentiation among the samples of workers and among the sample of employers, within sample comparisons for the sub-samples of workers and employers have been performed and put in Appendix G as an additional analysis.

5.1. Mean Total Score Analysis

In this section the perception of civil rights and duties are evaluated. Since item numbers for civil, political and social elements are not equal all scores were indexed to 100 for comparison purposes. The following table summarizes the mean scores of total civil rights together with standard deviations and number of observations for the total sample and for sub-samples. There have been eight items in the survey which measures the perception of civil rights of citizenship.

Table 5.1: Mean Total Scores of Civil Rights

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	75.55	12.10	361
Employers	73.15	12.66	68
Bureaucrats	78.85	10.33	105
Retired military officers	73.95	9.39	48
Total sample	75.68	11.75	582

The mean scores of the above table indicate the level of agreement with the basket of civil citizenship rights defined according to the hypothetical construct of the ideal type of state-citizen relationship. As explained in the previous chapter, the ideal type has been constructed to reflect a responsible state-citizen relationship in a social democratic welfare state. On the basis of the discussions provided in Chapter IV, the whole list of the highest scores which defines the framework of the ideal construct is provided in the English translation of the questionnaire in Appendix E.

Therefore, since the scores are indexed to 100, a respondent who agree with the whole items of the ideal construct will obtain a score of 100. According to the above table, the survey respondents approximately 76% agree that civil citizenship rights should be as stated in the hypothetical construct. In terms of occupational groups,

while the employers have the least mean scores for civil rights, the bureaucrats are the group with the highest scores. The range of mean scores changes between 73 and 79. Hence, it can be inferred that with regard to civil rights all respondents act quite responsibly in reference to the ideal construct. A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) has been conducted to statistically explore the impact of occupational group on total scores for civil rights. ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in mean scores four sub-samples [$F(3, 578) = 4.011, p = 0.008$]. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for the employers is significantly different from that of the bureaucrats. The effect size, calculated using eta squared is 0.02, which in Cohen's (1988, quoted in Pallant, 2001:192) terms, is considered a small effect size. Cohen classifies 0.01 as a small effect, 0.06 as a medium effect and 0.14 as a large effect.

When the mean of total scores for eight items about civil duties of citizenship are checked it has been realized that the mean scores for civil duties are much higher than those of civil rights for all sample groups. (Table 5.2)

Table 5.2: Mean Total Scores of Civil Duties

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	89.48	9.97	374
Employers	91.90	7.45	71
Bureaucrats	94.53	5.22	109
Retired military officers	95.70	4.44	47
Total sample	92.35	8.96	601

The averages of the total scores of civil duties for sample groups took values ranging between 89.5 and 95.7. It may not be wrong to interpret the high scores as an indication of the fact that all the sample groups share quite similar views with the ideal construct. The retired military officers with a mean score of around 96% almost entirely agree with the hypothetically constructed civil duties. Even the lowest score of 89.5 which belongs to the sample of workers indicate a high level of agreement with the hypothetical construct. Again, in order to compare the means of total scores for civil duties an ANOVA and post-hoc tests were conducted. The results indicate a

statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in mean scores four sub-samples [$F(3, 597) = 14.688, p = 0.000$]. Post-hoc tests reveal that the mean score for the workers is different from that of the bureaucrats and military officers and the actual difference is of medium size (0.07). Employers do not differ significantly from either of the other groups.

Another one-way ANOVA has been conducted to compare the diversities of groups in terms of the means of differences between mean total scores of civil duties and those of civil rights (Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Mean of Differences between Mean Total Scores of Civil Duties and of Civil Rights

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	5.71	5.77	349
Employers	7.67	5.41	66
Bureaucrats	6.27	4.57	104
Retired military officers	8.61	3.83	46
Total sample	6.28	5.45	565

The results illustrated in the above table indicate a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in mean scores four sub-samples [$F(3, 561) = 5.632, p = 0.001$]. Post-hoc tests reveal that the mean of differences between scores of civil duties and civil rights for the workers is different from that of employers and from military officers and the actual difference, calculated by eta squared, is of small size (0.03). Bureaucrats do not differ significantly from either of the other groups.

According to the results for the perceived balance between civil rights and duties of citizenship all occupational groups of the survey sample perceive a “duty-surplus” at the idealized level. This suggests that, in aggregate terms, the respondents regardless of their occupations put more emphasis on civil duties than they do on civil rights. In other words, the workers, employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers who participated to the survey share a perception of civil citizenship based on the civic-republican conception. But as the ANOVA results indicate there are differences between occupational groups, and in order to discover where these differences stem from, item-level analyses are carried out in the following sections.

5.2. Item-level Analyses

In the previous section, on the basis of the balance between total scores of civil rights and of duties it has been concluded that since in all occupational groups the duties are given more weight compared to rights, the survey sample as a whole regardless of occupational differences is considered to perceive civil elements of citizenship in line with the civic-republican model. Here, through an item-level analysis it is attempted to discover the differences between the occupational groups in terms of the significance assigned to particular items. The qualitative data, on the other hand, will provide explanations to the specific choices of the survey sample. Additionally, the qualitative data offers a possibility to detect different sub-categories of republican or liberal perceptions through analyzing the discourses of the participants and interviewees. As explained in Chapter II, there are less or more demanding forms of republican citizenship. In its most stringent form which I prefer to name as '*patriotic and militant citizenship*' borrowing the term employed by Füsün Üstel (based on the conceptualizations of Rousseau and Jean Leca), republican citizenship demands unquestioning loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizens accompanied by a whole-hearted devotion to duties. In its less demanding forms which I call as '*enlightened citizenship*' borrowing J.S. Mill's terminology, republican citizenship does not necessitate forsaking of all self-interests, but still emphasizes the good of the community. On the other hand, while the liberal-individualist understanding of citizenship attaches priority to individual rights it has been discussed that in terms of social citizenship two sub-categories of liberal thinking are differentiated as neo-liberal and social-liberal approaches, which is discussed later under the perception of social citizenship. The qualitative data is evaluated in the light of these sub-categories of republican citizenship. But it is crucial to note that the final evaluation of perception types is based on the survey results, not on the qualitative research findings. Even though the qualitative data is employed to differentiate citizenship perceptions, because of the fact that the qualitative research has been conducted to only 19 persons it will be statistically insignificant to draw conclusions on the basis

of such a small sample. However, they are of considerable assistance in interpreting the quantitative survey results.

5.2.1. Civil Right Items

The eight items of the survey on civil rights of citizenship are equality of citizens before the laws (not granting any privileges due to one's professional position); right to freedom of expression; equality of spouses in the distribution of assets acquired during the marriage; abolishment of capital punishment; right to equal opportunity to get recruited and promoted in all kinds of jobs; right of foreign immigrants to live and work in Turkey; right to free immigration within the country and equality of men and women in the business life.

For an item analysis first the percentage distribution of scores for each civil right item is examined. The distribution of affirmative responses for the civil right items of the citizenship rights scale is presented in table 5.4. In the table the items originally have a wording contradicting with the hypothetical construct have been reformulated and marked with an asterisk.

According to the percentage distribution of responses for the total sample, the items CR7 and CR4 are the ones with lowest levels of agreement. Only 31% of the total sample supported the item CR7, the right to free immigration to metropolitan cities.²² The item on the abolishment of capital punishment (CR4) has been approved by 55% of the total respondents. 66% of the total sample believes that there should not be any privileges among citizens whether they are deputies or public officials (CR1). The right to freedom of expression (CR2) is supported by 67% of the respondent citizens. 68% of the respondents do not approve any strict measures against the foreign immigrants (CR6). The remaining civil right items on equal opportunity to get recruited and promoted in all jobs (CR5), equal distribution of assets between spouses (CR3) and equality of men and women in the business life (CR8) have been approved by more than 87% of the total sample.

²² 62% of the total sample approved that measures should be imposed to restrict immigration to metropolitan cities and 7% of the total respondents neither approved nor disapproved such measures.

Table 5.4: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (or Strongly Agree) with Civil Right Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
CR1	The deputies and certain public officials should not have the right to immunity.*	65.8	73.4	45.2	50.4	71.5
CR2	It is appropriate that people express all their opinions freely.*	67.2	70.9	63.9	65.2	46.9
CR3	It is absolutely right that both spouses have an equal right to the assets acquired during the marriage.	87.3	87.9	74.0	89.9	95.9
CR4	In my view, it is right to abolish capital punishment.	54.8	52.9	58.3	60.0	54.2
CR5	All citizens living in Turkey should have an opportunity to get recruited to and promoted in all kinds of jobs.	88.6	85.2	94.4	94.5	93.8
CR6	Strict and robust measures should not be taken against the foreign immigrants in Turkey.*	67.5	62.0	69.5	82.7	73.5
CR7	Immigration to metropolitan cities like Istanbul from other provinces should not be restricted.*	31.1	28.5	26.4	48.2	20.4
CR8	Males and females should have equal rights in all spheres of the business life.	87.3	84.8	78.1	99.1	93.9

Since the distribution of item-level responses of the sub-samples of workers, employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers are not similar to those of the total sample, the results of each item are interpreted in terms of occupational groups and wherever available, the evaluation is supported by qualitative research findings.

According to the results, the first item indicating that ‘deputies and higher public servants should not have the right to immunity’ is highly supported by workers (73%) and military officers (72%). If this item is interpreted as ‘the right to equal treatment under the law’ then it can be argued that workers and military are quite sensitive to this right. It can be claimed that since they do not have any organic ties neither to politicians nor bureaucrats, they can remain impartial and opt for justice. The fact that only half of the bureaucrats (50.4%) and less than half of the employers (45.2%) object to such a privilege might be explained by the close relations between the bureaucracy, business community and politicians. While those bureaucrats who

do not object such a differentiated treatment may believe that one day they may also need the shield of immunity for themselves. Additionally, the fact that especially at the higher ranks of the bureaucracy there exist many political appointments makes those higher civil servants dependent to politicians. This may be an explanation for those who do not oppose immunity rights of deputies. As for the employers, despite a certain improvement business circles still depend on state finances, and having connections and developing close relations with the key figures in the bureaucracy as well as with the ruling party is still critical (Öniş, 2005; Heper, 1985). Considering that the sample of employers is composed of medium-scale entrepreneurs, the low level of opposition to juristic immunities can be interpreted as a pragmatic liberal approach which accords primacy to self interests.

On the right to freedom of expression the workers seem to be the most tolerant group with an approval rate of 71% as expressed by two workers during the focus group meetings:

A (male, 47, worker, Yol-İş Union member, high school graduate): “On that issue I think everybody should express whatever her/his thoughts are without any restriction and I’m totally sincere. The guy should come out and say: “Guys when I take the power I’ll do this and that.” Let him/her come out to defend his/her ideas.”
“Ben o konuda hiçbir sınırlama olmadan herkesin düşüncesini ifade etmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Çok da samimiyim. Çıksın adam desin kardeşim, ben geleceğim asacağım, keseceğim bu ülkeyi yöneteceğim, çıksın savunsun.”

D (male, 45, worker, Yol-İş Union member, university graduate): “This country does not deserve the Article 301. Everybody should express her/his thoughts.”
“301.maddenin olmaması lazım bu ülkede, herkes düşüncesini ifade etmeli.”

The only concern of workers has been political leaders who might, they thought, manipulate people through political discourses. They argued that if the leaders are allowed to defend such ideas as fascism or sharia, because of the low education level, many people without considering the hazardous results of such regimes may vote to these parties.

The other survey sub-samples and especially that of the retired military officers have not been as tolerant as workers. While 65% of bureaucrats and 64% of employers defended freedom of expression, only 47% of retired officers agreed that all opinions should be freely expressed. Those who were in favour of restrictions to this right

expressed several concerns such as national unity, public order and peace, mores and traditions, ethical and family values, and mostly underlined the low level of education:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “Freedom of thought should exist. This is the right path. But unfortunately I have constraints for the countries where some values haven’t yet been established and upon which games are played. As a citizen and as a patriot I’ve got doubts. We can be cheated by some tricks for having some rights. Just because of this I’ve naturally have some doubts.”

“Doğrusu, düşünce özgürlüğünün olmasıdır. Ama maalesef bazı değerleri oturmamış, hâlâ üzerinde oynanan ülkeler için tereddütlerim var tabii ki. Bir yurttaş olarak, bir memleketsever olarak tereddütlerim var. Bir takım hakları sağlayacağız diye bazı oyunlara gelebiliriz. Bundan dolayı tereddütlerim olur tabii ki.”

H (male, 60, owner of companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, high school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “Of course [freedom of thought should be secured]. The way the individual is created varies. Since the human beings have different natures they also have differing thoughts. Physically different, differing in thoughts. Just because of this there are hardships in Turkey and some other places. To start with I want, I wish that people should respect each others’ thoughts. Why because as long as, I’d like to emphasize here, these won’t harm the society, these won’t destroy the unity of the nation it is natural that people have differing opinions and the others should tolerate different thoughts I believe that those differing thoughts can have outputs beneficial to the society to the nation.”

“Elbette [düşünce özgürlüğü olmalıdır]. Bireyin yaratılış şekli çok farklı. İnsanlar farklı yaratılışlara sahip olduğu için farklı düşüncelere de sahiptir. Fizik olarak farklı, düşünce olarak farklı. Bundan dolayı Türkiye’de veya farklı ülkelerde bazı sıkıntılar yaşanıyor. Bir defa insanların birbirlerinin düşüncelerine saygılı olmasını isterim, arzu ederim. Neden, çünkü insanların farklı düşüncelerinden dolayı –topluma zarar vermeyecekse, altını çiziyorum bunun, milletin bütünlüğünü bozmayacaksa- farklı düşünceleri olması gayet normaldir, doğaldır ve insanlar o farklı düşüncelere tahammül etmelidir, o farklı düşüncelerden toplumun, milletin yararına faydalı şeyler çıkabilir diye düşünürüm.”

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “Everything that take morality, the structure of the Turkish society and the country’s interests into account are acceptable. Now to me there has to be some moral limitations. Propagandas destructing the family say, OK this is thought as well, but in the end one should take the society’s structure into account.”

“Ahlak, Türk toplumunun yapısı, ülkenin çıkarları dikkate alınarak yapılanların hepsi kabul. .. Şimdi ahlaki çizgiler olması lazım bana göre. Aileyi yıkıcı propagandalar mesela, bu da fikir, ama bir de toplumun yapısını dikkate almak lazım.”

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): “Now we’ve got an evolution, we’ve got mores and customs. Of course the people should take all these into account. Let me put it this way I you argue like “I express whatever I think whenever I feel like it and this is freedom” and if you violate the freedom of the people against you and if you can’t put up with it when that other person tells you something then there is some issue to think upon. I mean the thin line is education. Provided that all these being taken into account of course there is benefit in everybody expressing what s/he thinks. Bur of course at the right time, at the right place and in the right manner. Let s/he tell why s/he supports fascism but without getting aggressive. There is no harm in that. Because otherwise as s/he can’t express him/herself verbally s/he will get aggressive and ruin social order. But it is important to express in the right manner at the right place. I mean if you let this happen like “ I go and impress these people” in a place where an educational background is weak and people are not conscious ... I mean if you let a fascist to

advocate before you educate the society then you see that all the society turns to be fascist. But if you educate the society and then let fascism to be advocated then there is not a problem..”
“Şimdi bir gelişimimiz var, örf ve adetlerimiz var, tabii ki insanların bunu düşünmesi lazım. Söyle söyleyeyim, her fikri ben istediğim zaman söylerim, bu bir özgürlüktür, ifade özgürlüğüdür deyip de karşınızdaki kişinin özgürlüklerini çiğniyorsanız, o da kalkıp da size bir laf söylediğinde bunu hazmedemiyorsanız o zaman düşünmek gerekiyor. Yani bunun çizgisi, yine eğitim. Bunlara dikkat etmek kaydıyla tabii herkesin fikrini söylemesinde fayda var, ama yerinde, doğru yerde, doğru şekilde. Saldırgan olmadan niçin faşizmi savunduğunu anlatsın. Anlatmasında bir zarar yok. Çünkü öbür türlü ifade edemediği için saldırgan hale gelecek toplumu bozacak. Ama doğru şekilde anlatılması lazım, doğru yerde konuşulması lazım. Yani siz bunu kalkıp da bilinçsiz veya o konuda eğitimi olmayan bir altyapıya karşı, efendim ben şimdi geleyim sizi etkileyeyim şeklinde müsaade ederseniz.. Yani siz toplumu eğitmeden bir faşisti salarsanız herkes faşist olur. Ama toplumda eğitim verip de faşistliği tartışırıyorsanız sorun yok.”

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “Nowadays some concepts have been so idolized. Freedom of expression is one of these. We say freedom of thought and freedom of expression then we draft a Law against child pornography. Thus I mean the boundaries of the freedom of expression should well be defined. In established societies freedom of expression has some unofficial limits. Everything is free in theory but the people know what could be done to what extent. But sometimes they even don’t know the boundaries and similar issues and with more complication arise. Like the child abuse scandal in Belgium or the pornography cases in the States. Everybody can think as s/he likes and no one can prevent this. In fact there is no way to prevent. And in fact some of these thoughts are not deliberate at all, say [those of] the people some call psychopaths. Freedom of expression, on the other hand, its boundaries can be extended only to the sphere of the others. Say for example I don’t like that person and think that the guy is a thief. But I’m not free to express this thought and I shouldn’t be because then some other person can abuse the same freedom of expression against me and without a solid base. There’s a thin line there and this should be defined well and I think this is possible only through education.”

“Bugünlerde bazı kavramlar çok putlaştırıldı. Bir tanesi de ifade özgürlüğü. İfade özgürlüğü, düşünce özgürlüğü diyoruz sonra çocuk pornografisine karşı kanun tasarısı getiriyoruz. Dolayısıyla bir kere ifade özgürlüğünün sınırlarının çizilmesi lazım. Yerleşmiş toplumlarda ifade özgürlüğünün gayri resmi sınırları var. Kâğıt üzerinde her şey serbesttir ama insanlar neyi ne kadar yapacaklarını bilirler. Ama onlar da bazen neyi ne kadar yapacaklarını bilemiyorlar ki aynı sorunlar çok daha fazla bir şekilde o toplumlarda çıkıyor. Özellikle Belçika’daki çocuk taciz olayları, ABD’deki pornografi olayları gibi. Herkes her şeyi düşünsün buna kimse mâni de olamaz. Mâni olmanın bir yolu bulunamadı. Kaldı ki bir takım düşünceler istem dışı da düşünceler, işte ne bileyim bazıları ruh hastası diyor bunlara. Gelelim ifade kısmına, demin söylediğim gibi bu ifadenin sınırı benim sınıırıma kadar oluyor. Aynı şekilde ben falancadan hoşlanmayabilirim ve hırsız olduğumu da düşünebilirim ama bunu ifade etme özgürlüğüne sahip değilim. Olmamam da gerekir, çünkü başkaları da o hürriyeti bana karşı kullanabilir ortada hiç bir şey yokken. İnce bir çizgi var orada ve bunun çok iyi belirlenmesi lazım ve bunun yolu da bence eğitimden geçiyor.”

While some participants defended freedom of expression as long as it is not put into practice one bureaucrat pointed to the importance of manipulative force of ideas which may lead other people to get into violent action:

H (male, 58, retired Brigadier General): “I say ‘no’ to the fact that people are punished because of their thoughts. As long as there is no action, one can say whatever s/he wants either in the parliament or outside it. Okay I can denounce these ideas. This is another issue. But take it like denouncing is my freedom of expression. Therefore, thoughts should be free, NGOs should flourish, ideas should be expressed also in the NGOs. The society should not isolate or exclude

the people who express their thoughts. All should be considered within the freedom of thought. But all I said is for positive contributions. I mean you can't express a thought that will spread perversity among the society.”

“Kişilerin fikirlerinden dolayı cezalandırılmasına ben hayır diyorum. Eyleme geçmeyen hiçbir olayda, kişi söyler, mecliste de söyler, meclis dışında da söyler. Ha söylediği için ben ayıplayabilirim o sorun değil. Ama ayıplamak da benim fikrim. Onun için fikir serbest olmalı, STÖ'ler yaygınlaşmalı, onların içinde söylenmeli. Çıkıp da fikrini söyleyen şahısları toplum da dışlamamalı. Fikir özgürlüğü içinde düşünülmesi. Ama tabii bu söylediğimiz şeyler hep pozitif, kalkıp da sapıklığı topluma yaygınlaştıracak fikri söyleyemezsin.”

M (male, 36, bureaucrat, Department Head, university graduate): “.. you can't intervene in thoughts but the important thing in expression of thought is, that thought should bring about some good, some unity. If it's gonna be destructive or discriminatory than some limits should be imposed. If thought is just thought I mean without action let people defend them freely. Either the guy is a fascist or a communist I don't care ...But if s/he gets into action by using violence. No, that can't be accepted.”

“.. düşünceye müdahale edemezsiniz ama önemli olan bu düşüncenin ifade edilirken güzelliğe sebep olması, birlikteliğe sebep olması. Eğer yıkıcı, ayrıştırıcı olacaksa o sınırlar tabii ki konmalı. .. Düşüncede kalıyorsa eyleme dökmeden fikir bazında tabii ki [istediği fikri] savunsun. Bana ne faşist olsun, komünist olsun umurumda değil yani. Ama onu eyleme döküp de şiddet kullanıyorsa öyle şey olmaz.”

O (male, 48, bureaucrat, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “But concerning the thought not put into action there is another issue. In the Penal Law there is a conception of solicitation (incite someone to a criminal action). One of the best examples of this is the Russian Tsar's having Rasputin killed. He didn't hire a man to murder Rasputin; he just said “Isn't there anybody in Russia who will save me from this man?” Finally one of the princes shot the man. Now, saying that ‘I didn't get into action, it was my opinion’ or in honour killings saying that ‘this sister should be killed, isn't there a man of honour’ cannot be considered as freedom of expression or thought. After a certain while some people in society may be brain-washed on some subjects and get into action and that action might in fact be against the spirit of democracy.”

“Yalnız eyleme dönüşmeyen düşünce konusunda bir de şöyle bir şey var. Ceza Kanunu'nda azmettirme diye bir kavram var. Bunun en güzel örneklerinden bir tanesi Rus Çarı'nın Rasputin'i öldürtmesidir. Kimseyi tutup da onu öldür bile demedi, koskoca Rusya'da beni bu adamdan kurtaracak kimse yok mu dedi. Prenslardan biri de çekip adamı vurdu sonunda. Şimdi, ben eyleme dökmedim, düşüncemdi yahut töre cinayetlerinde ‘bu kız kardeşi vurmak gerekir, yok mu namuslu bir erkek burada’ demek fikir özgürlüğü, konuşma, ifade özgürlüğü olarak değerlendirilemez. Bir müddet sonra toplumda belli kişilerin beynini yıkayabilirsiniz belli konularda ve birisi bu konuda hareket edebilir ve bu hareket aslında demokrasinin ruhuna aykırı olabilir.”

Another point that was remarked during the qualitative research was the significance of the way the ideas are articulated. They defended freedom of expression on the condition that thoughts should be expressed without humiliating or harassing people or directing people to criminal acts:

F (male, 50, bureaucrat, Department Head, university graduate): “Humans exist as long as they express themselves. Otherwise you don't have anything, you just live. But if you are a cultural being, proving yourself as an individual is possible only by self-expression. I'll give the example of Turan Dursun. This person has really well-grounded scientific knowledge. But he put his views so badly that many believers were offended. For example you may tell me that ‘in

this century how people can continue to pray by putting their heads to the ground?’ In response to this remark I’ll say OK let’s think about it. But saying that ‘You are so backward you still put your heads to the ground’ is regarded as an insult. I mean this man’s attitude in his book was essentially an attack to the opposite side rather than a critique or a self-expression. In that context, expressing oneself does not mean offending the other, people might criticize but their critics should not contain insults and provocation, and should not direct other people to criminal actions, and -it might be in line with the September 12 terminology but- should not be disturbing social peace nor distorting the harmony of the society.”

“İnsan kendini ifade edebildiği sürece vardır. Öbür türlü bir şeyiniz kalmıyor, sadece yaşıyorsunuz. Ama kültürel varlıksanız bir birey olarak kendinizi ortaya koymak ancak kendinizi ifadeyle mümkün. Turan Dursun örneğini vereceğim. Bu zat hakikaten bilgi sahibi, ilim sahibidir. Fakat orada bilgilerini o kadar kötü ortaya koydu ki birçok inanç sahibi bundan rencide oldu. Mesela bana diyebilirsiniz ki ‘ya 20.yüzyılda kafayı yere koyarak ibadet mi olur?’ Ha bir düşünelim der insan bunu. ‘Ya siz ne kadar gerisiniz, hâlâ kafanızı yere koyuyorsunuz’ demek ise hakarete girer. Yani adamın o Kulleteyn’deki yaklaşım tarzı bir eleştiri ya da kendini ifadeden çok karşı tarafa saldırı niteliğini taşıyordu. O bağlamda kendini ifade ediyor olmak karşı tarafı rencide ediyor olmak demek değil, insanlar keza eleştirebilirler ama hakaret içermemeli ve tahrik içermemeli, diğer insanları suça yöneltmemeli, -12 Eylül tabiri olacak ama- toplumdaki huzuru bozucu, ahengi, o armoniyi bozucu olmamalı.

Finally, the participants argued that freedom of expression can be supported, but the declared ideas should be based on material evidences.

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “Bütün düşünceler ifade edilebilir. Ama bütün düşünceler derken düşüncesini de belli yerlere dayandırması lazım. İşte Orhan Pamuk şu kadar Ermeni’yi kestik diyor. Bunun altyapısı var mı yok mu? Söylediğini de kanıtlaması lazım.”

“All kinds of thought can be expressed. But when I say kinds of thought I mean that thought should have some solid ground. Say Orhan Pamuk says we slaughtered that many Armenians. Does this have any solid grounding? He has to prove what he says.”

M (male, 60, retired Brigadier General): “Freedom of expression is a “sine qua non” but just because of that freedom exists everybody can’t tell openly whatever it is in his mind whenever s/he wants. And there are those people, those leaders, those commanders who are not themselves anymore but are owned by the society. They can’t tell what they want to and where they want to. Orhan Pamuk can’t say; ‘We slaughtered the Armenians and we killed the Kurds’. He can’t say those non-factual, a historical stuff. Is lying to be considered within the freedom of expression? To express thoughts which are against the national benefits of a country, is it freedom of expression? If the thoughts of those guys who have become “social brands” are against *my* long term interests²³ this can’t be their freedom.”

“Fikir ifade etme özgürlüğü olmazsa olmaz şartlardan birisi ama bu özgürlük var diye her önüne gelen insan her aklına gelen fikri her istediği yerde açıkça beyan edemez. Bir de topluma mal olmuş büyük liderler, büyük komutanlar var. Onlar her istediği lafi her aklına gelen yerde ifade edemez. Orhan Pamuk Ermenileri kestik, Kürtleri öldürdük diyemez. Yapılmamış tarih dışı gerçekleri söyleyemez. Yalan söylemek fikir özgürlüğü müdür? Bir ülkenin milli menfaatlerine aykırı fikirleri beyan etmek fikir özgürlüğü müdür? Topluma mal olmuş kişilerin fikirleri eğer benim uzun vadeli menfaatlerime aykırıysa onların bu özgürlüğü olamaz.”

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): “In the very principle if you advocate an idea with the condition of proving it of course everybody can say it. Say it Orhan Pamuk or you yourself. If he says or writes his opinion I can take it natural too. But this is not his opinion He doesn’t express an opinion there He says “Slaughtered” I mean on what basis does he say this? Under those

²³ It is important to note that the retired General identifies himself with the state by using the term “my interests” instead of the interests of the state.

circumstances it is natural that this society presses charges against him and the Judge asks him about the proving documents.”

“Temelde olan bir şey var ama bir fikri savunuyorsanız belgeleme kaydıyla bunu Orhan Pamuk da söyler, siz de söylersiniz. Fikrini söylemişse yazmışsa bunu, onu da doğal görüyorum. Ama onun fikri değil, o orada fikir falan değil, kesmiştir diyor, neye göre söylüyor? Burada da toplumun onu mahkemeye vermesi de doğal, hâkimin ona getir belgeleri demesi de doğal.”

On the basis of these comments and as the percentage distribution of the survey reveals it is possible to conclude that the right to freedom of expression was not unhesitatingly welcome by the majority of the sample regardless of their occupations and many reasons were put forward to justify its restriction. According to Kinzer this attitude can be explained by the general belief that “the country is not ready for full democracy.” Kinzer notes that there are many people in Turkey who:

know that once Turks are allowed to speak and write freely, to form political parties that advocate unorthodox ideas and to challenge long-held principles in the court of public opinion, Turkey will become turbulent. That is something they deeply fear. They doubt their society can withstand the clash of ideas that is the essence of democratic life. (Kinzer, 2001: 17-18)

Kinzer claims that this rationale for limiting democracy looks like “what an overprotective mother might say about her child.” For Kinzer, “the fear of popular will that underpins Turkey’s political system is like that of a mother whose child turns fifteen and then eighteen and then twenty-five and older, but is still not trusted to leave home alone.” (Kinzer, 2001: 18) Hence, it can be presumed that the educated elite of Turkey tend to regard the Turkish people as if they are incompetent children rather than adults who can make rational decisions.

The item concerning the equal distribution of assets between spouses was accepted by the majority of all occupational groups. While 88% of workers, 90% of bureaucrats and 96% of retired officers agreed with the item, in the employer sample the accordance rate decreased to 74%. Likewise, in the focus group meetings and interviews this regulation was generally approved on the grounds that it protects the integrity of the family and supports the prevailing division of labor between spouses:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “While this law was being discussed, very fancy words were uttered and different ideas appeared. In the Justice Commission a member said: “Say the guy is a builder. Why does the divorced wife demand half his wealth?” Another

replied: “The one behind that builder was not his mistress but his wife. The one economizing at home, not gambling etc.” I mean of course in the end the style of the marriage and the consumption patterns will determine the distribution, but you know, I liked for example the guy can’t sell the house which is the family property and waste the gain. Can’t say I will get into business so I’ll sell the house. This is really good. He can’t sell the house where the family resides in for making a business attempt or say standing as a candidate for the elections. I’ve heard so many stories since my childhood on guys who sell the house for the election campaigns. So if (this Law) can be enforced such practices ruining the family can be avoided.” “Bu yasa tartışılırken çok güzel sözler söylendi, farklı görüşler çıktı ortaya. Adalet Komisyonu’nda bir tanesi diyor ki adam müteahhit, boşanırken karısı niye servetin yarısını istiyor diyor. Öbürü de cevap veriyor: o müteahhidi ayakta tutan metresi değil karısıydı sonuçta. Evde ekonomiyi sağlayan, konkene gitmeyen vs. Yani evliliğin tarzı ve tüketim kalıpları da belirleyecek mutlaka bölüşümü ama, şey hoşuma gitti benim; aile ikametgahı olan mülkü adam satın yiyemiyor mesela. İş kuracağım evi satıyorum diyemiyor, bu bence güzel bir şey, çoluk çocuğun ikamet ettiği mekânı satın ben işte şöyle bir atılıma gireceğim, adaylık koyuyorum mesela diyemeyecek. Ben çocukluğumdan beri çok duydum, evini satın seçimlerde yiyen bir sürü insan bilirim. O tip, aileyi harap eden şeylerin önüne geçilmiş olur eğer hakikaten uygulanabilirse.”

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “What Mr. F said at the beginning is totally true. This is a decision made to evaluate the contribution of the non-working spouse to the working one. The example of the builder is so appropriate. That’s his wife who stands behind him, run his household affairs maybe helping him to maintain his mental psychological health and thus let him make those attempts. Even more important especially in contemporary life is the fact that, some professional women with careers gets obliged to leave those. I mean a kind of division of labour like; “You stay at home, take care of the kids and the house and don’t worry about the financial loss of that choice I’ll handle”. And this is not an unfair practice. Because this is the money that the woman would earn under normal conditions.”

“F. Bey’in ilk söylediği çok doğru. Çalışmayan eşin çalışana olan katkısını değerlendirmek için alınmış bir karar bu. Çok güzel bir örnek işte o müteahhidi ayakta tutan, evini çekip çeviren, belki ruh sağlığını zihin sağlığını koruyarak o atılımları yapmasına yol açan karısı. Daha da önemlisi ama özellikle bugünlerde kadın çalışıyorsa ve meslek sahibiyse, belli şeyler için onlardan vazgeçmek zorunda kalıyor. Bir nevi bir işbölümü oluyor; sen evde kal, çocuklara bak, evi çek çevir, senin bu vesileyle elde edebileceğin yılda işte şu kadar para var, merak etme ben bakarım hallederim. Aslında bu haksız da bir şey değil. Çünkü normal şartlarda bu, kadının elde edebileceği bir para olarak da düşünülebilir.”

On the other hand, those who have some preoccupations regarding the practical consequences of this regulation remarked that if the education level of woman was not adequate there would be problems in application, and also the education level of the society in general was stated as an obstacle for women to exercise her right:

M(male, 36, bureaucrat, Department Head, university graduate): “It is good in theory but I think education is of utmost importance for applicability of such a practice. Because ours is still a patriarchal society. Unfortunately even though we don’t want it there is such a reality; there is physical violence against women. Our women are forced to abandon their rights through exposure to violence.”

“Teoride güzel bir şey ama uygulamanın sağlıklı olabilmesi için bence eğitim son derece önemli. Çünkü hâlâ ataerkil bir toplumuz. Maalesef istemesek de bir gerçek var: şiddet kullanılıyor. Kadınlarımız şiddet yoluyla bastırılarak bu haklarından feragat ettiriliyorlar.”

Some participants were concerned that the regulation about equal distribution of assets might result in some unfair practices if the spouses do not contribute equally to the family life:

M (male, 60, retired Brigadier General): “That law is appropriate in general but I think it might cause inequalities or unfairness during implementation. Say for example a very talented career woman married an unemployed guy. She works and earns and they’ve got property. Meanwhile the guy goes to teahouse to gamble there. Or vice versa. When a separation is occurred that guy who does nothing but gambling will be entitled to half share of the property acquired through that woman’s efforts. I think there is some kind of unfairness in such a case.”

“O kanun genelde uygun ama uygulamada eşitsizlik, haksızlık olabileceğini düşünüyorum. Diyelim ki çok yetenekli bir kadın çalışıyor, hiç çalışmayan birisiyle evlendi. O çalışıyor diye kazandı kazandı, mülk sahibi oldular, adam kahveye gidiyor, kumar oynuyor. Bunun tam aksi de olabilir. Ayrılma vuku bulduğunda o kahveden çıkmayan kumar oynayan adam, kadın sayesinde kazanılmış olan tüm malların yarısına ortak. Burada da bir haksızlık oluyor düşüncesindeyim.”

The item about the abolishment of capital punishment was approved a little more than half of the total sample (55%). In terms of occupational groups there are not significant differences. The bureaucrats were the group who were relatively the most supportive of the abolishment of death penalty with a rate of 60%, followed by the sample of employers with a 58% of approval rate, whereas only 53% of the workers and 54% of the retired officers approved this item. Even though during the focus group meetings the participants were not asked to comment on capital punishment while discussing other items two participant workers indicated that they support capital punishment for such crimes as child abuse, particularly sexual abuse. This might be an explanation for those who favor death penalty, but taking into account the public sensitivity towards the soldiers killed in terrorist fights, it can be presumed that many people believe that the terrorists deserve capital punishment.

The fifth civil right item about ‘having equal opportunity to get recruited to and promoted in all kind of jobs’ are approved at high rates by all sample groups. 85% of workers, 94% of employers and of retired officers, and 95% of bureaucrats agreed that all citizens should have equal opportunity in recruitment and promotion in all kinds of jobs. Focus group participants similarly approved the importance of equality of opportunity so that those with higher skills should get the job or promotion. However, they thought in practice it is not the case because of several reasons as gender and ethnic discrimination; nepotism; socio-economic status of the families

and patriarchal tradition which restricts women's participation to professional life. Workers gave examples of discriminations in recruiting people to work as a judge, police, military officers or civil servants in Ministries. One worker further remarked that even in the elections of their union they experienced discriminations:

D (male, worker, Yol-İş Union member, 45, university graduate): "We are members of the board of directors of the Union. During the union elections we all experience that the opponents instead of discussing your performance as a union leader, offends you on regional grounds. He says this man is Kurdish, Eastern or Alawite, Circassian or Sunni. .. This is the same in politics. In all areas you are faced with regional differences. We of course do not approve it. It should not be experienced but we actually do, even if we do not want to."²⁴

"Şimdi biz en ufağından şurada sendika yönetimindeyiz. Sendika seçimlerinde hepimiz yaşıyoruz. Karşıdaki muhalefet senin sendikacılığımı tartışmıyor, yöresel olarak sana saldırıyor. Bu diyor Kürttür, Doğuludur veya bu Alevidir, Çerkesdir, Sünnidir gibisinden. .. Siyasette de böyle. Her alanda karşına bölgesel farklılıklar çıkıyor. Biz tabii bundan yana değiliz. Yaşamaması lazım ama valla yaşıyoruz, istemsek de yaşıyoruz."

But one of the workers was more radical and claimed that if someone accepts submission to the ruling classes then s/he can easily promote in any job and may even become the President:

A (male, worker, Yol-İş Union member, 47, high school graduate): ".. If we consider the identity issue or the issues on religious factions such hassle definitely exists but there are also those who can easily overcome this. How can they manage? They act like a dog, I mean figuratively. I mean if you are a dog your religion, your race etc. does not count anymore. Then your identity I mean your being Circassian, Turkish, Kurdish, Alawite, Sunni or whatever stops becoming a burden. If you submit to the ruling classes these are not important anymore. One can even be a President."

".. Kimlik noktasında baktığımızda ya da mezhep noktasında baktığımızda bu tür sıkıntılar da oluyor tabii ki ama onu aşanlar da var. Nasıl aşılıyorlar? Tırnak içinde köpeklik yaparak aşılıyorlar. Yani eğer köpeksen dinin, dilin, ırkın vesairen hiç önemli değil. O zaman, .. kimliğin vesairen, işte Çerkezliğin, Türklüğün, Kürtlüğün, Aleviliğin, Sünniliğin her neyse artık adı, o çok sorun olmuyor. Eğer hâkim sınıflara kafadan teslimiyeti kabul ettiyse hiç önemli değil, Cumhurbaşkanı bile olur."

Concerning the item about the rights of foreign immigrants the sample groups displayed varying attitudes. 62% of workers, 70% of employers and 74% of retired officers and 83% of bureaucrats approved that strict measures should not be taken against the foreign immigrants. Relatively low rate of approval among workers can be explained on economic grounds, because most of the foreign immigrants work informally and at lower wages.

²⁴ It is interesting to note that this participant uses the term "regional or local differences" while referring to religious or ethnic origins of people.

Regarding the seventh item, on the other hand, it seems that freedom of immigration to metropolitan cities was not popularly perceived as a citizenship right by the sample citizens. While 48% of bureaucrats agree that there should not be restrictions on immigration to metropolitan cities only 20% of retired military officers; 26% of employers and 29% of workers support this view. When we check the answers of the respondents who are not residents in big cities (Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir) it was observed that the distribution of affirmative responses remained unchanged. It is generally agreed that as a result of rural-urban migration, infrastructure facilities in metropolitan cities which are already not well developed become insufficient to meet the demands of newcomers. Accordingly, squatter houses emerge, informal economy grows, the quality of public education and health services deteriorates, and traffic and environment problems arise. Even though these arguments are not totally wrong I believe that defending restrictions to migration is an elitist approach²⁵ and is an indication of not paying attention to the fact that citizens should have the right to free movement. Thus, it can be inferred that the survey sample is generally insensitive to this right, because even in the most supportive group of bureaucrats nearly half of the respondents approve restricting the right to migrate.

The last civil right item is about the equality of men and women in the business life which was heavily approved by all sample groups. 78% of employers, 85% of workers, 94% of retired officers and 99% of bureaucrats agree that gender equality should be maintained in the business life. Despite the relatively lower rate of approval among the sub-sample of employers, during the interviews one of the employers strictly defended the significance of women because they are mothers and even found such a question as redundant:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “Of course. This issue [equal rights of men and women in business life] is undebatable. I would even feel ashamed to answer this. This question shouldn’t be asked at all. And with all my rage I want to tell that from my point of view women should be a step forward. Because she is the mother. It is not the father who raises the child. As a matter of

²⁵ My standpoint might be contested by arguing that the workers’ preferences should be explained in economic terms rather than cultural or elitist grounds. But it should be recalled that the survey sample of workers is made up of unionized workers. Thus, they have more or less secure jobs and higher income levels.

biology, of the nature the one who has flesh to flesh relationship with the child, the one who has all the responsibility for months is the mother. Afterwards, it is the mother who breastfeed, clean, share eye to eye love with the child. Is it possible to discuss whether women are equal or not. What a shame!”

“Tabii bu [kadınla erkeğin iş yaşamında eşit haklara sahip olması] tartışılmaz, bunu cevaplamaktan bile utanırım. Böyle bir soru bile olmamalı. Hatta kızgınlığımdan şunu da söyleyeyim, bence kadın daha önde olmalı. Çünkü anne. Çocuğu yetiştiren baba değil ki. Bir kere biyolojisi, doğası gereği daha çok çocukla ten tene temasta olan, aylarca onun her türlü sorumluluğunu taşıyan, anne. Sonra da yıllarca onu emziren, giydiren, altını temizleyen, mamasını yapan, onunla göz göze sevgiyi ilk paylaşan anne. Konuşulur mu bunun eşitliği ya da eşit olup olmaması. Ne kadar yanlış bir şey!”

In sum, as far as the total bunch of civil rights is considered the survey sample as a whole gives considerable importance to the right to equal opportunity in recruiting to jobs; to equality of spouses in distribution of assets and to gender equality in business life. In terms of other rights there are differences among occupational groups. While the workers attach more significance to the right of equal treatment under the law and right to freedom of expression in comparison to the other groups, in terms of the rest of the rights the bureaucrats are the group who accord more weight to them compared to other groups.

5.2.2. Civil Duty Items

The survey items on civil duties have been designed to measure citizens’ reactions to the following eight issues: respecting others’ right to freedom of expression; work ethic; respecting others’ religious beliefs; obeying the traffic rules; general amnesties and tax amnesties; cooperating with the police and paying taxes.

The percentage distribution of civil duty items is summarized in Table 5.5. Again, the items originally have a wording contradicting with the hypothetical construct were reformulated and marked with an asterisk.

Table 5.5: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (or Strongly Agree) with Civil Duty Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officer
CD1	I support that the other people, even if their thoughts are different than mine, express themselves freely.	92.4	91.8	97.2	95.5	84.0
CD2	I believe that performing my job in an honest and proper way will contribute to the country's welfare.	97.4	95.9	100.0	100.0	100.0
CD3	It does not disturb me to have a neighbour of a different religion.	85.4	79.6	88.9	98.1	97.9
CD4	Even if the road is clear, I do not cross/drive the street while the traffic light is red.*	80.0	80.2	76.4	76.4	92.0
CD5	It is not appropriate that the state grants frequent amnesty since such a practice bypasses the preventive function of the sanctions.	88.7	84.9	93.0	97.3	92.0
CD6	Tax amnesties are not appropriate.	82.0	76.1	83.3	94.5	98.0
CD7	It is a citizenship duty to help and cooperate with the police to ensure the peace and rest in the country.	93.8	91.6	97.2	96.4	100.0
CD8	It is a crime against the society not to pay the taxes.	93.9	91.5	93.0	100.0	100.0

In aggregate terms, the results presented in the table indicate that the total sample highly supports all the civil duty items of the ideal construct. The range of affirmative response percentages lies between 80 and 97.4%. It seemed that the least popular civil duty is about obeying traffic rules with an approval rate of 80%.²⁶ On the other hand, almost all (97.4%) the respondents in the total sample agreed that performing one's job in an honest and proper way will contribute to the country's welfare. The sample also seemed very sensitive to the duty of paying taxes with an approval rate of 94% and 82% did not approve tax amnesties. Likewise 89% objected to general amnesties. Interestingly, 92% of the total sample agreed that they supported other people's right to freedom of expression, whereas, as a civil right freedom of expression was approved only by 67% of the total respondents. 85% of the total respondents respect the freedom of religion and 94% believe that cooperating with the police is a citizenship duty.

²⁶ Actually when the current situation of traffic in Turkey is taken into consideration a lower rate of approval was expected for this item. The high percentage may be explained by a social desirability effect.

In terms of sub-sample groups they all seem to quite agree with the civil duties of the ideal construct. The percentage rates change between 76 and 100. The first item which is about respecting others' right to freedom of expression is in fact a control question with reference to the same issue as a citizenship right. However, similar to the total sample results all sub-sample groups highly approve this item as a duty, whereas it has been approved at lower rates when formulated as a right. To remind, freedom of expression as a right was supported by 71% of workers, 64% of employers, 65% of bureaucrats and 47% of retired officers; whereas when it was formulated as a duty of respecting others' right to freedom of expression it was supported by 92% of workers, 97% of employers, 96% of bureaucrats and 84% of retired officers. One possible explanation for this incoherency may be related with the wording of the items. While the right item is formulated as 'It is appropriate that people express **all** their opinions freely', the duty item is stated as 'I support that the other people, even if their thoughts are different than mine, express themselves freely'. Thus, the fact that the first sentence contains the term of "all opinions" might influence respondents' answers. Recalling the debate on freedom of expression during which several reasons were uttered for restricting the expression of some thoughts it can be interpreted that they support others' right to expression *as a matter of principle* as most of the focus group participants clearly expressed. So, the implicit assumption may be that "I support freedom of expression of thought as long as they do not harm national interests, national unity, public order, social peace, moral and traditional values, or not offend others, not incite them to criminal actions."

The second item on 'the duty of proper and honest practice of one's job' was the most popular item for all sample groups. While 96% of workers agreed that performing one's job in an honest and proper way will contribute to the country's welfare, there was unanimous agreement among employers, bureaucrats and military officers. The same univocal attitude was confirmed by the qualitative research study. While one worker defended that people should work in the jobs they like to do, the others emphasized the notion of work ethic and argued that everybody should adhere to his/her job and do his/her best even if s/he does not like the job.

S (female, 38, worker, Yol-İş Union member, university graduate): “I mean a person should value and respect the job whatever s/he is doing. S/he is supposed to do it properly either it is selling bagels or running the state.”

“Şimdi insan ne iş yapıyorsa yaptığı işi önemsemeli. Simit de satsa devleti de yönetse yaptığı işi önemsemek zorunda.”

N (female, 33, worker, Yol-İş Union member, university graduate): “You just get educated in an education you haven’t chosen consciously or not chosen at all and you work in an institution that you haven’t opted for at all. Even there you have to have the work ethics. If I do this job I have to do this in the best way.”

“Hasbelkader bir okulda okuyorsun, bilinçsizce seçilmiş ve tesadüfen yine seçilmemiş bir kurumda çalışıyorsun. İşte orada iş ahlakı olmalı. Ben bu işi yapıyorsam en iyi şekilde yapmalıyım.”

Similar to the workers, all other participants also believed that if people do their jobs in an honest and proper way it will have positive reflections not only on themselves but also on their families, friends, relatives, the society and the country. One of the employers further remarked that good performance in professional life is not adequate and that it should serve to the well-being of the country and thus should be duly registered:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “If a person does not perform his/her job properly and honestly, unfortunately it is the country that loses. Initially it appears as if it were the person who lost but no, it is the country, the country pays the price. If s/he performs his/her job properly and honestly s/he contributes to the country’s welfare. It is not enough just to perform well. I mean out there, there are many successful people who do his/her job well but what use will it have to the country if that person does it informally? In that case it is beneficial only to the person him/herself, to his/her family album.”

“İnsan işini iyi ve dürüst yapmazsa önce ülke kaybediyor maalesef. Aslında insanlar kaybediyor gibi görünüyor ama önce ülke kaybediyor, ülkeye mal oluyor bu. İşini iyi ve dürüst yaparsa ülke refahına katkısı olur. Sadece iyi yapması yetmiyor. İşini iyi yapan bir sürü başarılı insanlar var ama onu memleketi adına olmaktan çıkarırsa, kayıt dışına çıkarırsa ne faydası var? Bireye faydası var, sadece kendi aile albümüne faydası var.”

Another employer touched on the competition in the business life both in the globalizing world and in Turkey and told that in order to keep up with this competition people should do their best in their jobs and should work honestly:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, high school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “The people should be honest, should be honest while doing their jobs, should not cheat, should gain some kind of consciousness of production – knowledge, product, idea whatever it is, we have to aim at maximum productivity or I mean if we’re working in a factory and manufacturing we should pay maximum effort and care to the task we’re in charge of. What benefits can it bring out? The world is in fierce competition; our country is in fierce competition. I mean when we say globalising world if you leave yourself behind in the race then what happens? Your country gets behind; your family gets behind, your locality likewise. So I mean we have to achieve the most perfect, the highest quality, the most

productive in whatever we're doing. Thus it will be beneficial to all segments of the society, to family, to themselves of the people.”

“İnsanların dürüst olması, yaptığı işi dürüst yapması, işine hile katmaması, belli bir üretim bilincine ulaşması -bu fikir olabilir, bilgi olabilir, ürün olabilir- üretirken bir defa maksimum verimliliği hedef almak veya fabrikada çalışıyorsak, bir ürün ürettiyorsak o sorumlu olduğumuz işe azami emek ve dikkati vermemiz lazım. Bunun ne gibi faydaları olabilir? Dünya bir yarış halinde, bulunduğumuz ülke bir yarış halinde. Küreselleşen dünya dediğimiz zaman eğer bu yarışın içinde siz kendinizi arka planda bırakırsanız o zaman ne oluyor, ülkeniz geri kalıyor, aileniz, bulunduğunuz il veya ilçe geri kalıyor. O zaman biz sorumlu olduğumuz, yüklediğimiz herhangi bir işte en iyiyi, en mükemmeli, en kaliteliyi ve en verimliyi yakalamak mecburiyetindeyiz. Dolayısıyla böyle olursak toplumun her kesimine, aileye, insanların kendisine çok büyük yararlar sağlar.”

Additionally, the bureaucrats and retired military remarked the importance of assigning right persons to right jobs which is generally not respected in Turkey as one officer noted “Unfortunately in Turkey it is the job that is assigned to a person and not the person who is assigned to a job [*Türkiye’de maalesef adama iş bulunuyor, işe adam bulunmuyor*].” Furthermore, one bureaucrat touched on the notion of honesty and argued that especially those people who are selected and appointed must conduct honestly. One of the Generals, on the other hand, reminded a principle of the Turkish Navy Forces which dictates that “the person who does his job best is the one who loves his country most”.

The third item concerns the duty of respecting others’ religious beliefs. Even though this item was approved at high rates by all groups there are differences in the degree of approval rates. While workers with an agreement level of 80% seemed to be the least tolerant group to have a neighbour of different religion, 89% of employers, and 98% of both the bureaucrats and retired officers stated that they will not be disturbed if they had a neighbour of a different religion. When the focus group participants and interviewees were asked to comment on religious practices of people with different beliefs than the majority, almost all of them agreed that all citizens should practice their religious beliefs as long as they did not distort the public order or harm the society. As examples of disturbing practices the retired military officers mentioned about the rituals of Aczimendis and Satanists. Only one employer had several preoccupations concerning religious tolerance and argued in a very ‘patriotic and militant’ way that citizens should act responsibly in order not to destroy the unity of the nation:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “It is not easy to be a State in its proper sense. If the State says “As long as you’re my citizen and to the extent that the state is secular – and in fact there are not many secular states in the world- it is necessary to secure that everybody has the means to practice his/her belief with his/her free will. But as I said before since I’m deeply concerned about the games played over Turkey I feel like at this point in history it won’t be appropriate and in fact will even be dangerous accept these demands [concerning Alawites’ urges for setting up their own temples]. In that aspect, our citizens who are Alawites or Assyrians or the others should be more prudent and understanding for the sake of a citizenship consciousness. Because hadn’t it been experienced in the Ottoman Period that the church and the mosques stood next to each other for ages? Hadn’t the Christians, Jews and Muslims co-habited in peace? They had. Without any unrest at all. Why? Because, then there had nothing to separate Ottoman Empire. The situation is not alike. Unfortunately at the moment Turkey and countries like Turkey are under the control of some imperialist powers. I feel sad to say this. And they want to keep everything under their control. Ones they are retaining control our well intentions can provide them some opportunities. That is what I’m preoccupied about. Hadn’t been for such a constraint ... I usually attend the Friday prayer in the mosque over there, but I have loads of Alawite brothers, friends and employees. I never practice any such discrimination but if they do practice of course that disturbs me, makes me uncomfortable. If those games come to an end, Turkey as a State, the Turkish as a nation I mean despite the roots ... Had only we known the value of the richness of its roots. These are such good values, but they don’t let us know their value and we don’t know them.”

“Devlet olmak kolay değildir. Devlet diyorsa ki yeter ki sen yurttaşım ol ve laik bir devletseniz –ki dünyada fazla da laik devlet yok- gereği odur tabii. Herkesin kendi özgür iradesine, anlayışına, inançlarına göre ibadetini yapabilmesidir. Ama biraz evvel söylediğim gibi, Türkiye üzerine oynanan oyunlar beni rahatsız ettiği için bu konuda şu zamanda bu olsun demek [Alevilerin cemevi talepleri ile ilgili olarak] çok tehlikeli olabilir. Bu konuda Alevi vatandaşlarımızın da Süryani vatandaşlarımızın da diğer vatandaşlarımızın da daha sağduyulu olması, daha anlayışlı olması yurttaş bilinci anlamında daha doğru olur. Çünkü Osmanlı döneminde yıllarca kiliseyle cami yan yana olmamış mı? Hıristiyanı, Müslümanı, Yahudisi bir arada olmamış mı? Ne rahatsızlık yaşanmış? Hiçbir rahatsızlık yaşanmamış. Niye? Çünkü o zaman Osmanlı’yı bölecek, parçalayacak, rahatsız edecek bir güç yokmuş. Şimdi öyle değil ki. Şimdi Türkiye ve Türkiye gibi ülkeler bir takım emperyalist güçlerin kontrolü altında maalesef. Bunu çok üzümlere söylüyorum. Ve her şeyi ellerinde tutmak istiyorlar. Elleri tutarken de bizim bu iyi duygularımız onlara bir takım fırsatlar verebilir, bundan çekinirim. Yoksa böyle bir çekincem olmasa.. Ben Cuma namazını kılarım şuradaki camide genelde ama benim bir sürü Alevi dostlarım, kardeşlerim var, burada benim yanımda çalışan bir sürü Alevi insan var. Hiç öyle bir ayrımcılığa girmem ama onlar girerse de bundan rahatsız olurum tabii ki, üzülürüm. Bu oyunlar ortadan kalkarsa, Türkiye devlet olarak, millet olarak bu kadar kökenlerine rağmen –aslında bu kökenlerin zenginliğinin değerini bilsek, bunlar o kadar güzel değerler ki, ama bildirmiyorlar ve bilmiyoruz..”

Another patriotic –but less severe- remark made by one of the retired military officers who claimed that in the whole world the Turkish nation is the one which most tolerates and respects all religious beliefs, but he was not approved by other officers who reminded the intolerance of Sunnis (or Sunnites) against Alawites manifested in Sivas and Maraş cases.

Contrary to the employer whose comment was quoted above, another employer was very sensitive to the freedom of religious practice and she thought that it was a state

duty to provide worship places for all citizens. By claiming that “the state exists to meet the demands of its citizens” she expressed a typical liberal understanding of citizenship:

T (female, 43, manufacturer of cut flowers, university graduate): “If people of differing beliefs are under the roof of “citizenship” then the state absolutely and absolutely must provide them temples where they can practice their beliefs, just to provide them a service , in fact this is the *raison d’être* of a state. State exists to cater the requirements of the citizen. If somebody is a Christian or if there is a community in a locality there has to be a church. I mean if we are wealthy enough. I mean not for one person or two. But if they want to finance it themselves they shouldn’t be objected.”

“Eğer farklı inançlara sahip bireyler aynı yurttaşlık çatısı altında toplanmışsa o devlet yurttaşlarına mutlaka ve mutlaka inancını uygulayabileceği ibadet yerleri açmak zorunda ona hizmet götürme adına, devlet onun için var. Yurttaşlarının ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için var devlet. Birisi eğer Hıristiyanı, yaşadığı mahallede, köyde bir grup, cemaat varsa kilise olmak zorunda. O kadar zenginsek tabii. Bir-iki kişi için de olmaz. Kendileri kurmak istiyorlarsa da karşı çıkılmamalı.”

Her above remarks were supported by the comments of a bureaucrat who pointed to the urge to provide more space for all believers in Turkey, despite his reservations for the Alawite community:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “I think differently about the Alawites. Since they don’t have a holy book or a prophet of their own I just feel it weird that they prefer another organisation. But of course the space of action is very important for them as well. Of course in the country there will be people of different belief. They will observe their beliefs just as the majority observes its own. As an example I should say even though the number of Catholics in this country is about 2-3 thousand I support that Christmas should be a holiday. In a recent article an author wrote that “previously the calendars mentioned special days like orthodox Christmas, Easter, Hanukah etc. Those were the times that we inherited the multinational culture. The first 10-20 years of the Republic.” We had just entered a process within which the space of action for people of different belief – not only the Alawites – got narrower and narrower. I mean normally everybody should have a space of action say as much as a Jew in the States.”

“Aleviler konusunda farklı düşünüyorum. Aleviliğin bir kitabı bir peygamberi olmadığı için ayrı bir örgütlenmeye gitmelerini yadırgıyorum. Ama hareket özgürlüğü tabii ki çok önemli onlar için de. Ülkede mutlaka farklı inanç sahipleri olacak, çoğunluk nasıl (*inancını*) yaşıyorsa onlar da öyle yaşayacak. Mesela Türkiye’de birkaç bin Katolik bile olsa ben Noel’in tatil olmasından yanayım. Türkiye’de dini inanç sahipleri için çok fazla hareket alanı olduğunu sanmıyorum. Bir köşe yazarı yılbaşında yazdığı bir makalede şöyle diyordu: “Eski takvimlerde Katolik Yortusu, Nisan’daki Paskalya, Noel, Ortodoksların suya haç atma merasimi filan hepsi olurdu çok uluslu kültürü devraldığımız yıllarda, Cumhuriyet’in ilk 15-30 yılındaki takvimlerde.” Biz farklı inanç sahiplerinin hareket alanlarını -sadece Aleviler için değil herkes için söylüyorum- çok daraltmış bir sürece girdik. Normalde herkesin mesela ABD’deki bir Musevi kadar hareket alanı olmalı.”

On the other hand, one of the bureaucrats made a distinction between two issues: practicing/praying according to one's religion and living in accordance with one's religion. He remarks that praying is everyone's right but if one decides to follow a way of life shaped thoroughly by his religion he may interfere with other persons' lives. However, it is essential that the right to freedom of praying/worshipping should be guaranteed. It can be proposed that he expressed his arguments by way of a rational enlightened approach:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): "At this point there is a nuance between to observe your religious practices and to live in line with your religion. Practicing is everybody's right. I mean as one can't say the majority of the society is Sunnite Muslim so the Christians also should worship in a mosque, the same should also be true for Alawites. If they want to worship in a community house then let them have it. I think the danger here is not in Alawite community houses it is in building new mosques on every corner of every street just because the majority is Sunnite Muslims. Because here the point is ensuring that while people are living in line with their religion they shouldn't intervene into others' lives and here I don't mean just not offending. It's going to be an extreme example but let's take the Law stipulating that you can't open a restaurant with an alcohol license within 100 m of a mosque. If you want to amend the law you'll most probably face a serious objection. On the other hand, we don't have any rule against building a mosque wherever you like. So when you build a mosque somewhere you're indirectly dragging an alcohol-consuming person out of that certain locality. Similarly a hard core Muslim can think like "during the Ramadan all restaurants should be closed during the fasting hours". This is an intervention not only to the commercial sphere but to the lives of non-fasting people as well. I mean to live your religion might easily transform itself to intervene in the others' lives. Here the important point is securing that everybody practices safely, but if you say living the religion you're sort of getting into public life, to the social order. And this can have unwanted consequences."

"Şimdi burada bir nüans var: bir dininin gereğini yerine getirsin, iki dinine göre yaşasın. İbadet herkesin hakkı. Nasıl ki toplumun çoğunluğu Sünni Müslüman, Hıristiyanlar da gitsin camide ibadet etsin diyemezse aynı şekilde Aleviler de inançlarına göre cemevinde ibadet etmek istiyorlarsa cemevinin de olması gerekiyor. Burada bence tehlike cemevinde değil, çoğunluk Sünni diye her köşe başında cami kurmakta. Çünkü burada esas olan herkesin dinini yaşarken başkasının yaşamına müdahale etmemesi, yalnız rencide etmemesi değil. Uç bir örnek olacak ama caminin 100 metre yakınında içkili lokanta açılmaması kuralını düşünelim. Bunu değiştirmeye kalksanız büyük ihtimalle itirazlarla karşılaşacaksınız. Ama diğer taraftan herkesin her köşe başında bir cami yapmasını engelleyen bir kural da yok. Bir yere bir cami yaptığınız zaman mesela içki içen bir kişinin o çevreden yararlanmasını önlüyorsunuz dolaylı olarak. Aynı şekilde dini bütün bir Müslüman Ramazan'da gündüz vakti lokantaların kapalı olması gerektiğini düşünebilir. Bu oruç tutmayanların yaşamına bir şekilde müdahaledir, bırakın ticari hayata müdahaleyi. Dolayısıyla inancını yaşamak çok rahat bir şekilde başkasının yaşamına müdahaleye dönüşebilir. Burada esas olan herkesin serbestçe ibadet edebilmesini sağlamaktır. Ama inancı yaşamak dediğiniz takdirde biraz herkesin ortak olduğu kamunun içine, toplum düzenine girmiş oluyorsunuz. Onun da yanlış sonuçları olabilir."

In a similar way of thinking one General pointed out the presence of social pressure on those women not covering their heads, particularly in small provinces.

The fourth item is about obeying traffic rules and is formulated to measure people's attitudes toward a frequently violated rule of not crossing while the traffic light is red even if the road is clear. According to the results the survey sample seems to be composed of law-abiding citizens, because 80% of workers, 92% of retired officers and 76% of both employers and of bureaucrats claimed that they did not violate this rule. As noted before the high rates must be related with a social desirability effect. But it can be inferred that even if the number of people violating this rule were higher in reality, not admitting their wrong-doing is in fact an indication of their approval of this item as a duty to be obeyed.

Concerning the fifth civil duty item stating that 'frequent amnesties are not appropriate' despite the high rates of approval in all occupational groups the level of agreement varies. While 85% of workers did not support amnesties, 93% of employers, 97% of bureaucrats and 92% of retired officers objected to granting amnesties frequently. Qualitative research results confirmed this picture with the exception of employers.

During the focus groups, the participant workers generally did not approve amnesties but they supported amnesties for political thought crimes and one of them was also in favor of forgiving persons who had to steal for living. Bureaucrats and retired officers were against amnesties. As for the employers, there were differences in opinions about general amnesties. One female employer totally objected to general amnesties because of its encouraging effect on criminals. One employer, similar to the workers, disapproved general amnesties but was in favour of political amnesties. The remaining employers were supporting general amnesties as long as they were not given frequently. One employer was in favour of people's being forgiven because of their natural tendency to crime and sin and he further argued that crimes against the individual should not be forgiven by the state:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): "Of course people should be forgiven. Human beings commit crime because they have a tendency. To start with people have a tendency towards sin. As part of their nature they have a weakness towards the forbidden, towards the

unknown. So if these people haven't been well educated, haven't assimilated the social benefit (common good) they commit crime. And also human beings have an egoistic tendency. They want all to themselves. Not one for them the other for the other. This is also associated with the mode of being brought up, the education they undergo. In social issues there have to be amnesties, but this shouldn't be limitless, this should be well designed. But what kind of crimes should be given amnesty? This should be analysed in detail. There are crimes against the society and there are crimes committed against an individual. The State, the Parliament is giving amnesty to the latter. It is totally wrong. Because that crime has been committed against me, myself, so it is only me who can forgive it. They haven't got the authority to give amnesty. Because the misdemeanor, the crime has been committed against me as a person so I don't think like it is right that the State gives amnesty."

"Mutlaka insanlar affedilmeli, insanlar suç işlerler, suça meyillidirler çünkü. İnsanlar bir defa harama meyillidir. Yaradılış özelliği itibarıyla gizli olana yasak olana bir zaafları vardır. Dolayısıyla da bu insanlar iyi eğitim almamışsa, toplumsal faydayı çok iyi özümsememişse bu insanlar suç işlerler. Bir de insanın hep bana hep bana diye bir zaafı vardır, keser gibidir, hep kendine yontar, testere gibi değildir bir sana bir bana mantığı yoktur. O da yetişme şekliyle, alınan eğitimle çok yakinen alakalıdır. Sosyal konularda mutlaka af olmalıdır ama bu af sınırsız olmamalıdır, alışkanlık haline getirilmemelidir. Dolayısıyla af olmalı ama çok iyi düşünülerek yapılmalıdır diyorum. Ama hangi suçların affi olmalıdır? Onların ayrıntıları gerekecek. Bir topluma karşı işlenmiş suç var, bireyin kendisine karşı işlenmiş suçlar var. Tutuyor devlet, TBMM affediyor bunu, bu çok yanlıştır. Çünkü bana karşı işlenmiş olan suçu ancak ben affedebilirim, onların affetme gibi bir yetkisi yoktur. Çünkü o kusur, suç şahsıma karşı işlenmiştir, dolayısıyla devletin affetmesini doğru bulmam."

Likewise, the retired military officers stated that the Parliament did not have such a right to declare amnesties to those who committed crimes against the individuals. The same issue was repeated by one of the bureaucrats who remarked that in Turkey there was no general amnesty because the state forgives the crimes committed against others and not those claimed to be committed against the state itself. He also explained the apathy of the people against general amnesties by arguing that since people do not trust the judiciary system they consider amnesties as a kind of compensation for the unfair practices:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): "Maybe at that point we have to think about this. Why do Governments give amnesty? Because they're populists. But then why does the rest of the society remain silent? It is not possible to find an explanation in terms of social inertia or apathy. I think people don't have confidence in the penal law, the court process or the tax system. They already think that there is injustice and they feel like the amnesty offsets the injustice. You read in the papers news of what happens to people during the court process or people who were unjustly sentenced to prison. I mean in the people's minds there are always some doubts. They don't fully trust that the guy in the prison is guilty. Unfortunately our procedural Law does not eliminate those doubts. There are processes that last for ages or that pend till statute of limitation. The latter case automatically creates an image that the guilty just ran away without punishment. They start thinking like that chap had the means to organize this. And the chaps locked up are there just because they were powerless. So maybe to them amnesty appears as offsetting this injustice."

"Burada belki şuna bakmak lazım; hükümetler niye af çıkarıyor, çünkü popülist, peki toplumun geri kalanı niye buna ses çıkarmıyor? Bunun toplumsal ataletle, apatiyle filan bence açıklaması yok. Bence insanların ceza kanununa yani ceza yargılamasına, vergi sistemine de güvenleri

yok. Zaten ortada bir adaletsizlik olduğunu düşünüyorlar ve bu affın bir şekilde o adaletsizliği ortadan kaldırdığını düşünüyorlar. Gazetelerde okuyorsunuzdur, yargılama sırasında insanların başına gelenleri, haksız yere hapis yatanları.. İnsanların zihninde hapiste olan insanın yüzde yüz suçlu olduğuna dair bir inanç yok, daima bir tereddüt var. Maalesef bizim ceza yargılama sistemimiz de bu tereddütü ortadan kaldırmıyor. Uzayan, zaman aşımına bırakılan davalar oluyor. Bir dava zaman aşımına bırakıldığında insanlarda otomatikman suçlu bir kişi kaçtı imajı yaratılıyor. Bunun imkanları vardı, bu işi organize etti, içerideki garibanın suçu ne düşüncesi oluyor. Dolayısıyla af belki bir şekilde bu adaletsizliği ortadan kaldırıyor.”

Another bureaucrat suggested that if a jury system was established and if prosecutors were determined by elections there would be no need for general amnesties:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “In principle, I am against amnesty. And as a solution I can offer this. It might not be appropriate that the judges are appointed by open elections but for securing that the public feels itself as part of the legal system we have to give the people a say in the system. Maybe we can introduce an institution like the jury. Or we can think about elected public prosecutors. When the public appropriate the system we won't need either tax amnesties or general amnesties in the long run. In fact, the state is really harsh about the crimes committed against itself. It just wears lives of poets, authors away condemning them to long sentences during which they've got nothing to do but to waive carpets but ordinary murderers just got an easy release to continue serial killing. I mean as a solution I suggest jury and the election system. Cause such a change introduces a system much more appreciated by the local people. Because it's a bit meaningless to expect a law graduate from Ankara or Istanbul to have the same reflexes with the locals in Ardahan and Marmaris. I watched a TV drama last night. The guys were drinking raki and saying 'The judge didn't implement a customs reduction in the sentence. Tomorrow I'm gonna shoot him.' ”

“Prensip olarak ben de affa karşıyım. Bir çare olarak da şunu önereceğim. .. Hâkim seçimle gelmeyebilir ama halkın bir ölçüde hukuk sistemiyle bütünleşmesini sağlamak için halka bu konuda söz hakkı vermemiz lazım, jüri gibi bir kurumu getirebiliriz belki. Seçimle gelmiş savcılar gündeme gelebilir. Halk benimsediği zaman sistemi bence uzun dönemde ne vergi affına ne de genel affa ihtiyaç kalacaktır. Hakikaten devlet kendine karşı işlenen suçlarda çok katı, bir şaire, bir yazara orada kilim dokutarak ömrünü tüketiyor ama adi katiller çıkıp seri cinayetlere devam edebiliyorlar. Çare olarak da dediğim gibi jüri ve seçim sistemini öneriyorum. Yöre halkının daha benimseyeceği bir sistemi başlatır. Çünkü Hukuk'u İstanbul'da okumuş bir çocuğun Ardahan'la Marmaris'te aynı refleksi göstermesini beklemek anlamsızlık oluyor. Akşam bir dizide seyrettim, bir taraftan rakı içip bir taraftan hâkim töre indirimi yapmadı namussuz, yarın vuracağım onu diyor filan..”

Additionally, while one of the bureaucrats mentioned the negative consequences of reconstruction amnesty (*imar affi*) which encourages people to build squatter houses in public lands, one retired General pointed out the discontent of people as a result of the amnesties and the danger of resorting to illegal mafiosi solutions to establish justice. Furthermore, another General argued that there was no need for amnesties because the penalties have already been readjusted with respect to the good conduct of the prisoners. The retired Colonel remarked the importance of rehabilitation and argued noted that without rehabilitating the criminals amnesty will not be a solution.

Item six about tax amnesties and the last item on paying taxes should be evaluated simultaneously. Although 92% of workers agreed that ‘not paying taxes is a crime against the society’ they seemed a little reserved about the tax amnesties as only 76% of them believed that tax amnesties are not appropriate. While 93% of employers believed the significance of tax paying, 83% of them did not approve tax amnesties. 95% of bureaucrats and 98% of retired officers were against tax amnesties and both groups unanimously agreed that ‘not paying taxes is a crime against the society’.

In line with the survey results, during the focus groups and interviews all participants agreed on the indispensability of paying taxes. Workers argued that without regular and fair collection of taxes the state cannot provide adequate and qualified social services as education and health. Apart from one employer and two bureaucrats who thought tax amnesties were legitimate in times of economic crisis, all participants were against tax amnesties. Employers pointed to the high tax rates and the unjust and dishonest practices of the government members concerning tax collection and allocation of taxes which discourage people to pay taxes:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “.. I have to pay the taxes arising from the income I have through what I produced and sold so that I’ll have the return as energy, or increase the level of prosperity of my citizens as roads, infrastructure, sewage etc. Where do I earn the money to be taxed? From the people of this country or through the added value of the goods I exported. So while doing this I absolutely have to pay the taxes. But there are reasons why people evade taxes. As I said if the cadres running the state allocate the taxes to certain guys, a person thinks like they will distribute my money illegitimately then why should I pay my taxes. Or the state does not invest the money appropriately.”

“.. ben ürettiğimden sattığımdan kârdan elde ettiğim vergiyi vermeliyim ki bu bana enerji olarak dönecek bir. İki, yol olarak, üç; su, altyapı, kanalizasyon, yani benim insanlarımla refah düzeyini yükseltecek. Ben nereden kazanıyorum vergi olarak ödediğim parayı, bu ülkenin insanlarından kazanıyorum veya dışarıya sattığım maldan katma değer elde ederek kazanıyorum. Bunu yaparken de mutlak suretle vergiyi ödemeliyim. Ama verginin kaçırılmasına sebep olan şeyler var, dediğim gibi devletin başındaki yönetici kadro belli kişilere peşkeş çekiyorsa adam niye vereyim, götürüp yine birilerine peşkeş çekecek diye düşünüyor. Veya aldığı vergiyi akıllı yerlere yatırmıyor.”

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “Of course one should pay his/her tax in order that the state could provide services like health, education or roads. But whether the taxes collected are used for those purposes is a dodgy issue. We all see the credits allocated, the businesses doing well or the ones that can’t.”

“Elbette insan vergisini verecek ki .. sağlık, eğitim, yol hizmetlerini devlet yapabilsin. Ama tabii verdiğiniz vergiler oraya mı gidiyor, orda da şaibeli bir durum var ortada. Görüyorsunuz işte verilen kredileri, kimler batıyor, kimler çıkıyor.”

In a similar way of thinking bureaucrats argued that because of the unfair practices in tax collection and due to lack of transparency in the way taxes are utilized there was a tendency to evade tax. They noticed the importance of auditing and penalizing. One bureaucrat noted that people generally considered tax payment as a function of the state and did not expect any services from the state in return for paying tax. They argued that referring citizens as “tax payers” instead of “voters” -as used in the Western countries- is more appropriate from the citizenship point of view. If citizens regard themselves as tax payers they will ask for accountability in practices of the government. Another bureaucrat noted that tax payment should not be let to people’s conscience and the state by establishing a good registration system with appropriate penalties and by decreasing tax rates should collect taxes. This point is expressed by one retired General as “tax is not given, tax is taken. Nobody will go and give his money.”

While employers noticed that tax amnesties encourage informal economy and causes unfair consequences for those already paid their taxes, one of the bureaucrats argued that because of unfair practices tax amnesties were considered as compensatory:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “One of the major duties of the State is ensuring an environment where everybody can work properly, can operate his/her function but the State can’t secure this. Moreover, nobody believes that there is justice in either the tax system or the money that the state collects in other ways. Thus, they think that a tax amnesty balances this. When the income tax and the social security premium on the wages are considered, it means that the half or even 60% of the wages are paid to the State. This is a great injustice. People sometimes don’t, sometimes can’t pay this. When tax amnesty is granted, this injustice is rebalanced. I mean naturally in an efficiently functioning tax and penal system amnesty is absolutely unacceptable. Except for really extraordinary cases like that the guy is very ill or he has an exceptional case then he’s given amnesty. Or say the man is working really honestly so in order not to ruin the enterprise the tax admin does not prefer liquidation and provide an opportunity. But unfortunately in Turkey the amnesty is considered as a means of offsetting the injustice.”

“Devletin görevlerinden bir tanesi herkesin düzgün bir şekilde çalışabileceği, işini yürütebileceği bir ortamı sağlamak, ama devlet bunu sağlayamıyor. Artı gerek vergi sisteminde gerek devletin çeşitli şekillerde aldığı paralarda da bir adalet olduğuna kimse inanmıyor. Vergi affıyla bunun dengelendiği düşünülüyor. İşçi ücretlerinin üzerindeki sosyal güvenlik ve diğer vergileri düşünürsek yarı yarıya hatta yüzde 60’ı devlete ödeniyor demektir. Bu büyük bir adaletsizlik, insanlar bazen bunu ödemiyor, bazen de ödeyemiyor. Afla bu ortadan kalktığı zaman işte bir şekilde dengelenmiş oluyor. Tabii bunun esası, düzgün çalışan bir ceza ve vergi sisteminde affın kesinlikle yeri yok. Çok olağanüstü durumlarda olabilir, mesela adam çok hastadır veya başka bir özel durumu vardır affedilir. Veya adam çok dürüst çalışıyordu, işletmeyi ortadan kaldırmamak için tasfiyeye gidilmez, bir imkân sağlanır. Ama maalesef Türkiye’de af bir adaletsizliği giderme olarak görülüyor.”

According to one employer, taxes empower the position of a country against the others and if the country had very rich natural resources there would be no need for tax payment. He was against tax amnesties and he defended that to prevent informal economic activities and tax evasions the mentality of the state should be changed and the state should exist for its citizen and not the vice versa. His remarks in the following quote are quite interesting, because in contrary to his previous patriotic and militant discourse he defended the priority of the citizen over the state in line with a liberal notion of citizenship:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “.. In Turkey we still have a state of mind suggesting that we sacrifice whatever means we have for our state. In fact this should be the opposite. The state should give whatever it has for the citizen. We always sacrifice ourselves; we talk like that because we’ve been indoctrinated as such. In the developed countries the state always gives the priority to its citizen. What I want to say is this is the idea underlying the autocontrol mechanism. The state should exist for the citizen. Not the vice versa. There comes the power of the state. I shouldn’t suffer as a citizen where there exists the reign of the Law, where exists rights. Then as a human being I see a brighter future with the insight that I’m strong and I’m in the right place and I do not opt for informality.”

“.. biz hâlâ Türkiye’de devletimiz için varımızı yoğumuzu koyan bir anlayış içindeyiz, aslında bu böyle değil de, devlet vatandaşı için her şeyini koyabilecek düşünce içinde olmalı. Biz hep kendimizi feda ediyoruz, öyle konuşuyoruz, bugüne kadar hep öyle aşılanmışız. Ama gelişmişlikte öyle olmuyor. Gelişmiş ülkelerde devlet her zaman vatandaşını ön planda tutuyor. Benim söylemek istediğim otokontrolörlük anlayışında esas bu var zaten. Devlet vatandaşı için olmalı, vatandaş devleti için değil. Devletin gücü odur, o olmalıdır. Devlet benim için olmalıdır. Hakkın, hukukun olduğu yerde, insani değerlerin olduğu yerde ben ezilmemeliyim vatandaş olarak. O zaman işte ben güçlü olduğumun, doğru yerde olduğumun, insanca yaşadığımın güveniyle yarınlarıma daha doğru bakarım. O zaman kayıt dışına da çıkmam.”

Another bureaucrat pointed out the contradiction between not paying taxes and still expecting a strong state:

R (male, 46, Department Head, university graduate): “We all say “God save the state” and do not pay taxes at the same time... Of course one can explain the reluctance to pay the taxes with bad allocation of the money collected or with nepotism involved but on the other side we say God save the State. We consider the state as a divine authority and probably think like the states income comes from the heaven. There is a contradiction here.”

“Hem Allah devlete zeval vermesin diyoruz, hem vergi vermiyoruz. .. tabii vergi vermedeki gönülsüzlüğü toplanan vergilerin çarçur edilmesi, hortumlanması ile açıklayabiliriz ama bir yandan da Allah devlete zeval vermesin diyoruz. Devleti ilahi bir güç olarak görüyoruz ya da bir şekilde bir yerden onun gıdası geliyordur diye düşünüyoruz. Orada bir çelişki var.”

The final item which concerns helping and cooperating with the police to ensure public order is also approved in majority of all sample groups. While 92% of

workers, 97% of employers, 96% of bureaucrats approved this item, there was a unanimous approval in the sample of retired officers. The relatively low level of approval among the workers was supported by the views of the workers in the focus group. They explained their preoccupations in cooperating with the police because of their previous experiences. They generally did not trust the police and one of them said that “Even if it were my father who worked at the police institution, I would not trust him.” [*Valla poliste babam olsa güvenmem.*] Two female workers also mentioned about police officers sexually harassing political criminals or those behaving unprofessionally to the women asking for help. But the rest of the interviewees did not share worker’s despise for the police even though they admitted that there might be some problems because of insufficient education and stressed the importance of education as in the following comments:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “The police and the gendarme must do their job. In fact, their job is strictly defined by Law. But in Turkey since they act upon bias, since they are inconsistent they ruin the citizen’s confidence. This is again something to be tackled by education. The police and the gendarme should be well educated. Education is of utmost importance. Is it possible that the one who knows and the one who doesn’t are the same? No way. Of course the one who knows is superior. The one without a consciousness can create all kind of problems.”

“Polis, jandarma mutlaka görevini yapmalı, yasal sınırlarla belirlenmiştir zaten onların görevi. Ama şimdi polis ve jandarma Türkiye’de yanlış hareket ettiği için, tutarsız olduğu için vatandaşın güvenini sarsıyor. Bu da bir eğitimidir. Polisin, jandarmanın iyi eğitilmesi lazım. Eğitim çok önemli. Hiç bilenle bilmeyen bir olur mu? Mutlaka bilen yüksektir, iyidir. Bilinçsiz insan her türlü sıkıntıyı yaratabilir.”

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “We shouldn’t generalize it to the totality of the police force. Absolutely there are good ones among them. This, in the end is a human community. Thus there are good ones and there are bad ones among the group. But recently there are guys like the ones in the special teams who have been recruited from the street, without any education. In fact we see from time to time among those there are certain guys that commit suicide or homicide his wife... There are guys like those among them.”

“Bütün polisleri katmamak lazım. Mutlaka iyileri de vardır içerisinde. Bu bir insan topluluğudur, mutlaka iyisi de kötüsü de vardır içerisinde. Ama son dönemlerde bu çevik kuvvet, özel hareket timi diye sokaktan alıp toplayıp aldıkları adamlar var, eğitimsiz. Onların içerisinde de zaman zaman görüyoruz, kimisi intihar ediyor, kimisi karısını öldürüyor, o tür insanlar da var içerisinde.”

One employer noted that with recent improvements the level of education of the police was upgraded. In a nationalistic discourse he also pointed to the importance of impartiality of the police and he believed that the Turkish police should be like the Turkish soldier:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “To speak frankly, so far I haven’t had such a personal experience with the police. But recently, since the number of people graduated from police colleges and police academies –like the military- are increasing within the police force I personally feel more comfortable. Of course there will be a huge difference between those who doesn’t have an academic or educational background and working sentimentally and those who have been through a special education and training which equip them with national and the global values. I mean that is something of the past now. The majority of the first kind of police retired or passed away –may God have mercy on them-. New generation in the security forces is luckier in this aspect, they are better. But here as a nation we should be careful that those shouldn’t have a belonging to this or that group. That should be the police force of the Turkish Nation. Like the Military. We all know that in the military they are strictly sensitive against that kind of belongings. They cut the person off the organization. Likewise in the Turkish Security Organisation there has to be the Turkish police, like the Turkish military. I believe the path is towards that direction. In 3-5 years time it will be even better.”

“Benim şimdiye kadar şahsi olarak [polisle ilgili] böyle bir deneyimim olmadı açıkçası. Ama şu son zamanlarda, aynen askeri düzen gibi Polis Kolejleri ve Polis Akademileri’nden mezun olan emniyet görevlilerimiz çoğalmaya başladığından beri ben şahsen daha rahatım. Sadece duygularıyla polislik yapan, herhangi bir eğitim altlığı, akademik altlığı olmayan bir polis memuruyla memleketi için yetiştirilmiş, memleket değerlerini, dünya değerlerini bilen ve belli sıkı bir eğitim ve öğretim yapılanmasından geçmiş memurlar arasında tabii ki çok farklar olacaktır. Artık o bence gerilerde kalmaya başladı, o tip jenerasyonun çoğu emekli oldu ya da Allah rahmet eylesin öldü gitti. Yeni jenerasyon emniyet teşkilatı bu konuda şanslı, daha iyi geliyor. Tabii burada da ulus olarak şeye dikkat etmemiz lazım, bunların içinde de kökten şunlar kökten bunlar, yok işte şu yanlı bu yanlı olmamalarına dikkat etmemiz lazım. Türk polisi olması lazım. Aynen Türk askeri nasıl, askeriyede yıllardır kuş uçar mı, anında temizlerler. Türk Emniyet Teşkilatı’nın da Türk polisleri olması lazım, Türk askerleri gibi olması lazım. Ben buraya gittiğine inanıyorum. Üç beş yıl içinde daha da doğru yerlere gidecektir.”

Additionally, the attitudes of participants in the case of witnessing a problem regarding public order were discussed. Participants consensually considered personal intervention to events disturbing public order as a citizenship duty, social responsibility and sensibility. The retired officers also emphasized the importance of intervention without waiting the police because apathy of the society would encourage people’s inappropriate actions. Some employers, on the other hand, argued that the society as a whole became less sensible to such events and we lost our old good virtues. While one employer pointed to the “televole culture” as the reason of insensibility, another one remarked the possibility of people being afraid to get involved because the person might be armed. According to one bureaucrat people abstain from witnessing because of the sluggishness of the judiciary system.

One bureaucrat suggested considering citizenship in a broader context to include relations with neighbours, neighbourhood and the environment which encourages people to react improper actions in their neighbourhood. In response to her

suggestion another bureaucrat remarked that if people have a respectful citizenship relationship with the system than they will react to problems:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “To ignore the crime or to see it but not letting the authorities learn about it arises from the fact that the person him/herself is a potential criminal. I mean just forgive my openness, but in the end the guy himself is not a good citizen either. What I mean is you work all your life to buy a flat, the guy migrating from the village invades public land, and afterwards make a deal with the builder for 9 flats. You can’t expect such a guy to be sensitive against injustice. All his life view relies on an injustice. Within the system, I mean if the people are within a relationship of good, respectable citizenship with the system of course they would be more active, more responsive about the malpractices or the malfunctioning.”

“Suç görüp bildirmeme ya da suçu görmezlikten gelme eğilimi insanın kendisinin de potansiyel bir suçlu olmasından kaynaklanır. Kusura bakmayın açık açık söylemek lazım adamın kendisi de iyi bir yurttaş değil ki. Şunu kastediyorum, siz ömür boyu çalışıp bir daire alabiliyorsunuz, o köyden gelip bir arsa çeviriyor müteahhide verince dokuz daire alıyor. Siz o adamdan haksızlık karşısında çok ses çıkarmasını bekleyemezsiniz ki. Adamın bütün dünya görüşü haksızlık üzerine kurulu. Sistemin içersinde insanlar iyi bir yurttaş, saygı duyulması bir yurttaşlık ilişkisi içinde olsalar sistemle, mutlaka bir kusur veya hata gördükleri zaman daha etkin ve aktif reaksiyon verebilirler.”

In general, according to the survey results, the military officers were the sample with the highest approval rates for all duty items which makes them the most sensitive group to civil duties. Only for the item about supporting others’ expressing their ideas retired military officers were more conservative than the other sample groups. The workers, on the other hand, had the lowest approval rates for civil duties with the exception of the item on respecting others’ right to freedom of expression.

5.2.3. General Evaluation of the Results on Civil Citizenship

On the basis of the balance between total scores of civil rights and of duties it has been concluded that since in all occupational groups the duties are given more weight compared to rights, the survey sample as a whole regardless of occupational differences is considered to perceive civil elements of citizenship in line with the civic-republican model. Then, since the statistical comparisons indicate the presence of some differences between occupational groups item-level analyses are carried out by employing both the survey results and the qualitative data of the focus group studies and interviews.

The item-level results of the survey reveal that while the total sample give considerable significance to the right to equal opportunity in recruiting to jobs; to equality of spouses in distribution of assets and to gender equality in business life; they do not give the same importance to the more critical civil rights of right to equal treatment under the law; the freedom of movement and freedom of expression. During the interviews the participants advanced several restrictions to the freedom of expression. Furthermore, the abolishment of capital punishment was approved by low rates ranging between 53-60%. On the other hand, all civil duty items including respecting others' right to freedom of expression were approved at high rates (ranging between 76 and 100% of approval rates) in all sample groups. Therefore, the conclusion reached on the basis of total civil citizenship scores was confirmed by the item-level analyses and the survey sample regardless of their occupations displayed a republican perception of citizenship in terms of civil rights and duties. On the basis of survey results it is not possible to offer further comments but the discourses of the qualitative research participants are helpful to highlight different patterns of citizenship understanding.

The fact that during the focus group meetings and interviews all participants accord utmost importance to society's well-being, common good, public order, social peace and rest indicates that for them public interests have priority over individual freedoms. Likewise, the unanimous agreement on the importance of work and the relevant discussions are in line with the official republican understanding of citizenship which is described on the basis of 'responsibility/work ethic'. As argued by Üstel (2004) this understanding of work as a virtue and a form of moral existence enables to disregard the class conflicts in line with the corporatist doctrine. And in fact, apart from one worker, none of the participants articulated any views in terms of social classes. On the other hand, listing several conditions concerning the unity of the nation, national interests, 'games played over Turkey' and 'the conditions of Turkey' to justify restrictions on individual freedoms clearly supports a patriotic republican notion of citizenship which attaches priority to national interests.

Even though most of the participants displayed republican citizenship orientations there were some workers and employers who adopted liberal-individualist conception of citizenship by attaching more significance to individual civil rights compared to national or societal interests. The participant bureaucrats who adopted a questioning and rational approach to both duties and rights can be said to share an 'enlightened republican' conception of civil citizenship whereas, majority of the retired officers and one of the employers articulated ideas in line with a 'patriotic and militant' republican notion of citizenship. Hence, based on the qualitative research sample it can be concluded that it is possible to come across different perceptions of citizenship as well as different modalities of the same understanding of citizenship within an occupational group.

CHAPTER VI

PERCEPTION OF THE POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF CITIZENSHIP

In this chapter, similar to the approach followed in the previous chapter, first, the total scores of the survey respondents for political rights and for political duties are analysed by using the means of total scores, analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) and post-hoc comparisons. After examining the mean total scores for political rights and for political duties the type of perception for political elements of citizenship are analysed on the basis of the difference between mean total scores of rights and duties. Then, the results for each item of political rights and duties are evaluated by employing the survey findings and the qualitative data obtained from the focus group meetings and interviews. It should be reminded that Appendix G can be checked to see the within sample comparisons for the sub-samples of workers and employers.

6.1. Mean Total Score Analysis

In the citizenship rights scale there have been five items about political rights. The following table summarizes the mean scores of total political rights together with standard deviations and number of observations for the total sample and for sub-samples. The scores are again indexed to 100.

Table 6.1: Mean Total Scores of Political Rights

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	83.16	3.56	371
Employers	85.68	2.69	69
Bureaucrats	79.80	3.31	105
Retired military officers	81.32	3.20	49
Total sample	82.72	3.42	594

According to the above table while the bureaucrats have the least mean scores for the total of political rights, the employers are the group with the highest scores. This outcome can be interpreted that the employers are the group with the highest expectations of political rights. The range of mean total scores changes between 80 and 86. ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in mean total scores four sub-samples [$F(3, 590) = 3.007, p = 0.03$]. Post-hoc tests reveal that the mean total score for the employers is different from that of the bureaucrats, but the actual difference is of small size (0.02). The workers and retired military officers do not differ significantly from either of the other groups.

In the following table, the mean scores that are indexed to 100 for political duty items (4 items), standard deviations and number of observations for each sample groups are presented. It is observed that except for the retired military officers, mean scores of total political duties were lower than those of political rights.

Table 6.2: Mean Total Scores of Political Duties

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	77.80	2.63	370
Employers	79.55	2.17	70
Bureaucrats	75.05	2.54	106
Retired military officers	83.40	2.94	50
Total sample	78.10	2.62	596

The mean total scores for political duties range between 75 and 83. The bureaucrats turn out to be the group that gives the least weight to political duties, whereas the retired military officers are the group that gives the highest value compared to the other occupational groups. ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in mean scores of four sub-samples [$F(3, 592) = 5.094, p = 0.002$]. Post-hoc tests reveal that the mean score for the retired military officers is different from that of the workers and of bureaucrats, but the actual difference, calculated by eta squared, is of small size (0.03). The employers do not differ significantly from either of the other groups.

Since the item numbers are not equal for political rights (5 items) and political duties (4 items) ANOVA cannot be conducted to compare the sub-sample means of differences between total scores of political duties and those of political rights. But to see the differences in absolute terms, the results of the mean total scores for political duties and rights together with the differences are summarized in the following table.

Table 6.3: Differences between the Mean Total Scores for Political Duties and the Mean Total Scores for Political Rights

	Means of total scores		Differences between mean scores
	Political duties	Political rights	
Workers	77.80	83.16	-5.36
Employers	79.55	85.68	-6.13
Bureaucrats	75.05	79.80	-4.75
Retired military officers	83.40	81.32	2.08
Total sample	78.10	82.72	-4.62

The results for the perceived balance between political rights and duties of citizenship show that all sample groups with the exception of the retired military officers, perceive a “right-surplus” at the idealized level. The military officers’ perception of political rights and duties of citizenship have a “duty-surplus” character. This suggests that, the workers, employers and bureaucrats put greater emphasis on political rights than political duties, whereas, retired military officers expect less in terms of political rights compared to the importance they give to political duties. Consequently, it can be concluded that the retired officers display a republican perception of political citizenship which assigns more weight to duties, on the other hand, the workers, employers and bureaucrats are considered to perceive political elements of citizenship in line with the liberal-individualist model since they assign more weight to rights.

6.2. Item-level Analyses

Following the analysis of the perception of political citizenship with respect to total political rights and duties, the nature of the balance between right and duties will be detailed by checking the weights given to each item and the differences between the

preferences of occupational groups through an item-level analysis supported by the qualitative data.

6.2.1. Political Right Items

The political right items have been designed to measure people’s views on five different political issues: political representation in the Parliament, female participation in political parties’ decision making bodies, naming one’s child according to his/her own choices, being informed about the practices of the state and getting education in mother languages other than Turkish in private classes.

Table 6.4 summarizes the percentages of affirmative responses of the survey samples to the five items on political rights of citizenship. The sentence with an asterisk at the end refers to a reformulation of the item which has been originally designed in an opposite direction of the ideal construct.

Table 6.4: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (Or Strongly Agree) With Political Right Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
PR1	All the political choices of citizens should be represented in the Parliament.	86.0	86.2	84.7	84.4	89.8
PR2	Particular attention should be paid to ensure participation of a certain number of female members in the decision making bodies of political parties.	83.2	80.4	91.5	82.5	94.0
PR3	One does not have to decide to name his/her child in accordance with the rules of the state.*	77.4	80.6	81.9	70.4	60.0
PR4	The citizens must be informed about the practices of the state in all realms.	88.0	88.4	89.4	85.3	88.0
PR5	The right to get education in mother languages other than Turkish in private classes should be secured.	58.8	58.0	67.1	58.5	54.0

With reference to the percentage distribution of positive responses, the sample as a whole, except for the last item (the right to get education in mother languages other

than Turkish in private classes), approves the political rights at high rates. It seems that the respondents as a whole have some reservation for this item as only 59% of them approved such a right. The other rights are approved at high levels ranging between 77 and 88%. But as the previous one-way ANOVA tests showed there are differences between perceptions of sub-samples.

According to the survey results, the first item about the Parliamentary representation of all political choices the lowest rate of approval which is 84% came from the bureaucrats. While 86% of workers and 85% of employers agreed with the item, the retired officers approved it with the highest rate of 90%. During the meetings and interviews all respondents agreed that there should be a minimum level of vote to be represented in the Parliament and generally they thought that the requirement of obtaining at least 10% of national votes is high and should be lowered. Some of them proposed that the election system should be changed and that instead of a representation at country-level, regional or province-level representation could be applied. Some workers argued that because of the low level of education prevailing in the society the electorates generally do not have an agreeable level of consciousness, thus abolishing the minimum vote requirement for parliamentary representation would cause hazardous results. Other participants defended that there should be a minimum level of votes (less than 10%) because of the multi-ethnic structure of the country; the security conditions of Turkey, and to ensure stability.

The employer who defended the minimum level of vote rule on the grounds that Turkey is a multi-ethnic country proposed some changes in the election system based on populations of geographical regions:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): "I'm not really into politics but I think it's more agreeable that there exists a percentage level of representation. Representation by parties of major votes is better than proportional representation. One shouldn't gain power with 25-30 % of the votes. The votes that lead to govern the country should be at least 60-70 %. Just then we can say that we give full credit to democracy. In a country with diverse ethnical backgrounds we are obliged to have a percentage level, because we are a multi-coloured, polyphonic country. If there are a few countries like that in the world Turkey is among those few so a percentage level is a means to respond to this diversity of voices. This can also be regional. I'm a businessman so I can't be equipped about the political requirements but I believe in this: If the population of Turkey is 70 million and there are 7 regions then a regional percentage level directly proportional to the

population of the regions can be implemented. The negligence of the Eastern and Southeastern Turkey can also be tackled that way.”

“Ben siyasetten anlamam ama sanıyorum bir baraj olması daha doğru olur. Nispi bir çoğunluk yerine daha fazla oy alan partinin ya da partilerin temsil edilmesi daha doğru olur. Halkın oylarının %25-30’uyla iktidar olunmamalı. En azından bu %60-70’lere çıkacak bir şey olmalı ki o zaman demokrasinin hakkını yaşamış oluruz. Türkiye gibi farklı etnik kökenlere sahip bir ülkede herhalde baraja mecburuz. Çünkü biz çok renkli ve çok sesli bir ülkeyiz. Dünyada böyle birkaç ülke varsa bunlardan biri de Türkiye, onun için bu çoksesliliğe cevap verebilme adına baraj olması faydalı olur. Bu bölgesel de olabilir. Ben bir işadamıyım, siyaset neyi gerektirir bilemem ama ben şuna inanıyorum; Türkiye’de 70 milyon nüfus varsa, yedi tane de bölge varsa, bu yedi bölgenin nüfus oranına göre bir baraj konabilir. Ondan sonra işte Doğu’ya, Güneydoğu’ya ihmaller de ortadan kalkabilir.”

One of the female employers, on the other hand, told that minimum level of national votes should be reduced to 5-6% and while discussing the issue she opposed the formation of political parties which emphasize ethnical or religious differences. With regard to DTP (Democratic Society Party)²⁷ she argued that there was no need for a separate Kurdish party. Additionally, even though she praised the Alawite community because of their loyalty to the principles of Atatürk and the Republic, she disapproved a separate Alawite party, either:

T (female, 43, manufacturer of cut flowers, university graduate): “Why is the urge to form a separate Kurdish party? First of all I am against this, because they are also the citizens of the Republic of Turkey. What is that they defend in particular, what is that party (DTP) wants to do which cannot be achieved in other parties, with their team? I mean what are their different targets? If they want to violate the integrity of the country or interfere with the governing system or claim territory or autonomy, then this is before everything else against our Constitution. It is better they should not enter into the Parliament. They must not involve in any practice violating the national integrity. Because we have loads of parties. They can do something for the country in those parties. I cannot indeed justify the formation of a separate party. It is better that they remain out of the Parliament. .. I absolutely do not approve the attempts of Alawites to form a separate party, either. Once, Mustafa Timisi founded Union Party of Turkey as the party of Alawites. It was a short-lived one, I think five years after its establishment it was closed down. I mean this was done before and seen that it was wrong. I don’t think that Alawites will establish [a party] again. The community which adheres most to the principles of Atatürk and the Republic and who still struggles for these principles is that of Alawite. They embrace and defend these principles more than anybody else. Therefore, they are generally under the roof of the RPP (CHP) or now some under the Worker Party (İP) and Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP)²⁸ but most of them are in CHP.”

“Niye ayrı bir Kürt partisi kurulması ihtiyacı hissediliyor? Bir kere en başta buna karşıyım. Çünkü Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin bir vatandaşı onlar da. Kendilerinin özellikle savundukları, o partinin yapmak istediği şey nedir ki diğer partiler aracılığıyla onların kadrolarında bunu

²⁷ DTP (Democratic Society Party) was established in 2005 as the continuation of DEHAP (Democratic People’s Party) and HADEP (People’s Democracy Party) all of which follow the same political line emphasizing Kurdish ethnic identity. In 2002 elections the party (DEHAP) obtained 6.2% of the national votes and did not achieve to enter into the Parliament. But in 2007 elections 22 candidates supported by DTP were elected as independent MPs.

²⁸ ÖDP (Freedom and Solidarity Party) which incorporates different socialist groups was established in 1996. The party could not have obtained the required 10% national threshold in elections. But in 2007 elections the party leader was elected as an independent MP.

başaramıyorlar? Farklı hedefleri ne yani? Eğer ülke bütünlüğünü bozmak ya da yönetim şekline müdahale etmek ya da toprak almak, kendilerine özerk bir şeyler isteniyorsa bu başta Anayasamıza aykırı bence. Hiç girmemelerinde fayda var. Ülke bütünlüğünü bozucu faaliyetlerde bulunmamaları gerekiyor. Çünkü parti sayımız az değil ki bizim. Bir sürü partimiz var. O partilerin içersinde de fikir bütünlüğüne ulaşip ülke için bir şeyler yapabilirler. Ayrı bir parti kurulmasına anlam veremiyorum açıkçası. Dışarıda kalmalarında da fayda var. .. Alevilerin ayrı parti kurma girişimlerini de onaylamıyorum kesinlikle. Alevilerin partisi olarak Türkiye Birlik Partisi'ni Mustafa Timisi kurmuştu işte o zamanlar. Çok kısa süreli oldu zaten, zannediyorum kurulduktan beş sene sonra da kapandı. Yani bu daha önce yapıldı ve yanlış olduğu da görüldü. Zannetmiyorum Alevilerin tekrar kuracaklarını. Atatürk ilkelerine ve Cumhuriyet'e en çok bağlı ve şu an hâlâ mücadelesini veren topluluk da Alevilerdir Türkiye'de. Tüm ilkelere en çok sahip çıkan ve savunan.. Onun için genelde de CHP çatısı altında ya da şu an bir kısmı İşçi Partisi'nde ve ÖDP'de var ama geneli CHP'dedir.”

Another employer although wished that all ideas should be represented in the Parliament, supported a minimum level of vote principle (but less than 10%) in the name of stability in the country. It is important to note that this employer emphasizes that individuals are creatures of God and he analyzes people's attitudes with reference to the order of God and not in their relation to the state. Hence, it can be argued that he does not attach any sacred or secular value to the notion of state because God is superior to any institution. From that standpoint he criticizes the discriminating practices of the state on the grounds that it interferes with the will of God. I will propose that his perception of citizenship can be described as a 'religious liberal', because he gives importance to individual freedoms on the grounds that they are created differently by God:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “Basically all different ideas should be represented in the Parliament. But there is an unemployment rate of 10-11 % in this country. Turkey needs stability. Stability in the family and in the enterprises is of utmost importance. Peace reigns in a stable family. If the enterprise is peaceful, then the production increases to the benefit of the enterprise. Then just translate this to the sphere of the state. Just imagine a paternal president in Turkey. In peace with all his/her people either Turkish or Kurdish or Sunnite or Alawite or Yezidi whatever. This diversity is beyond our means. It is not us who created them. They are created by the Lord. They are all his subjects. Either unbelievers or Muslims they are all the Lord's subjects. How can I find the right to oppress the Lord's creations? Why would I deal with that? What I'm supposed to do is being merciful, caring and treating everybody equal. While God is not discriminating and feeding them who am I to discriminate? Now coming to your question, I think there shouldn't be a 10 % level. All the parties should be there but just for the sake of stability there should be a lower percentage.” “Esasen Mecliste bütün farklı fikirler temsil edilmeli. Ama Türkiye'de yüzde 10-11 civarında işsizlik var, Türkiye'nin istikrara ihtiyacı var. Ailede, işletmelerde istikrar çok önemli. İstikrarlı bir ailede huzur vardır. İşletmede huzur varsa üretim artar, işletmeye faydası olur. Devlete çeviriyorum bunu, düşünün TC de müşfik devlet başkanı, bütün halkıyla barışık, ister Kürt, ister Türk, ister Alevi, ister Sünni, ister Yezid, ne aklına geliyorsa o. Benim elimde değil ki bunlar ya, ben yaratmadım ki onları. Yaratan Allah, bütün bunlar Allah'ın kulu. Kâfiri de Müslümanı da kulu, bana ne yani. Bunlara eziyet etme hakkına ben nerden sahip oluyorum? Niye ben bunlarla uğraşacağım? Bana düşen müşfik, merhametli, eşit davranmaktır. Allah

bunları ayırmıyor rızıklandırıyor da bana ne oluyor? Şimdi bana sorduğuna gelince, yüzde on barajı bana göre olmamalı. Bütün partiler orada olmalı ama istikrar bakımından bir baraj da olmalı.”

One bureaucrat emphasized that democracy is a culture of reconciliation and high number of political parties display lack of reconciliation. He also noticed the impossibility of political representation of all ideas. He also mentioned that parliamentary mandate should not be regarded as a profession. If deputies consider it as profession then restricting parliamentary representation -either by minimum level or deposit requirements- becomes more important:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “The problem is not the level of the percentage, when we ask like whether all the parties running for the elections should be represented in the Parliament, then we miss a basic point which is the fact that the democracy is a culture of reconciliation. If you are talking about thousands of political parties then you mean that nobody can act together; in other words everybody establishes his/her own political party. That all those parties are represented in the Parliament – OK it was possible to give a say to everybody in Athens in Ancient Greece or currently in a few cantons of Switzerland – I mean is not practical at all. The percentage level or a similar limitation is a solution to this problem. .. People shouldn’t regard the parliamentary mandate as a lifestyle, a means of earning income or a profession but rather as a way of serving to more dignified purposes by people who already have the means to support themselves. OK while doing this people should be secured the means to survive. But if you start regarding this as a profession everything changes. Then implementing a limit gets even more important say it a percentage level or depositing requirement or whatever.”

“Esas olan barajın yüksekliği alçaklığından çok seçime giren her parti temsil edilmeli mi dediğimiz zaman bir temel nokta gözden kaçıyor, o da demokrasinin bir uzlaşma kültürü olduğu. Binlerce partiden bahsediyorsanız hiç kimse bir araya gelmiyor, herkes kendi partisini kuruyor bir nevi. Bunların mecliste temsil edilmesi –belki Eski Yunan’da Atina’da, İsviçre kantonlarında mümkün, herkesin meydana çıkıp sözünü söylemesi ama- şu anda mümkün değil. Bunun çözümü bir baraj ya da başka şekilde bunu sınırlamak. ... İnsanlar milletvekilliğini bir hayat tarzı, hayatını kazanmak için bir yol, bir meslek olarak görmemeliler, zaten kendi işi gücü olan bir kişinin daha ulvi amaçlarla yapacağı bir hizmet. Bunu yaparken de aç kalmaması lazım. Ama bunu bir iş olarak görürseniz tabii olay tamamen değişiyor. O zaman bir baraj olması daha da mühim. Yüzde mi olur yoksa depozito mu konur veya başka şekilde mi sınırlanır..”

Another bureaucrat repeated the urge to abolish country level restrictions and noted that it was necessary to have a Parliamentary General Board where everybody could express his/her ideas:

R: (male, 46, Department Head, university graduate): “The country level restrictions should absolutely be abolished, provincial restrictions are enough. They shouldn’t maintain the restrictions at country level and one shouldn’t be afraid of the differences are multiple. Even though tens of parties are represented in the Parliament in fact they are not that differentiated ideologically. Most of them sound alike. But at least some nuances will be demonstrated. It is necessary to have a Parliamentary General Board where everybody can say what s/he says.” “Ama ülke barajının kesinlikle kaldırılması lazım, il barajı yeterli. Barajı ülke bazında

tutmamak lazım, farklılıkların çok olmasından da ürkmemek gerekir. Sonuçta onlarca parti bile girse Meclise aslında ideoloji ayrımları o kadar fazla değil, çoğu birbirine yakın şeyler olacak. Ama bir takım nüanslar vitrine çıkmış olacak. Herkesin söyleyeceği şeyi söylediği bir Meclis Genel Kurulu olması lazım.”

According to one retired General because of Turkey’s conditions and due to security reasons some restrictions should be set to Parliamentary representation:

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “I mean normally it is appropriate that all opinions are represented. But the country, from time to time can have at least some conditions. Currently for example the situation is just like that because of the Southeastern Cause. I think had it not been for the troubles there Turkey wouldn’t have had a problem relevant to the representation of political parties. I mean of course in the past there had been some problems. Say with the Worker Party. Like what happens with the Democratic Society Party. But normally it should be represented. But in line with Turkey’s circumstances some limitations can be set. Let me say this. One shouldn’t be worried about the high number of parties in the Parliament. This exists in the world, in Europe everywhere. I mean one can heartily desire that there were two parties alternating between each other. In fact in the past when there were two parties we faced the hardest problems. For electing a president those two parties established a coalition. In the former government three parties – hitherto known as each others’ fiercest enemies- got together to form the government. So I mean consensus can be achieved. So we have to get accustomed to this. But for the sake of the security of the state or under some circumstances there can be a limitation. But one shouldn’t be scared about different opinions in the Parliament. This, at least prevents operating as a cell, or recourse to the illegal.”

“Şimdi normalde bütün fikirlerin temsili uygun. Ama ülkenin, zamana bağlı olarak en azından bazı şartları olabiliyor. Şu anda Türkiye’nin durumunda bu var, Güneydoğu dolayısıyla. Sanıyorum eğer Güneydoğu’da böyle bir mesele olmasaydı, Türkiye’de çeşitli siyasi partileri temsili bakımından bir sorun olmazdı. Geçmişte olmadı mı, oldu sıkıntılar. İşçi Partisiyle sıkıntılar oldu, aynı DTP’ye yapıldığı gibi, ama normalde temsili gerekir. Türkiye’nin şartlarına göre bazı tahditler konabilir, normalde olması gerekir. .. Şimdi ben şunu söyleyeyim, meclise fazla parti görüşü girmesinden çekinmemek lazım. Bu dünyada, Avrupa’da her yerde fazlasıyla var. Hani gönül isterdi ki iki parti olsun, biri çıksın biri insin. Vaktiyle o iki partinin olduğu devirde en kötü şartları da yaşadık. O günlerde bir cumhurbaşkanı seçelim diye iki parti beraber koalisyon kurdu. Bundan evvelki hükümette birbirine tamamen zıt kardeşler olarak bilinen üç parti bir araya geldi, hükümeti kurdu. Yani bazı yerlerde anlaşılabilir. Onun için buna da alışmamız lazım. Ama devletin güvenliği ve diğer bazı şartlarda belirli bir miktar [baraj] konulabilir. Ama meclise çeşitli fikirlerin gelmesinden de çekinmemek lazım. En başta hücre usulü çalışmayı önler, yeraltına inmez.”

According to another General who approved restrictions for political representation, the Parliament was not a platform to express all ideas but it was the place where national interests were defended, long-term resolutions were taken and laws were promulgated:

M (male, 60, retired Brigadier General): “But you know the Parliament is not a platform in which all different ideas make their voices heard. In a large country like Turkey with a population of 70 million if there exist groups of thousand people, five thousand people, ten thousand people advocating different ideas the Parliament is not the place for them to make their voices heard. Because the Parliament is the place where short and long term national interests are defended, long-term resolutions are taken and laws are promulgated. It can’t be

operated to give every opinion a voice or to secure that all the opinions are represented. Because then someone comes and say: 'Mine is the party of the nuts'. In that case you're supposed to allocate a quota for all the parties, create opportunities to be in the Parliament for all the parties to be established. And such a move is not in accordance with the interests of the majority. I mean naturally the Kurds are not just represented by the party established by the Kurds. They can even be the Presidents. They can enter the Parliament from the other Parties, from other regions. And also the Kurds do not live only in the South Eastern Turkey. They've got the right to be elected from places like Ankara, İstanbul or İzmir and from all the parties. They are not a minority."

"Ama şimdi Parlamento tüm değişik fikirlerin sesini duyurduğu yer değil. 70 milyonluk nüfusu olan Türkiye gibi büyük bir ülkede bin kişilik, beş yüz bin kişilik, on bin kişilik bir grup farklı fikirleri savunuyorsa onların sesini duyuracağı yer Parlamento değil. Çünkü Parlamento ülkenin uzun-kısa süreli menfaatlerinin savunulacağı, uzun vadeli kararların alınacağı, yasaların çıkarılacağı yer. Her fikre söz hakkı vereceğim diye, her fikir temsil edilsin zihniyetiyle olmaz. Çünkü birisi çıkar deliler partisi der. O zaman her partiye kota vermek lazım, kurulan her partiye meclise girme olanağı yaratmak lazım. Böyle bir şey de çoğunluğun menfaatine uygun değil. Tabii Kürtler sadece Kürtlerin kurduğu partiyle temsil edilmiyor ki. Cumhurbaşkanı da olabiliyor. Diğer partilerden de, her partiden değişik yerlerden Parlamenteoya giriyor. Sonra Kürtler sadece Güneydoğu'da değil ki, Ankara, İstanbul, İzmir gibi yerlerden her partiden Parlamenteoya girebilme hakkına sahip. Onlar azınlık değil ki."

On quota application for female participation in political parties, according to the survey results 80% of workers, 83% of bureaucrats, 92% of employers and 94% of retired officers agreed with the item that 'particular attention should be paid to ensure participation of a certain number of female members in the decision making bodies of political parties'. During the meeting and interviews there emerged two different views regarding this issue. All female participants and a few male participants regarded quota application as a useful instrument to encourage women's participation to political life:

İ (female, 48, Department Head, M.S. degree): "I support affirmative action. I wasn't aware of this quota issue before. Then while dealing with some issues in Middle Eastern Countries I got really surprised to see that in some of those there were many female deputies in the Parliament. While trying to understand how that happened I discovered the quota. It is implemented in Jordan, in Egypt. I was surprised to see that there are tens of female deputies in these countries whereas there are only a few in Turkey. In fact the reason is the quota. Maybe this is not such a democratic thought but if you allocate a quota for the women, I believe that the women that will be in the Parliament will be really the women with a place in the society with an education and a culture. Because at least the Party leaders will select that kind of women."

"Ben pozitif ayrımcılığı savunuyorum. Ben bu kota meselesini yıllar önce bilmiyordum. Hasbelkader Ortadoğu ülkeleriyle ilgilenirken bir baktım bazılarının meclisinde inanılmaz yüksek oranda kadın milletvekili olduğunu görünce çok şaşırıştım. Nasıl oluyor filan diye deşince altından kota çıktı. Ürdün'de, Mısır'da var. Türkiye'de üç-beş tane varken bu ülkelerde onlarca kadın milletvekili var diye çok şaşırıştım. Meğerse kotaymış hikmeti. Bu pek demokratik bir düşünce değil belki ama belli bir kadın oranının temsiliyle ilgili kota koyduğumuzda, ben oraya gidecek kadınların hakikaten toplumda yer edinmiş eğitilmiş, kültürlü kadınlar olacağına inanıyorum. Çünkü en azından parti başkanları öyle seçecektir."

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “In fact of course such quotas are indication of the fact that the democracy has still unsettled. Under normal conditions it wouldn’t be necessary to protect the women or other such groups. In general I believe that affirmative action reduces the quality and damages the system. But on the other hand somebody should pave the way, should pioneer, and should set an example. In that sense, of course it has an educative function.”

“Aslında tabii bu tip kotalar demokrasinin tam oturmamış olduğunun bir göstergesi. Normal şartlarda kadın veya daha değişik grupların korunmasının gerekmemesi lazım. Bu tür pozitif ayrımcılığın genel olarak kaliteyi düşürdüğüne ve sisteme zarar verdiğine de inanıyorum. Diğer taraftan da birilerinin yolu açması, öncülük yapması, örnek olması gerekiyor. O açıdan da bir eğitsel yönü var tabii.”

The General who supported quota application mentioned that this positive discrimination offers an opportunity to women who want to work in political parties. He argued that even men experienced difficulties in launching into politics. He further suggested increasing the quota level up to 50%:

H (male, 58, retired Brigadier General): “Positive discrimination (affirmative action) is not in the least forcing the women to get engaged in politics, it means providing the women an opportunity. Today even men who seriously have such a desire can’t find a space to get into politics. They can’t I mean either due to their lack of financial means or just because they aren’t accepted to the parties or if they managed to get registered they just don’t get nominated. By applying a quota they pave a way for the willing woman to walk. Now even those willing can’t get in because there is no chance. In a male society like Turkey even man can’t get in (politics) how can a woman get in?”

“Pozitif ayrımcılık hiçbir zaman kadını zorla siyasete sokmak değil, kadınlara o fırsatı vermek demek. Bugün erkekler bile, ciddi olarak düşünen kişiler bile siyasette yer bulamıyor. Ya maddi olarak giremiyor ya da kaydedilmiyor, adaylığını koyamıyor. .. Ama kotayla yol açıyor ki istekli kadın hiç olmazsa gelebilirsin. Şimdi istekli de gelemiyor, imkânı yok çünkü. Türkiye gibi erkek bir toplumda erkek giremiyor ki kadın girebilirsin.”

On the other hand, majority of the male participants did not welcome such a quota principle. While some believed that this application cause some manipulations to use up the quota and thus other techniques should be searched to increase women’s presence in the Parliament, some others argued that if women had the qualifications they can be elected to the political parties and they should not be forced by setting a quota. Some retired officers further argued that women are not willing to engage in political affairs or do not work hard enough to get into political parties:

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): “Can I ask such a question? If the women have a discontent with the current situation why don’t they think of establishing a party in which they will have 100 % quota? If there’s such an exigency, I mean imposing a quota means imposing or even sweating an exigency. I believe in this. Were the women in Turkey willing, without the need to impose a quota, not just have it 50-50 % but say 70%-80% female. But whether the women feel such a need or not should be carefully analysed. Not just because let’s have a female Parliamentarian to raise her hand. If they really want to take part in politics, if they really want to do this I don’t

think that anybody in Turkey will oppose. Women can do this with ease if they want and can be really successful. But I think there is no such willingness.”

“Ben şöyle bir soru sorabilir miyim? Kadınlar niye madem bu eksikliklerinden rahatsız değil de kendileri bir parti kurup da kendilerini %100 getirmeyi düşünmüyorlar? Bu ihtiyaç varsa, bakın kota koymak bir ihtiyacın ortaya çıkartılması, zorlanması, empoze edilmesi demek. Ben şuna inanıyorum, Türkiye’de kadınlar buna istekli olsalar kota koymaya gerek olmadan %50-%50 değil de %70 de, %80 de falan olsun. Ama kadınlar da gerçekten buna ihtiyaç duyuyorlar mı, duymuyorlar mı, bu iyi tespit edilmeli. Laf olsun diye biz milletvekili seçelim, orada parmak kaldırtalım değil. Gerçekten yönetime soyunmak istiyorlarsa, gerçekten de bu işi yapmak istiyorlarsa ben Türkiye’de buna kimsenin engel olacağını sanmıyorum. Kadınlar da bunu rahatlıkla yapabilirler isteseler ve çok da başarılı olabilirler. Bence isteklilik yok ortada.”

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “Now there’s no inequality in terms of opportunities. Normally like they can be academics, judges or officials the ladies can run for the elections with the condition that they put enough effort. The ladies can’t get elected just because they don’t work hard enough. I mean to me, setting a quota for women isn’t equality.”

“Fırsatta hiçbir eşitsizlik yok şimdi. Normalde nasıl hâkim, öğretim görevlisi, subay oluyorsa hanımlar seçimlere de girip şey edebilirler, yeter ki o konuda çalışsınlar. Hanımlar fazla çalışmadıkları için giremiyorlar. Yani kadına kota ayırmak bana göre bir eşitlik değil. “

One of the employers approached the subject from a different point of view by stressing the significance of motherhood. He argued that qualified women should hold office but the quota for women should not be more than 5-10%, because there are other professions that they can practice. According to him women should give the priority to motherhood, because the mother is the essence of the family. He supports his argument by referring to the importance assigned to the mother in all religions:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “Just think of a woman for example who is offered for the Parliament with such qualifications at the international scale or really qualified in her job or really productive I volunteer to give a seat to that woman, that lady a seat in the Parliament. But I scrutinize her carefully. Of she’s a bit loose in morals I personally do not opt for her. If she’s strict, presentable and agreeable I opt for her. Either male or female... Otherwise I don’t accept a person who will just sit like a puppet in a 10 m2 room without producing anything but chit chat over a cup of tea. If I do the right thing Turkey rapidly develops. If not, I beg your pardon but an empty sack goes and sits there in the Parliament. A man who’s good for nothing. He can’t produce anything because he doesn’t have such a culture. And without such a culture he’s of no use either to himself or to anybody else. I allocate a seat for ladies of that quality but not in a proportion over 5-10 %. Why? Because there are hundreds of professions, 72 professions in the Chamber of Trade registry. In Germany there are 300 professions registered to the Chamber of Commerce. She has to be able to work in each of these professions. Just with one condition. There’s something we call the mother care. A father can’t give it to the child. The energy that is passed to the child in his/her mother’s lap is not the same with that of the father. The treatment of the mother by the God and the prophet is in fact different. This fact is true in Judaism, in the religion of the Jesus Christ and in the religion of Mohammad. Hence I can’t sacrifice the family just because the woman will do this and that there. Because the mother is the thermodynamics of the family. I say the same to my offspring. You’ll have a position but in return 4 kids won’t have a proper upbringing. No it doesn’t work. You just drag the kid to this place and to that place like a racing horse. Nothing to do with his/her spiritual world.”

“Bir kadın düşünün mesela meclise sokulacak, öyle bir donanımı var ki uluslararası düzeyde veya mesleğinde çok donanımlı veya çok üretken, ben o kadına, o hanımefendiye mecliste yer veririm. Ama ben onu iyi tetkik ederim, öyle hoppa zıppa ise ben şahsen tercih etmem. Oturaklı, kabul edilebilir, prezantabl, donanımlı ise ben yer veririm. Erkek de olsa yer veririm. Yoksa gelecek öyle kukla gibi oturacak, on metrekairelik odanın içinde, hiçbir işe yaramayacak, hiç üretmeyecek, laklak, gelsin çay kahve, yapmam ben onu. Doğruyu yaparsam Türkiye çabuk kalkınır. Yaparsam işte orada, affedersin, bir çuval gelir oturur. Hiçbir işe yaramayan bir adam olur orada. Üretemez çünkü üretme kültürü yoktur onda. Olmayınca da ne kendine ne başkasına faydası olur. Ben o nitelikteki hanımefendilere yer veririm. Nispetini de yüzde 5-10’u geçirmem. Neden geçirmem? Sadece siyaset değil meslek, yüzlerce meslek var, ticaret odasına kayıtlı 72 tane meslek var, Almanya’da Ticaret Odası’na kayıtlı 300 tane meslek var. Bu mesleklerin her birisinde çalışabilmeli. Ama bir şeyi göz ardı etmemek kaydıyla; anne şefkati dediğimiz bir olay var. Baba onu gideremez. Annenin çocuğunu bağrına basmasıyla çocuğa geçen pozitif enerji babadan geçenle çok farklıdır. Allah’ın, Peygamber’in anneye davranışı da farklıdır. Musa Aleyhisselam’ın dininde de bu böyledir. İsa Aleyhisselam’ın dininde de Muhammed Aleyhisselam’ın dininde bu böyledir. Öyle olunca, kadın orada bilmem ne yapacak diye ben aileyi feda edemem. Çünkü ailenin temel termodinamiği anadır. Ben çocuklarıma da aynı şeyi söylüyorum. Sen bir yere geleceksin ama dört tane çocuk bozuk yetişecek. Olmuyor işte, yarış atı gibi çocuğu oradan oraya gönderiyorsun, ruh dünyası ile alakası yok.”

On the item about naming one’s child 81% of the workers, 82% of the employers, 70% of the bureaucrats and 60% of the retired military officers agreed that there should not be any rules set by the state. Hence, compared to workers and employers, bureaucrats and officers as the representatives of the state sphere had some reservations about the right to freedom of naming one’s child. Normally this item aims to measure reactions of people to giving names which are not Turkish, and especially Kurdish, because according to the press news²⁹ despite the amendments in legislation there are still public registrars who object parents’ choice of names for their children. However, with the exception of one employer none of the participants claimed that names should be Turkish. That employer again putting forward the ‘present conditions of Turkey’ argued that it would be beneficial that the children’s names should be Turkish. He considered giving names other than Turkish as an act of toleration which might damage the nation states:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “As required by the present conditions in Turkey, it is beneficial that the children’s names are Turkish. Because just abusing certain sympathetic feelings issues are taken to different points. We’ve experienced this throughout our history. I’m 51 years old. We all lived through the 12 September. We passed years during which leaving home in the morning to go to the university people were worried about whether we’d be able to get back home at night. The same story is scripted all the time. 30 years passed and we forget everything fast. So, one has to think that tolerating certain issues with feelings of sympathy can damage

²⁹ See for example Ahmet Şık (2003) “Kanun Değişti Kafa Değişmedi” [The Law has been Changed but not the Mentality] *Radikal* (daily), September 1.

the nation states. Thus I support the view that our children should have Turkish names.”
“Türkiye’nin içinde bulunduğu şu şartlar gereği isimlerin Öztürkçe olmasında fayda var. Çünkü burada bazı içtenliklerden yararlanarak farklı noktalara çekilebiliyor, bunları yaşadık tarihimizde. Ben 51 yaşındayım, 12 Eylül’ü yaşadık. Sabahleyin üniversiteye gittiğimizde akşama eve dönüp dönmeyeceğimizden endişe edildiği yılları yaşadık. Pişirip pişirip aynı şeyler yeniden önümüze getiriliyor. Aradan otuz sene geçmiş ve bunları çabuk unutuyoruz. Onun için bazı içten samimi davranışlarla bazı şeyleri tolere etmenin, hoş görmenin ulus devletlere zarar verebileceğini düşünmek lazım. O yüzden çocuklarımızın isimlerinin Türkçe olmasından yanayım.”

The other participants agreed that one can name his/her child as s/he likes as long as the mental health of the child, public order and ethical values are taken into consideration as discussed by one of the bureaucrats in the following manner:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “There is an important issue here. Well there is a child. I mean if you name a male child say *Sissy* then the child will suffer all his life. Of course there has to be a rule here. For example in Sweden a family was taken to the court. Because they named the child as something like *yyzx*, I mean a 20 letter set having just x’s, y’s and z’s. The parents defended themselves arguing that the name they preferred meant freedom in a clan language in Nepal. But the Court didn’t accept this. Now there are two issues here: first is the mental health of the child, the second is the public order. A family can be really loose and can bring her daughter that way, but naming their child as say I beg your pardon but “Tart” causes an unrest in the society. So there has to be some rules. But on what criteria these rules will be based? To protect the culture, a certain culture, Turkish culture, you can discuss this. You can say that this shouldn’t happen. But on the other hand, there is no problem in naming one’s child as long as the child’s mental health is not ruined and the public order is protected. One of the best examples of this is *Melisa*. *Melisa* is the name of a flower, it is Greek. It was objected then. On the other hand, the state has a mission to avoid degeneration of the society and a loss of identity.”

“Burada çok önemli bir şey var, bir çocuk var. Eğer erkek çocuğa “Yumuşak” diye isim koyarsanız çocuğun hayatı kayar yani. Elbette bu için bir kuralı olması lazım. İsveç’te bir aileyi çocuğuna verdiği isimden ötürü Nüfus İdaresi mahkemeye veriyor. Anne-baba çocuğa *yyzzyx* gibi x,y,z’den oluşan yaklaşık 20 harfli bir isim vermişler. Savunmalarına göre bu efendim Nepal’deki bir kabiledede özgürlük anlamına geliyormuş. Ama mahkemeye kabul ettiremediler. Şimdi burada iki konu var, bir, çocuğun ruh sağlığı. Öbürü, kamu düzeni. Bir aile çok rahat olabilir, kızlarını da öyle yetiştirebilirler ama çocuklarına affedersiniz *sürtük* ismini verilerse bu toplumda da bir rahatsızlığa yol açar. Dolayısıyla bunun belli kuralları olması lazım. Ama kurallardaki kriter, dayanak nedir? Kültürü korumak, belli bir kültürü veya Türk kültürünü korumak, bunu tartışabilirsiniz olmaması gerekir diyebilirsiniz. Ama diğer taraftan kamu düzenini bozmayan ve çocuğa da ruhi bir zarar vermeyen bir ismin konmasında da bir mahsur yok. Buna en güzel örneklerden bir tanesi galiba *Melisa* ismi. *Melisa* bir çiçek, Rumca. Karşı çıkıldı. Ama diğer taraftan devletin toplumun yozlaşmasını veya kendisini kaybetmesini önleme görevi de var.”

The fourth political right item is about inquiry right and is formulated as ‘the citizens must be informed about the practices of the state in all realms’. The sub-sample groups agreed with this item at similarly high rates. While 88% of workers and of retired officers, and 89% of employers approved this item, the bureaucrats favored

this right at a slightly lower rate of 85%. Thus, all groups gave considerable importance to the right to inquiry.

The last item which had the lowest rates of approval among all political rights is about getting private education in mother languages other than Turkish. It is evident that the implicit “mother language other than Turkish” in this item is Kurdish and although it is now a legally secured right in Turkey to get private education in Kurdish, the survey sample did not seem to whole-heartedly appreciate this freedom. Among the four sub-samples the employers seemed to be the group who were most in favour of such a right with an approval percentage of 67%, whereas the retired military officers were the most cautious group of whom only 54% agreed with this right. The workers and bureaucrats displayed equivalent rates of agreement at levels of 58% and %59% respectively. As noted by the bureaucrats and retired military officers during the focus group meetings, these low rates of approval was in fact mainly related with the poor wording of the survey item. Since ‘getting education in other languages in private classes’ may easily be misunderstood as suggesting that the instruction media should be in mother languages other than Turkish, such as Kurdish. However, the item was supposed to measure people’s opinions about education of Kurdish as a language, and not education in Kurdish. When this point had been clarified during the meetings and interviews it was observed that almost all participants approved that each citizen should have the right to learn his/her mother language.

One of the bureaucrats and one retired General paid attention to the distinction between learning a language and schooling in that language as follows:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “Those two [learning and schooling] are very different. Education in mother tongue means schooling in that language. But learning the mother tongue is a different issue. Of course I don’t think like anybody will oppose to this. About learning the mother tongue if somebody says: “That’s my mother tongue and I want to learn this”. Nobody should say no. But having an education system in another language than Turkish of course this is unacceptable.”

“İkisi [eğitim ve öğretim] arasında büyük fark var anadilde eğitim o dilde tedrisat demek, ama anadilin öğrenilmesi çok ayrı bir konu. Elbette ona kimsenin itiraz edeceğini sanmıyorum. Bu anadilin öğrenilmesi için, birisi bu benim ana dilim diyor ve öğrenmek istiyorum diyorsa elbette buna kimsenin engel olmaması lazım. Ama eğitim sisteminin Türkçe dışındaki bir dilde olması tabii o olacak bir şey değil.”

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “But now we have to make a distinction between learning and schooling. To teach reading and writing of the language is OK but if you say schooling no! We teach English or Japanese. So let them learn Kurdish as well.”
“Şimdi eğitimle öğretimi ayıralım yalnız. Okuma yazma öğretmek, lisan öğretmek açısından tamam ama öğretim dersiniz yok. İngilizce öğretiyoruz, Japonca öğretiyoruz, Kürtçe de öğrensin.”

In response to the above remark of the General who defended teaching Kurdish as a language in public schools other officers objected to him by arguing that the state had only one language and in schools Kurdish as a language should not be taught. Those who wanted to learn Kurdish could learn it from their parents, thus the state did not have a duty to teach Kurdish:

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): “My commander, the state can’t have such a mission. Anybody who wants to learn this, I mean can s/he learn from his parents or a society? Yes s/he can. Today who has learnt Kurdish or Laz language or whatever and faced any problems or got prevented? But let’s meet at a point. What does this demand bring about? Now even in the States there are Spanish descendents or African descendents. Why don’t they do all of this? Why don’t they grant the same thing to all of them? While there are that many differences in Europe why don’t they do the same? The problem is here. I mean in Turkey who asked this question to whom, who said to whom: “Come on bro Speaking Kurdish is banned”? Nobody to nobody at all. I have been on duty for such a long time. My soldier didn’t know Turkish the day he arrived. He used to speak Kurdish just beside me. I didn’t ask him why he couldn’t speak Turkish. While he was leaving he learnt Turkish on his own. While the world is moving towards being a single language place for the ease of communication we are enforcing multi languages to cut down communication. I mean here, divide and rule. They are making us do this. We say: ‘Let’s speak Turkish all together and communicate’, they say ‘No never do this’.”
“Komutanım devletin böyle bir mecburiyeti olamaz. İster ana babasından veya derneğinden bunu isteyince gidip de öğrenebiliyor mu, öğreniyor.. Bugün Kürtçeyi Lazcağı veya başka bir şeyi öğrenmek isteyip kim kime engel olmuş, kim kime hesap sormuş. Ama bir yere gelelim. Şimdi bu nereye geliyor, Amerika’da bile İspanyol var, zenci var, Afrika kökenli var, başka şey var. Niye hepsini birden yapmıyorlar? Niye hepsine birden aynı şeyi tanımıyorlar? Niye Avrupa’da bu kadar farklılıklar var, aynı şeyi yapmıyorlar? Sıkıntı şurada. Yani Türkiye’de kim kime bu soruyu sormuş, kardeşim Türkçe konuşmak yasaktır demiş. Kimse dememiş. Ben bu kadar görev yaptım. Askerim ilk geldiği gün Türkçe de bilmiyordu, benim yanımda Kürtçe konuşurdu. Ben niye Türkçe bilmiyorsun demedim. Giderken de kendi başına öğrenmişti Türkçeyi. Dünya iletişimde bulunmak için tek dile doğru giderken biz Türkiye’de iletişimi kopartmak için çoklu dili mecburiyet haline getiriyoruz. Yani burada parçala, böl, yönet bize bunu yaptırıyorlar. Biz diyoruz ki hep birlikte Türkçe konuşalım anlaşalım, onlar diyorlar ki asla konuşmayın..”

In a similar way, one of the employers remarked that it should be in a private education system without a contribution from the state:

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “Education in Kurdish is right of course but this has to be in a private education system. I mean I don’t think that the state will finance this. To speak one’s mother tongue is a natural right of course. To learn that mother culture as well..”

“Doğru tabii Kürtçe eğitim, ama bu özel bir eğitim sistemi olması lazım, yani devletin ona katkısı olacağını zannetmiyorum. Ana dilinde konuşması en tabii hakkıdır tabii. O kültürü öğrenmesi de en tabii hakkıdır.”

While all the participant workers consensually approved the right to get education in mother tongues other than Turkish, some employers advanced some conditions. One of the employers pointed out that a person could not choose his birthplace, family, gender or language; it was God’s will, so there should not be anything to say. But he also remarked that in speaking one’s mother language s/he should not distort public order by superiority of race or nationalist claims. His ‘religious liberal’ approach is again evident from his critics of the state’s decisions which he believes interfering in the will of God:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “Of course, my daughter. Let the guy get his education in Kurdish. Here the basic point is this. A person can’t choose where s/he was born, his/her gender, his/her parents, the language s/he speak. These all lie in the sphere of the God’s will. And also God says: “I create you in different ethnicities and nations. Just that you learn each other, get acquaintance, establish relationships and ties.” I mean if God had wanted he would have created all human beings as Turkish, Iranian, Arab or whatever... He just preferred a variety of races, colours, physical shapes indeed. If you see the issue that way, there’s nothing to discuss. Someone comes and says like you are going to speak Turkish. Come on bro. In this country there are 8 million Kurdish people. What am I supposed to do then? Kill them all? I am not Kurdish, I am an Oguz Turk. But I’ve Kurdish friends. My son, for example says: “I won’t employ any Kurdish person.” How horrible, isn’t it? They lived together for a thousand years. I mean if you go in depth we can say that we arrived from Central Asia but the Kurds are indigenous people of this land. I went for a tender in Iraq. And on the way I read a book. The Kurdish Salahaddin Eyyübi says “Thanks my God to send these Oguz clans to my help. If it weren’t to their credit I would hardly have that victory”. Then have a look in us. In Canakkale Kurdish, Turkish, Laz, Circassian they fought back to back. During the Russian War the same and families are intertwined. My village as an example has 90 households 5 among those are married to people of Kurdish origin from Diyarbakır, Kars, Mardin –or maybe there are more. There have been weddings. What I want to say here is that. A person should speak his/her native language. It is not something within his/her will. But while speaking his/her language s/he should not distort public order by superiority of race or nationalist claims.”

“Tabii evladım, Kürtçe okusun adam. Bakın buradaki temel sorun şu; insanların doğduğu yeri, cinsiyetini, annesini babasını, konuştuğu dili tayin etmek kendi iradesinin içerisinde değil, külli iradenin içerisinde o. Bir de Allah diyor ki “ben sizi farklı farklı kavimlerden yarattım, birbirinizle tanışasınız, bilişesiniz, akraba, dost olasınız diye”. Yani Allah dileseydi bütün dünyayı Türk kavminden yaratırdı, dileseydi Acem, Arap, Sami kavminden, her neyse yaratırdı. Farklı farklı ırk, renk, boy, vücut şekli ya... Bir defa böyle baktığımız zaman söyleyecek hiçbir şey yok. Bu adam diyor ki bana illa Türkçe konuşacaksın. Yahu kardeşim iyi ama burada 8 milyon Kürt yaşıyor ya, kesecek miyim şimdi bunları Allah aşkına? Ben Kürt falan değilim, Oğuz Türküyüm. Benim de onlardan arkadaşlarım var. Benim oğlum mesela “yanımda Kürt çalıştırmayacağım” diyor. Bak şimdi ya, ne korkunç bir şey. Bin yıl beraber yaşamış bunlar. İşin özüne bakarsan ben Orta Asya’dan gelmişim, ama Kürt dediğimiz adamlar burada yerleşik kavim. Irak’ta ihaleye gittim. Oraya giderken bir kitap okudum. Diyor ki Kürt Selahaddin Eyyübi “Allahım iyi ki bu Oğuz boylarını benim yardımımıza gönderdin, onlar olmasaydı ben bu zaferi çok zor kazanırdım” diyor. Bize dönün şimdi Çanakkale’de Kürt, Türk, Laz, Çerkez hepsi vuruşmuş, e pekâlâ Rus Harbi’nde, yine aynı şeyler olmuş ve iç içe

girmiş aileler. Benim köyüm mesela 90 hanedir, beş tane insan vardır ki, Diyarbakır, Kars, Mardin -belki daha fazladır bilemiyorum- Kürt aileleriyle evlidir. Kız almış kız vermiş, tamam mı? Burada söylemek istediğim şu; insanlar dilini konuşabilmeli, elinde değil bu. Ama bu dili konuşurken bir ırk üstünlüğü, milliyetçilik yaparak ülkenin huzurunu, genel asayişini bozmamalı.”

On the other hand, the ‘patriotic militant’ employer told that a person could speak or sing in Kurdish only if he believed that his mother language was Turkish, because the mother language of Turkey was Turkish. It is difficult to understand from his discourse whether he favors or disapproves the right to get education in other mother tongues, because I personally could not figure out how a man has the right to speak Kurdish on the condition that he believes his mother tongue is Turkish:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “If you can increase the level of prosperity in Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia just like in the Black Sea, Aegean or Marmara Regions, like our Laz, our Circussian or Tatars and do not make people look through other windows then set everything free. It won’t change anything. This is important not only as a window within ourselves but also as a window opening to the outer world. Even though it is an unrest served to us by our Kurdish citizens in Eastern Anatolia, as a citizen, as a Turkish citizen I believe that the real unrest comes from outer powers. My father served as an education specialist in Muş Malazgirt for years. I am a Turkish person who as a 4th grade student witnessed the sincerity, altruism of the Kurdish people. But we neglected those regions for ages; we provided the outer world all those arms. And then some of our Kurdish citizens there collaborated with the outer powers and now we are discussing this issue. That guy can speak Kurdish can sing in Kurdish if he wants. But if and only if he accepts that his mother tongue is Turkish. The mother language in Turkey is Turkish. We are Turkish Citizens, whatever our ethnical roots are we are the citizens of the Republic of Turkey. All can be as long as this is assimilated by all.”

“Eğer Doğu Anadolu ile Güneydoğu Anadolu’nun aynen Karadeniz gibi, Ege gibi, Marmara gibi, Lazlarımız gibi, Çerkezlerimiz, Arnavutlarımız, Tatarlarımız gibi refah seviyesini yükseltirseniz, insanları farklı pencerelerden baktırmaz hale getirirseniz her şeyi serbest bırakın, ne değişecek ki? Bu, sadece kendi içimizde halletmemiz gereken bir pencere değil, dünyaya da açacağımız pencere anlamında önemli. Bu bize Doğu Anadolu’daki Kürt vatandaşlarımızın getirdiği bir rahatsızlık olmakla birlikte, esas rahatsızlığı bize dış güçlerin getirdiğini düşünüyorum ben bir yurttaş olarak, Türk vatandaşı olarak. Benim babam bir eğitimci olarak yıllarca Muş Malazgirt’te görev yaptı. Ben ilkokul 4. sınıftayken Kürtlerin ne kadar içten, ne kadar verici olduklarını orada yaşamış bir Türk’üm. Ama biz yıllarca o bölgeleri ihmal etmişiz, dışarıya o silahları vermişiz, oradaki bazı Kürt vatandaşlarımız da bunu kullanıp, dışarıdakilerle beraber olmuşlar, bugün oturup bu noktayı tartışıyoruz. O adam Kürtçe konuşmak istiyorsa konuşabilir tabii, Kürtçe şarkı söylemek istiyorsa söyleyebilir ama o adam anadilinin Türkçe olduğuna inanmak kaydıyla bunları yapabilir. Türkiye’nin anadili Türkçedir. Türk vatandaşıyız etnik kökenlerimiz ne olursa olsun. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti vatandaşıyız. Bunu kanıksamak kaydıyla olabilir tabii.”

In addition, the bureaucrats unanimously argued that learning one’s mother language should not be forbidden; otherwise it would have negative consequences like separatist demands of radical ethnic groups:

M (male, 36, Department Head, university graduate): “From my point of view education or schooling in languages other than the official language is not applicable. But if the guy wants to learn his mother language let him learn. Unfortunately this was banned in our country. What happened when it was banned? It had negative repercussions in our country. The ban was lifted. Then what happened? Somebody wanted to make use of this, prepared some shows, they established private courses. Then nobody got enrolled and the course was closed down. When such bans are introduced or defended the individual or the state should be careful, sensible and open minded. At home I was speaking in Kurdish with my mum and in Turkish with my dad. I spoke Turkish with my friends or in school. My mum could speak Turkish but some old relatives visiting us asked me how I was in Kurdish. I talked Kurdish with them. But outside in social life, school, friends I used Turkish. Then what happened? The ban came like. Those who wanted to use this for claiming ethnic discrimination PKK and all had a very good instrument. They influenced the people saying: “You can’t even talk your mother language.” I had a friend who had a kiosk selling newspapers. Under the counter – everybody even the police knew it- he had Kurdish newspapers and periodicals and they were sold just like bread and cheese. As I observed all this I know well. The guys who buy these papers do not understand politics or anything but just because of that ban ... Kurdish cassettes likewise were copied under the counter. Then these all got free, the ban was lifted, then everybody stopped buying. So, one has to be careful. By imposing a ban you are providing an instrument to a group having different purposes. And they are using this. It is difficult to understand the arguments of those against people learning their mother language. .. Now we’ve got ethnic relatives in Western Thrace in Greece, don’t they get education in their own language? Once they didn’t, and we said they were being tormented, tortured and we protested. We’ve got people in Germany or in the States. If they want they can establish their own schools, they can be selected as deputies. Double standard can’t be accepted when the issue takes place in Turkey.”

“Bence resmi dil dışında eğitim olmaz. Ama adam anadilini öğrenmek istiyorsa öğrensin. Maalesef ülkemizde yasaktı bu. Yasaklanınca ne oldu, bu hep olumsuz şekilde döndü ülkemize. Serbest bıraktık, bunu bazıları kullanmak istedi şov yaptı, işte dersane açtı, insanlar gitti mi, gitmedi, sonra kapattı. Bu tür kısıtlamalar ya da yasaklamaları koyarken ya da savunurken - bireyin, devletin fark etmez- çok dikkatli, çok hassas ve çok geniş düşünerek hareket etmesi lazım. Ben evde annemle Kürtçe konuşuyordum, babamla Türkçe konuşuyorum. Okulda Türkçe konuşuyorum, arkadaşlarımla Türkçe konuşuyorum. Annem Türkçe biliyor ama eve gelen yaşlılar beni gördüğü zaman nasılsını Kürtçe soruyor, ben onlarla Kürtçe konuşuyorum. Ama dışarıya çıktığım zaman sosyal yaşam, okul eğitim, arkadaşlarımla hep Türkçe konuşuyorum. İşte o dönemlerde yasaklamalar, yanlışlıklar.. Ne oldu, bunu etnik ayrımcılığa çekmek isteyenler, işte PKK bunu çok güzel kullandı, maalesef çok güzel kullandı. Bakın siz anadilinizi bile konuşamıyorsunuz diyerek insanları etkilediler. Benim gazeteci bayi arkadaşım vardı, yanına giderdim. Tezgâh altında –bunu polis de biliyor- Kürtçe dergi, gazete vs. satılırdı, ama nasıl satılırdı biliyor musunuz, peynir ekmeği gibi satılırdı. Gözlemlediğim için biliyorum, alan da politikadan filan anlamaz, sırf o dolduruş, o yasaklama.. Kürtçe kasetler aynı şekilde, el altından çoğaltılıyor filan. Bir serbestleşti, yasak kalktı, bir tane satmıyor.. Dolayısıyla, bunlara dikkat etmek lazım, yasaklayarak farklı amaçları olan bir gruba bir silah, bir argüman veriyorsun, bunu kullanıyor. Ama dil öğretimine karşı çıkanların ne gibi argümanları var anlamak güç. .. Şimdi bizim Batı Trakya’da, Yunanistan’da soydaşlarımız var, onlar kendi dillerinde eğitim almıyorlar mı? Almadılar, biz onlara zulüm yapıldı, işkence yapıldı diye ayaklandık. Almanya’da, Avrupa’da insanlarımız var, istiyorlarsa eğitim okullarını kuruyorlar, milletvekili oluyorlar. Kendimize gelince çifte standart olmaz.”

Another bureaucrat touched on the issue from an economic point of view and argued that in the society there is not a demand for Kurdish language courses:

İ (female, 48, Department Head, M.S. degree): “Maybe because of my background I am more tempted to think in economic terms. I mean this is an issue of supply and demand. In the 20th century, maybe there exist families teaching their offspring Kurdish or Arabic. But why would they try to teach a language that will be of no use instead of teaching English. But a child hears

from his/her parents and learns. This is something good. For me, one shouldn't impose such bans. I don't think that there is such a desire in the society but when it comes to Quran courses I've totally different thoughts.”

“Ben belki biraz background'um nedeniyle ekonomik düşünüyorum ama mesele bir arz-talep meselesi. 20.yüzyılda çocuđuna hani belki heveslenip Kürtçe veya Arapça öğreten aileler vardır ama okulda öğrendiđi Türkçeden sonra İngilizce öğreteceđine niye o kadar geçersiz bir lisanı öğretmeye çabalasın, kullanmayacak. Ama anasından babasından görür öğrenir, o da güzel bir şey. Bence böyle yasaklara gitmemek lazım. Böyle bir talebin toplumda olduđuna inanmıyorum ama Kuran kursları için farklı düşünüyorum..”

In sum, according to the survey results in terms of political right items, the employers attach more importance to rights in comparison to other groups, whereas the bureaucrats and retired military officers who display similar attitudes give relatively less significance to rights. However, qualitative research findings did not totally confirm the survey results, because the workers and bureaucrats who attended the focus group meetings approve all rights without advancing serious conditions. The retired officers, on the other hand, had some reservations regarding some rights as parliamentary representation and quota application for women. The employers interviewed expressed opposite views. While one employer raised several conditions to the exercise of some political rights, the others generally agreed on the importance of these rights.

6.2.2. Political Duty Items

The political duty items of the survey are intended to measure respondent's views on two main citizenship duties: voting and military service.

Table 6.5 summarizes the percentages of affirmative responses of the survey samples to the four items on political duties of citizenship. The sentences with an asterisk at the end refer to a reformulation of the item which was originally designed in an opposite direction of the ideal construct.

The results of the total sample indicate that they strongly agree (97%) with the importance of voting as a citizenship duty but they do not support any penalties imposed on those not voting as only 36% approve penalties. 92% of the total respondents state that they listen to the speeches of the party leaders and analyze

them. As for the compulsory military service 59% of the total sample disapproves those rejecting this service. Again the levels of perception among the sub-samples vary.

Table 6.5: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (Or Strongly Agree) With Political Duty Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
PD1	I vote in the polls.	97.0	95.9	98.6	98.2	100.0
PD2	I listen to the speeches of the chairperson of the political party for whom I intend to vote and analyze them.	91.6	90.8	97.2	89.8	94.0
PD3	Those not voting should be penalized.*	36.3	38.4	40.0	19.4	50.0
PD4	Those rejecting compulsory military service (conscientious objectors) might not have any fair reasons.*	59.1	59.9	47.9	54.5	80.0

In terms of sub-samples they all exhibit responsible views and attitudes towards voting and particularly, conscious voting. 96% of workers, 99% of employers, 98% of bureaucrats and all of the retired officers state that they vote in the polls, whereas 91% of workers, 97% of employers, 90% of bureaucrats and 94% of the retired officers listen to the speeches of party leaders and analyze them. But they react differently to the idea of penalizing the citizens prefer not to vote. While half of the retired military officers approve such penalties, only 19% of the bureaucrats, 38% of the workers and 40% of the employers support this idea. Focus group participants and interviewees generally uttered views in line with the survey results.

During the focus group studies and interviews all participants agreed that voting is the most important right, and employers and retired officers emphasized that it is both a right and a duty. Some bureaucrats explained the importance of voting on several grounds. One of them argued that voting is important because it is an instrument in determining one's own fate and at the same time a tool contributing to the legitimacy of the democracy:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): "This has two facets in fact. From the view point of the person I mean if s/he is going to whine about the situation the legitimacy of

the whining is grounded on the fact that s/he used her/his vote. I mean, to me voting is an instrument of determining one's own fate. The person has a right to have a say about what's going to happen to him/her and s/he has to make the best use of that right, in other words s/he should not sell his/her vote for a sack of rice. Secondly, voting is important for operation of the system because the legitimacy of democracy is directly proportional to the number of people who used their votes. I mean in a country of 40 million electorates a party coming to power after an election during which 1 million people voted can be legal but its legitimacy is open to debate. So the number of votes used is of crucial importance for the sake of democracy.” “Bunun iki yönü var tabii. Kişi açısından, kişi daha sonra bulunduğu durumla ilgili sızlanacaksa, bu sızlanma hakkını veren ona baştan oy vermiş olması. Yani kendi kaderini belirlemede bir araç olarak görüyorum ben oy vermeyi. Başına gelecekler konusunda bir tek orada bir hakkı var ve bunu iyi kullanmalı, diğer bir deyişle bir torba pirince satmamalı. İkincisi, sistemin işlemesi açısından çok önemli, çünkü demokrasinin meşruiyeti oy kullananların sayısı ile doğru orantılıdır. 40 milyon seçmenin olduğu bir ülkede bir milyon kişinin oy kullanmasıyla iktidara gelen bir parti yasal olabilir ama meşruiyeti tartışılabilir. Dolayısıyla sayının artması demokrasi açısından çok önemli.”

Another bureaucrat remarked that voting provides a sense of attachment to the country, but he believed that ‘tax payer’ concept as used in the USA was more rational regarding the citizen-state relation. According to him in Turkey the voter-state relationship is totally sentimental, utopian and abstract, whereas as a tax payer the citizens have a more concrete relation with the state based on material interests:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “The right to vote is of course very important. I consider this about my own country. Thinking about the old people who brought me up I felt like they were born as subjects but died as individuals. The fact that they voted modernized their relationship with this geography. The people who were being investigated because of smoking tobacco during the times of Abdulhamid were afterwards started living in a country where they had voting rights and this fact gave them a sense of attachment to the country. They were attached to this country with a citizenship tie. But their relationship with the Ottoman State was not more than being ummet. So to me voting is really important. It gives a sense of attachment to a country, an identity card, a passport. But I think the American way is even better. For example, for us the voter is important, they on the other hand emphasize the tax payer which is a better relationship. I mean you've got a material relation with your country. The relationship between the state and you is more concrete, tangible. Ours is totally sentimental, utopian and abstract. For example the poll in Denver (plebiscite about a new airport) is just this. The guys are rushing to the polls with a feeling like “In the end my income will raise or in case of an irrational investment I'm going to pay with my taxes.” A relationship based on interest, I mean a material relationship drags people to the polls. I mean this is the calculable benefit. If we can shape such a process of course people will use their votes, their approach to the polls will be different.”

“Oy verme hakkı tabii ki önemlidir. Ben kendi ülkem açısından bakıyorum, beni yetiştiren yaşlı insanları düşününce şunu hissettim, onlar tebaa olarak doğdular ve birey olarak öldüler. Onların oy kullanıyor olmaları bu coğrafya ile olan ilişkilerini daha çağdaş bir hale getirdi. Abdülhamit döneminde üç kuruşluk tütün sarıp içtiğinde takibata uğrayan insanlar artık oy kullandıkları bir ülkede yaşıyorlar ve oy kullanıyor olmaları onları o ülkeye bağlamıştı. Bu ülkeye onlar vatandaşlık bağıyla bağlıydı. Ama Osmanlı ile ilişkileri ümmet olmaktan öteye geçmiyordu. O bakımdan oy kullanmak çok önemli bence. Bir ülkeye, nüfus cüzdanına, pasaporta aidiyet duygusu veriyor. Ama Amerikalıların tabiri daha güzel, mesela bizde seçmen çok önemlidir, onlar tax payer diye vurguluyorlar ki o daha güzel bir ilişki. Ülkenizle yani özdeşsel bir ilişkiniz var. Ülkeyle somut, sesi çıkan bir ilişki dönüyor aranızda, bizdeki tamamen duygusal, ütöpik, el dokunmayan, soyut bir ilişki. Denver'daki oylama [havaalanı yapılması konusunda

plebisit] da o yani. Adamların koşarak gitmesi sonuçta benim vergim artacak, irrasyonel bir yatırım olursa boşuna o vergi kesilmesin benden. Çıkar ilişkisi daha doğrusu maddi bir ilişki insanları sandık başına itiyor. Ölçülebilir fayda onları sandığa itiyor. Biz de o sürece sokabilirsek elbette ki bizde de oy oranı artacak, insanların sandığa bakış açısı daha farklı olacak.”

About voting behaviour, almost all participants stated that they listened to the political news and debates, and speeches of the party leaders. While a few of them stated that they also read the programs of political parties, the general tendency is not to read the programs because they do not believe in the validity of the promises as put by one of the bureaucrats:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “I don’t read party programs and I don’t think that anybody does either. Moreover I don’t think that party programs mean something at all. Because any party doesn’t write a program to implement what is written there. It is just because such a thing should exist. I mean it is being written, published, distributed to the press just because there has to be a party program, some written material, some slogans. In the media sometimes certain interest groups make a few speeches about what is written there like about forestry or the workers. But that doesn’t mean anything at all.”

“Ben okumuyorum, kimsenin de parti programını okuduğunu zannetmiyorum. Üstelik parti programının bir şey ifade ettiğini de zannetmiyorum. Çünkü hiçbir parti, o programı uygulamak niyetiyle yazmıyor. Sadece belli şeyler olması gerektiği için, işte parti programı olması lazım, yazılı materyal lazım, belli sloganlar lazım diye hazırlanıyor, dağıtılıyor, basına gönderiliyor. Basında belki belli çıkar grupları bu konularda bazı konuşmalar yapıyor. İşte ormanlıkla ilgili, işçilerle ilgili üç satır var gibi.. Ama bir şey ifade etmiyor.”

Likewise, one of the workers noted that if workers and public servants were reading party programs they would not have voted for parties supporting privatization:

A (male, 47, high school graduate): “Here lies an interesting point. I read on the paper today. There are 10.6 millions of people working in Turkey. I mean labour class, public servants etc. To me the first question of the working people should be this: In this country one shouldn’t vote any party supporting privatization, because privatization means unemployment, more exploitation and lower wages. I don’t think that the majority in this country reads any party program at all. Otherwise what kind of a worker or a public servant would go and vote for a party supporting privatization? When you say privatization whoever you ask says: “It’s bad. I’ll end up jobless” but I mean if s/he glanced at party program s/he would see that the program includes privatization and s/he goes and votes for that party. The same holds for left wing parties as well. Today I think that the parties claiming to be social democrats are also pro-privatization.”

“Burada ilginç olan bir şey var. Bugün gazetede okudum, 10,6 milyon çalışan insan varmış, işçi sınıfı, memur falan. Bence çalışan insanlar öncelikle şunu sormalılar, bu ülkede özelleştirmeyi savunan hiçbir partiye oy verilmemesi gerekiyor. Çünkü özelleştirme demek işsizlik demek, daha çok sömürü demek, daha az maaş demek vs vs. Ülkenin büyük bir çoğunluğunun parti programı falan okuduğunu düşünmüyorum. Öyle olsa, benim kafam almıyor, hangi işçi, hangi memur özelleştirmeyi savunan bir partiye oy verir? Özelleştirme dendi mi kime sorsanız kötü bir şey der, işsiz kalacağım der, fakat adamın programını alıp baksın özelleştirme yazıyordur orada, yine de tutup o partiye oy verir. Bu sol partiler için de geçerlidir. Bugün sosyal demokrat olduklarını söyleyen partilerin de özelleştirmeden yana olduklarını düşünüyorum.”

Regarding their own voting behaviour, while some employers stated that they always supported a specific party; other participants explained that the following factors determine their voting decisions: ideological preferences; the leader, the program, historical background and past performance of the party; the intellectual team of the party. They stated that it was particularly significant that the party leader should give priority to national interests over individual interests. Concerning their opinions about the general voting behaviour of the electorate in Turkey; workers argued that voters generally act like supporters of a football team or there exists a kind of partisanship tradition which passes from grandfather to grandson, and other participants added that religious communities and heads of clans are significant factors that determine voting behaviour. One of the bureaucrats noted that the opinions of those in the immediate surroundings or the general political tendency in a neighbourhood are also important:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “In general I believe that the Turkish people are winded up just at the dawn of the elections. His/her micro environment, his/her neighbourhood. The atmosphere in the neighbourhood is just reflected. I mean as a person living in Keçiören you can’t vote for the TCP (Communist Party of Turkey). It doesn’t work even the polls manager can’t yell like “One for the communist party” while s/he is counting the votes in the box. This is a personal hobby of mine; during the night of the election I just visit polling stations. I even recall myself trying to correct procedural mistakes and being told off. The polls paper is folded and the seal is say illegible that is counted in accordance with the tendency of the neighbourhood. I believe that micro environment is largely influential in the voting behaviours of the people.”

“Genellikle ben Türk halkının seçim arifesinde dolduruşa geldiğine inanıyorum. O andaki bulunduğu mikro çevre, mahalledeki akım neyse genellikle o cereyan ediyor. Mesela siz Keçiören’de yaşayan birisi olarak TKP’ye oy veremezsiniz. O zaten işlenmez, arada kaynar o, sayım sırasında Sandık Kurul Başkanı TKP diye bağırılmaz zaten o oyu okurken.. Benim özel ilgi alanımdır bu, seçim geceleri gezerim sayım yerlerini. Birkaç kere hata düzeltmeye kalktığımı ve fırçalandığımı da hatırlıyorum. [*Oy pusulası*] katlanmış ve karşı tarafa geçmiş, o mahallenin tandansı neyse oraya okunur o. [*Mührü*] vurduğunuz yere okunmaz. .. Mikro çevre bence insanların oy tercihinde büyük ölçüde etkili oluyor.”

With regard to imposing penalties to assure voting, among all participants only two female employers told that those not voting should be penalized, but the remaining participants did not think that penalties would serve to increase voting rate, and noted that because of penalties people might give blank votes. They also noticed that in practice the penalties were not put into practice.

S (female, 63, owns a rehabilitation center for hearing disabled, 50 employees, graduate of Teachers College- retired teacher): “Let them get penalized. I might appear a bit strict but if there is a sanction that sanction should be implemented and let that person come and use his voting right. Whatever the sanction is should be implemented. In fact if it happens to be like this then that person uses his/her vote on time and there won’t be any votes wasted. Maybe the result will differ by his/her vote. Thus I say the penalties should be implemented. And moreover when they don’t vote they say: ‘It’s none of my business whoever gets elected’.” “Cezalandırılınsın. Ben biraz katı gözükebilirim ama bunun bir yaptırımını varsa uygulansın, gelsin kullansın o da. Neyse cezası uygulamak gerekiyor. Zaten böyle olursa o zaman herkes oyunu zamanında kullanır, oy kaybı olmaz. Belki onun oyuyla daha başka sonuçlar çıkacaktır. Onun için uygulansın diyorum. Bir de kullanmadığı zaman kim seçilse seçilsin bana ne diyor.”

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “No, penalizing does not work at all. The person says: “OK I’ll pay the penalty and don’t vote”. I don’t know any specific formula here, but being a citizen, an individual does not go hand in hand with a feeling of crossness. Unfortunately those who feel cross pay the price in the end. Not only just them indeed, but those who vote as well. About this issue we all need to act with a consciousness of citizenship, we all have to be sensitive and absolutely have to fulfill this duty.”

“Yo [cezalandırmak işe] yaramıyor, veririm diyor gitmiyor mesela. Orada nasıl bir formül uygulanır bilemem ama yurttaş olmak, birey olmak küskünlükle olmaz. Onun bedelini yine küsenler öderler. Hatta yalnızca küsenler değil, oy verenler de öderler maalesef. Bu konuda hepimizin yurttaşlık bilinciyle hareket ederek daha dikkatli, daha duyarlı olmamız lazım ve bu görevi mutlaka ve mutlaka yerine getirmemiz lazım.”

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): “I don’t think that to impose penalties is right. If a person prefers not to vote then s/he has a reason. S/he makes a sheep of himself. Someone who is not using his/her vote is a sheep. S/He says: ‘Somebody is elected and governs me’, s/he treats him/herself as a sheep. This is an indicator of the extent to which democracy is settled.”

“Bunu cezalandırmak doğru değil bence, kişi oyunu kullanmıyorsa bir sebebi vardır demek ki. Kendini koyun yerine koymuştur. Oy vermeyen kişi koyun demektir. Birileri seçilir o da beni yönetir diyor, kendi kendine koyun muamelesi yapıyor. Demokrasinin ne kadar yerleştiğinin bir göstergesi bu.”

The last political duty item is formulated to measure people’s opinions on “conscientious objectors.” As it was expected, the retired military officers were the sample group with the least tolerance against “conscientious objectors”; 80% of them agreed that those objecting to military service cannot have any fair reasons. Among the other three sub-samples, employers seemed to be the most tolerant group as less than half of them (48%) approved that ‘those rejecting military service might not have any fair reasons’. 55% of bureaucrats and 60% of workers thought that conscientious objectors were not right in their choices. However, during the focus group meetings, the most tolerant persons toward conscientious objectors were among the workers and bureaucrats. 6 participants out of 19 had not heard about conscientious objectors before. In general, the participants’ reactions against those rejecting military service can be stated under three categories: i) those who say: ‘conscientious objectors are right, I support them’, ii) those who say ‘objectors may

be right but conscientious objection is open to abuses’, and iii) those who say ‘in no way they can be right, they must and will do the military service’.

Under the first category there are two workers and two bureaucrats who supported the objectors. One worker did not agree with the claim that conscientious objectors abstain from the defense of the nation and he believed that in case of a national threat the objectors would also take part in defending the country:

A (male, 47, high school graduate): “I mean the opposing idea is this: “You’re running away from defending your country.” Definitely this is not true. In fact I develop a theory of my own. Had the States done in Turkey what they did in Iraq. Everybody in this country, even the most ordinary person does everything to defend the country. Of course there will always be collaborators. This is also a truth. But I think all the strata, all the individuals living in Turkey just feel like me. I think they consider the process like me. In that sense I think one shouldn’t say “Oh you have to do the military service” to those kids. If the kid doesn’t want to do let him not.”

“Yani bunun karşı düşüncesi şey, sen vatan savunmasından kaçırıyorsun falan. Kesinlikle alakası yok. Hatta şöyle bir teori de geliştiriyorum Keşke ABD şu Irak’a yaptığını bize yapsa. Bu ülkedeki herkes, en sıradan insan bile ülke savunması için her şeyi yapar. Ama işbirlikçiler her zaman çıkacaktır, o da bir gerçektir. Bizim Türkiye sınırları içersinde yaşayan her katmanın benim gibi düşündüğünü düşünüyorum. Bu sürece böyle baktığını düşünüyorum. O anlamda çocukları öyle zorla illa asker olacaksın dememek gerekir diye düşünüyorum. Gitmek istemiyorsa gitmesin çocuk.”

By remarking the influence of mores and traditions on the society he further refused the view that if conscientious objection is allowed, then no man will do military service. Another worker proposed to establish a professional military force which the former worker agreed:

A (male, 47, high school graduate): “Maybe the solution lies there. Implement professionalism in military and then train the others 3 months for using the arms and let them go. While he is conducting his daily life teach him about national defence during the weekends. But naturally since capitalism has assigned a different role to Turkey- I mean we have the most crowded army in the world with, I think, 650 thousand soldiers- they want to maintain this. If we were left alone we would sort this out.”

“Belki de çözüm odur. Yap profesyonel askerlik şeyini, adama da üç ay bir silah eğitimi ver, hadi git işine. İşine gidip gelirken hafta sonları ülke savunmasını da öğret. Bence bunun çözümü çok basit. Ama tabii kapitalizm Türkiye’ye çok farklı rol biçtiği için o 650 bin herhalde asker sayımız, dünyanın en kalabalık askeri bizde, onu da her zaman korumak istiyorlar. Yoksa bizi kendi halimize bıraksalar biz onu çözeriz.”

Two bureaucrats were not in favour of the military service because of their own recruitment experiences. They proposed a professional army or shortening the duration of the service. While a female bureaucrat who was the daughter of a General

and grew up in that community thought that the officers form an elite social group, considered military service as an important training and experience, and did not approve conscientious objectors, another bureaucrat reacted to her as follows:

R (male, 46, Department Head, university graduate): “I don’t think like Ms. İ. For example the period of the compulsory military service can be shortened or in fact the institution can be better professionalized. For me military service is a bit like a waste of time and resources as it is practiced in Turkey. There is no need to suffer from security paranoia just because we’re situated in between the Middle East and the Balkans. Of course since Ms. İ’s dad was a general the environment within which she grew up is one where top rank officials lived. I don’t think that the kids in the Army are living in an elite surrounding.”

“Ben İ. Hanım gibi düşünmüyorum. Mesela askerliğin süresi kısaltılabilir veya daha profesyonel bir yapıya dönüştürülebilir. Askerlik bana biraz zaman ve kaynak israfı gibi geliyor Türkiye’deki mevcut haliyle. Ortadoğu ve Balkanların arasındayız falan diye bu kadar da güvenlik paranoyası yaşamaya gerek yok bence. İ. Hanım tabii paşa kızı olduğu için orası daha üst düzey askerlerin bulunduğu bir ortam. Ben askerlik yapan çocukların çok da nezih bir ortamda yaşadıklarını zannetmiyorum.”

M (male, 36, Department Head, university graduate): “Well I might say like in terms of freedom of thought of course those conscientious objectors can think as they actually do. I don’t feel angry at all. It is not fair to say they don’t want to join the Army so they are traitors. Naturally under the circumstances of the world not only us but all the countries will establish an Army for ensuring their security. This is just reasonable. But on the other hand, it has been on the agenda for years I mean professionalization of the Army. This has to be established. I did a compulsory military service of 8 months and I witnessed there. Indeed on the third day I sent my praises to God that I was a university graduate and didn’t get obliged to serve a longer term. My claim is that: we all say that the psychology of this society has got a problem, one of the major causes of this –though I don’t know it’s precise rank among the causes- long term military service. The violence and the terrible conditions those 18-20 years old youngsters exposed to in the barracks are highly influential. For six months I went at around seven at night and I was patrolling till ten o’clock in the morning. What did I do? Nothing at all. Threw a few bullets. So am I supposed to do military service? We have to consider the issue from such a perspective. I’ve got a friend who served 550 days in the military even during his last couple of days he was under: “Turn right! Turn left!” At least they could do this. He lives in Istanbul. You know an earthquake zone. They could have taught them first aid. They didn’t. Traffic is a serious problem. They could have provided training on traffic. Even though I was in the transportation section they didn’t. When talking about the military service we should consider all these.”

“Ben de şöyle söyleyeyim, düşünce özgürlüğü anlamında bu vicdani retçiler öyle düşünebilir tabii, hiç kızmıyorum. Bunlara askere gitmek istemiyor, vatan hainidir falan demek yanlış. Tabii içinde bulunduğumuz ortam konum gereği sadece biz değil, tüm ülkeler güvenlikleri açısından askerini oluşturacak, bu olması gereken bir şey. Diğer taraftan hep yıllardır gündemde olan o profesyonel ordu kavramı var, bence olması lazım. Ben de sekiz ay yaptım orada gördüm gerçekten, hatta üçüncü gün okul okuduğum ve bu sayede uzun dönem yapmak zorunda kalmadığım için Allah’a şükrettim. Bu benim bir iddiamdır: bu toplumun psikolojisi bozuk deriz, bence bunun sebeplerinden bir tanesi, kaçınıcı sıradadır bilemiyorum; uzun dönemli askerlik. O gençlerin 18-20 yaşında kışlaya geldiklerinde uğradıkları şiddet ve kötü ortamın çok büyük etkisi var. Bunun canlı örneklerini çok yaşadım. Altı ay akşam yedide gittim, sabah ona kadar nöbetteydim. Ne yaptım, hiç bir şey yapmadım, üç tane mermi attım. E ben askerlik mi yaptım şimdi? Böyle yaklaşmak lazım. 550 gün askerlik yapmış bir arkadaşım var, terhis olmasına iki gün var, hâlâ eğitime çıkartıp sağa dön sola dön diyorlar. Bu askerlik değil. Ama şunu verebilirdi. İstanbul’da yaşıyor, orası deprem bölgesi, orada ilk yardım eğitimi verilebilirdi, vermediler. Trafik ciddi bir sorun, trafik eğitimi verilebilirdi, ulaştırma sınıfıydım, vermediler. Askerliği bir de bu boyutlarda düşünmemiz lazım.”

Two other bureaucrats can be placed under the second category; they believe in the importance of military service but they also understand conscientious objectors, however, they are concerned about abuses. One of them noted that conscientious objection is a meaningful notion, but for Turkey it is early and for the homogenization of the country military service is important. He also remarked that this notion is open to abuses in Turkey:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “While the talks evolved into this line let me continue with a small memoir from my days in the Army. I had a military training of 3 and a half months in Tuzla. I kept a journal then. I sometimes check that journal and see that I hadn’t written even a single negative line about those days. It was just fun. The most disturbing memories of that 3,5 months period is of those guys who joined by force and who were counting backwards. I think conscientious objection could be a solution for them. I thought had they not been among us we would have a more enjoyable time. But such a practice can easily get abused. We can’t find anybody to do the military service. And we lose a generation who has to spend that period of their lives under such a discipline. Those chaps have to experience this. It is still early for Turkey to implement Conscientious objection. Maybe it is a meaningful, good institution but it is still premature for Turkey. Let them not touch arms but let them fulfill their national duty in another way. This institution (the Army) is important for homogenisation of our country. Cause a guy from Mugla and Bitlis does not share any other environment together.”

“Madem öyle bir mecraya girdi konu, ben de bir askerlik anısıyla devam edeyim. Ben üç buçuk ay temel askerlik eğitimi gördüm Tuzla’da. O üç buçuk ay hatıra defteri tutmuşum, arada bir bakıyorum, hiçbir olumsuz satır yok. Çok zevkli geçmiş. Fakat o üç buçuk ayda aklımda kalan en olumsuz şey askere zorla gelmiş ve gün sayan tiplerdi. Kafamda da vicdani retçiliği onlar için çözüm olarak düşündüm. Onlar olmasa aslında biz daha zevkli askerlik yaparız diye düşündüm. Fakat Türkiye’de bu konu istismar edilir. Silah altına alacak adam bulamayız ve o dönemi askeri disiplin altında geçirmesi gereken bir kuşağı kaybederiz. Onların o rahle-i tedristen geçmesi lazım. Türkiye için vicdani retçilik henüz erken. Belki güzel bir kurum, anlamlı bir kurum ama Türkiye için erken. Onlar silah almasın ama başka bir şekilde vatani görevlerini yapsınlar. Ülkemizin homojenizasyonu açısından bu kurum önemli. Çünkü bir Muğlalı ile bir Bitlisli başka türlü yan yana gelmiyor.”

The other bureaucrat who agreed with the possibility of abuse suggested that conscientious objectors might be asked to do an obligatory public service. He also mentioned that military service is one of the essential aspects of being a nation:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “Here I always think that example. The guy counts the days during the military service but he has nothing against the Military in principle. But he has some business or has a fiancée in the village or whatever. So how can you distinguish such a guy and a conscientious objector? When you accept conscientious objection as an option there will be such abuse. So what can be the solution? Maybe an obligation of social service will be introduced just like in Europe a kind of thing that’s going to give the guy a hardship similar to that of a Military Service. Like telling a guy from Mugla to teach in a Primary School in Bitlis for a salary of a soldier. This is one facet of the issue. Then on the other hand I agree Ms. İ. that doing the military service is something similar to paying taxes. Like we contribute to the common expenses for our survival by paying taxes, we are protecting our common benefit by doing the military service in a place like Turkey with such geography.

This is one of the aspects of being a nation. In fact it is said that the Turks evolved from a community to a nation during the Canakkale Wars. Because there those people for the first time in their history protected a common territory in their own land. It is normal for developing a consciousness of citizenship. But as I just mentioned of course there are people who don't want to hold a gun. So how are you going to distinguish those types? In Europe there is the option of civil service but under the pre-Second World War conditions nobody would even imagine this. Now the circumstances are much more comfortable. Say France at the moment is not under a threat. When NATO existed Germany was between France and Russia so the French felt at ease most probably thinking like 'While the Russians will be able to come here I will have enough time to organise the Army'."

"Burada benim aklıma hep şu gelmiştir. Adam askerde gün sayar ama askerliğe karşı bir durumu yoktur fakat işte o an işi gücü vardır, köyde yavuklusu vardır falan. Bu adamla vicdani retçiyi nasıl ayıracaksın? Vicdani ret mümkündür dediğiniz anda büyük bir istismar olacak. Çözüm ne olabilir? Belki Avrupa'daki gibi bir sosyal hizmet yapılacak, adama hakikaten askerliğin bir şekilde ona verdiği, verebileceği olumsuzluğu yaşatacak, ne bileyim işte Muğlalı birine git Bitlis'te öğretmenlik yap asker ücretine gibi bir şey olabilir. Bu işin bir kısmı. İ. Hanım'a da katılıyorum, yani askerlik bir şekilde vergi vermek gibi bir şey. Nasıl ki vergi vererek ortak yaşamımızı idame ettirecek giderlere katkımız oluyor aynı şekilde, hele Türkiye gibi bir coğrafyası olan bir yerde de askerlik yaparak ortak çıkarımızı koruyoruz hepimiz. Bu millet olmanın esaslarından da bir tanesidir. Türkler Osmanlı'daki cemaatten millet olmaya Çanakkale Harbi'nde geçti denilir. Orada çünkü ilk defa olarak kendi bölgelerinde bir ortak yurdu savundu insanlar. Bu bir yurttaşlık bilinci geliştirmesi açısından normal. Ama demin dediğim gibi hakikaten silahı eline alamayan insan vardır muhakkak, peki bunu nasıl ayıracaksınız? Bunu Batı'nın da çözdüğünü zannetmiyorum. Avrupa'da askerlik yerine hizmet verme imkanı var, fakat Dünya savaşı öncesindeki şartlar varken bunu kimsenin düşünebileceğini dahi tahayyül edemiyorum. Ortam rahatladı, işte Fransa şu anda bir tehdit altında değil, NATO varken de Fransa ile Rusya arasında koskoca Almanya vardı, adam kendini rahat hissediyordu, bunlar buraya gelinceye kadar ben zaten orduyu toplarım diye düşünüyordu büyük ihtimalle."

All the employers and retired military officers are under the third category of persons who did not approve those rejecting military service, but not all of them was very strict. One female employer pointed out that if it was necessary for defense, the men had to learn how to use arms but they did not have to use them. Another employer did not approve conscientious objection on the grounds that the society had its rules and if everybody objected who would do the defense:

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): "I don't approve this. Conscientious objection is OK but this society has got an order. Some organs are necessary for operation of the order. The functions of these organs should be fulfilled by somebody. If everybody says 'I'm a conscientious objector' then who's going to defend the country?"

"Onaylamıyorum. Vicdani retçilik tamam da yani toplumun bir düzeni vardır. Bu düzenin çalışabilmesi için belirli organlara ihtiyaç vardır. O organların işlevini de birilerinin yerine getirmesi lazım, herkes ben vicdani retçiyim derse kim yapacak bu işleri?"

One employer was very rigid against conscientious objectors and argued that considering the strategic conditions of Turkey such a discussion should be out of question:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “I don’t accept anything like this for Turkey. As a human being I do accept. I am not a person with a gun. I’m authorized to use a gun but I don’t carry, want or like guns. And I don’t want it but when I was in my early twenties doing the military service was my duty like it is those twenty year olds’ duty today. In a country with a strategic importance like Turkey such issues shouldn’t be debated. Then let them go to the United States to dance Rap. Let them be American citizens if they can. Such issues can be discussed there. They are addicted to suck the blow of the world; they are making such a fuss when a couple of their citizens are dead. I have had 30-40 thousands of martyrs what are they talking about? Let them go and become American citizens then. That’s why I asked whether they were Turkish citizens. No in Turkey under such circumstances such issues can’t be discussed. It is a shame, a sin. While all those martyrs are causing pain in people’s hearts. In a humanitarian point of view, but let’s not make a confusion now. Me for example I’m authorized to have a gun but I don’t use that right. God save but thus I do accept whatever can occur to me. Cause if I carry a gun then who knows if I feel angry then I might say... or cause an accident. Or attempt at somebody’s life then I can’t deal with such a sentimental burden. My conscience can’t deal with this but this is something different. I mean the guy is attacking your country, your land, the blood of your ancestors is there, they are going to take you away, an imperialist power in this world. This can be a scenario scripted by them. How can I surrender to this? I think this can be their script; here there are not only humanist feelings. Why doesn’t the United States approve the Kyoto Protocol? Where’s humanity? So let’s not talk these. They will do their military service, either deliberately or not.”

“Türkiye için böyle bir şeyi kabul etmem. İnsan olarak kabul ederim. Ben silahı olan bir adam değilim. Silah kullanmaya yetkim var ama taşımıyorum, istemiyorum, sevmiyorum, istemem de ama ben delikanlılık yaşımda iken askerlik benim görevimdi, bugünkü delikanlıların da görevi. Türkiye gibi bir stratejik bir konumu olan bir ülkede bunlar konuşulmamalı. O zaman gitsinler Amerika’da rap yapsınlar. Amerikan vatandaşı olsunlar olabiliyorsa, orada olabilir o. Dünyanın kanını emmeye alışmışlar, üç tane askerleri öldü mü dünyayı ayağa kaldırıyorlar. Ben otuz bin tane, kırk bin tane şehit vermişim, neyi konuşuyor bunlar? Gitsin Amerikan vatandaşı olsunlar o zaman, o yüzden sordum ben Türk vatandaşı mı bunlar diye. Olmaz Türkiye’de şu konumda o konuşulmaz, ayıptır, günahdır. Onlarca şehit insanların yüreklerini dağlarken.. İnsani anlamda, bakın onu karıştırmayalım. Ben de bakın silah alma yetkim var şu anda almıyorum. Başıma geleceğe de Allah korusun, razıyım. Çünkü kızarım bir şey olur, kaza olur, birinin canına kastederim, benim yüreğim onu kaldırmaz. Benim vicdanım onu kaldırmaz, o ayrı. Ama adam senin ülkeneye, topraklarına kastedmiş, atalarının kanı yerde yatıyor orada, alıp götürcekler seni, emperyalist bir güç dünyada, bu onların senaryosu olabilir, ben onlara nasıl teslim olurum? Bence onların senaryosudur bu, sadece insancıl duygular değil buradaki. Niye ABD Çevre Şartnamesi’ne imza atmıyor, nerde insanlık? Onun için bunları konuşmayalım. Yapacaklar, tıpış tıpış askerliklerini yapacaklar.”

Another employer despite his disapproval of conscientious objectors was more flexible and told that those objectors might have their fair reasons by referring to the discriminatory practices of the military and politicians based on ethnicity or religion:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “I haven’t heard anything like this and I don’t consider this ethical. If I live within the boundaries of this country and if the Military maintains my security -in the end one needs such a unit and this is the military and the police- I have to do my compulsory military service, I have to fulfill my duty. But there is a tiny point here. As far as I know Turkey has got 800 thousand soldiers. Turkish army is the most crowded army. These soldiers are provided by the Army. And also there is that armament issue which is naturally very important. You have to be an expert to follow this. Against what are you buying

arms? First of all, against the surrounding countries, against the potential dangers. But there's something here. Something very important. The politicians and the Army staff should not divide the country, should not divide because of race, religion, religious sect etc. There are ethnic groups in Turkey. Turks, Kurds, Circassians, Laz, Greeks, Armenians. In the end they all exist. If you discriminate against those say against the Sunnis or Alawites or say the Turks whatever, this creates a tension for the other ethnic groups. Then that people say there's a bias here favouring this or that group so I won't do my military service so he can reject the Army on such conscientious grounds. He can react in such a way. So Turkey will really be sensitive to this."

"Duymadım, hiç ahlaki bulmam onu. Eğer ben bu ülkenin sınırları içinde yaşıyorsam, asker benim güvenliğini sağlıyorsa –güvenliğimi sağlayacak bir birim olması lazım sonuç itibarıyla, bu askerdir, polistir- ben gidip askerliğimi yapmalıyım, bu hizmeti yerine getirmeliyim. Burada bir tek şey var yalnız. Türkiye'nin 800 bin tane askeri var diye biliyorum. En büyük ordudur Türkiye'nin beslediği ordu. Ordu bunların yiyeceğini içeceğini temin ediyor. Bir de silahlanma dediğimiz bir şey var, bu çok önemli bir şey tabii. Bunu takip etmek için bunun uzmanı olmak lazım. Neye karşı silahlanıyorsunuz? Evvela etrafınızdaki ülkelere karşı, olabilecek muhtemel tehlikelere karşı silahlanma içine giriyorsunuz. Ama burada bir şey var, çok önemli bir şey. Siyasetçiler ve asker kökenli insanlar toplumu bölmemeli. Dinden dolayı, mezhebinden dolayı, ırkıdan dolayı bölmemeli. Türkiye'de etnik gruplar var; Türk var, Kürt, Çerkez, Laz var, Ermeni var, Rum var, var işte sonuç itibarıyla bunlar. Bunları etnik kimliğinden ötürü bölerseniz, beyninizin bir tarafıyla şey yaparsanız atıyorum Sünniliğe, atıyorum Aleviliğe, atıyorum Türklüğe ayrımcılık yaparsanız bu, diğer etnik gruplar açısından sıkıntı yaratır. O zaman der ki bu gruba yanlı davranıyor, askerlik yapmayacağım diyebilir, askerliği vicdani olarak uygun görmeyebilir, bir sebeptir onun için yani. Der ki bunun yandaşı budur, ben buna mı hizmet edeceğim der, böyle bir tepki verebilir. Türkiye buna çok dikkat etmeli."

The retired military officers were also quite strict against conscientious objectors whom they considered as impostors. They believed that even if it is related with one's conscience everybody must do military service because it is a rule and should be obeyed:

H (male, 58, retired Brigadier General): "First of all, a society is comprised of rules, everybody should obey those rules. The conscientious objectors are impostors, they are not sincere. They don't want to do their military service. So what? Say I don't want to pay taxes but I can't do anything about this. So everybody should comply with the rules. Then conscientious objection can be expanded to such a scale to cover everything. For example my conscience objects to pay the taxes but since there is a rule either deliberately or not I pay my taxes."

"Bir defa toplumu kurallar oluşturur, herkes o kurallara uymak zorunda. Vicdani retçiler sahtekâr, samimi değil, askere gitmek istemiyor. E ben de vergi vermek istemiyorum da elimden gelmiyor. Onun için herkes kurala uyması lazım. O zaman sadece askerliğe karşı değil her şeye karşı vicdani ret olur. Benim de vicdanım istemiyor ama toplumun kuralı olduğu için zoraki veriyorum (*vergiyi*)."

M (male, 60, Retired Brigadier General): "It is not right to say 'I am a conscientious objector' in order not to do something that everybody else does. Whatever he thinks about it he's obliged to do his military service. Either he finds it as 'moral' or 'immoral' or whatever. It is the system; it is the state that will decide whether the military service will be voluntary or compulsory. If it has sufficient economic resources the state might introduce a voluntary system but if it doesn't have the means and it introduced compulsory military service, if everybody else's son goes to do the military service then that kid will go as well. He doesn't have another option. Let him be a conscientious objector in his mind. .. Another issue, say the country faces some political circumstances and got obliged to recourse to war, I mean 'I am a conscientious objector, I can't hold a gun'. Then his land will be defended by somebody else. A

country is defended by the entire nation, by everybody. Laws and rules are enacted. Age limitations are introduced and it is said: "Everybody between the ages this and that will contribute to the country's defense." Nobody has the right to say 'I am a conscientious objector, I can't hold a gun'."

"Herkesin yaptığı bir işi ben vicdani retçiyim diye yapmak istemiyorum diye düşünmek doğru değil. O istediği kadar düşünsün ama askerliği yapmak zorunda. Kişi kendi kafasında vicdani bulur, vicdansız bulur ne yaparsa yapsın. Gönüllü veya zorunlu askerlik sistemi konmasına sistem karar verir, devlet karar verir. Devlet kendi ekonomik imkanları olsa gönüllülük sistemini getirebilir ama o imkanları yoksa zorunlu askerlik sistemini getirmişse, herkesin çocuğu askere gidiyorsa, o çocuk da askere gidecektir, gitmeme diye bir şansı yoktur. Vicdani retçiliği kendi kafasında yaşasın. .. Bir başka konu, ülke çeşitli siyasi gelişmelere sahne olmuş savaşmak durumunda kalmış, e ben vicdani retçiyim silah tutmam. O zaman onun topraklarının savunmasını bir başkası yapacak. Bir ülke herkes tarafından savunulur. Yasalar konulur, kural konur, yaş sınırı getirilir. Şu yaşlar arasında şunlar ülke savunmasına katkıda bulunacaktır denir, kimsenin öyle ben vicdani retçiyim silah tutmam deme hakkı yoktur."

One officer argued that conscientious objection was an indication of the fact that we lost our values, our instincts and asked if a person attacked to a conscientious objector what he would do:

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): "I mean in Turkey any person that's a man will fulfill this duty. If he rejects this then we as a society think like 'we missed all our values. That was a social character. That was an instinct to protect ourselves, we are losing our instinct'. Why do people have recourse to this? Because the military is not a bad job. If everybody becomes a 'conscientious objector' then who's going to provide the security of the society or even individual security? That objector friend when he gets attacked what does he do for his security? Does he retaliate with a blowing fist or does he just stand like that? Who's going to ensure his own security? How can he demand this? On what grounds? If everybody is a conscientious objector then who's going to protect the society? .. I mean in logical terms I am a conscientious objector as well. I've never carried a gun unless I am on duty, even a single day. My gun is locked in the safe now. And I've never touched a gun unless necessary. What I ask is how the conscientious objector ensures his own security. Then he subcontracts that duty. He considers the 'subcontractor' as a lower kind, a murderer and I can never accept such a point." "Valla Türkiye'de erkek olan kişi bu görevi yapacak. Eğer bunu reddediyorsa o zaman biz toplum olarak şöyle düşünürüz; demek ki ne değerlerimizi kaybettik. Toplumsal olarak bir özelliğimizi bizim, güvenliğimizi kendi kendimize sağlama içgüdüsüyüdü. Bu içgüdümüzü kaybediyoruz. İnsanlar buna niye tevessül ediyor? Çünkü askerlik kötü bir meslek değil. Herkes vicdani retçi olursa o zaman toplumun güvenliğini, hatta kişisel güvenliği kim sağlayacak? O retçi arkadaşına birisi saldırdığı zaman acaba patlatıyor bir tane gözünün üstüne yoksa hiç karşılık vermiyor mu? Şimdi soruyorum, bu arkadaşına biri vursa acaba ne yapacak diyorum kendi güvenliği için? Onun güvenliğini başkası mı sağlayacak? O kişi o zaman hangi hakla bunu isteyecek, bunu talep edecek? Herkes vicdani retçiye toplumu kim koruyacak? .. Mantık olarak bakıyorsanız ben de vicdani retçiyim. Nöbetimin dışında silah taşımadım, beylik silahımı bir gün dahi takmadım, şu anda kasada kilitli. Hiçbir zaman da silaha gerekmedikçe dokunmadım. .. Benim sorduğum vicdani retçi kendi güvenliğini nasıl sağlıyor? O zaman vicdani retçi kendi güvenliğinin sağlanması için taşeron tutmuş oluyor. Karşı tarafı aşığılık katil pozisyonunda tutuyor ki bunu asla kabul etmem."

To recapitulate, in terms of the first two political duty items about voting all survey groups display that they whole-heartedly embrace the duty of voting. The fact that they followed up the political news, listened to the political speeches before elections

also confirms the importance they attached to voting. This attitude is in accordance with the qualitative research findings. The third item which states that 'those not voting should be penalized' has been formulated on the idea that 'if people consider voting as a duty, then they will approve imposing penalties to those who do not fulfill this duty'. However, apart from the retired officers half of whom approved this item, the survey sample was not in favour of penalties. The survey results have been confirmed by the focus group participants and interviewees. They all argued that penalties did not serve anything and if someone decided not to vote, then that showed his unconsciousness concerning his own living.

The last duty item is about conscientious objectors and the sample generally does not approve those rejecting military service. While the retired officers were the strictest group as 80% of them thought that 'conscientious objectors might not have any fair reasons', employers were the most tolerant ones. These results are not in conformity with the qualitative research discussions. During focus groups and interviews, the workers and bureaucrats displayed more tolerant attitudes towards those objectors, whereas the participant employers as opposed to the survey sample were not quite tolerant against conscientious objectors. Only the participant retired officers reacted in the same way as the survey sample of retired officers by disapproving those objectors. This item has also been formulated in a similar way of thinking that 'if people consider military service as an important duty, then they will not approve conscientious objectors'. However, it is possible to consider this item as 'the right to be a conscientious objector' rather than a control item for the duty of military service. In that case according to the survey results the percentages of those agreeing that 'conscientious objectors might have fair reasons' are: 20% of retired officers, 28% of workers, 35% of bureaucrats and 42% of employers (and 31% of the total respondents). Even though employers give more importance to the right of being a conscientious objector, the approval rates are the lowest in comparison to other political rights. In fact, the high rates of disapproval towards conscientious objectors indicate that the survey generally accords substantial importance to the duty of military service.

6.2.3. General Evaluation of the Results on Political Citizenship

As discussed previously, on the basis of the balance between total political rights and duties, while the retired officers attach more weight to political duties than rights, the workers, employers and bureaucrats assign more weight to political rights in comparison to political duties. And based on the duty-surplus balance the retired military officers are concluded to share a republican conception of citizenship, whereas as a result of the other groups' right-surplus attitude they are considered to have a liberal-individualist perception of political citizenship. The item-level results, on the other hand, show that the employers approve all rights by majority and the retired officers display relatively lower approval rates for the two items about 'naming one's child' and 'the right to get private education in mother tongues other than Turkish'. Therefore, these two groups' item-level results for rights are in accordance with the total scores. However, it has been observed that the workers and bureaucrats while approving the other rights, display lower approval rates (58 and 59%) for 'the right to get private education in mother tongues other than Turkish'. Additionally, following the above argument on the last duty item, the fact that in all occupational groups the percentages of those who thought that 'conscientious objectors might have fair reasons' are very few (ranging between 20%-retired officers- to 42%-employers-) reveals that the idea of regarding 'conscientious objection as a citizenship right' is not popularly embraced.

Consequently, with reference to the total score findings and the item-level results it can be safely argued that the survey sample of retired military officers perceive political citizenship in terms of republican notion of citizenship. On the other hand, despite different levels of approval for some items, the survey samples of workers, employers and bureaucrats share a liberal understanding of political citizenship. On the basis of item-level results, it is fair to conclude that the employers display more liberal attitude towards political elements of citizenship in comparison to the workers and bureaucrats, because they accord relatively more significance to some political rights.

Furthermore, if the qualitative research observations are considered it can be concluded that the retired officers maintain their perception which overlaps with the official republican understanding of citizenship. But depending on the items while sometimes they manifested an enlightened pattern of republican citizenship (e.g. naming one's child), for some items they adopted a more patriotic understanding (e.g. conscientious objectors issue). As for the participant workers, they can be considered to have an unconditional liberal conception of political citizenship. The participant bureaucrats and employers reacted differently to some items and thus exemplified perceptions in line with both the liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship at varying degrees. On the other hand, the employer who is the owner of a private school defended the importance of political duties and raised several conditions for restricting some political rights and approached the issues again from a patriotic militant perspective. Likewise, the other employer who is the MÜSİAD member kept on his 'religious liberal' approach and supported political freedoms by referring to religious values.

However, in general, with the exception of the participant workers, when the discourses of qualitative study participants are analyzed it can be observed that there are many references to republican values which emphasizes the importance of national unity, integration or homogenization of the country, order of the society, significance of obeying rules and fulfilling duties. For example, most of the participants argued that there should be minimum level of vote requirement for Parliamentary representation because of the integrity of the country, security and stability of the country, and 'Turkey's circumstances'. Similarly, the majority of the participants objected the conscientious objectors by arguing that 'Turkey has an important strategic position', 'the society has a order and in order that the social organs can function properly the rules should be obeyed' and 'military service is necessary for the homogenization of the country', 'military service serves to protect the common interests and is important for developing a consciousness of citizenship'. Hence, it is possible to infer that the qualitative study participants – except the workers- share a republican conception of political citizenship.

CHAPTER VII

PERCEPTION OF THE SOCIAL ELEMENTS OF CITIZENSHIP

In this chapter, similar to the approach followed in the previous two chapters, first, the total scores of the survey respondents for social rights and for social duties are analysed by using the means of total scores, analysis of variance tests (ANOVA) and post-hoc comparisons. After examining the mean total scores for social rights and for social duties, the type of perception for social elements of citizenship are analysed on the basis of the difference between mean total scores of rights and duties. Then, the results for each item of social rights and duties are evaluated by employing the survey findings and the qualitative data obtained from the focus group meetings and interviews. Again, Appendix G can be checked to see the within sample comparisons for the sub-samples of workers and employers.

7.1. Mean Total Score Analysis

In the citizenship rights scale there are seven items about social rights. The following table summarizes the mean scores of total social rights together with standard deviations and number of observations for the total sample and for sub-samples. The scores are again indexed to 100.

Table 7.1: Mean Total Scores of Social Rights

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	92.34	9.52	376
Employers	79.29	13.95	69
Bureaucrats	81.97	13.07	107
Retired military officers	87.57	11.00	49
Total sample	84.89	12.05	601

The high level of mean scores of total social rights for the total sample and sub-samples, ranging between 79 and 92, indicates a close match of the perceptions of respondents concerning social rights with the hypothetical construct of these rights. ANOVA results indicate a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in the mean scores of four sub-samples [$F(3, 597) = 44.679, p = 0.000$]. Post-hoc tests reveal that the mean score for workers is different from those of the bureaucrats, of employers and of retired military officers and the mean score for the military officers is different from that of the other groups. In this case the actual difference, calculated by eta squared, is of large size (0.18). The employers having the lowest mean (79) for total social rights can be interpreted as the group who has least expectations in terms of social rights in contrary to the sample of workers who has the highest expectations for social rights with a mean total score of 92.

In the scale for citizenship duties there are eight items on social duties. The following table summarizes the mean scores of total social duties together with standard deviations and number of observations for the total sample and for sub-samples. The scores are again indexed to 100.

Table 7.2: Mean Total Scores of Social Duties

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	89.18	8.77	373
Employers	87.75	9.60	71
Bureaucrats	88.88	7.91	109
Retired military officers	92.10	7.80	50
Total sample	88.95	8.68	603

The means of total scores for the total sample and the four sub-samples lie between 88 and 92. Similar to the results of social rights, a high level of agreement is observed between the respondents' perception of social duties and the hypothetically constructed items. Among all groups the sample of retired military officers has the highest total scores (92) for social duties on the average as it was the case for civil and political duties as well. The employers, on the other hand, seem to be the sample with the least concerns about social aspects of citizenship in terms of both rights and duties.

According to the ANOVA results for mean scores of social duties of sub-samples there is not a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(3, 599) = 2.597, p = 0.052$]. However, post-hoc comparisons conducted by using Tukey test reveal that the mean score for employers is different from that of the retired military officers, but the actual difference is of small size (0.01). The workers and bureaucrats do not differ significantly from any other group.

Similar to the political citizenship items, the item numbers are not equal for social rights (7 items) and social duties (8 items). Thus, ANOVA cannot be conducted to compare the sub-sample means of differences between total scores of social duties and those of social rights. But to see the differences in absolute terms results of mean total scores for political duties and rights together with the differences are summarized in the following table.

Table 7.3: Differences between the Mean Total Scores for Social Duties and the Mean Total Scores for Social Rights

	Means of total scores		Differences between mean scores
	Social duties	Social rights	
Workers	89.18	92.34	- 3.17
Employers	87.75	79.29	8.46
Bureaucrats	88.88	81.97	6.90
Retired military officers	92.10	87.57	4.53
Total sample	88.95	84.89	4.06

The mean differences indicate that with the exception of the sample of workers, the respondents share a “duty-surplus” perception in terms of social rights and duties of citizenship. This suggests that, in aggregate terms, the employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers have fewer expectations of social rights as opposed to social duties, whereas for the workers social rights are more important compared to social duties.

As already discussed, social rights are considered to be different from civil and political rights. In terms of social citizenship republican and liberal traditions may take identical stands as opposed to their perspectives towards civil and political

elements of citizenship. As to be recalled within the liberal tradition there are different strands of thinking regarding social citizenship. As explained in Chapter II while neo-liberalism (or libertarian liberalism) objects to the provision of social rights by the state on the grounds that they interfere with market mechanisms; social liberalism (or egalitarian liberalism) supports the provision of social rights arguing that without them citizenship cannot be achieved in its fullest sense. On the other hand, according to the republican tradition in general, and its contemporary version which is communitarianism, in particular, social rights are mainly privileges which undermine the moral basis of the civic order and to achieve a correct balance between individual autonomy and the common good social rights should be restricted to a basic level (Etzioni, 1995). Accordingly, in terms of social rights the republican approach shares the same standpoint with the neo-liberal approach, but on totally different grounds. The republican understanding objects to the provision of social rights because of its negative effects on the moral basis of public order, whereas neo-liberal understanding's objection stems from an economic concern that social rights negatively influence the functioning of the market mechanism. Therefore, with regard to the survey groups in determining the type of perception in terms of social citizenship it can be argued that the bureaucrats and military officers have duty-surplus perception for social elements of citizenship in line with republican understanding, and the employers as the representatives of the market sphere can be assumed to have a neo-liberal understanding of social citizenship. As far as the sample of unionized workers is considered, it can safely be concluded that they share a 'social liberal' perception of social citizenship.

7.2. Item-level Analyses

In the following sections the social right and duty items are elaborated to see the importance assigned to each of them by the sample groups. The qualitative data is again employed to gain more insights in explaining the behavioral pattern of the survey sample.

7.2.1. Social Right Items

The items on social rights are formulated to cover the main social services of health, education and social security, the provision of unemployment benefit and housing, and workers' rights to collective bargaining, to form unions and to organize strikes. There is another item on distribution of public investments. To recall, in the hypothetical ideal construct it has been assumed that the social democratic welfare state provides all these welfare benefits and pays attention to make investments in order to diminish interregional differences.

For an item level analysis, the percentages of affirmative responses of the survey samples to the seven items on social rights of citizenship are presented in Table 7.4. The sentence with an asterisk at the end refers to a reformulation of the item which was originally designed in an opposite direction to the ideal construct.

According to the table, the percentage distribution of affirmative responses of the total sample ranges between 71 and 95. The item SR5, which is "the state is obliged to provide low-cost mass housing" has the least agreement level with 71% and the item SR3, which is "it is one of the major duties of the state to provide social security" has the highest approval rate with 95%. While access to public health services without any charges is approved by 83% of the total respondents, 87% considered that education should be free of charge. 85% of the total sample agree that the state should provide unemployment benefit and 87% approved workers' rights to collective bargaining, unionization and strike. Finally, 92% thought that the public investments should aim reducing interregional inequalities.

Table 7.4: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (Or Strongly Agree) With Social Right Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
SR1	All the citizens should have free (of charge) access to the health facilities of the state.	83.1	89.2	76.7	68.2	78.0
SR2	All levels of education should be free of charge.	86.8	93.8	72.6	69.1	92.0
SR3	It is one of the major duties of the state to provide social security (in terms of health and pension rights) to the citizens.	94.5	94.9	91.8	94.5	95.9
SR4	The state is obliged to provide unemployment benefit.*	85.3	90.7	63.7	83.5	78.0
SR5	The state is obliged to provide low-cost mass housing to its citizens.	71.4	77.6	61.7	56.5	70.0
SR6	All the workers should have the rights to collective bargaining, unionization and strike.	87.4	93.6	64.4	79.1	92.0
SR7	The public investments should be made in order to tackle interregional inequalities.	92.4	92.0	87.7	96.3	94.0

Since during the qualitative research study the first five items about public health, education and old-age pension services, unemployment benefits and the provision of housing are discussed simultaneously, first the survey results of these items are checked in terms of occupational groups. While only 68% of bureaucrats approved free public health services, it was approved by 78% of both employers and of retired officers, and by 89% of workers. Free public education at all levels was approved by 94% of workers and 92% of retired officers, whereas 69% of bureaucrats and 73% of employers were in favour of this item. Thus, the lowest approval rates of public health and education services free of charge came from the bureaucrats. It can be argued that the bureaucrats of the survey sample who are middle or high-level civil servants and actively involve in the decision making process of public policies, have a better knowledge of the public resources, and thus can better evaluate the possibility of offering free public services. The third item stating that the provision of social security (in terms of health and pension rights) was approved at considerably high rates by all occupational groups: 92% of employers, 95% of bureaucrats and of workers, and 96% of retired officers agreed with this item. With regard to unemployment, only 64% of employers agreed that the state should provide

unemployment benefits, whereas 78% of retired officers, 84% of bureaucrats and 91% of workers approved this item. The fifth social right item is about the provision of low-cost housing by the state and it was approved by 78% of workers and 70% of retired officers, on the other hand, only 57% of bureaucrats and 62% of employers agreed with this item. Thus, the workers and the retired military officers seemed to agree with all the social rights items of the ideal construct at high levels, but employers and bureaucrats had some reservations regarding the first five social rights. Not so differently from this picture, during the focus group meetings workers generally defended all these rights whereas all other groups articulated some conditions.

In general, all participants agreed that the provision of health and education services is one of the basic duties of a state, because the Turkish state is constitutionally defined as a welfare state, as one of the retired officers put it: “In Turkey as stipulated in the Constitution the state should be welfare state.” But there were differing views regarding the level of these services, and with regard to the provision of housing and old age pensions.

One of the bureaucrats with a rational and ‘enlightened’ approach noted that social citizenship had two facets: education and health services are considered as citizenship rights, but having well-educated and healthy citizens also facilitates the governing function of the state. He further argued that while the state was expected to provide the infrastructure of housing rather than building houses and that providing job opportunities should not be considered as a state duty:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “Of course the issue has two facets: that of the individual and the State. For example we can argue that if the people have a university education they, as a consequence, will have much better opportunities. So they have to pay for this and they have to find a solution themselves. On the other hand, it is easier for a state to govern a better educated society. So by educating the individuals the state also serves itself. Health is likewise, say vaccination campaigns. In Turkey as far as I know the state does not cover the expenses of Hepatitis A vaccine then it spends loads of money for the cure. If the vaccine was free of charge, the state would have a benefit in the end. If for example you let people have vaccinated against the flu, then you save yourself from the labour absenteeism due to illness. So the issue has two sides. On one side you consider it as a social right but at the same time the State has a benefit. So a reasonable midway solution can be found. Certain rights should be provided. But say providing jobs shouldn’t be a duty of the State. The real duty of the state is securing an environment within which everybody can find a job. Housing, as far as I

know is one of the major human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights has an article stating that everybody has the right to a healthy shelter suitable to human dignity. Of course whether the housing should be provided by the state or the state should create the environment within which housing will be provided is another topic of discussion. Creating the environment might be regarded as more reasonable.”

“Tabii olayın iki tarafı var, birey ve devlet bakış açısı. Şöyle diyebiliriz mesela, üniversite eğitimi alırsak bunun sonucunda insanlar çok daha iyi imkanlara kavuşacaklardır. Dolayısıyla bunun bedelini ödemeleri lazım, o yüzden kendi başlarının çaresine bakmalılar. Diğer taraftan iyi eğitilmiş toplumlara yönetmek de devlet açısından büyük kolaylıktır. Dolayısıyla devlet bireyleri eğiterek aynı zamanda kendisine de bir hizmet vermektedir. Sağlık da aynı şekilde, aşılama kampanyaları mesela, Türkiye’de bildiğim kadarıyla sarılık aşısının parasını devlet vermiyor, sonra da sarılık tedavisi için dünyanın parasını harcıyor. Bedava olsa sonuçta kendisine de fayda sağlayacak. Grip aşısı yapıldığı takdirde mesela işgücü kaybından kurtuluyorsun. İşin iki tarafı var yani. Bir yandan sosyal hak diye bakıyorsunuz ama aynı zamanda devletin de bunda büyük çıkarı var. Dolayısıyla makul bir orta yol bulunabilir. Belirli hakların sağlanması lazım. İş sağlamak mesela bence devletin görevi olmamalı. Herkesin iş bulabileceği bir ortamı sağlamak devletin esas görevidir. Konut, bildiğim kadarıyla temel insan hakları içinde yer alıyor. İnsan Hakları Evrensel Beyanamesi’nde herkesin sağlıklı, onuruna uygun barınma hakkı olduğuna dair bir madde var. Tabii bu konutu devlet mi vermeli yoksa yine devlet o konutun sağlanacağı ortamı mı yaratmalı o ayrı bir konu. Ortamı yaratmak çok daha makul kabul edilebilir.”

Workers who were the most demanding group in terms of social rights believed that if the state defines itself as a welfare state then it has to provide health, education, housing, old age pension and employment services to its citizens:

S (female, 38, university graduate): “The state should provide this, should provide free education, free health, jobs and food to all. First it has to provide jobs, food and shelter to the society.”

“Devlet sağlamalı bunu, eğitimi parasız verecek, sağlığı parasız verecek. Herkese iş verecek, aş verecek. Öncelikle topluma iş, aş ve barınma sağlamalı.”

However, one worker argued that in terms of employment citizens should not expect everything from the state:

N (female, 33, university graduate): “Regarding employment one shouldn’t expect everything from the state. Unemployment benefit can be granted but one shouldn’t be that statist about employment. I mean the logic should not be “Let’s rely on the state and then whatever happens” but rather like “Let the state do what it has to do then the citizens do what they can but with a raised consciousness”.. If s/he is rich let him/her finance construction of a school; if s/he is a new graduate let her/him first look for a job in the private sector. Of course s/he can look for a public employment but should not expect everything from the state.”

“İş konusunda her şeyi devletten beklememek gerekiyor. İşsizlik sigortası verilebilir ama iş konusunda çok da devletçi olmamak lazım. Devlete sırtımızı dayayalım ne olursa olsun mantığı değil de, devlet üstüne düşenleri yapsın kalanı da vatandaş bilinçlenerek yapsın. .. Zenginse okul yaptırın, yeni mezunsa önce özel sektörde iş arasin. Devlette de arasin ama her şeyi devletten beklemesin.”

Another worker objected to her argument and advanced that the state should properly audit and inspect tax payers and invest these tax revenues to new employment areas,

because the priority of the private sector is profit making and not providing employment:

A (male, 47, high school graduate): “There is something I want to add to what my friends said. I think with a Republic of Turkey ID number you should be able to go to any hospital, should get registered to any school. But about the employment issue I don’t agree what my friend said. On that basis: Most part of the budget of this country is allocated to armament, a large share goes to the Administration for religious Affaires. For me there’s something absurd in this. A second absurdity is the private sector’s recourse to informality. I don’t think that the private sector will be effective in job creation because the private sector is seeking its profit. The State should audit and provide and pave the way. It has to catch the tax evader. In fact the duty of those who run the state starts here. They are supposed to take that money from the guy, to create new jobs with that money to tackle unemployment.”

“Arkadaşların söylediklerine ek olarak söyleyeceğim bir şey var. Bence TC kimlik numarasıyla her hastaneye gidebilmelisin, her okula kayıt yaptırabilmelisin. İş konusunda yalnız arkadaşımıza (N. hn) pek katılmıyorum. Gerekçem de şu: bu ülkenin bütçesinin büyük bir kısmı silahlanmaya ayrılıyor, büyük bir kısmı diyanete ayrılıyor. Burada bir saçmalık var bence. İkinci bir saçmalık da kayıt dışında başlıyor. Özel sektörün ben yapacağımı düşünmüyorum, çünkü özel sektör kârının peşinde. Devlet denetlemeli ve yapmalı ve yol açmalı.. Vergi kaçıranın yakasına yapışmalı. Devletin, yönetenlerin görevi burada başlıyor. O adamdan o parayı alacak ve o aldığı parayla yeni iş alanları yaratarak işsizliği çözecek.”

In their discussion of job creation, the retired officers clarified the subject by arguing that if investing to a sector which is beneficial to the public good is not profitable, then the state should invest and create employment, but as long as investing has a return the state is only responsible to prepare the infrastructure which facilitates creation of new employment:

M (male, 60, Retired Brigadier General): “To provide new employment is not a duty of the State. The duty of the State is creating the environment within which new employment will be created, establishing the infrastructure. It is a duty of the State to construct a highway but constructing a factory beside the road is not a duty of the State. It is the State’s duty to take the measures encouraging investments and increasing employment, to provide this with an incentives system.”

“İş sahaları açmak devletin görevi değil. Devletin görevi iş sahaları açacak ortamı yaratmaktır, altyapıyı kurmaktır. Yol yapmak devletin görevidir ama yolun yanına fabrika yapmak devletin görevi değildir. Fabrika yapımını teşvik edici, istihdamı artırıcı tedbirleri almak devletin görevidir. Teşvik sistemiyle bunu sağlamaktır.”

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): “But if the private sector can’t do this, if it is not profitable and if there is public interest in it then it is the duty of the state.”

“Ama eğer özel sektör yapamıyorsa, rantabl değilse, kamu yararı da varsa bu devletin görevidir.”

M (male, 60, Retired Brigadier General): “If it is not profitable the state should do it as a service, and after rendering it profitable should transfer it to the private sector. Because the state will fulfill its major duties, will run the country, will keep inflation at a low level through the policies implemented, will defend the national interests against the other countries and will ensure that the people will be educated with a perspective to achieve the national goals.”

“Evet eğer rantabl değilse hizmet için bunu devlet yapmalıdır. Rantabl hale getirdikten sonra da mümkünse özel sektöre devretmelidir. Çünkü devlet asli görevlerini yapacak, ülkeyi yönetecek,

izlediği politikalarla enflasyonu düşük rakamlarda tutacak, dış ülkelere karşı ülkenin milli menfaatlerini savunacak ve milli hedeflere ulaşma doğrultusunda halkın eğitilmesini, yetiştirilmesini sağlayacak.”

While the bureaucrats argued that the state should not have any other priorities than education, health and security one of them noticed that only basic (compulsory) education should be free of charge but those who wanted a different education might prefer to continue education in paid universities established by foundations. Similarly, he believed that the state should be responsible of providing only basic health services and those need more than this should pay the difference.

One of the employers, on the other hand, viewed the state as a kind of parent to its citizens and argued that the state is responsible to ensure that citizens have access to health facilities and get education without being charged until the university level. She also told that the state should provide the infrastructure for housing facilities:

T (female, 43, manufacturer of cut flowers, university graduate): “Healthy living is a human right. If you are a citizen of a state the state is absolutely obliged to protect the right to live, it is obliged to provide all health related services. It is obliged to provide this service to all the citizens whether they have social security or not. I am against any kind of discrimination. Education likewise. I consider it that way. If I am a parent then I need to care about my child’s health and education and I have to raise her/him as a good citizen. And now I make an analogy between a parent and the State.”

“Sağlıklı yaşam hak. Bir devletin vatandaşıysanız eğer o yaşam hakkını mutlaka korumakla yükümlü, sağlıkla ilgili tüm hizmeti sağlamak zorunda. O devletin vatandaşıysa eğer ister sosyal güvencesi olsun ister olmasın herkese eşit olarak bu hizmeti vermek zorunda. Bir ayırım yapılmasına karşıyım. Eğitim de öyle. Ben şöyle görüyorum; ben eğer bir ebeveynsem eğer, anne-babaysam o çocuğun gerek sağlığına gerek eğitimine sahip çıkmam lazım ve iyi bir vatandaş olarak yetiştirmeliyim diye düşünüyorum. Kendimi de şu sorularda devlet konumuna koyuyorum.”

Similarly another employer defended that provision of social benefits (health, education and housing) is the elementary function of a welfare state. He believed that in Turkey all level of education should be free of charge, and approved the new reforms on social security system:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “I want the state to provide those services free; it is an exigency for being a social welfare state. The purpose of uniting the social security institutions is this. The case of the worker is different than of the civil servant than that of the self-employed. Their salaries differ; their status likewise. This can’t be accepted. There is so much benefit in uniting these. For example the guy is recorded in Civil Servants’ Pension Fund. He goes to the hospital for a check-up. Has one and then he goes to another hospital to have

another check-up after 10 days. How can a system deal with such a cost? This year for the first time the social security institution in Germany paid the pensioners' salary by going under debt. Turkey has been like this for decades. Is it sustainable? What will happen now? (The state) will control with the TR identity number and detect who has made the same transaction again and again. .. So what they did with the Law on Social Security is right. .. By doing this it will cut the expenses, will check the private or the state hospitals. The person will get the invoice and the state will reimburse him. Now he provides this to the green card holders. To the others as well. Such practices haven't existed until a couple of years ago. These are good practices. I say that these should be."

"Ücretsiz sağlmasını ben isterim, sosyal devletin gereği bu. Bu adamların yaptığı da bu. Sosyal güvenlik kurumlarının bir araya getirilmesindeki amaç bu. İşçi başka, memur başka, emekli başka, maaşları başka, statüleri başka, hepsi TC vatandaşı, hepsi ayrı telden çalışıyor, böyle bir şey olmaz. Bunları bir araya getirmekle o kadar fayda var ki. Adam Emekli Sandığı'na bağlı mesela, hastaneye gidiyor check-up yaptıracak, bir tane yaptıyor, bir de başkasına gideyim diyor. On gün sonra bir daha yaptıyor. Bunun getirdiği maliyetin altından bu sistem kalkabilir mi? Bu sene ilk defa Almanya'daki SSK kurumu borç para alarak emeklilerin maaşlarını ödeyebildi. Türkiye bunu onlarca yıldan beri ödüyor, buna can dayanır mı? Ne olacak şimdi? TC vatandaşlık numarasıyla girecek, tekrar tekrar aynı işlemleri yaptırnanları tespit edecek. .. O yüzden Sosyal Güvenlik Yasası'nda yaptıkları doğrudur. .. Bunu yaparak masrafları aşağıya çekecektir, devletin hastanelerine, özel hastanelere bakacaktır. Gittiği yerden faturasını alacaktır, devlet de onu ödeyecektir. Şimdi yeşil kartla bunu yapıyor, diğerlerinde bunu yapıyor. Bunlar yoktu birkaç sene evveline kadar. Bunlar güzel şeyler. Olmalı diyorum."

Likewise, retired military officers consensually agreed that education (up to university) and health services are basic duties of the state. One officer also pointed to the dangers of the 'health trade' and argued that the state cannot leave health services to the private sector:

A (male, 47, retired Colonel): "Now the private sector makes an investment on what ground? Its own profit. If (the investor) is a society, a foundation or something like that it has an income source. Other than those private sector is profit oriented. For the private sector if you don't have a profit you can't survive. Today you have to control efficiently what we call the health trade. What benefit is it of to people? Why a lot of people have had their kidneys stolen? Why this or that is like this or that? The answers should be sought. Health is a very specific issue. It is impossible for the State to leave that issue aside. Especially in a country like ours with a weak economy it is even harder in terms of protecting the people's rights, to establish the justice. Thus the health system should be run by the State. If they want to get involved, let the private sector get involved but not by jeopardizing people's health. This has to be insured." "Şimdi özel sektör neye yatırım yapar? Kârına. Dernek olur, vakıf olur, böyle bir kuruluş yaparsa yine bir gelir kaynağı vardır. Onun dışında özel sektör tamamen kâr amaçlıdır. Özel sektörde kârınız yoksa ayakta durmanız diye bir şey olmaz. Bugün sağlık ticareti denilen olayı çok iyi kontrol etmeniz lazım. İnsanlara ne kadar yarar veriyor, niye bu kadar insanın böbreği çalışıyor, neden böyle oluyor sorularının hepsine cevap vermek gerekiyor. Sağlık çok özel bir konu. Devletin bundan elini çekebilmesi mümkün değil. Hele de bizim gibi ekonomisi zayıf bir ülkede bu çok daha zor, insanların haklarının korunması, adaletin oluşturulması açısından. Onun için de devlet eliyle sağlık sistemi yürüme zorunda. Özel sektör de yapıyorsa yapısın, ama insanların sağlığıyla oynayarak değil, bunun sağlanması lâzım."

One of the employers, however, was not in favour of state's granting social rights. He argued that in the present demographic structure of Turkey where Kurdish

citizens deliberately make large number of children, expecting social benefits and provisions from the state is not fair, because as a businessman he has to pay taxes for the social expenses of the state. His views in some way reflect the contemporary republican understanding which states that “social rights should be seen as potential privileges to dutiful members who meet their responsibilities and behave in a manner deemed appropriate by the wider community” (Selbourne, 1994, cited in Dwyer, 2004: 67). Thus, in line with this viewpoint he seems to believe that Kurds do not behave responsibly and violate communally defined norms by making 20 children, and he objects to any publicly granted social rights especially to such selfish citizens because of its potential burden on the dutiful and tax-payer citizens like himself. He defended that most of the services should be privatized and the state should be a regulatory and inspecting authority, which he termed as ‘auto-controller’. Because of his views on privatization it is also possible to describe his attitude towards social rights similar to as a neo-liberal (or libertarian view) approach. Although it may, at first glance, seem to be contradictory that his views overlap both communitarian and neo-liberal views, as discussed previously these two approaches have much in common in terms of social citizenship and they take identical stands. However, since he emphasizes the irresponsible attitude of Kurdish citizens, and not the market mechanism as an obstacle to the public provision of social rights it is more meaningful to describe his approach as a communitarian understanding of social citizenship. Additionally, he stresses that businessmen should aim at ‘doing something for the country’ and this way of thinking which underlines national interests again supports a republican conception of citizenship:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “I mean these problems are not a piece of cake for Turkey. I am above everything an entrepreneur and from my point of view a lot of services should be privatised. But even this is not enough, because everybody does not think like me. All the businesspeople are not sincere, are not after the aim of doing something for the country. There is a terrible greed, terribly high scale theft and for years the banks were abused, there has been clientalism. I mean the country has been sucked out of its blood. To construct the balance is really hard here. On one side you see in places where development is experienced and a level of civility is achieved a person has one, two or at most three kids. On the other side the guy deliberately made 20 or 30 children. Now how can you cover the health and education expenses of those? I don’t have such a debt. I can’t even tolerate such a deliberate mischief. So these balances should be well constructed. For a determined period of time I want the state to provide the autocontrol. But we can’t overcome anything by letting the state to cover everything because in the end as the businesspeople we are obliged to pay the taxes for these. We are supposed to create the land or the employment. From whom will you take the taxes? Either

from the wage earner or the business people? I mean the guy made 20 children and boasts on the TV. He has got 4 wives, one lies to his left the other on the right and he says: "I sleep with one of them every night." What kind of indecency is this? This is not just ignorance. These are deliberate behaviours and these are behaviours rendered possible by the state's negligence. I can't pay the price for this. Am I stupid or what to have just 2 kids? I love children as well. Why does the majority of the citizens have a single child? You just have a look now most of the parents with a culture make a single child saying that I can just afford this. What does that person living there do? Then you can't say this to me. You can't say the state should provide free health and education to all. How will this be financed? Those Kurds will explode the population and me... Don't get me wrong. I can sacrifice my own life for my Kurdish citizens, for the Kurdish citizens who say: "I'm Turk" and indeed, they don't attempt such a deliberate mischief. But attempting such a mischief, by trying to exploit all the benefits of the Turkish Republic you can't make me cover the expenses of the 20, 30 children you made. Nobody has such a right, it is not fair. At the level of God it is not fair either."

"Şimdi bu konular Türkiye için çok kolay konular değil. Ben bir müteşebbisim öncelikle, bana sorarsanız birçok şeyin özelleşmesinden yanayım. Ama o da yetmiyor ki, çünkü herkes benim gibi düşünmüyor ki. Bütün iş adamları içten, memleket için bir şeyler yapma peşinde değil ki. Müthiş bir açgözlülük, müthiş bir soygunculuk var ve yıllarca da bankaların içi boşaltılmış, yandaşçılık, kıyakçılık yapılmış, canına okunmuş memleketin. Burada dengeler çok zor. Bir yandan medeniyetin yoğun olduğu, kalkınmışlığın yaşandığı yerlerde bakıyorsunuz adamın bir-iki, en fazla üç tane çocuğu var, öbür taraftan kasıtlı olarak 20 tane 30 tane çocuk yapmış adam. Şimdi bunların neyin sağlık giderini, eğitim giderini karşılayacaksınız, böyle bir borcum yok benim. Böyle bir kasta benim tahammülüm de yok. Onun için bu dengeleri çok iyi kurmak lazım. Belli bir süre için devletin otokontrolü sağlamasını isterim. Ama her şeyi de devletin karşılamasıyla biz hiç bir şeyin üstesinden gelemeyiz, çünkü onun vergisini bir işadamı olarak bizler ödemek zorundayız. Onun arsasını, istihdamını biz yaratmak zorundayız. Kimden alacaksınız vergisini, ancak ücretliden kesecek, işadamından alacak. Adam 20 tane çocuk yapmış, bir de övünerek televizyona çıkıyor. Dört tane karısı var, biri sağında, biri solunda yatıyor, her gece birinin yanına girerim diyor. Böyle terbiyesizlik olur mu? Bu cahillik falan değil. Bunlar kasıtlı davranışlar ve devletin de ihmalden kaynaklanan davranışlar. Ben bunun bedelini ödeyemem. Ben aptal mıyım yani, niye benim iki tane çocuğum var, on tane çocuğum yok? Ben de çok seviyorum çocuğu. Niye çoğu vatandaşın bir tane çocuğu var? Şimdi bakın çoğu kültürlü anne-baba bir tane çocuk yapıyor, gücüm ona yetiyor diyor. Oradaki zoru ne? Yok, o zaman bana bunu diyemezsiniz. Devlet herkesin sağlığını, eğitimini bedava vermeli diyemezsiniz. Nerden gelecek bu değirmenin suyu? Kürtler nüfus peydahlayacak, ben.. Yanlış anlaşılmasın, Kürt vatandaşlarıma canım feda, "Ben Türküm" diyen Kürt vatandaşlarıma canım feda. Zaten onlar böyle kasıtlı bir davranış içine girmezler. Ama kasıtlı davranış içine girip Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin her türlü nimetinden faydalanmaya çalışıp 20 tane 30 tane çocuğunun sağlık hizmetini de eğitim hizmetini de bana yaptırmasınız. Böyle bir hakkı olamaz, reva değil, Tanrı'nın katında da hoş değil."

He argued that if the demographic problems are solved by birth control policies then the state can be expected to provide health and education services. The fact that he accords priority to national interests over individual interests as a businessman, once again reflects a republican notion of citizenship:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): "Yes indeed with a sound demographic structure of course I am supporting all these. I own a private school. If that school has to be expropriated for the sake of my state I wouldn't even hesitate for a second. If I do exist for my country, for my national values as a working person then the benefits of my state, of my nation should come the first.. But when you look at the developed countries you see that free of charge education or health does not exist anymore. Even though it appears as free of charge everything has a price.

Neighbourhood schools are established by providing support to the local councils. This is called as contribution but in the end the residents of the neighbourhood are those who pay for the school, it is the residents of the neighbourhood who pay the salaries of the teachers, not the state but them. Is it what you might call as “it is the state that established the school?” I mean we have to deduce this. The state will be an “auto-controller.” The State will be at equal distances towards all its citizens. And the citizens in return will respect the state. If when I’ve got two kids and that guy over there has got 40, then I haven’t got an equal distance with my state. Such an injustice can’t be accepted. Then you can’t have such a position to defend the rights of those people for the sake of the social state. It will be a pity. Leave alone my case; it’s going to be a pity for your country. Just impose some rule like in the Eastern, Southeastern Anatolia having more than 2-3 kids is not allowed you’ll see what will happen...”

“Evet evet, doğru bir demografik yapıyla bunların hepsinin olmasından yanayım tabii ki. Ben bir özel okul sahibiyim. Bu okulunun eğer devletimin uğruna devletleşmesi gerekiyorsa hiç gözümü kırpmadan giderim. Ben çalışan bir insan olarak ülkem adına ulusal değerlerim adına var isem önce devletimin, ulusumun menfaatleri gelmelidir. Ama dünyadaki gelişmiş ülkelere baktığımızda, artık dünyanın hiçbir yerinde bedava sağlık, bedava eğitim yok. Aslında bedava gibi görünmekle birlikte her şeyin bir bedeli var. Belediyelere yardım yaparak mahalle okulları kuruluyor. Bunun adı yardım diye geçiyor ama o mahallenin yurttaşları o okulu yaptırıyor. Öğretmenin maaşını o mahalleli veriyor, devlet vermiyor ama mahalleli veriyor, bunun adı şimdi devlet mi yapmış oluyor? Yani buradan şunu çıkaracağız. Devlet otokontrolör olacak, devlet bütün vatandaşlarına eşit mesafede olacak, vatandaşları da devlete saygılı olacak. Benim iki tane çocuğum varken orada 40 tane çocuğu olan adamla ben devlete karşı eşit seviyede değilim, öyle bir haksızlık olmaz. O zaman sosyal devlete sığınarak o insanların haklarının savunucusu konumunda olamazsınız, yazık edersiniz. Beni bir yana bırakın, ülkeniz adına yazık edersiniz. Bakın şimdi Doğu Anadolu’da, Güneydoğu Anadolu’da iki-üç çocuktan fazla çocuk olmayacak diye bir şey getirin ne oluyor?”

Concerning housing issue generally all participants agreed that the state is mainly responsible to provide the infrastructure for housing facilities:

D (male, 45, worker, Yol-İş member, university graduate): “The infrastructure [of housing] should be provided by the State. Maybe it can’t build houses for all but it has to develop the infrastructure for securing that everybody living in Turkey can have housing. It has to produce mass housing in accordance with the people’s income levels. It has to do this through cooperatives I mean in the end it has to establish the infrastructure.”

“ [Konut] Altyapısını devlet yapmalı. Herkese belki konut yapmayabilir ama Türkiye’de yaşayan herkesin konut sahibi olabilmesi için altyapısını yapması lazım, gelirine göre, toplu konutlar üretmesi lazım, kooperatifler yoluyla yapmalı, yani yine altyapısını oluşturması lazım.”

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “The state has to establish the infrastructure and provide the houses to a certain level. Then the institutions to be established should carry on with this. Separate funds should be allocated and everybody should be supported to has/his own house through these funds.”

“Hem altyapıyı oluşturmalı hem de belirli bir düzeye gelinceye kadar konutlarını sağlamalı. Ondan sonra kuracağı kurumlar bu işi devam ettirmeli. Ayrı fonlar ayırmalı, bu fonla herkesi konut sahibi yapmalı.”

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “When it comes to housing, I mean the opportunities are created. It is not a duty of the state to build houses but it will create opportunities in which everybody, all of varying income levels can have a house. The banks are begging to offer credits. Just that should be regulated on a solid ground. Otherwise it is not possible to say the private state should not be allowed and the state should build houses for everybody. There are ways. The world does it. Banks are ready they are begging. Just with the condition that the conditions are well set, with a security. In us, the number of cooperatives that completed the

work they started are really few and most of them cost much more than initially forecasted. So the State has to provide a guarantee, a security, and well define the methods. I mean health and education are the primary duties of the state but when it comes to pension or housing it has to establish a descent system and has to control the functioning of the system.”

“Konuta gelince, o da imkânları sağlar. Devletin konut yapıp vermesi görevi değil ama herkesin kendine göre konut edinebileceği, çeşitli gelir durumuna göre, imkânlar yaratacaktır. Bankalar yalvarıyor, kredi vereyim diye. Yeter ki o işi de sağlam esaslara bağlasın. Yoksa oturup da devlet lojman ev yaptıracak özel sektör çekilsin demek mümkün değil. Bunun yolları var. Dünya da bunu yapıyor. Bankalar hazır yalvarıyor, yeter ki şartları iyi sağlansın, güvenceli sağlansın. Bizde işini bitiren kooperatif çok azdır ve düşünülenden çok çok pahalıya mal olmuştur hepsi. Onun için bu işi garantiye alması güvenilirliğini sağlaması, yolunu yordamını iyi tespit etmesi lazım. Yani sağlık, eğitim devletin birincil görevi ama emeklilik, konut konusunda doğru dürüst sistemi kurup işletmesini denetlemesi lazım.”

In addition to the above comments, two employers expressed their appreciation of the housing policies of the Mass Housing Administration (TOKİ) which helped preventing squatter housing and one employer also supported the mortgage system:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, vocational school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “Housing as well should be like this, [everybody] should have a shelter within which s/he can live decently. Because if not... Look what the Altındağ Municipality has done? I envy the guy... He demolished Çinçin, I envy the Chairperson of TOKİ because he’s having affordable houses built, not leave the people to get cheated, produces low cost housing plots. What will happen if the mortgage is introduced? These have been experienced in Europe for years. If mortgage is launched the sector will gain certain vitality, there will be opportunities for the investors in the sector and opportunities for the people to have decent shelter. And also a guy when he has TL 3-5 billion he goes to build a squatter. He just squatters on somewhere and you can’t demolish it. It is a social issue. So [by providing social housing] you also control this. That’s why I call this a useful practice.”

“Ev için de bu olmalı, insanca yaşayacağı bir ortam olmalı. Çünkü olmazsa.. Altındağ Belediyesi’nin yaptığına bak, imreniyorum oğlana. Çinçin’i vurdu yıktı, geçti gitti ya. TOKİ Başkanı’na imreniyorum şimdi, çünkü uygun fiyata ev yaptırıp milleti kazıklattırmıyor, ucuza arsa üretiyor. Mortgage çıkarsa ne olacak? Avrupa’da bunlar yıllardan beri yaşanıyor. Mortgage gelirse sektöre canlılık gelecek, o sektörle ilgili yatırım yapan insanlara imkânlar ve insanlara insanca oturacak yer sağlanacak. Bir de adam üç milyar beş milyar para bulduğu zaman gidiyor bir gecekondu yapıyor. Konuyor bir yere onu kaldırmak yıkmak etmek başına başı başına bir bela getiriyor. Kontrole alıyorsun yani, o bakımdan yararlı diyorum.”

Regarding old age pensions the retired military officers argued that the state is mainly responsible to establish a system and regulate its functioning:

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “I mean retirement is in the end the outcome of a contribution. A person pays some money to the state or in the case of individual pension to somewhere else. It is important that the mechanism is well established in order that disastrous situations are not faced. In case of a bankruptcy of a bank or a company in the future the state can’t take a position like: ‘What can I do? You’d rather not given that money’. It has to provide the security.”

“Şimdi emeklilik her halükarda bir ödemenin karşılığı. Şu anda devlete veriyor veya dışarıda bireysel emeklilik için oraya da para veriyor. Önemli olan mekanizmanın iyi kurulması ve sonu hüsrana gidecek durumlara yol açılmasın. Yarın herhangi bir bankanın veya şirketin batıp

gitmesi gibi devlet de çekilip kenara ne yapayım vermeseydiniz diyemez, o güvenceyi de sağlaması lazım.”

About the provision of unemployment benefit the retired officers similar to the workers defended that the state should provide unemployment benefit:

H (male, 58, retired Brigadier General): “About unemployment benefit, I mean it is not paid to the unemployed but to the person who lost his/her job. Consequently, of course it is to be paid by the state. Because as long as you’re working you are paying a contribution and in return the state is paying you an unemployment benefit, not permanently but for a certain period.” “İşsizlik sigortasına gelince, bu işsize verilmiyor, çalışıp işsiz kalana veriliyor. Dolayısıyla tabii ki devlet verecek. Çünkü senden çalıştığın sürece kesinti alıyor bunun karşılığında işsizlik sigortası veriyor, bunu da devamlı değil, belirli bir süre veriyor.”

Similarly, one of the employers also supported unemployment benefits but he underlined the importance of eliminating unemployment by pointing to the misuses of unemployment benefit:

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “[Unemployment benefit] should of course be provided and in a bigger amount. As far as I know, currently it is provided for a period of 6 months. This is not right. Now rather than unemployment benefit the state should give the priority to creation of business, creation of jobs. By giving the guy YTL 100-200 you’re making the guy passive. It happens here as well. The guy has some agricultural land. He goes and works on his land while having the unemployment benefit. Then at the end of the 6 months period he starts working in another workplace for 3-4 months. So I mean it is abused. Unemployment benefit should be provided but unemployment should be tackled at the same time.”

“[İşsizlik sigortası] vermeli tabii ve biraz daha fazla vermeli. Şimdi bilebildiğim kadarıyla altı ay karşılıyor, bu yanlış. Burada işsizlik sigortası yerine iş yaratmayı, istihdam yaratma konusunu öne almalı. Adama 100-200 lira veriyorsun, bir yerde adamı pasifleştiriyorsun. Bizde de oluyor mesela adamın bağı bahçesi var, geliyor hem bağında bahçesinde çalışıyor hem de işsizlik sigortasından istifade ediyor. Ondan sonra altı ay bittikten sonra bir başka yere girip 3-4 ay da orada çalışıyor. Yani kötü amaçlar için kullanılıyor. İşsizlik sigortası verilmeli ama işsizliği de ortadan kaldırmalı.”

One of the bureaucrats, on the other hand, was not sure whether this benefit should be regarded as a right or as an instrument for the regulation of the labour market:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): “I’m not sure whether we should regard unemployment benefit as an individual right or as a commitment to regulate the labour market or ensuring public security. Because even though the unemployment benefit offers an opportunity to the unemployed -I think not permanently but for a certain period of time, 6 months- it is for smooth functioning of the labour market. The purpose is protecting the public order during the period within which the person that lost his/her job can find a new one. I mean this is not a right but a practice implemented for a different purpose.”

“İşsizlik sigortasını kişi hakkı olarak mı görmek lazım, yoksa işgücü piyasasının düzenlenmesi veya kamu düzeninin sağlanması için bir tasarruf olarak mı görmek lazım, ondan emin değilim. Çünkü işsizlik sigortası her ne kadar işsiz kalana bir imkan verirse de –sanıyorum ilelebet değil

bir süre, altı ay için- bu da işgücü piyasasının düzenli çalışmasını sağlamak için. İnsanlar işini kaybedince yeni bir iş bulana kadar geçen sürede kamu düzenini korumaktır esas olan, yani bu bir hak değil, başka bir amaçla konulmuş bir uygulamadır diye düşünüyorum.”

With reference to the quality of public social services almost all participants agreed that if the state could establish a well functioning and properly audited tax system all public social services would become of good quality. One of the employers also argued that if academicians, businessmen and politicians act together solely on the basis of national interests, education and health systems of good quality could be achieved. Additionally, one General mentioned that job opportunities did not suffice to match the demands of increasing population because of the lack of birth control in the country:

M (male, 60, Retired Brigadier General): “Now in a country with a population of 70 million, if the state implements a fair practice and collects the taxes on time it can provide all the services it has to provide. One of the major problems in provision of these services is the lack of a population control and the people’s unawareness of birth control. Then the job opportunities in the country do not meet the population increase. Then the state can’t meet all the requirements. Then it has to grant concessions to the employers, can’t collect the taxes or premiums it should collect. Then it tries to fulfill its duty by the money it collected from the sale of tobacco, alcohol or oil under the name of special consumption tax. The state can’t manage to succeed in this because the money is inadequate. It is not possible to resolve these problems unless a fair tax system is implemented.”

“Şimdi 70 milyonluk ülkede devlet adil bir uygulama yapsa, toplaması gereken vergileri zamanında toplasa devlet yapacağı hizmetlerin tamamını yapar. Devletin hizmet yapmada esas sorunlarından bir tanesi nüfus kontrolü olmaması, halkın doğum kontrol bilincinde olmaması. Böyle olunca, ülkede artan nüfusla iş olanakları uyuşmuyor. Uyuşmayınca da devlet tüm ihtiyaçları karşılayamıyor. Bu sefer işverene taviz vermek durumunda kalıyor. Ondan alması gereken sigortayı, vergileri alamıyor. Alamadığı için alabileceği vergilere, işte özel tüketim vergisi adı altında sigara, tekell maddeleri, benzinden topladığı parayla devlet görevini yapmaya çalışıyor. Burada da başarılı olamıyor, yetmiyor çünkü. Adaletli bir vergi sistemi uygulanmadan bu sorunların çözümü de mümkün değil.”

However, the employer who disfavored state’s provision of social rights proposed that to improve the quality of health and education services, the state should privatize them. But he argued that the state should control the privatized services according to a set of criteria based on national and human values:

M (male, 51, owner of a private school (preschool, primary school, high school), 86 employees, Sports Academy graduate): “If the state attempts a reasonable privatization it increases the quality in both health and education. The state should have to be an auto-controller. For God’s sake is it really free of charge what you call the state hospitals, dispensaries, maternity centers or the state schools? Who says that? The state pays all the money, that money is taken out of the state budget. I say: “O my state, you become an auto-controller, set the criteria here. Like the size of the classroom, oxygen level for each student, the type of the playground for the

children, the quality of the teachers. And then privatize these, save yourself of that burden but with the condition that doing the auto-control to secure that your national values and the humanitarian values are not damaged.” You won’t allow those who do not comply with the criteria. For example you say the structure of the hospital will be such and such, the doctors and the nurses will be like this or that, the hygiene standards will be like this ... Then you’ll see that in Turkey there won’t be either any man with 40 children nor any man whose kid has an arbitrary education or himself has suffered from an arbitrary health service. We are used to leave as gratuity seekers. There is nothing free now, nowhere in the world. That era came to an end. Not even a sibling will support a sibling for nothing.”

“Devlet akli başında bir özelleştirmeye giderse eğitimi de sağlığı da kaliteli yapar. Devlet otokontrolör olacak. Şu anda devlet okulu dediğiniz, devlet hastanesi, dispanseri dediğiniz, sağlık ocağı dediğiniz yerler bedava mı Allah aşkınıza? Ne alakası var? O paraları devlet ödüyor, devletin kesesinden o paralar çıkıyor. Ben diyorum ki, sen otokontrolör ol ey devletim, buradaki kıstasları koy. De ki sınıf büyüklüğü şu kadar olacak, oksijen metreküpu şu kadar olacak, çocukların oyun alanları şöyle olacak, öğretmenlerin nitelikleri böyle olacak. Bırak bunu özelleştir, sen bunun yükünün altından çekil ama ulusal değerlerine, insani değerlere hiçbir gölge düşürmeyecek otokontrolörlüğü yapmak kaydıyla. Bunu yapmayanlara, bunu sürdüremeyenlere izin vermeyeceksin. İşte, hastanenin yapısı şu olacak, doktorun, hemşirenin yapısı bu olacak, hijyen şartları bu olacak de, bakın o zaman Türkiye’de ne 40 tane çocuklu adam bulursunuz ne de çocuğu rasgele eğitim alan, rasgele sağlık hizmeti gören bir adam görürsünüz. Biz bedavacı yaşamaya alışmışız. Dünyanın hiçbir yerinde hiçbir şey bedava değil artık, bitmiş o devir. Kardeş kardeşi bile bedava çekemez artık.”

According to the survey results, the sixth social right item about the right of workers to collective bargaining, unionizing and strikes was supported by 94% of workers, 92% of retired officers, 79% of bureaucrats, but as expected only 64% of the employers supported this right.

The last item stating that ‘public investment should aim at diminishing interregional inequalities’ were approved at high percentages by all groups: 88% of employers, 92% of workers, 94% of retired officers and 96% of bureaucrats.

In recapitulation, the survey sample regardless of their occupations agree on the importance of all social rights apart from the public provision of low-cost mass housing. In terms of sub-sample groups, the workers assign the highest value to all social rights. The employers and bureaucrats give the lowest approval rates to different items. While the employers attach the lowest approval rates to the provision of unemployment benefit, workers’ right to unionization and collective bargaining, the bureaucrats put the lowest weights to free public services of health and education and the public provision of low cost housing. The retired officers, on the other hand, approve almost all rights at relatively high levels.

With reference to focus group meetings and interviews, it can be argued that not very different results have been obtained from the qualitative research. While one of the employers supported the privation of social services, all other participants agreed that providing the access of citizens to basic health and education services is one of the essential duties of the state. Regarding the housing issue, all participants (except the employer who defended privatization) agreed that the infrastructure of housing facilities should be provided by the state. They also agreed that unemployment benefit should be granted. Additionally, retired officers remarked the importance of the regulatory function of the state concerning the pension and health systems. Some workers, on the other hand, argued that the state should engage in creating new employment as well.

7.2.2. Social Duty Items

The survey items on social duties are about responsibilities of citizens concerning education (sending children to schools without gender discrimination, when possible monetary contribution to education facilities); not using illegal electricity; assisting the state in preventing corruption; informing the authorities about infrastructure problems in one's neighborhood and participating in voluntary actions to help less fortunate citizens. There is another responsibility item specifically concerns employers which is about paying social security premiums of employees.

Percentages of affirmative responses of the survey samples to the eight items on social duties of citizenship are presented in Table 7.5. The sentences with an asterisk at the end refer that the items which were originally designed in an opposite direction of the ideal construct are reformulated.

Table 7.5: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (Or Strongly Agree) With Social Duty Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
SD1	It is not acceptable to prefer the male offspring to his female sibling in providing education.*	93.3	91.5	91.5	99.1	98
SD2	It is necessary to impose monetary penalties to the families not sending their children to primary school.	76.6	74.7	83.3	71.8	92.0
SD3	All the citizens with adequate economic means should help the state by contributing to campaigns for supporting education.	84.0	85.4	78.1	81.0	88.0
SD4	Those employers who do not pay the social security premiums of their employees might not have any good reasons.*	88.5	92.0	71.2	88.2	88.0
SD5	Using illegal electricity and thus not paying should be considered as a crime.*	81.7	76.0	86.3	91.7	98.0
SD6	To prevent corruption is a responsibility not only of the state but of the citizens as well.	94.1	92.7	94.5	97.3	96.0
SD7	If there is a hole on the street or the water pipe explodes in my neighbourhood I contact the Municipality.	94.7	95.1	94.5	92.7	96.0
SD8	I try to help those who are less fortunate than me by participating in voluntary actions such as teaching or instructing.	88.3	91.4	91.8	75.4	88.0

According to the percentage distribution, for the total sample, the range of responses that agree with these social duties lies between 77 and 95%. While 93% of the total sample agreed that ‘giving priority to male sibling over female sibling in providing education is not acceptable’, only 77% approved to impose monetary penalties to the families not sending their children to primary school. 84% of the total respondents expected that those with adequate economic means should contribute to campaigns for supporting education. 89% disapproved employers who did not pay the social premiums of their employees. 82% of the sample as a whole considered the illegal use of electricity as a crime. 94% of them believed that preventing corruption was a responsibility of not only the state but of the citizens as well. While 95% stated that they contacted the local administration if there was an infrastructure problem, 88% of

the total sample approved that they participated in voluntary actions to help less fortunate people.

In terms of sub-samples, although the total scores are quite close to each other there are differences with respect to some items. In the first item of 'giving priority to male sibling over female sibling in providing education is not acceptable' it was observed that 92% of both workers and of employers agreed with this item, whereas the agreement level was much higher in the samples of bureaucrats (99%) and retired officers (98%). With regard to imposing penalties to the families not sending their children to primary school the retired officers were more rigid compared to other groups and 92% of them approved such penalties, whereas 72% of bureaucrats, 75% of workers and 83% of employers supported this item. However, even though all the participants of the focus group meetings and interviewees were against any gender discrimination between siblings, they did not approve imposing penalties to the families not sending their children to the school with the exceptions of one employer and one bureaucrat.

All participants unanimously agreed on the importance of education and they believed all children without any gender discrimination should get primary education. One employer, after reminding that God did not made any gender discrimination with respect to education claimed that the education of women is more important since it is the mother who raises the children³⁰:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, high school graduate, MÜSİAD member): "God created the sexes equal. God said that it is a religious must to learn the sciences, didn't say that it is not an obligation for the women. Why didn't God say that? Because in terms of function female has more... Why do I tell you this? The better educated the individuals of a society; either male or female, more developed is the society. The education of the mother is even more important at that point. .. So both the women and men, they should all get an education."

"Allah eşit yaratmış, Allah ilim öğrenmek farz demiş, bu kadına farz değil dememiş ki. Niye dememiş, fonksiyonu itibariyle kadının şeyi daha fazla. .. Niye söylüyorum bunu, ne kadar kaliteli, ne kadar bilinçli, eğitilmiş olursa bu toplumun fertleri, kadın-erkek, bu toplum o kadar fazla inkişaf eder. Annenin eğitimi burada çok daha önemlidir. .. Onun için kadın da erkek de eğitim almalı.."

³⁰ As to be remembered in discussing a previous item he had underlined the importance attached to the mother in all religions.

One of the bureaucrats pointed out that if girls got education then our culture would be more homogenized:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): "I've got two examples here; one from my own country the other from Central Asia. Kurdish woman can't speak Turkish. Why? Because they don't do a military service. I witnessed the same in Central Asia. The Uzbek women couldn't speak Russian whereas the men could. There as well I saw that the mother tongue survives through the women. The authentic local culture, local culture survives through the women. But when there is education, in a society in which the girls are schooled we will have a more homogenous culture. As expressed by Tevfik Fikret a nation that doesn't educate its daughters cries for the moral orphanage of its offspring."

"İki örnek. Biri kendi ülkemden biri Orta Asya'dan. Kürt kadınları Türkçe bilmezler, neden, askere gitmedikleri için. Aynısını Orta Asya'da da yaşadım. Özbek kadınlar Rusça bilmezdi, erkekler bilirdi. Orada da anadilini kadının yaşattığını gördüm. Yerel otantik kültür, mahalli kültür kadınlarla yaşıyor. Ama eğitim olduğu zaman, kızların da okula gittiği bir toplumda daha homojen bir kültürümüz olacaktır. Tevfik Fikret'in dediği gibi kızlarımızı okutmayan bir millet evlatlarının manevi öksüzlüğüne ağlar."

On the other hand, according to another bureaucrat ensuring that one's child got education is not a choice of the family but rather it is about the child's success, happiness and becoming a good citizen:

O (male, 48, Deputy Director General, M.S. degree): "It's [not sending the child to the school] an attitude which is totally wrong. The education you provide to your child is something related to his/her becoming successful and happy, becoming a good citizen rather than a personal choice of yours. A psychopathic child without any skills after his parents passed away is harmful to his/herself and to the society. Thus, the parents should send their children to school, a school transferring the common values of the society. It is not something right to say: 'I hired a teacher at home and I will raise my child as a good Swahili'."

"[Çocuğu okula göndermemek] Çok yanlış bir davranış. Çocuğunuza verdiğiniz eğitim sizin seçeneğinizden çok onun başarılı olması, mutlu olması, iyi bir yurttaş olmasıyla ilgili bir şey. Ana-baba öldükten sonra hiç bir kabiliyeti, özelliği olmayan psikopat bir çocuk hem kendisine hem topluma zararlı. Dolayısıyla anne-babanın çocuklarını okula göndermesi ve toplumun ortak değerlerini veren bir okula göndermesi lazım. Ben evde öğretmen tutuyorum, çocuğumu iyi bir Svahili olarak yetiştireceğim demek doğru bir şey değil."

While the retired military officers argued that primary school education was an obligation and not sending children to schools was an indication of ignorance, the participant workers mentioned two points on families not sending their children to schools: religious and economic concerns. They argued that gender discrimination was mainly related with religious beliefs and they believed that in the rural areas since families need labour force to work in the plantation they could not afford to send children to schools. But one of the bureaucrats (who was born and grown up in Diyarbakır) stated that in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces families did not

send their female sibling to schools on the grounds that she would get married and save her life:

M (male, 36, Department Head, university graduate): “[The problem] is not only economical. In the East or the Southeast the guy doesn’t send his daughter to school thinking that she’ll get married, settle in her husband’s house and save her life. I mean how can you persuade such a guy?”

“Yalnızca iktisadi değil, Güneydoğu’da, Doğu’da adam kız çocuğunu okula göndermiyor zaten koca evine gidecek hayatını kurtaracak diye. Sen şimdi bu adamı nasıl ikna edersin?”

As mentioned above, almost all participants believed that imposing penalties to families not sending their children to schools was not a solution and families should be convinced or other methods should be searched:

S (female, 63, owns a rehabilitation center for hearing disabled, 50 employees, graduate of Teachers College- retired teacher): “When I was working as a teacher in one of Ankara’s villages I went from door to door to convince the families that they were obliged to send their children to school and if not they would get penalised. I collected the pupils from their houses and after made them sing the national anthem dragged them to the classroom. They were running away again, because they were working in the fields. The families said: “I don’t send my child because he has to take care of the cows” and another said: “She has grown up. She’s a teenager.” But there are all objectionable. All the families must send their children to school. Not a monetary penalty but we were telling different stuff. We were holding meetings to convince them that the primary education was compulsory, that they absolutely needed to make their kids literate, that even people of 60 years old were learning to read and write in private courses and that the earlier the better, that the state financed this. I mean monetary penalties and all, they don’t make any sense. The guy doesn’t have a cup of tea to offer you, what money of his can you take? By acting upon different fears, for example I made use of the mukhtar by taking him to my house visits -and they trusted me since I was a women- I made them send their kids to school. Otherwise the school remains closed.”

“Ben Ankara’nın bir köyünde öğretmenlik yaparken kapı kapı gezip çocuklarını okula göndermelerini, bunun bir yaptırımı olduğunu, ceza alacaklarını söyleyerek çocukları toplayıp da İstiklal Marşı’nı okutup sınıflara sokardım. Gene kaçıyorlar, çünkü tarlaya gidiyor, işte diyor ben göndermiyorum inek bakıyor, o diyor ki genç kızdır, çok büyüdü ben göndermiyorum. Ama bunlar çok sakıncalı. Her aile mutlaka çocuğunu okula göndermeli. Para cezası uygulaması değil de o yaptırımı biz başka türlü söylüyorduk. İlköğretimin mecburi olduğunu, çocuklarını muhakkak okuryazar yapmaları gerektiğini, 60 yaşında da insanların gelip okuma yazma öğrendiğini düşünün, ama bunlar küçük yaşta gelsinler okusunlar, devlet bunu karşılıyor diyerek, toplantılar yaparak ikna etmeye çalıştık. Yoksa para cezası, neyini alacaksın sen? Evine gittiğinde bir bardak çayı bile olmuyor da sen onun ne parasını alacaksın? Başka tür korkularla, mesela köyün muhtarını ben kullandım, onunla birlikte gezerek –bir bayan olduğum için aileler daha çok güvendiler bana- okula göndermelerini sağladım. Yoksa okul kapalı kalıyor.”

F (male, 50, bureaucrat, Department Head, university graduate): “No. Monetary penalties can’t offer a solution. This can only be achieved by education, convincing the parents. Because the citizens should embrace the idea that the schools are their own schools, the teachers are their own teachers. If you force them to send to school by means like penalties then there is a behavioural pattern called as the Eastern Germany syndrome then when the kid gets back home the parents will say: “Oh boy, whatever you’re taught at school is not true. Let me tell you the truth.” There will be a dual culture like that of the Sabetayists taking the oath at school during

day time and doing something else at night. This is not something to be done by punishments, the people should be convinced, they will believe in its benefit and act in accordance.”

“Yok [para cezası çözüm] değil. Bu bence eğitimle, onları iknaya olacak bir şey. Çünkü o okulların kendi okulları, öğretmenlerin kendi öğretmenleri olduklarını özümsemeleri lazım vatandaşların. Öyle para cezasıyla zorla göndertildiği zaman yine –o Doğu Almanya sendromu diye açıklanan bir davranış kalıbı var- akşam eve gelecek, oğlum okulda öğretmenin anlattıklarının hepsi yalan, onlar doğru değil, ben sana doğrusunu anlatayım diyecek. Sabataycılar gibi gündüz gidip okulda and içen akşam gelip başka şeyler yapan ikili bir kültür oluşacak. Cezayla olacak bir şey değil bu, benimsetilmesi lazım insanlara, faydasına inanacaklar ve gereğini yapacaklar.”

One of the employers further emphasized the social injustice brought about by those having fifteen children while others try to raise well their one or two kids:

Z (male, 68, manufacturer of passenger cars, 80 employees, Military Academy graduate): “[The fact that the families don’t send their children to school] is an horrendous behaviour. But I think penalising is not right either. They have to be persuaded to its importance, these aren’t problems that can be resolved by penalizing. First of all the state should prevent this, either by education or by another way I don’t know. Now you say social justice and you make two children and make a hard effort to provide them a good education then you just see that a guy has 15 children. I mean am I obliged to help the guy just because of the fact that he made 15 kids? Am I obliged to educate his kids? There lies an injustice. It should be prevented. And now you see that they started to favour this, they will grant a tax deduction to the people with 4 children etc.”

“[ailelerin çocuklarını okula göndermemesi] Korkunç bir davranış. Ama cezalandırmak bence yanlış, onu ikna etmek, onun gerekliliğini anlatmak suretiyle olması lazım, cezayla olacak işler değil bunlar. Bir defa şunun önüne geçmesi lazım devletin, bu eğitimle mi olur başka türlü mü olur bilemem. Şimdi bakıyorsunuz sosyal adalet diyoruz, siz iki tane çocuk yapıyorsunuz, onu eğitmek için uğraşıp didiniyorsunuz, e bakıyorsun adamın on beş tane çocuğu var. Ben mecbur muyum yani adam on beş tane çocuk yaptı diye ona yardım edeyim, çocuklarını okutayım? Adaletsizlik çıkıyor ortaya. Bunu ortadan kaldırmak lazım. Şimdi bakıyorsun buna prim vermeye başladılar, dört çocuğu olana vergi indirimi yapacaklarmış falan.”

However, one bureaucrat was very rigid on this issue and claimed that all means including imprisonment should be employed to ensure that all children get education:

M (male, 36, Department Head, university graduate): “Had I been said that I’d be the President my first speech would be: “Education, education and education.” I mean education is highly related to all the issues upon which we have been talking here. Education is a must. This is for sure. Either this can be achieved voluntarily, I am a bit strict on this. If the parents don’t send their kids to school then they will be forced to do it. Not even monetary penalties even imprisonment should be considered. I am a kind of person who has closely witnessed the consequences of lack of education, of ignorance. Under present circumstances we can’t do this by voluntariness etc. Then by using force, by fulfilling the obligations of being a state you are supposed to take the child to school. The state will take the child and make him a decent person. The state will also provide the opportunity to that family, in that process new mechanisms can be created, that family can be convinced. But the children need to go to school. Secondly you send the child to school but unless there is a good system of education that this will also make no sense. I read on the newspaper recently. While we are still discussing the *imam-hatip* issue, in the developed countries they are discussing on issues like

how to create and develop a child's self-confidence. We also need to reconsider the issue from that aspect.”

“Bana deseler ki gel seni Başbakan yaptık, ilk demecin nedir? İlk demecim eğitim, eğitim, eğitim. Dolayısıyla eğitim bu başından beri konuştuğumuz olaylarla çok ilgili. Eğitim şart, kesin. Bu gönülle mi olur, orada ben biraz katırım. Göndermiyorsa zorla gönderilecek, para cezası da değil, hapis cezası, gönderilecek. Ben çok yakinen eğitimsizliğin, cahilliğin nelere yol açtığına şahit olan bir insanım. Onu öyle gönülle gönülle şu anda yapamayız. O zaman zorla, devlet olmanın gereğini yaparak çocuğu okula göndereceksin. Alacak. Onu adam edecek. O aileye de o imkanı yaratacak, o süreçte başka mekanizmalar oluşturulur, yardım edilir aile ikna edilir. Ama çocukların okula gitmesi lazım. İkincisi, okula gönderdin, orada da sağlıklı bir eğitim sistemi yoksa o da anlamsız. Geçenlerde Eğitim Şurası'yla ilgili olarak bir gazetede yazıyordu; biz hâlâ imam hatipleri tartışırken gelişmiş ülkelerde çocuğa öz güveni nasıl verebiliriz, özgüvenini nasıl geliştirebiliriz onu tartışıyorlar. Bir de öyle yaklaşmak lazım.”

The third item is about monetary contribution to education facilities and it was generally approved with high percentages by all groups. While the employers with an agreement level of 78% seemed to be relatively the most reluctant group, 81% of bureaucrats, 85% of workers and 88% of retired officers agreed that citizens with adequate means should contribute to campaigns for supporting education.

The fourth item stating that ‘those employers who did not pay social premiums of their employees might not have any good reasons’ were highly approved by all groups and as expected the employers displayed a lower approval rate of 71%, whereas 92% of workers and 88% of both bureaucrats and of retired officers disapproved such attitudes of employers.

‘The utilization of electricity illegally and thus not paying the fee’ was considered as a crime by all groups. But this time workers were more tolerant to this illegality as manifested by their lower agreement level of 76%. On the other hand, 86% of employers, 92% of bureaucrats and 98% of retired officers considered this illegality as a crime. In line with the survey results, the focus group participants and interviewees generally agreed that utilization of the electricity illegally and thus not paying the fee was a crime. Only one worker argued that if the person did not have the means then it should not be considered as a crime:

A (male, 47, high school graduate): “The person does not have enough money to buy coal, he's hungry. I mean such a man of course uses electricity illegally and it is just right.”

“Adamın eve kömür alacak parası yok, aç, bu adam bu elektriği kaçak kullanır ve bu doğrudur.”

In response to his argument another worker suggested that by means of a state regulation such persons can be given a kind of immunity (such as green card or health document) to use electricity free of charge.

Some participants explained that not paying the electricity fee was a crime because the country was experiencing an important energy shortage:

H (male, 60, has companies in construction, presswork and health sectors, 160 employees, high school graduate, MÜSİAD member): “It is a crime. Absolutely. Let me tell you why it is a crime. By the year 2020 Turkey will be requiring 560 billions kw-hour of electricity. The current production is 165 billions of kw-hour. Turkey has a serious bottleneck of electricity. So how can this demand be met? Wind power, solar power, and hydraulic power stations. And now the guy is stealing this. Just have a look. The chap is taking the water of the Sakarya Dam without paying a penny. Why do you do this? Stealing is an horrendous behaviour because what you’re doing is stealing the other people’s rights.”

“Suçtur, kesinlikle. Neden suçtur, onu da söyleyeyim, Türkiye’nin 2020 yılı itibarıyla 560 milyar kw-saat elektrik ihtiyacı var. Türkiye’nin bugün ürettiği elektrik 165 milyar kw-saattir. Türkiye ciddi anlamda bir elektrik sıkıntısı içersindedir. 2010’da ihtiyacı 265 milyar kw-saat olacak, bu yüz milyarlık açığı kapatması lazım. Bunu karşılayacağın yer nedir? Rüzgâr enerjisidir, güneş enerjisidir, hidrolik santrallerdir. Şimdi bunu adam alıyor, buyur.. Gidip Sakarya’daki barajın suyunu alıyor, beş kuruş para ödmeden... Niye yapıyorsun bunu? Hırsızlık çok kötü bir şey, çünkü gidip öteki insanların hakkını alıyor.”

Similar to his views one of the bureaucrats defended that using electricity without paying is a crime, sin and a shame:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “[Electricity] is an energy which is very expensive to produce. Even uttering such a sentence is immoral. It is a crime, a sin, a shame. The society should be convinced in all these aspects and [that practice] should be prevented.”
“Çok pahalı elde edilen bir enerji. Bunun telaffuzu bile gayri ahlaki. Suçtur, günahdır, ayıptır. Her yönüyle bunun toplumda işlenip önüne geçilmesi lazım.”

Furthermore, one retired General pointed out that first of all those who let this illegality should be punished:

K (male, 75, retired Lieutenant General): “But first of all the one(s) who let the other steal it should be punished. Doesn’t the Municipality know about it? You can’t find so many people stealing [electricity] anywhere else. There are ads for lease on the newspapers saying that the flat is like this and that and with illegal electricity connection.”

“Yalnız en başta cezayı çaldırana vermek lazım. Belediye bilmiyor mu? .. Bu kadar çalan insan bulamazsınız hiçbir yerde.. Gazetede kiralık ev ilanı var; evin şusu var busu var, kaçak elektriği vardır diye yazıyor.”

The sixth social duty item indicating that ‘both the state and citizens are responsible in preventing corruption’ was approved at considerably high rates by all groups: 93% of workers, 95% of employers, 96% of retired officers and 97% of bureaucrats. Thus, it can be deduced that the survey sample considers fighting with corruption as an important duty.

Similarly, in terms of informing the local administrations about infrastructure problems all sample groups acted responsibly: 93% of bureaucrats, 95% of both workers and of employers, and 96% of retired officers stated that they would contact the Municipality if there was a hole on the street or the water pipe exploded.

Finally, in terms of participating to voluntary activities to help less fortunate persons apart from bureaucrats all groups again displayed highly responsible attitudes. While only 75% of bureaucrats stated that they took part in voluntary actions such as teaching or instructing, 88% of retired officers and 92% of both workers and employers affirmed their participation to voluntary activities. During the focus group meetings all participants approved the importance of participating in voluntary actions to help less fortunate citizens. They articulated that such actions brought moral pleasure and provided a sense of being useful. Most of them also remarked that such voluntary activities should be done in an organized manner and pointed to the significance of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

One of the bureaucrats argued that there were two different views regarding those who engage in voluntary activities. They were either devoted persons who wanted to share her/his values with others or they did not have any other thing to do:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): “This is the expression of a rich hearth. [The person] is altruistic, s/he has something to give to the society and s/he wants to share this with the society. This is a positive point of view. Then there is this negative point of view which I observed in some voluntary activities. I mean [the person] has got nothing else to do and goes there not to get isolated from the society, to find him/herself something to care about.” “Bu gönül zenginliğinin ifadesidir. Özverilidir, verecek şeyleri vardır topluma, bunu toplumla paylaşmak ister. Bu bir olumlu bakış açısı. Olumsuz bakış açısı da şu: ben bazı gönüllü faaliyetlerde şunu da gözlemlemiştir şahsen. İşte başka işi yoktur, toplulmdan soyutlanmamak için bir taraftan tutunmak için gider.”

They generally admitted that because of time constraints they did not participate to voluntary activities. Additionally, one bureaucrat discussed that family and school are important factors to acquire the habit of actively taking part in voluntary activities.

According to a bureaucrat if a person was proud of being the citizen of a country then he would be more devoted. He believed that solidarity or social bonds between citizens are strong then they become devoted persons to their countries and perform their duties. His following words neatly express a republican understanding of citizenship where social bonds between citizens are based on sharing a way of life and where people are proud of being the citizens of that particular country:

F (male, 50, Department Head, university graduate): "If you are proud of being a citizen of this country you're getting really altruistic. This is not just getting winded-up, a kind of conscious love. In the United States (sometime) there was a terrible draught and a bottleneck in animal feed. They just sent some hay by a cargo-plane from the East. This is of course totally symbolic but in the end they are proving like: "You've got us to rely on. Just carry on." This is the basic condition of being a nation, this is what makes a geography a country and when the people get to that level of consciousness they will not be conscientious objectors, but will approve conscientiously or become volunteers, they will protect their health and send their kids to school. They will get integrated to the legal or the tax system. For example in us there is this dilemma between the tax and the zekad. Probably the guy says to his accountant: "I've paid my zekad. Just deduce that tax a bit." There's that mentality. There are a lot of people considering the tax as the money transferred to a non-Islamic state regime. For example I also think that stealing electricity is really amoral, a shame, a sin alongside being a crime. Tax evasion is also like that. To me evading the tax and abstaining from paying the zekad are the same. Because in both [of the practices] you violate the God's creatures' rights. Maybe this has been a very religious discourse but in the end the religion has an important role in behavioural patterns of the people."

"Bu ülkenin vatandaşı olmaktan gurur duyuyorsanız hakikaten çok özverili oluyorsunuz. Bu dolduruşa gelmek değil, biraz bilinçli de bir sevgi. ABD'de Batı Eyaletlerinde bir kuraklık oldu, hayvan yemi sıkıntısı çıkmış, hemen bir yük uçağı ile Doğu eyaletlerinden saman gönderdiler. Bu tamamen sembolik tabii ama orada şunu gösteriyorlar; dayanın arkanızda biz varız. Bu, ülke olmanın temel şartı, coğrafyayı ülke yapan şey bu ve o bilince varıldığı zaman insanlar vicdani kabulcü de olacaklar, gönüllü de olacaklar, sağlıklarını da koruyacaklar, çocuklarını da okula gönderecekler. Hukuk sistemiyle de vergi sistemiyle de bütünleşecekler. Mesela bizde zekât-vergi ikilemi vardır. Muhtemelen ben zekât verdim zaten der muhasebecisine vergiden şu kadar kırp, o zihniyet vardır bizde. Vergiyi gayri İslami bir düzene verilen para gibi gören çok insan vardır. Mesela elektrik hırsızlığının da çok gayri ahlaki, günah, ayıp bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum, suç olmasının ötesinde. Vergi kaçırmak da öyle. Vergi kaçırmakla zekâttan imtina etmek bence aynı şeydir. Çünkü ikisinde de kul hakkı yiyorsunuz. Belki çok dinsel bir söylem oldu ama insanların davranış kalıplarında dinin büyük rolü vardır."

In sum, all groups of the survey sample highly approved the importance of all social duty items. The retired military officers were, once again, the most responsible group

with the highest levels of agreement with all social duty items. The bureaucrats were the most tolerant group towards the families not sending their kids to school and only 72% approved imposing penalties to those families. The employers, on the other hand, as expected, were the most tolerant ones against those employers who did not pay social premiums of their employees. The workers displayed the most tolerant attitude concerning 'illegal utilization of the electricity and thus not paying the fee'. Additionally, according to the results, the bureaucrats participated less to voluntary activities in comparison to other groups.

In a similar fashion, all qualitative study participants agreed on the importance of providing education to children without making any gender discrimination. With the exception of one employer and one bureaucrat they did not approve imposing monetary penalties to those families not sending their kids to schools. With regard to using electricity illegally, apart from one of the workers, all participants disapproved such an illegal practice. Finally, they all agreed that voluntary activities were of great importance but they underlined the importance of organization which should be done by NGOs.

7.2.3. General Evaluation of the Results on Social Citizenship

As to be recalled, according to the total score results while the workers assigned more importance to social rights than duties, the remaining groups put more emphasis on social duties. Thus, in line with the relevant accounts of republican and liberal conceptions of citizenship on social rights, while the workers are considered to share a social liberal perception of social citizenship, employers are defined as having a neo-liberal social citizenship perception. The bureaucrats and retired military officers are described to adopt a republican perception of citizenship.

Item level results yielded that the workers are the group who attached the highest values to almost all of the social right items and gave the lowest approval to the duty item that 'using the electricity illegally and not paying the fee should be considered as a crime'. On the other hand, the bureaucrats had reservations for the social right

items on the free public provision of education and health services and on the provision of low-cost mass housing by the state. As for the employers, they did not wholly approve the right to unemployment benefit and workers' right to unionization and collective bargaining and they had reservations concerning two social duty items of 'monetary contribution to education facilities' and the item stating that 'those employers who do not pay social premiums of their employees might not have any good reasons'. The retired officers, in fact, approved all social right items at quite high levels but they put much more importance to the social duty items.

Similar results have been obtained from the qualitative research. Generally, the participant bureaucrats and retired officers adopted a 'rational and enlightened republican' approach towards both social rights and social duties. They emphasized the importance of providing education to children in order to make them good citizens. They also agreed that providing the access of citizens to basic health and education services is one of the essential duties of a welfare state. Similarly, they agreed that the infrastructure of housing facilities and unemployment benefit should be provided by the state. Likewise, unanimously they disapproved using electricity illegally. Furthermore, one of the bureaucrats expressed his disapproval of such illegal practices as using electricity without paying the fee and not paying taxes by referring to religious terminology.

As for the participant workers, in a similar fashion to the survey sample of workers, they assigned more significance to social rights than duties. In addition to the public health, education and social services, some workers defended that the state should create new employment as well. With regard to duties even though they all affirmed the importance of providing education to children as a social duty of parents, one of the workers claimed that if a person did not have the economic means he should have the right to use electricity without paying the fee. Hence, the participant workers embrace a social liberal understanding in terms of social citizenship.

When the views of participant employers are observed, it has been seen that the employers had differing opinions concerning social citizenship as it was the case in

terms of other elements of citizenship. The employer who owns a private school continued to express opinions that coincide with a republican understanding by arguing that “businessmen should do something for the country”, “If my school has to be expropriated for the sake of my state I wouldn’t even hesitate for a second. If I do exist for my country, for my national values as a working person then the benefits of my state, of my nation should come the first.” He was supporting the privatization of social services, because he believed that as a result of the present demographic structure of the country the state cannot provide welfare benefits and he puts the blame on Kurdish citizens who make 20 children. As discussed within the chapter his views in some way reflect the contemporary republican understanding (communitarianism) which states that “social rights should be seen as potential privileges to dutiful members who meet their responsibilities and behave in a manner deemed appropriate by the wider community” (Selbourne, 1994, cited in Dwyer, 2004: 67). Thus, in line with this viewpoint he argued that Kurdish citizens deliberately make large number of children and thus do not behave responsibly, and in turn expecting social benefits and provisions from the state is not fair, because as a businessman he has to pay taxes for the social expenses of the state.

The other participant employers, on the other hand, uttered views close to those of the bureaucrats and retired officers and approved the public provision of basic health and education services, housing infrastructure and unemployment benefit. They attached substantial importance to education as well. The employer who is the MÜSİAD member again employed religious motifs while expressing the importance of education for both genders. He stated that “God did not differentiate between genders while saying that science is a religious must (*farz*) for all”. Thus, it can be concluded that the participant employers approved the importance of both social rights and duties but assigned more importance to social duty items such as education and not using electricity without paying the fee.

Consequently, on the basis of the total score results which are confirmed by the item-level results, it has been concluded that the workers of the sample who assign more significance to social rights share a social liberal perception of social citizenship. The

bureaucrats and retired officers put more emphasis to social duties compared to social rights and are considered to share a republican understanding. Employers, on the other hand, despite the total balance of their social citizenship scores in favour of duties are not considered to adopt a republican understanding, but rather because of their market interests they are described to pursue a neo-liberal perception of social citizenship. It can also be argued that the employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers generally adopt the liberal economic policies pursued by the governments since 1980, whereas the workers whose social rights were hampered the most, are not in favour of the liberal market rules.

CHAPTER VIII

ANALYSES OF CITIZENSHIP PERCEPTION AS A WHOLE

In the previous three chapters the results of the perception of civil, political and social elements of citizenship have been evaluated in terms of total scores and item-level analyses. It has been observed that in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship the occupational groups of the survey displayed different perceptions. In terms of civil elements all the four groups shared the same perception of civil citizenship based on a republican understanding. In terms of political elements, the retired military officers perceive political citizenship in line with the republican notion of citizenship. On the other hand, despite different levels of approval for some items, the workers, employers and bureaucrats share a liberal understanding of political citizenship. On the basis of item-level results, it is fair to conclude that employers display more liberal attitude towards political elements of citizenship in comparison to workers and bureaucrats because they accord relatively more significance to some political rights. With respect to social elements, the workers who assigned more significance to social rights were defined to adopt a social liberal perception of social citizenship. Bureaucrats and retired officers put more emphasis to social duties compared to social rights and thus they were considered to share a republican understanding. Employers, on the other hand, despite the total balance of their social citizenship scores in favour of duties were not considered to adopt a republican understanding, but rather because of their market interests they were described to pursue a neo-liberal perception of social citizenship. The evaluation of the perception of citizenship elements have been enriched by employing the findings of the qualitative studies.

In this chapter, the perception of citizenship rights and duties as a whole is analyzed on the bases of total scores of all citizenship rights and duties of those citizens participated in the questionnaire survey. Additionally, the resulting scores of the relevant items in the Part IV of the questionnaire about the ‘general practice of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey’ together with the results of the last part on ‘the duties of the state’ are employed in interpreting the citizenship perception. Then, the hypotheses set in the Methodology Chapter are verified.

The statistical instruments used in analyzing the perception of citizenship in terms of total scores are the means of total scores, analysis of variance tests and post-hoc comparisons.

8.1. Perception of Total Citizenship Rights and Duties

In order to compare the perception of total citizenship rights and duties, first the mean total scores for each scale are examined. Then, the means of differences between total scores of rights and of duties are checked to determine whether the perception type resembles to a civic-republican duty-based understanding of citizenship or to a liberal right-based understanding of citizenship.

As to be remembered there have been 20 items in the scale of citizenship rights. The mean total scores for 20 citizenship right items for the total sample and sub-samples are shown in the table below. Since there are missing values in some items number of observations are smaller than the original sample sizes.

Table 8.1: Means of Total Scores for Citizenship Rights

	Mean (out of 100)	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	83.53	8.44	338
Employers	79.10	7.99	62
Bureaucrats	80.45	8.45	98
Retired military officers	80.26	7.80	46
Total sample	80.95	8.40	544

The mean scores indicate the level of agreement with the whole basket of citizenship rights defined ideally. The results reveal that for all groups total scores of citizenship rights have mean values quite close to each other. Literally this means that the survey sample 81% agree that citizenship rights should be as stated in the hypothetical construct of a responsible citizenship in a social democratic welfare state. To be more specific, the employers constitute the group the citizenship perception of whom has the least match with the ideal case having an agreement level of 79 per cent. The workers, on the other hand, perceive citizenship rights closer to the ideal case presentation at an agreement level of around 84 per cent. The bureaucrats and military officers share agreement levels in between these two groups. It can thus be deduced that all sample groups act quite responsibly in regarding their citizenship rights.

A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) has been conducted to statistically explore the impact of social group (determined by occupational organizations) on the scores of total rights. There is a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in total rights scores for the four social groups [$F(3, 540) = 8.00, p = 0.00$]. Despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean scores between the groups is quite small. The effect size, calculated using eta squared was 0.04, which in Cohen's (1988, quoted in Pallant, 2001:192) terms, is considered a small effect size. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for the unionized workers is significantly different from the employers and bureaucrats. The mean score for the retired military officers does not differ significantly from any other group. We have already seen in the previous chapters that in aggregate terms, with respect to civil rights and social rights the employers put the lowest values; and with regard to political rights the bureaucrats accord the lowest weight to the whole group of political rights. On the other hand, the highest mean score for civil rights is that of the bureaucrats; the highest scores for political rights are those of the employers, and in terms of social rights it is the workers who attach the highest weight to social rights compared to the other three groups.

As for the duties, the scale of citizenship duties contains 20 items as well. The mean total scores for 20 citizenship duty items for the total sample and sub-samples are shown in table 8.2. There are again some missing values.

Table 8.2: Means of Total Scores for Citizenship Duties

	Mean (out of 100)	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	87.36	7.27	342
Employers	87.97	6.57	67
Bureaucrats	88.37	5.43	104
Retired military officers	91.51	5.31	47
Total sample	88.28	6.42	560

Similar to the results for citizenship rights, for all groups total scores of citizenship duties have mean values quite close to each other, but in absolute figures the mean scores for duties are higher than those for rights. The level of agreement of the respondents in the total sample with the fact that citizenship duties should be as stated in the hypothetical construct is approximately 88%. In terms of sub-samples, while the citizenship perception of workers has the least match with the ideal case having an agreement level of 87%, retired military officers perceive citizenship duties very close to the ideal case presentation at an agreement level of 92%. Employers and bureaucrats share agreement levels in between these two groups. Hence, it is possible to conclude that all occupational groups display responsible citizenship attitudes in terms of their duties.

A one-way between groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) was also conducted to statistically explore the effect of social group (determined by occupational organizations) on total duties scores. There is a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in total duties scores for the four social groups [$F(3, 556) = 5.38, p = 0.001$]. As it is the case for total rights, despite reaching statistical significance, the actual difference in mean duties scores between the groups is small. The effect size, calculated using eta squared was 0.03. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for retired military officers is significantly different from workers, employers and from bureaucrats. As observed in the previous chapters, in terms of all elements of citizenship duties the retired military officers

assign the highest weight to duty items. As for the lowest scores; the workers give the lowest values to civil duties; the bureaucrats assign the lowest weight to political duties and the employers obtain the lowest scores in terms of social duties.

In aggregate terms, higher means for total duties compared to those of rights indicate that this is a sample which perceives a duty-surplus citizenship at the idealized level. Since the ideal case is constructed on the assumption that both the citizens and the state are acting as responsible agents, higher scores for duties generally mean that sample respondents are more responsible in terms of their duties compared to their rights. In other words, all occupational groups in the survey sample accord priority to citizenship duties over citizenship rights.

In order to explore whether the difference between total duties and rights is statistically important the means of differences are compared by using ANOVA. But before, the mean total scores for duty-right difference are checked.

Table 8.3: Means of Differences between Total Scores for Citizenship Duties and Total Scores for Citizenship Rights

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	4.13	10.03	305
Employers	9.14	8.73	58
Bureaucrats	7.83	10.57	95
Retired military officers	10.98	8.14	45
Total sample	6.02	10.12	503

The results indicate that there are differences between sub-samples in terms of the mean scores of the difference between total scores of duties and rights. ANOVA also supports that there is a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level in difference scores four sub-samples [$F(3, 499) = 10.56, p = 0.000$]. In this case the actual difference is of medium size. The effect size, calculated using eta squared is 0.06. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicate that the mean score for workers is significantly different from those of the employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers.

The most important outcome of these results for the total scores of citizenship rights and duties is that the citizens in the sample groups regardless of their occupations share a common understanding with regard to the perception of citizenship: they emphasize duties rather than rights. But it should also be noted that the degree of emphasis is not the same according to the occupational groups. While for the military officers the balance between duties and rights is the highest in favour of duties, the workers give only slightly more weight to citizenship duties than citizenship rights. The employers and bureaucrats display balance perceptions in favour of duties similar to those of the military officers. Nevertheless, if civic-republican understanding of citizenship is defined as giving more weight to duties compared to rights, then it is possible to argue that the survey sample as a whole exhibits a civic-republican understanding of citizenship. Thus, in spite of the fact that the sample groups display different perceptions in terms of citizenship elements, they share the same type of citizenship perception with respect to the balance between total duties and rights.

8.2. General Practice of Citizenship Rights According to the Survey Sample

The total citizenship perception analysis can be refined by looking at the results of some items concerning the general practice of citizenship in Turkey which were asked in the fourth part of the questionnaire (Appendix E). In that part along with other items on the exercise of specific rights and duties, some items were formulated (on the basis of the findings of the Ankara pilot study) to gather the opinions of the citizens concerning the exercise of rights in general. The following table summarizes the views of the respondents on these items.

Table 8.4: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (Or Strongly Agree) With Items on the Practice of Citizenship Rights

Item no	Item description	Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
RD1	As a citizen living in Turkey, I think I do not have any rights at all.	20.4	27.2	11.4	6.4	16.0
RD4	I have got some rights as a citizen but they are not adequate.	85.4	88.3	84.1	76.8	84.0
RD7	I have got all the fundamental rights according to the Constitution but there are problems in implementation.	86.1	84.9	94.2	84.3	92.0
RD8	Whether one enjoys the citizenship rights is directly related to her/his economic and social status.	63.6	65.9	62.3	57.3	60.0
RD10	The Republic of Turkey protects all fundamental rights and liberties of its citizens.	55.1	56.3	44.1	54.7	60.0

In regard to the exercise of rights in general, most of the sample citizens believe that the Constitution stipulates all kinds of fundamental rights but there are problems in implementation. A similar number of respondents think that they have some rights but they are not sufficient. While concerning these two similar views occupational groups do not much differentiate from each other, those who assume not having any rights at all vary in terms of sample groups. The workers seem to be the most pessimistic group because 27% of them perceive themselves as having no rights at all. Conversely, the bureaucrats have the most positive perception regarding the exercise of rights and only 6.4 % feel not having any rights. However, with respect to the state's performance in protecting the rights and liberties of the citizens, the employers turn out to be the most pessimistic group and the military officers are relatively the most optimistic group. But generally it can be argued that they all have some doubts about the performance of the state in safeguarding the rights. Furthermore, around 64% of the total sample believes that the socio-economic status of the citizen affects the exercise of rights³¹. Hence, if the general perception of rights is summarized, the survey sample assumes that despite the implementation problems (either due to the incapability of the state in protecting the rights or because

³¹ As discussed in Chapter IV, during the pilot survey conducted in Ankara some citizens remarked that if a citizen does not have the economic means, then s/he cannot access to some citizenship rights, especially to the social rights like the public health and education services.

of the socio-economic status of the citizen) they have all sorts of fundamental rights according to the Constitution. Accordingly, this general belief in having all fundamental rights on legislative level might be an explanation for giving less weight to rights compared to duties.

8.3. The Duties of the State According to the Survey Sample

There exists another set of data concerning the responses of the sample to the most important duties of the state which may provide further insights to the type of citizenship perception of the survey sample. To recall, the sample was asked to choose and rank top five duties of the state that they consider as the most important ones among the following 16 duties:

1. to fight unemployment by creating employment opportunities
2. to prevent corruption
3. to facilitate the functioning of the private sector by making the necessary infrastructure investments
4. to collect the taxes on a fair and regular basis
5. to abolish the push (backing) mechanism
6. to safeguard the citizens' rights to life and property
7. to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens
8. to treat all the citizens on an equal basis regardless of language, religion or race
9. to ensure the independency of judicial bodies
10. to inform the citizens of its practices with a transparent and sharing manner
11. to secure all citizens' access to social services like education, health and pension rights
12. to fight poverty
13. to provide low-cost housing
14. to represent the country properly on international fronts
15. to protect the indivisible unity of the homeland
16. to take measures with a view to reduce dependency on foreign sources

Although the sample was asked to choose the most important five duties, here only the results of the first state duty and the results of the total percentages for the duties chosen as among the top five duties will be evaluated. But before proceeding further, I would like to propose that the sixteen state duties mentioned above can be classified into two broad categories in terms of citizenship rights and national interests. The state duties concerning the rights of citizens can further be divided into

two groups as i) legal and political rights, and ii) social and economic rights of individuals. Correspondingly, the duties of the state can be categorized in the following manner:

A. State duties with regard to citizenship rights:

1. State duties concerning legal and political rights: to prevent corruption (duty number 2); to abolish the push (backing) mechanism (5); to safeguard the citizens' rights to life and property (6); to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens (7); to treat all the citizens on an equal basis regardless of language, religion or race (8); to ensure the independency of judicial bodies (9); and to inform the citizens of its practices with a transparent and sharing manner (10).

2. State duties concerning social and economic rights: to fight unemployment by creating employment opportunities (1); to facilitate the functioning of the private sector by making the necessary infrastructure investments (3); to collect the taxes on a fair and regular basis (4); to secure all citizens' access to social services like education, health and pension rights (11); to fight poverty (12); and to provide low-cost housing (13)

B. State duties regarding national interests: to represent the country properly on international fronts (14); to protect the indivisible unity of the homeland (15); and to take measures with a view to reduce dependency on foreign sources (16).

According to this classification it is possible to identify the type of perception by looking at the priority given to the most important state duty. If one of the three duties stated under national interests is considered as the most essential duty of the state, then it seems appropriate to label the choice as an indication of a citizenship perception based on a civic-republican conception, because it accords normative primacy to the national interest over individual freedoms. In a similar way of thinking, attributing priority to the protection of citizenship rights will refer to a citizenship perception based on a liberal understanding.

In the following table the percentage distribution of the duties of the state that the respondents chose as the most important one among sixteen duties is presented.

Table 8.5: Percentage Distribution of the First State Duty According to the Sample Groups

Duty no.	Total sample	workers	employers	bureaucrats	Retired military off.
1	17.1	24.6	8.6	0.9	10.2
2	7.3	9.6	5.7	0.9	6.1
3	1.2	1.1	4.3	0.0	0.0
4	3.6	3.1	2.9	4.7	6.1
5	0.7	1.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
6	12.8	8.5	20.0	24.5	8.2
7	9.3	5.9	22.9	14.1	4.1
8	2.8	1.7	5.7	3.8	4.1
9	1.7	0.9	1.4	4.7	2.0
10	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
11	2.1	2.3	1.4	2.8	0.0
12	1.6	2.0	1.4	0.9	0.0
13	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
14	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.0
15	34.2	32.5	17.1	40.57	57.1
16	2.9	4.5	1.4	0.0	0.0
N (number of observation)	579	354	70	106	49

According to the above results, for the total sample the most important duty of the state is ‘protecting the indivisible unity of the homeland’ (34%). In terms of sample groups; for the workers, bureaucrats and military officers the first top duty is the same as the total sample, and the percentage rates are 33%, 41% and 57% for workers, bureaucrats and military officers respectively. On the other hand, for the employers the most important state duty is ‘protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens’ (23%). It is important to note that while more than half of the military officers (57%) and 41% of bureaucrats put this duty at the first place, 33% of workers chose ‘the indivisible unity of the state with its nation’ as the most important state duty, and 25% of them considered that ‘fighting unemployment by creating employment opportunities’ is the most important one. In the sub-sample of employers, although ‘protecting fundamental rights’ chosen by most of the employers (23%) two other duties were preferred at percentages not very smaller: ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’ was marked by 20% of the

employers, and 17% chose ‘protecting the indivisible unity of the state with its nation’ as the first duty of the state.³²

These results have significant implications on perception of citizenship and need a closer inspection. At first appearance, on the basis of the above categorization of duties it is possible to deduce from the results that with the exception of the employers, the survey sample have a citizenship perception based on a civic-republican model which demands that the citizens “accord normative primacy to the national interest over individual freedoms, to duties over rights, and to state sovereignty over individual autonomy” (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 6). Because in all three sub-samples of the workers, bureaucrats and retired military officers the item of ‘protecting the indivisibility of the state with its nation’ was picked the most as the first duty of the state among 15 other duties. Particularly the sub-samples of retired military officers and of bureaucrats who stated this duty at high rates display a ‘patriotic’ republican conception of citizenship which, according to Rousseau, demands from the citizens putting the good of the community above all other considerations.

However, a closer look at the responses of the bureaucrats reveals that unlike the military officers two other duties were also picked at considerable rates: 25% of bureaucrats marked ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’ and 14% selected ‘protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens’ as the most important duty of the state. But since the duties of ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’ and ‘protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens’ are very similar, it is possible to argue that in the sub-sample of bureaucrats those who expect that the state before everything else should ‘protect individual rights’ constitute 39% of the whole sub-sample which is almost equal to the amount of those according priority to the indivisibility of the state. Consequently, the sub-

³² According to the within sample comparisons the sub-samples of TÜRK-İŞ and of HAK-İŞ workers do not differentiate in their choices of duties, but the employers have varying choices. While 50% of TÜSİAD members selected ‘protection of the fundamental rights’ as the most important duty of the state, 20% of MÜSİAD members chose that duty as the first one. On the other hand, only 4.5% of the independent employers stated this one as the top duty, whereas an equal percentage of independent employers (22.7%) chose ‘protecting the indivisible unity of the state’ and ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’ as the most important duty.

sample of bureaucrats seems to display two different perceptions regarding the duties of state; while 41% places more importance to the national interests than individual rights, 39% accentuates the priority of individual rights. But before jumping to a conclusion that ‘some bureaucrats adhere to a republican and some others to a liberal conception of citizenship’ their ranking of other duties should be checked as well.

Similarly, it should be noted that in the sub-sample of workers although the duty of ‘protecting the indivisibility of the state with its nation’ was marked the most compared to other duties, the fact that it was selected by 33% of workers and that 25% of them preferred that ‘state before anything else should fight unemployment’ suggests that the sample is not as homogeneous as that of the retired military officers. Hence, it can be inferred that while one third of the workers opt for giving priority to national interests, there is another tendency supported by 25% of the sub-sample to give more value to the protection of social rights. But again, unless their preferences for the total ranking of duties are analysed it will not be fair to talk about their perceptions.

On the other hand, the employer sub-sample emerges as the one having the most liberal conception of citizenship by stating that the state first of all should protect fundamental rights and freedoms. But similar to the workers, the employers did not choose that duty with an overwhelming majority. As a matter of fact as mentioned earlier, while the most marked one had a preference rate of 23% for the whole sub-sample, 20% picked ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’, and 17% chose ‘protecting the indivisible unity of the state with its nation’ as the first duty of the state. But as suggested above, the duties of ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’ and ‘protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens’ both refer to the protection of legal and political rights of the individual, it can be concluded that 43% of the employers expect that the state before everything else should ‘protect individual rights’. Thus, based on their priorities accorded to the duties of state it can be argued that the employers generally have a liberal understanding which prioritize rights and individual interests.

In spite of the fact that the preferences for the most important state duty is the most significant indicator regarding citizenship perception, the preferences of other duties as the top five ones are also important, because although the respondents may not choose a specific duty as the most important one, they may put it in the second, third, fourth or fifth place. These percentages are presented in the table below in order to get a broader understanding of perceptions.

Table 8.6: Percentage Distribution of Duties as One of the Top Five State Duties According To the Sample Groups

Duty no.	Total sample	workers	employers	bureaucrats	Retired military off.
1	38.9	52.3	21.4	8.5	32.7
2	38.2	44.1	28.6	23.6	40.8
3	17.8	17.5	28.6	14.2	12.2
4	45.4	45.8	40.0	42.5	57.1
5	13.1	18.4	7.1	1.9	8.2
6	59.8	49.7	62.9	85.8	71.4
7	47.0	34.5	55.7	78.3	57.1
8	37.3	33.1	40.0	52.8	30.6
9	35.9	28.2	47.1	53.8	36.7
10	4.1	5.4	2.9	0.9	4.1
11	43.4	44.4	42.9	39.6	44.9
12	11.6	14.1	10.0	5.7	8.2
13	3.5	4.8	2.9	0	2.0
14	6.9	4.0	15.7	7.5	14.3
15	57.5	56.2	34.3	72.6	67.3
16	13.3	14.1	12.9	10.4	14.3
N (number of observation)	579	354	70	106	49

The results of the total percentages of duties selected as one of the five important state duties yield another perspective. The sample as a whole and the sub-samples of employers, bureaucrats and retired officers mostly cited the item of ‘safeguarding the citizens’ rights to life and property’ among the five most important duties of the state. While almost 60% of the total sample placed this duty in one of the first five ranks, 86% of bureaucrats; 71% of retired officers and 63% of employers marked it as one of the top five state duties. On the other hand, in the sample of workers the most preferred duty was ‘protecting the indivisibility of nation’ which was cited by 56% of workers which is in line with their preferences as the first important duty. As for the second most marked state duty there are different choices according to the

occupational groups. In the total sample 58% selected 'protecting the indivisibility of nation' as one of the top five state duties, whereas this duty was chosen by 34% of the respondents as the most important duty. Likewise, 67% of retired officers selected this duty as one of the five duties, but it was chosen as the first duty by 57% of them. The second choice of bureaucrats for five state duties was 'protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens' which was marked by 78% of them among the top five duties and this duty was in fact chosen by only 14% of bureaucrats as the first duty. Even though for the bureaucrats 'protecting the indivisibility of the nation' was chosen by 40% as the top duty, it turns out to be the third most preferred duty among the top five duties with a rate of 73%. As for the employers, the second choice similar to that of the bureaucrats was 'protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens' which was cited by 56% of them and 23% of employers stated this duty as the most important one.

Consequently, with regard to the sub-samples of workers, bureaucrats and retired officers it can be pointed that these respondents expect that the state should protect the unity of the nation and at the same time should safeguard individuals' rights, because both duties were preferred at equivalently high rates. These results coincides with the communitarian view -which is in fact the contemporary version of republican citizenship- in the sense that giving importance to both individual rights and national unity is an indication of a citizenship perception seeking for 'the correct balance between individual autonomy and the common good' (Etzioni, 1995). On the other hand, employers sample seems to be adherent to a liberal perception which stresses individual rights, because while 63% cited 'safeguarding the citizens' rights to life and property', 56% marked 'protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens' and only 34% cited 'protecting the indivisibility of nation' as one of the most important five duties of the state.

As a consequence of the results on total scores, on responses of the sample to the items about the general practice of rights and to the state duties it can be concluded that these results provide substantial information for understanding how the sample respondents relate themselves to the state in general terms. However, they can

mainly highlight the dominant tendency of perceptions, whereas as observed in the previous chapters on citizenship elements, the results of the item analysis help to elaborate on the stringency level of these perceptions. Item-level analyses revealed the possibility of having two groups which share the same type of citizenship perception in general but with varying degrees. Furthermore, qualitative studies of focus group meetings and interviews showed that within the same occupational group there might be two different perceptions of citizenship or different levels of the same sort of citizenship perception. The focus group and interview results indeed not only helped to explain the choices of the survey respondents, but also the point of view of participants offered some insights to differentiate sub-categories of citizenship perceptions.

8.4. Verifying the Hypotheses

Now we have enough evidence to verify the hypotheses set out earlier. It might be useful to remind the hypotheses which are:

5. There are differences in citizenship perceptions of people from various social groups based on occupational organizations.
6. The citizens in Turkey who are representatives of the state sphere have duty-based citizenship perceptions.
7. The citizens in Turkey from social groups based on occupational organizations representing the civil society prioritize rights over duties.
8. In terms of civil, political and social elements people from different social groups have dissimilar perceptions of citizenship.

Based on the findings of total scores of citizenship rights and duties the first hypothesis should be rejected. Because all survey respondents regardless of their occupations share the same citizenship perception that gives priority to duties over rights. On the other hand, since the bureaucrats and retired military officers who are representatives of the state sphere have duty-based citizenship perceptions, the second hypothesis should be accepted. As for the third one, since the unionized

workers and employers as the representatives of the civil society (public and market spheres) have also duty-surplus perceptions of citizenship the hypothesis should be rejected.

Finally, on the basis of the findings on civil, political and social elements of citizenship the last hypothesis stating that “in terms of civil, political and social elements people from different social group have dissimilar perceptions of citizenship” should be accepted. Because the social groups of unionized workers, employers, bureaucrats and retired military officers differentiate regarding to their perception of citizenship in terms of the balance between civil, political and social rights and duties.

To recapitulate the results, in the following table, the perceived balances between rights and duties for three elements of citizenship are summarized for the total sample and the sub-samples.

Table 8.7: Perceived Balance between Rights and Duties

	Civil Rights and Duties	Political Rights and Duties	Social Rights and Duties	Total Rights and Duties
Workers	duty-surplus	right-surplus	right-surplus	duty-surplus
Employers	duty-surplus	right-surplus	duty-surplus	duty-surplus
Bureaucrats	duty-surplus	right-surplus	duty-surplus	duty-surplus
Retired officers	duty-surplus	duty-surplus	duty-surplus	duty-surplus
Total sample	duty-surplus	right-surplus	duty-surplus	duty-surplus

These results have several important implications. As discussed previously, the citizenship studies on Turkey consensually argue that Turkish citizenship is officially based on a civic-republican understanding which emphasizes duties, but since the 1990s this understanding has been challenged by demands of several groups for a liberal or liberal-democratic understanding which prioritizes rights. It can be proposed that the research study of this thesis, a compact summary of which is given in the above table, brings a new perspective to these claims. According to the findings of total scores of citizenship rights and duties, all respondents from different social groups share the same citizenship perception based on a civic-republican understanding which accentuates duties, but the picture changes in terms of civil,

political and social elements of citizenship. The present analysis of citizenship perception in terms of civil, political and social elements offers a more comprehensive illustration of the current situation of citizenship in Turkey.

To recapitulate, the results imply that the retired military officers who displayed a perceived balance of duty-surplus for all elements of citizenship adhere to a civic-republican understanding of citizenship. On the other hand, the workers, employers and bureaucrats who make up the rest of the sample of this research manifested a rights-based liberal approach not for citizenship as a whole but for political elements of citizenship in particular. Furthermore, in terms of social elements, the bureaucrats similar to the retired officers adhere to a republican understanding, whereas because of their market concerns the employers advocate a neo-liberal understanding, and the workers by attaching more importance to social rights display a social liberal understanding of citizenship. With respect to civil elements of citizenship all occupational groups have a common citizenship perception based on a republican model. Finally, in terms of total citizenship rights and duties all occupational groups who accord more weight to total duties in comparison to total rights share the same perception of citizenship in line with a civic-republican conception.

8.5. Evaluation of the Results in Relation to Occupational Groups

In this section, the meaning of these results obtained through measurement of the attitudes of the survey sample is attempted to be interpreted with respect to the occupational groups of the sample. Since the retired military officers had duty-surplus perception of both citizenship as a whole and of all the elements of its tripartite form, it seems easier to start with the military.

As stated by Heper after the proclamation of Republic in 1923, “the military came to identify itself to an unparalleled degree both with the republican state and with Atatürk’s reforms.” (Heper, 1985: 83) During the Atatürk and İnönü years (1923-1965) the military considered the RPP as a legitimate political representative. But since 1965 the RPP’s attempts to open itself up to mass politics made the officer

corps feel that they were left without a political representative and they assumed themselves as the only true guardians of the state and Atatürk's ideas (Karabelias, 2008). This attitude was institutionalized and the political hegemony of the military hierarchy was strengthened following the 1982 Constitution which stipulated that the Turkish armed forces have the duty to protect the Republic of Turkey from all external as well as internal threats to its national unity and territorial integrity. Soon after the 1980 coup General Evren expressed "the military's perception of themselves as the most patriotic institution and of the military officers as the most ardent upholders and guardians of the ideals of Atatürk" (Heper, 1985: 126).

A vital element for the perpetuation of the military's political supremacy over the civilian forces is the education of the officer corps as explained by Gerassimos Karabelias:

The careful process of selection of the future corps, the early age of their entrance into military schools (military high school, lyceum, academy) and their indoctrination into Kemalist principles and ideals aims to breed members of an educated, statist elite capable of defending Turkey's borders and Atatürk's ideas as well as being concerned with the country's domestic problems without any interference from civilian forces. (Karabelis, 2008: 20)

Stephen Kinzer points to other aspects of the education system and social life of the officer corps:

From the moment Turkish cadets enter military high school at the age of fourteen, they are inculcated with a sense of mission. .. [T]hey consider themselves purer than most civilians, less tainted by greed and dishonesty, more willing to make sacrifices for the good of the nation. They are a priesthood that lives and grows together, largely isolated from the rest of society. Most of the people they know are other cadets and officers. They live in their own neighborhoods and follow each other's careers intently. Many of the ambitious among them even choose their wives from military families. (Kinzer, 2001: 167-168)

He also notes that military students enjoy much better facilities than pupils in normal public schools. But most importantly, Kinzer remarks, cadets are told repeatedly that "they are Atatürk's children, a selfless cadre set forth in a dissolute world." Consequently, the most successful cadets graduate with "an almost mystical conviction that Turkey's fate, not just militarily but also politically and spiritually, depends on their superior wisdom." (Kinzer, 2001: 168)

Karabelias argues that as a result of several factors the military elite obtained financial and political autonomy and they developed into a distinct social class. With the creation of OYAK (Armed Forces Mutual Fund) in 1961 which led to the formation of the Naval, Air-Force and Land Forces Foundations the military obtained financial independence. In 1987 these three foundations were merged into TSKGV (Foundation for the Strengthening of the Turkish Armed Forces) which is exempt from several taxes and this development also contributed to the successful aggrandizement of the military. Furthermore, the military has been actively involved in the development of a domestic defense industry. (Karabelias, 2008: 17) On the political arena, the military continues to enjoy maximum political power in the National Security Council despite the recent reforms that decreased the number of military members. (Karabelias, 2008: 14)

The above outline of the general characteristics of the military officers gives some clues about what their citizenship perception looks like. The natural outcome will be that the Turkish military officers who start their military career with a solemn oath that “I will remain loyal to Atatürk’s principles and reforms, and I will defend them” and considers themselves as the most patriotic citizens, have a patriotic republican conception of citizenship which accords priority to duties and puts the national interests over the individual interests. And the results of the survey confirm this expectation for all elements of citizenship. Furthermore, the fact that the military sample stated the duty of ‘protecting the indivisible unity of the nation’ as the most important duty of the state reinforces their patriotic notion of citizenship.

As to be recalled the medium and high-level bureaucrats along with the military officers were chosen as the representatives of the state sphere. During the leaderships of Atatürk and İnönü, the higher civil servants, the RPP elite and the military who constituted the bureaucratic elite were mainly concerned with the preservation of Atatürk’s principles and played the role of the guardian of the republican state (Heper, 1985). But, as explained above, after 1965 with the changing policies of the RPP and following the effective manipulation of the civil elite through an extensive reshuffling of the civil servants by the coalition governments in and after 1973, the

differences between the civil and military sides of the bureaucratic elite were deepened. Heper (1985: 93) argues that “1973 was the beginning of the end of civil bureaucratic rule in Turkey” and their place was gradually taken by the military elite”. Therefore, the civil bureaucracy who has started to be heavily manipulated by the political elite since the 1970s lost its political force based on uniform political preferences and it was “relegated to a secondary role vis-à-vis the guardianship of the state” (Heper, 1985: 95). Consequently, although all civil servants still have to start their careers as “established civil servants” (*asli devlet memuru*) after taking the following oath delineated in Article 6 of the Civil Servants Law (adopted on July 14, 1965 and numbered 657), it is difficult to argue that the civil bureaucracy of today has uniform goals as it was the case during the years of Atatürk and İnönü:

I swear upon my honour that I shall remain loyal to the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, to the reforms and principles of Atatürk, to the Turkish nationalism as defined by the Constitution; that I shall implement the laws of TR in the service of the nation by being loyal to the principles of impartiality and equality; that I shall embrace, protect and try to develop the national, moral, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation; that I shall behave in conformity with my duties and responsibilities toward the Republic of Turkey which is a national, democratic, secular state based on the rule of law, human rights and the essential principles of the Constitution.

Thus, it follows that despite being placed in the state sphere, the bureaucrats of the survey sample might have different perceptions of citizenship compared to the military and this possibility was in fact confirmed by the scale findings. While the bureaucrats presented a perception of citizenship emphasizing duties in terms of total citizenship, civil citizenship and social citizenship items, they accorded primacy to political rights over political duties. Hence, with respect to political citizenship they displayed a liberal understanding of citizenship.

As for the employers, it will be remembered that the sample was made up of business persons from TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD along with some independent employers. As stated by Ziya Öniş since 1990s business associations have acted as powerful interest associations as well as civil society actors in pushing for democratization in Turkey. The most influential among these is TÜSİAD which is heavily concentrated geographically in Istanbul and the adjacent Marmara region. The increasing role performed by business associations in general, and by TÜSİAD in particular, is

important in challenging the republican notions of citizenship and bringing to the forefront a liberal notion of citizenship. Öniş analyzes the role of the business community in supporting democratization with respect to two different conceptions of democracy. He notes that in the context of neo-liberal globalization two dimensions of democracy can be distinguished:

The first dimension .. emphasizes that democratization is a process aimed at attaining “good governance” in the economic, political, social and legal affairs of a country, which would in turn bring about transparency and accountability into the system. Heavily influenced by the rhetoric of neo-liberalism and the new right, this understanding of democratization and the consequent citizenship regime it entails appears to be significantly technocratic in its approach to social phenomena. Furthermore, primary emphasis seems to be placed on individual rights such as the right to own private property, as opposed to an extension of social rights. Indeed, rights and freedoms in general in this schema seem to be defined in close relation to entitlements through the “market”. The second dimension of democratization highlights the necessity of improving civil or human rights, such as the right to assert one’s ethnic identity, in addition to the market-centered rights and freedoms. Whilst the two approaches intersect at certain points, such as demands for greater transparency, accountability and better governance, the latter approach is clearly more ambitious and far-reaching in its understanding of democracy and the extension citizenship rights. (Öniş, 2005-173-174)

According to Öniş since the 1990s TÜSİAD emphasizes the second dimension of democratization by underlining the need to improve civil and political rights in addition to stressing the importance of transparency and good governance. The factors that push the business community toward adopting ‘a more vocal democratization agenda’ are; desire to become a full member of the EU in order to become more integrated into the EU market and the international economy; and desire of the businessmen “to free themselves from a structure of perpetual dependence on the state and achieve a radical re-ordering of state-business and state-society relations” (Öniş, 2005: 175). TÜSİAD’s 1997 report on democratization involved proposals for constitutional reforms to improve civil and political human rights such as eliminating restrictions on freedom of expression, and providing cultural and language rights for the ethnic groups. Many other business associations following TÜSİAD also developed their agendas for democratization. MÜSİAD which is “a key representative of small and medium-scale firms originating from the rising Anatolian centers of power” (Öniş, 2005: 188) is one of these associations and it also published reports on democratization which includes proposals for constitutional reforms (MÜSİAD 2000 and 2008). Öniş notes that TÜSİAD has a rather restricted view of social rights and despite the fact that in a TÜSİAD report

(2000) on income distribution and poverty which accepts the inequality as a major problem in Turkey, the general tendency is pushing the issue of inequality into the background (Öniş, 2005: 189). Therefore, the scaling results of employers on political and social citizenship are in conformity with the performance of the business community; because as seen from the activities of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD they support improving political rights, thus, adopt a liberal-democratic approach. But they are not particularly sensitive on the issue of social rights, and in fact by giving more weight to social duties as opposed to social rights they adopt a social citizenship understanding in line with neo-liberal conception of citizenship. However, considering the importance accorded by both TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD to the freedom of expression as a civil right, the fact that according to item-level analysis only 64% of the employers of the sample approved the right to freedom of expression of all ideas is rather surprising. This result in a way reveals that the official views of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD do not unanimously embraced by their members. In fact, with regard to TÜSİAD, Öniş notes that TÜSİAD is not a homogeneous entity and it contains significant cleavages, hence its democratization demands are not genuinely acceptable to all its members (Öniş, 2005: 185).

Finally, the sample of workers was made up of unionized workers who are members of Türk-İş and Hak-İş Trade Unions. It is not an unknown fact the developments following the 1980 coup, mainly the adoption of the 1982 Constitution and the IMF programs pursued by the governments hampered the rights of the working class. The legislations regulating the working conditions brought important barriers to social rights of workers such as unionization and job security. Furthermore, as Erder (1998) notes, in Turkey social solidarity issues are generally left to “family and kinship networks” and this practice in turn, hinders the development of welfare state institutions which will organize social solidarity and social welfare aspects in a formal, standard and professional manner. In addition to this traditional attitude, the recent global tendencies which favor reducing the size of the state and limiting the scope of its activities served as a justification for the state to gradually leave the basic public services of education, health and social security to the family or to the market. Hence, some of these services which were proved to be profitable have started to be

commercialized. Erder argues that while upper or upper-middle income groups easily adapted to this commercialization and enjoyed better quality services of education, health or social security, middle or lower-middle income groups who are mainly dependent upon public resources and facilities faced with difficulties in accessing to basic social services (Erder, 1998: 110-111). Therefore, it is quite understandable that for the sample of workers of the survey, who are presumably in lower income groups in comparison to the employers, senior bureaucrats and retired officers, social rights are of substantial importance. Correspondingly, in terms of social citizenship the sample of workers manifested a right-surplus perception of social citizenship which is in line with social-liberal notion of citizenship. The fact that they also placed more emphasis on political rights compared to political duties is an indication of their demands for more democratic approaches. But like the rest of the sample they exhibited a duty-surplus citizenship perception for civil rights which is in agreement with republican conception of citizenship.

8.6. Conclusion

It is fair to pronounce that the findings of the scaling study provides quantitative and comprehensive evidence to support and refine the debates on citizenship in Turkey by underlining the differences of citizenship perception with respect to its civil, political and social elements. While the results of the total scores of right and duty items helped to draw the general picture for the occupational groups, through item analysis the specific preferences of the groups with respect to rights and duties were elaborated. In general, the item-level results confirmed the total score results, however, it has been observed that despite sharing the same type of perception sometimes groups gave different weights to some items. The qualitative data obtained from the focus group meetings and interviews also contributed to further understand the sample's attitude through the explanations of the participants which could not be captured by the survey questions.

To recapitulate, the results of the survey revealed that despite the fact that all occupational groups shared a republican perception of citizenship as far as the total

right and duty items are considered, in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship occupational groups displayed different perceptions. In terms of *civil* elements all the four groups shared the same perception of civil citizenship based on a republican understanding. In terms of *political* elements, the retired military officers perceive political citizenship in line with the republican notion of citizenship. On the other hand, despite different levels of approval for some items, the workers, employers and bureaucrats share a liberal understanding of political citizenship. On the basis of item-level results, it is possible to conclude that employers display more liberal attitude towards political elements of citizenship in comparison to workers and bureaucrats, because they accord relatively more significance to some political rights. With respect to *social* elements, the workers who assigned more significance to social rights were defined to adopt a social liberal perception of social citizenship. The bureaucrats and retired officers put more emphasis to social duties compared to social rights and thus they were considered to share a republican understanding. The employers, on the other hand, despite the total balance of their social citizenship scores in favour of duties were not considered to adopt a republican understanding, but rather because of their market interests they were described to pursue a neo-liberal perception of social citizenship.

The qualitative data, on the other hand, proved to be extremely useful not only in providing further explanations to the survey results but also in underlining the fact that there are different type of perceptions or varying degrees of the same type of perception within an occupational group. If the qualitative research sample and the survey sample are compared in general terms, it will be seen that the bureaucrats and retired officers have displayed the same republican understanding of citizenship in both samples. But, the workers who participated to the focus group meeting manifested a liberal understanding in all elements of citizenship, whereas the survey sample of workers had a republican perception with respect to civil elements of citizenship. Participant workers' different attitude might be related with the fact that their level of education were above the average of the workers of the survey sample. While four of the five workers in the focus group are university graduates and one is high-school graduate, in the survey sample only 13% of workers are university

graduate. On the other hand, the employers interviewed revealed both republican and liberal perception of citizenship at varying levels.

It is indeed possible to differentiate several sub-categories of republican or liberal citizenship perceptions based on the discourses of the focus group participants and the interviewees. As discussed at the beginning of Chapter V, two forms of republican citizenship were proposed as: '*patriotic and militant citizenship*' which demands unquestioning loyalty and total sacrifice from the citizens accompanied by a whole-hearted devotion to duties, and '*enlightened citizenship*' which does not necessitate forsaking of all self-interests, but still emphasizes the good of the community. As for the liberal notions of citizenship while the *liberal-individualist* understanding of citizenship attaches priority to civil and political rights, in terms of social citizenship two sub-categories of liberal thinking are differentiated as *neo-liberal* and *social-liberal* approaches.

It can be argued that the participants who assign substantial importance to society's well-being, common good, public order, social peace and rest can be said to share an '*enlightened republican*' conception of citizenship, because even though they give priority to public interests over individual freedoms they adopt a questioning and rational approach to both duties and rights. The participant bureaucrats can be placed under this category of citizenship perception.

Secondly, the participants who in addition to giving priority to public interests, mention several conditions concerning the unity of the nation, national integrity, national interests, 'games played over Turkey' and 'the conditions of Turkey' to justify restrictions on individual freedoms (freedom of expression and religion, right to give non-Turkish names to one's child, right to learn Kurdish as a language, right to Parliamentary representation, right to be a conscientious objector) can be described as having a '*patriotic and militant republican*' perception of citizenship. Most of the retired military officers and one of the employers who owns a private school can be cited under this category.

Thirdly, those participants who assign more significance to individual rights compared to national or societal interests can be defined as perceiving citizenship in line with a '*liberal-individualist*' conception. Some of the workers can be put in this category of citizenship. In terms of social citizenship those assigning considerable significance to social rights are described as sharing a 'social liberal' perception of citizenship and all participant workers can be placed in this category.

Fourthly, one of the employers who owns several enterprises and is a MÜSİAD member displayed a different perception of citizenship which I termed as a '*religious liberal*' because he gives importance to individual freedoms from a religious point of view. He emphasizes that individuals are creatures of God and he analyzes people's attitudes with reference to the order of God and not in their relation to the state. It can be argued that he does not attach any superiority to the notion of state on the grounds that God is superior to any institution.

In addition to these participants who can be more easily categorized due to their coherent views, there are some others who seemed to adopt different perceptions depending on the issue. For example, one of the employers indicated that the state should ensure the citizens' right to freedom of religion by articulating that 'the state exists to meet the demands of its citizens', whereas in discussing the right to parliamentary representation she strongly objected to forming a separate Kurdish Party by arguing that they were also the citizens of the Republic of Turkey and if they aimed to violate national integrity by forming a separate party they had better be out of the Parliament. While her statement about the *raison d'être* of the state is based on a liberal conception of citizenship, her argument about a Kurdish Party is rather in line with a republican understanding.

Consequently, it can be inferred from the qualitative research that the survey results based on the citizenship scale should be considered as giving the general tendencies for the survey sample, and it is possible to come across different levels of citizenship perception which can only be detected through qualitative studies.

CHAPTER IX

ANALYSES OF THE SCALE RESULTS ON TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CITIZENSHIP

As discussed in Chapter III, the European Union is considered to play an important role in altering the content and scope of the official republican understanding of citizenship. Some scholars such as Fuat Keyman and Ahmet İçduygu (2005: 12) argue that full accession of Turkey to the EU after implementing the Copenhagen criteria “would force the strong-state to approach its society by accepting that it consists of individuals as right-holders.” Correspondingly, through developing a scale to measure the possible impact of EU membership on citizenship it has been aimed to understand the viewpoint of the citizens in the survey sample. In formulating the scale items it has been presumed that a pro-EU perspective will indicate the sample's expectation that Turkey's accession to the EU will bring about positive consequences on citizenship practice in Turkey.

In this chapter the survey results for the scale of ‘EU membership of Turkey and citizenship’ are analyzed on the bases of, first, the mean total scores and then, responses to each scale item.

9.1. European Union Membership and Citizenship

In the scale constructed to see the views of the survey sample on the relation between Turkey's accession to the European Union and its possible effects on citizenship there have been seven items. The following table summarizes the mean scores of total scale items together with standard deviations and number of observations for the total sample and four sub-samples. The scores have been indexed to 100.

Table 9.1: Mean Total Scores of the Scale for EU Membership and Citizenship

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Workers	76.14	14.94	366
Employers	77.63	14.43	71
Bureaucrats	74.37	15.63	107
Retired military officers	77.66	15.46	49
Total sample	76.20	15.06	593

The means of total scores range between 74 and 78. As previously explained this scale aims to measure the perception of citizenship from a “pro-EU” perspective. In other words, higher scores indicate a perception of a positive impact of Turkey’s EU accession on citizenship practice in Turkey. Thus, it can be argued that in aggregate terms the respondents quite agree that (76%) Turkey’s EU membership will positively affect the citizenship practice in the country. In terms of sub-samples although the mean scores are very close to each other, the bureaucrats seemed to be relatively the most EU-skeptic group with the lowest mean score of 74. The retired military officers and employers both of whom had almost identical mean scores (77.66 and 77.63 respectively) were the samples who believed most in the positive influence of the EU membership on citizenship issues in Turkey. Similarly, the workers with a mean score of 76 can be identified as a pro-EU sample in terms of its effects on citizenship.

According to the ANOVA results for mean scores of EU membership and citizenship of sub-samples there is not a statistically significant difference at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(3, 589) = 0.893, p = 0.444$]. Hence, it can be concluded that all sample groups regardless of their social groups agree that Turkey’s EU accession will have positive consequences on citizenship practice.³³

When it is recalled that most of the survey was completed in 2006 (only the workers who are TÜRK-İŞ Union members completed the questionnaires in June-September 2004), the above results gain more significance. Because as discussed in Chapter III, since 2005 despite the constitutional reforms issued by the governments, the EU

³³ For within sample comparisons of the employers see Appendix G.

Commission reports started to emphasize the importance of implementation and in 2006 declared the suspension of negotiations because of Turkey's position regarding the Cyprus issue. Consequently, among the Turkish public there emerged a certain discontent towards the EU. It seems that EU's discouraging approach did not have much influence on the survey sample and they continued to support Turkey's membership to the Union. Moreover, if Turkey's accession to the EU is considered as a further step along the road toward modernization, then it is possible to comment that the sample embraces the goal of "attaining the standards of contemporary civilization as an honourable member with equal rights of the family of world nations"³⁴ as introduced by Atatürk as a founding principle of the Republic of Turkey.

Now, in order to see the points of accord or disaccord of the survey sub-samples with respect to specific issues of Turkey's accession to the EU, the sample's responses to each scale item are examined.

9.2. Item-level Analyses

The scale items measuring the relation between the EU membership of Turkey and citizenship have been designed to understand the sample's opinions concerning the EU membership impact on: citizenship rights in general; improving state's treatment to its citizens; providing individual benefits to citizens; religious values of the society; improving the civil society by restricting the political power of the military. They have also been asked whether the citizens of the EU member countries had more freedom of expression and religion, and more consumer rights in comparison to the citizens of Turkey.

The percentage rates of affirmative responses to seven items of the scale measuring the relationship between Turkey's accession to the EU and citizenship are displayed in Table 9.2. In the table the sentences with an asterisk at the end refer to a reformulation of the item which was originally asked from an anti-EU perspective.

³⁴ 1982 Constitution, Preamble, second paragraph (www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm)

Table 9.2: Percentage Distribution for Those Who Agree (Or Strongly Agree) With EU Membership and Citizenship Items

Item		Total sample	worker	employer	Bureaucrat	Retired military officers
EU1	Accession to the EU will have a positive impact on the citizenship rights in Turkey.	82.5	80.8	83.1	83.7	92.0
EU2	If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, I think the state will provide fairer and more equal treatment to the citizens.	79.8	79.2	81.7	77.1	88.0
EU3	I believe that the EU membership will provide some benefits to me as a citizen.*	71.4	71.1	74.6	70.9	70.0
EU4	If we access to the EU, our religious values will not be affected negatively.*	68.5	64.5	78.9	74.3	71.4
EU5	Citizens of the EU member states are luckier than the citizens of Turkey in terms of freedom of expression and of religion.	69.5	70.6	73.3	63.6	70.0
EU6	If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, since the role of the military on the political arena will be restricted civil society will become stronger.	61.9	61.9	70.4	58.3	58.0
EU7	As a consumer in Turkey, I do not have all the rights that a citizen of an EU member state has.*	60.5	62.2	60.6	55.4	58.0

The range of percentage distribution of affirmative responses for the total sample lies between 61 and 83%. Apart from the last two items the total sample can be interpreted as having a quite high pro-EU perspective with approval percentages ranging between 70 and 83. Almost 83% of the total sample agreed that accession to the EU would have a positive impact on the citizenship rights in Turkey. Around 80% of the total respondents believed that with Turkey's accession to the EU, the state would provide fairer and more equal treatment to the citizens. 71% approved that the EU membership would be advantageous for them as citizens. Approximately 70% of the survey respondents thought that the citizens of EU member states were luckier than Turkish citizens in terms of freedom of expression and of religion. The rate of respondents who did not think that our religious values would weaken in case of full membership was around 69%. The sample as a whole displayed less pro-EU views concerning two items; the role of the military and consumer rights. Around

62% of the respondents as a whole approved the item that “If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU; since the role of the military on the political arena will be restricted civil society will become stronger”. Thus, it may be argued that the sample did not expect much structural change in the society after full membership to the EU. As for the consumer rights only 61% thought that as a consumer in Turkey, they did not have the same rights as a citizen of an EU member state had. In other words, the respondents did not have much to complain about consumer rights in Turkey.

In terms of sub-samples the approval percentages range between 55 and 92%. For the item about positive impact of Turkey’s EU accession on citizenship practice the most optimistic sub-sample was that of retired military officers with an approval rate of 92%. The bureaucrats and employers were also highly supportive of this item with similar percentages of 84 and 83 respectively. Compared to other samples the workers yielding an agreement level of 81% were relatively less optimistic about positive effects of EU membership.

The retired military officers were again the most optimistic group -with 88 % of approval rate- concerning the expectation that the state’s treatment of the citizens would ameliorate. While 82% of the employers and 79% of the workers believed that in terms of fairness and equality the state’s treatment of the citizens would be upgraded, the sample of bureaucrats revealed a slightly lower approval rate of 77%.

The third item about the individual benefits of the EU membership to the citizens obtained lower approval rates in comparison to the first two items. While around 75% of the employers believed that the EU membership would bring individual advantages to them as citizens, the workers, bureaucrats and retired military officers who shared almost identical frequencies (70 and 71%) were a little less optimistic on this item.

In terms of religious values, the workers seemed to have some preoccupations as only 65% of them believed that Turkey’s EU accession would not weaken our religious values. On the other hand, it can be argued that employers did not worry on

this subject because around 79% of them approved that our religious values would not be affected negatively. For the bureaucrats and retired military officers the approval rates were 74 and 71% respectively.

About the practice of the freedom of expression and of religion in the EU member states, while 73% of the employers found EU citizens luckier than Turkish citizens only 64% of the bureaucrats shared this view. The workers and retired military officers with similar approval rates of 71 and 70% respectively were as optimistic as the bureaucrats. It can be presumed on the ground of these results that the survey sample generally believe that the EU enables through its binding legislation to improve the implementation of such individual freedoms as the freedom of expression and of religion.

Relating to the item on the structure of the civil society after full membership, apart from the employers, the sample groups did not display high rates of approval that the civil society would get stronger since the role of the military on the political arena would be restricted. While 70% of the employers confirmed such a change, only 58% of both the retired military officers and bureaucrats and 62% of the workers agreed with this item.

The approval rates of the last item stating that ‘Turkish citizens have less consumer rights than the EU citizens have’ were the lowest ones. While 62% of the workers and 61% of employers agreed with this item, only 55% of the bureaucrats and 58% of the retired military officers confirmed this opinion.

In sum, even though the employers displayed the highest pro-EU perception with highest approval rates for most of the items, the other groups of workers, bureaucrats and retired officers were also supporting the view that Turkey’s accession to the EU would bring positive consequences to the practice of citizenship. These results were in conformity with the fact that the business associations in Turkey gave the most support to the EU membership as they articulated on several platforms. The most striking outcome of this survey is related with the military’s positive approach to the

EU, because generally they are known to have several reservations for Turkey's accession to the EU. Their main reservation, in fact, was on the item about the improvement of the civil society as an outcome of restricting the political power of the military. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that the survey sample supports Turkey's membership and as proposed previously, this result can be interpreted as an indication of the will to become a member of the civilized West which is very much in line with the official citizenship understanding aiming at raising 'civilized' and 'patriotic' citizens.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUSION

*Ahlak yolu pek dardır
Tetik dur önün yardır,
Sakın “Hakkım var” deme,
Hak yok, vazife vardır
...*

*Ben, sen yokuz, biz varız
Hem Ogan, hem kullarız.
“Biz” demek, “Bir” demektir,
Ben, sen ona taparız*

*Ne derece hizmetin
Varsa, odur himmetin;
“Kıymetim var” deme ki
Gerçek ola kıymetin...*

*Ziya Gökalp (1915) **

In this thesis it has been aimed to study the citizen side of citizenship. The initial idea behind such an attempt stems from the desire to comprehend how citizens in Turkey relate themselves to the state. For this purpose, the concept of citizenship which denotes the legal status of a person as a member of a nation-state is considered to be the perfect tool since citizenship rights and duties embrace all the spheres where the citizens interact with the state. It has been consensually agreed that during the state-formation and nation-building processes of modern Turkey, the founding elite defined citizenship from above within the civic-republican tradition by prioritizing duties over rights. According to this construction of citizenship the ideal citizen

* *The road of ethics is rather narrow/ Be careful to the precipice in front of you/ Never say “I have my rights”/ There is no right, but duty/.../ Me, you do not exist, but we do/ We are both the Lord and the created/ “Us” means “One”,/ Me, you worship him./ Whatever the degree of your service is/ It is your endeavour;/ Do not say “I have value” so that/ Your value becomes reality... (from “Ahlak” in *Yeni Hayat*, p.11 [quoted in Taha Parla, (2005 [1989]) *Ziya Gökalp, Kemalizm ve Türkiye’de Korporatizm* [Ziya Gökalp, Kemalism and Corporatism in Turkey], İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, p.131.]*

should be 'civilized' to achieve the goal of progress and be 'patriotic' to ensure the social order. The thesis has tried to answer a basic question: Have the citizens embraced this conception of citizenship tailored by the Republican elite? In other words, has the Republican project achieved its goal with respect to citizen formation?

It has also been aimed to study the perception of citizenship in terms of civil, political and social elements in line with the tripartite pattern of citizenship proposed by T.H. Marshall. For this purpose a scale for citizenship rights and another one for citizenship duties have been developed on the basis of a questionnaire. In determining the indicators for citizenship rights and duties the main reference material has been the theoretical range of rights and duties proposed by Thomas Janoski (1998). In his study Janoski incorporated claims for group rights into the modern interpretation of universal citizenship rights. Janoski's right and duty items have been compared with the studies on citizenship in Turkey and they are combined to formulate the items of the citizenship right and duty scales to measure citizenship perceptions of citizens. Additionally, in order to measure people's opinions concerning the possible effects of Turkey's EU membership on citizenship issues a scale of "EU membership and citizenship" has been developed. The survey has been conducted to 625 citizens chosen as the representatives of the three different spheres of the society. It has been considered that applying the survey to citizens from different spheres of the society a broad spectrum of citizenship perceptions could be obtained. For this purpose, the categorization of society proposed by Janoski has been followed. According to Janoski (1998) the society can be divided into four spheres which may interact with each other in several ways: i) the private, ii) market, iii) public and iv) state spheres. On the basis of this categorization, employers who are members of employer associations as representatives of the market sphere; workers who are members of trade unions as representatives of the public sphere; and senior bureaucrats and retired military officers as representatives of the state sphere have been chosen as the survey sample.

The results of the scale study revealed that all occupational groups shared a republican perception of citizenship as far as the total right and duty items are

considered. However, when analysed specifically in terms of civil, political and social elements of citizenship, occupational groups displayed different perceptions. In terms of *civil* elements all the four groups shared the same perception of civil citizenship based on a republican understanding. In terms of *political* elements, the retired military officers perceive political citizenship in line with the republican notion of citizenship. On the other hand, despite different levels of approval for some items, the workers, employers and bureaucrats share a liberal understanding of political citizenship. On the basis of item-level results, it is possible to conclude that employers display more liberal attitude towards political elements of citizenship in comparison to workers and bureaucrats, because they accord relatively more significance to some political rights, namely cultural and language rights of ethnic groups and inquiry rights about the practices of the state. With respect to *social* elements, the workers who assigned more significance to social rights were defined to adopt a social liberal perception of social citizenship. The bureaucrats and retired officers put more emphasis to social duties compared to social rights and thus they were considered to share a republican understanding. The employers, on the other hand, despite the total balance of their social citizenship scores in favour of duties, were not considered to adopt a republican understanding, but rather because of their market interests they were described to pursue a neo-liberal perception of social citizenship.

The qualitative data obtained from focus group meetings and interviews with 19 citizens, on the other hand, proved to be extremely useful not only in providing further explanations to the survey results but also in underlining the fact that there are different types of perceptions or varying degrees of the same type of perception within an occupational group. Additionally, based on the discourses of the focus group participants and the interviewees several sub-categories of republican or liberal citizenship perceptions have been differentiated.

On the other hand, according to the scale results of 'EU membership and citizenship' all occupational groups of the sample agreed at high levels that Turkey's EU accession will have positive consequences on citizenship practice. Thus, the sample

has been presumed to have a pro-EU perspective regarding citizenship issues. When it is recalled that most of the survey was completed in 2006, the above results gain more significance. Because as discussed in Chapter III, since 2005 despite the constitutional reforms issued by the governments, the EU Commission reports started to emphasize the importance of implementation of the reforms and in 2006 declared the suspension of negotiations because of Turkey's position regarding the Cyprus issue. Consequently, among the Turkish public there emerged a certain discontent towards the EU. It seems that EU's discouraging approach did not have much influence on the survey sample and they continued to support Turkey's membership to the Union.

It has been concluded on the bases of these results that this thesis brings some new perspectives to citizenship studies in Turkey on mainly two aspects: firstly, it analyzes citizenship from the angle of citizens, and secondly, it elaborates on citizenship not as a whole but also with respect to civil, political and social rights and duties of citizenship. Consequently, it helps to identify the nature of the recent challenges to the official republican understanding. On the basis of the item-level analyses of the responses of the workers, employers and bureaucrats of the survey sample it can be presumed that there are demands for the improvement of political rights of parliamentary representation, women's participation to political parties and cultural and language rights of ethnic groups. However, as mentioned earlier the employers assigned relatively more importance to cultural and language rights of ethnic groups and inquiry rights about the practices of the state which means they demand a more transparent state.

Here, I would like to elaborate on the three main findings of this study. Firstly, the survey sample as a whole perceives citizenship in general in line with a republican understanding. Secondly, in terms of political elements of citizenship, it is mainly the employers of the sample who manifest a liberal understanding of citizenship. Thirdly, with regard to social citizenship, the workers of the sample assign priority to social rights over duties and thus have a social liberal perception of social citizenship.

First of all, I shall maintain that the fact that the survey sample of this research adopts the republican understanding of citizenship in aggregate terms is related with the characteristics of the survey sample and especially with their relatively high level of education. To recall, while 21% of the survey sample are primary and secondary school graduates, 37% of them graduated from high-school and 43% of them are university and above-level (master or doctorate degrees) graduates. Now, I shall try to show the importance of formal education in the inculcation of the official conception of citizenship by employing the terminology of Gramsci and Althusser.

Gramsci argues that it is possible to talk about the hegemony of a ruling class only if it achieves to unite political and economic leadership with intellectual and moral leadership. Hence, the hegemony of a class is achieved by means of a combination of political and economic coercion, and persuasion through ideology (Simon, 1982: 21). Chantal Mouffe adds that:

According to him [Gramsci] hegemony involves the creation of a *higher synthesis*, so that all its elements fuse in a 'collective will' which becomes the new protagonist of political action which will function as the protagonist of political action during that hegemony's entire duration. It is through ideology that this collective will is formed since its very existence depends on the creation of ideological unity which will serve as 'cement'. (Mouffe, 1979: 184)

By creating a 'collective will' on the basis of a common world-view which will serve as a unifying principle a 'collective man' can be formed. As Gramsci puts it:

A historical act can only be performed by 'collective man' and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social unity' through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world. (quoted in Mouffe, 1979: 191)

The creation of the collective will is achieved through ideology which is elaborated and spread by the use of different hegemonic apparatuses: schools, churches, the entire media and even architecture and the name of the streets (Mouffe, 1979: 187).

It is possible to elaborate on the role of the republican model of citizenship in the nation-building process of Republic of Turkey under the light of Gramsci's thought

outlined above. As discussed previously in Chapter III, during the nation-building process of modern Turkey, the bureaucratic elite tried to establish a nation and maintain social order not just through violence and political and economic coercion, but also creating consent through a hegemonic culture in which a conception of citizenship based on duties to the secular nationalist state is to become the ‘common sense’ values of all citizens. During this process the ‘collective will’ is defined as the ‘will to reach to the level of the contemporary nations’ and the ‘collective man’ or the ‘ideal citizen’ is tried to be formed by “the unifying discourse of Turkish modernity on the basis of which secularist Turkish nationalism reproduces itself” (Keyman, 2005: 268). In order to activate the masses towards the single aim of civilization, the state elite on the basis of the republican notion of citizenship, while giving some basic rights, “demanded at the same time that the citizens accord normative primacy to the national interest over individual freedoms, to duties over rights, and to state sovereignty over individual autonomy.” (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 6) Therefore, as Keyman and İçduygu stated in the following previously quoted lines, the republican model of citizenship has three important functions for the Turkish state:

The republican model of citizenship serves for the state, first as a “link” between state and society on the basis of the principle of national unity, second as an “articulatory principle” that connects people with different religious, ethnic and cultural origins under the rubric of modernity as civilization, and third as an “effective ideological device” by which the state attempted to disseminate its will to civilization throughout the society. (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005: 6)

In order to ensure that the citizens internalize this notion of citizenship, in Althusser’s terms, several *state apparatuses* have been employed. The ideas of Gramsci on ideology and hegemony have been taken up and thoroughly developed by Althusser. He differentiates between state apparatuses as the *repressive state apparatus* (RSA) and the *ideological state apparatus* (ISA). In Gramsci’s terminology the RSA would refer to the hegemonic apparatuses to exercise coercion and the ISA to those hegemonic means of gaining consent. Althusser explains that the RSA contains: “the government, the administration, the army, the police, the courts, the prisons”. Then, he lists the ISA as: “the religious ISA (the system of the different churches), the educational ISA (the system of the different public and

private schools), the family ISA, the legal ISA, the political ISA (the political system including the different parties), the trade-union ISA, the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc.)” (Althusser, 1971: 136-137). He remarks that both the RSA and ISA function by repression and ideology but while RSA functions massively and predominantly by *repression*, the ISAs function massively and predominantly by *ideology*.

It can be stated that in gaining and maintaining its hegemony, the state elite of modern Turkey used and continue to use both the repressive (e.g. the military coups and the restrictions of individual rights through legal regulations) and ideological state apparatuses. But the republican model of citizenship can be considered to be the most efficient ideology which has been disseminated mainly through the formal education system. As previously discussed, through civic education the private realm was tried to be supervised and regulated by defining the codes of conduct for almost every aspect of the citizen’s private life to make sure that the citizens share a certain life style and serve the collective will of civilization.

According to Althusser the dominant ideological state apparatus is the educational apparatus. In the following long quotation he succinctly expresses the dominant role played by the school in contributing to the reproduction of the ruling ideology:

It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and the for years, the years in which the child is most ‘vulnerable’, squeezed between the family State apparatus and the educational State apparatus, it drums into them, whether it uses new or old methods, a certain amount of ‘know-how’ wrapped in the ruling ideology (French, arithmetic, natural history, the sciences, literature) or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state (ethics, civic instruction, philosophy). Somewhere around the age of sixteen, a huge mass of children are ejected ‘into production’: these are the workers or small peasants. Another portion of scholastically adapted youth carries on: and, for better or worse, it goes somewhat further, until it falls by the wayside and fills the posts of small and middle technicians, white-collar workers, small and middle executives, petty bourgeois of all kinds. A last portion reaches the summit, either to fall into intellectual semi-employment, or to provide, as well as the ‘intellectuals of the collective labourer’, the agents of exploitation (capitalists, managers), the agents of repression (soldiers, policemen, politicians, administrators, etc.) and the professional ideologists (priests of all sorts, most of whom are convinced ‘laymen’). (Althusser, 1971: 147)

Even though Althusser analyzes the role of all state apparatuses within the framework of the Marxist theory with reference to “the reproduction of the conditions of production” his account on the role of the school can be employed in

analyzing the nation-building process of Turkey, because as Benedict Anderson (1993) notes school education is an important device in constructing a nation. As a matter of fact, the content of the civic education textbooks as discussed in Chapter III explicitly shows the reproduction of the official conception of citizenship which demands from the citizens a whole-hearted devotion to the duties in order to protect national interests. When the education level of the survey sample is considered, it can be argued that they had been in the formal education system long enough to adopt the republican model of citizenship. In addition to the civic education textbooks several other symbols or cultural instruments can be exemplified which play a vital part in the organization of consent among the citizens. The daily oath of the primary school students, the goals of higher education stipulated in the Law on Higher Education, the oaths of public servants and military officers taken at the beginning of their careers are the examples -that were previously stated in Chapters III and VIII- of the persuasive cultural instruments for reproducing the hegemony. In a similar manner, Hasan Ünal Nalbantoğlu elaborates on the role played by the university system in Turkey as an ideological state apparatus (Nalbantoğlu, 2005). The role of ideological state apparatuses is vital, because as Gramsci argues “hegemony can never be taken for granted, it has to be continually fought for afresh” (Simon, 1982: 37).

Therefore, based on the results of the research study I shall argue that the survey sample adopts a republican conception of citizenship in aggregate terms because they were formed in accordance with this official understanding of citizenship through long years of formal education. Correspondingly, they accord priority to national interests over individual freedoms and to duties over rights. Additionally, as the results of ‘the scale on EU membership and its effect on citizenship’ indicated by giving considerable support to Turkey’s accession to EU, they embrace the unifying will to modernity. However, it should be underlined that this argument is limited to the survey sample of this study as it lies on the results obtained from the responses of this sample. It needs to be tested by further research on those citizens with relatively less educational background. Thus, as far as the sample of this research is considered the Republican project seems to attain its goal with respect to citizen formation in terms of their perception of citizenship rights and duties in general.

Now if we return to the second finding about political elements of citizenship, they can be considered in general terms as demands for more democratization. On the basis of item-level results it has already been indicated that the employers of the survey sample display more liberal attitudes towards political rights compared to the workers and bureaucrats. The fact that the sample of employers are made up of mainly the members of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD who voice their demands for more democracy confirms the debates that civil society organizations and business circles have introduced the language of rights and freedoms (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005; Öniş, 2005). As it has been previously discussed in Chapter VIII, the main factors that push the business community toward adopting ‘a more vocal democratization agenda’ are; desire to become a full member of the EU because of the economic benefits associated with full membership; and desire of the businessmen “to free themselves from a structure of perpetual dependence on the state and achieve a radical re-ordering of state-business and state-society relations” (Öniş, 2005: 175). Thus, towards these ends the business associations in general, and TÜSİAD and recently MÜSİAD in particular, articulate their support for the expansion of individual freedoms along with their demands for good governance, transparency and accountability of the state.

On the other hand, concerning the third finding about social elements of citizenship, it is not so evident whether the finding that the sample of workers perceive social citizenship in line with a social-liberal understanding should be considered as a challenge to the official republican understanding or not. This is in fact related with the nature of social rights. As repeatedly emphasized during this study, social rights are different from civil and political rights of citizenship. Civil and political rights are regarded as negative rights or freedoms from the state intervention; whereas social rights are considered as positive rights or claims to the state, and in turn social citizenship is generally studied within the framework of the welfare policies of the state. It has been briefly discussed in Chapter VIII that because of the inadequacy of the welfare state institutions and as a result of the commercialization of the basic social services of education and health, middle or lower-middle income groups who

are mainly dependent upon public resources and facilities faced with difficulties in accessing to basic social services (Erder, 1998). And it has been concluded that the sample of workers of the survey are presumably in lower income groups in comparison to the employers, senior bureaucrats and retired officers, and thus it is an expected result that they accord primacy to social rights over duties. As a matter of fact, the results on social citizenship need to be elaborated in more detail with respect to the social welfare policies and their implementation, but social welfare policies are beyond the scope of this study which essentially aims to understand citizenship perception in terms of the balance between social duties and rights. However, when it was recalled that as discussed in Chapter VIII, 56% of the workers in the sample stated that 'protecting the indivisibility of nation' is one of the most important five duties of the state, and 34% considered it as the most important state duty, then it is possible to argue that the sample workers' claims for social rights do not constitute a direct challenge to the republican understanding. In addition, 76% of the workers approved that Turkey's accession to the EU will have positive impacts on citizenship. Hence, within the scope of this thesis I content myself to conclude that the unionized workers of the survey sample give priority to national unity and support the will to civilization but they claim more social rights.

It should again be emphasized that the results in favour of republican understanding which are directly related with the sample features refer to the concept of citizenship as a whole and not to its three elements. Generally it has been discussed that since the 1990s the official republican model of citizenship has started to be challenged by some groups on the bases of gender related, religious and ethnic identities. As a consequence of the globalization process which facilitated the transfer of images and populations across countries, the public realm was opened up to identity-based differences that were earlier part of the private sphere (Kadioğlu, 2005: 107) and Turkey has witnessed the resurgence of Islam, the reemergence of Kurdish nationalism in organized form and the emergence of civil society as challenges to the official conception of citizenship. Thus, in terms of citizenship elements the main challenge to the republican understanding is the claims for civil and political rights of ethnic, religious and gender-related groups. Therefore, republican understanding is

essentially contested on the grounds that the scope of rights should be extended to incorporate political rights of differentiated groups. From this perspective, the fact that workers, employers and bureaucrats of the sample assign more importance – though at varying degrees- to political rights can be considered to voice the demands for extending the range of political rights. But to repeat, among these occupational groups the employers due to the reasons explained above accord more significance to the improvement of cultural and language rights of ethnic groups along with the need to increase the transparency of the state.

In addition to the above remarks, I shall attempt to discuss the results of the study in relation to the ideas of Ziya Gökalp on *national solidarity* or *solidaristic corporatism*. As discussed in Chapter III, the Turkish citizenship was defined from above by the republican elite and its distinguishing characteristics were formulated by the six principles of nationalism, secularism, populism, republicanism, etatism and revolutionism (Kadıoğlu, 2005: 111). Furthermore, it has been indicated that Gökalp's ideas on national solidarity constitute the foundation of the idea of 'populism'. In line with Durkheim's philosophy, Gökalp argued that solidarity can be achieved through division of labour in a society which had a common collective consciousness. As to be recalled, according to Durkheim in modern societies, different specializations in employment and social roles create organic solidarity that ties people to one another, because people cannot count on filling all of their needs by themselves. Following Durkheim's thought Gökalp maintained that "national solidarity is the foundation of social order and progress and of national freedom and independence" (Gökalp, 2001a: 84). Additionally, both Durkheim and Gökalp underlined the importance of occupational groups or corporations which should conduct according to a certain work ethic are indispensable in ensuring solidarity due to their moral influence on individuals and on society. According to solidaristic corporatism, the total sum of corporative interests, which are realized within the triad of state-employer-worker, makes up an integrated 'public interest' and 'national interest'(Parla, 2005: 7-8). These ideas were incorporated into the principle of populism and adopted with other five principles during the Third Party Congress of the Republican People's Party in 1931. As explained in the official program of the

Republican People's Party what was intended by the principle of populism was that people who are organized in professional associations rather than in conflicting and competing classes would work in solidarity to achieve the common goal of civilization and to ensure social order. However, the results of the survey revealed that contrary to the spirit of populism, the occupational groups of the survey sample prioritized their 'class' or 'social status (based on occupational organizations)' interests especially with respect to social elements of citizenship.

Therefore, it may not be wrong to argue that the sample by assigning more weight to duties adopt a duty-surplus citizenship understanding in terms of aggregate right and duties of citizenship and thus perceives citizenship in line with the famous phrase of Ziya Gökalp, "There is no right but duty". But with respect to social elements of citizenship they do not seem to whole-heartedly adopt the solidaristic corporatism ideal of Gökalp as the samples of employers and workers manifested citizenship perceptions which reflect their class or social status-based interests rather than acting as representatives of occupational groups which work in solidaristic harmony to serve the collective interests. On the other hand, in terms of civil and political rights they tend to prioritize national interests and public order even though the responses of workers, bureaucrats and particularly those of employers yielded the need for more democratization regarding group rights.

To recapitulate, with this thesis it is hoped to provide a contribution to the studies on citizenship by examining the citizen side in terms of civil, political and social rights and duties of citizenship on the basis of a comparative research. Furthermore, in terms of its methodology it can be considered as a pioneering work in initiating the use of a measurement device for citizenship perception by developing scales for citizenship rights and duties. It is hoped and desired that the citizenship scale developed in this study in order to define citizenship perception will serve as a useful instrument for further studies. In addition, the scaling process indicated the need for additional research on the viewpoint of citizens through qualitative research methods such as deep interviews. Comparisons of the understandings of workers and employers with respect to citizenship rights; or employers' perspectives on liberalism

and capitalism with regard to citizenship; or comparison of Turkish citizens' understanding of rights with the definition of rights in the western literature can be exemplified as further research topics. If the thesis opens up a way for further research on citizenship perception it will be considered to attain its objective.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: MATCHING THE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS CLASSIFICATION OF JANOSKI WITH THE STUDIES ON TURKEY ¹

Janoski's Classification of Rights	Corresponding indicators for these rights in Turkey	References
<i>A, Legal (Civil) Rights</i>		
<i>1. Procedural rights:</i>		
1.1. Access to courts and counsel		Articles 19, 36, 40
1.2. Rights to contract		Art. 48
1.3. Equal treatment under the law	-privileged status of public officers before the law -legal rights of women	Ünsal (1998) Arat (1998), İlkaracan and İlkaracan (1998), Articles 10, 37, 38
1.4. Right of aliens to immigrate and citizens to emigrate	-dual citizenship issue for Turkish workers abroad	İçduygu (2002), İçduygu-Çolak-Soyarık (2000), İçduygu (2005), Article 62
<i>2. Expressive rights:</i>		
2.1. Freedom of speech	Freedom of speech	Esmer (1999), Articles 25, 26, 28-31
2.2. Freedom of religion	- Non-Muslims and Alevis as neighbours - Demands of Islamic groups	Esmer (1999), Ayata-Ayata (2000), Art. 24 Çolak (2005)
2.3. Choice of friends, companions and associates	- factors determining the choice of neighbour - ties of <i>hemşerilik</i> - relations in private life (visiting, seeing) - neighbourhood-social class relation	Esmer (1999) Baştuğ (1976), Güneş-Ayata (1991) Erder (1996a) Ayata-Ayata (2000)
2.4. Right to privacy		Articles 20-22
<i>3. Bodily control rights</i>		

¹ Articles correspond to those of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, from <http://www.byegm.gov.tr/mevzuat/anayasa/anayasa-ing.htm>

3.1. Freedom from assault and unsafe environment	-security assured by living with <i>hemşeri</i> in the same neighbourhood -confidence/trust to security personnel	Güneş-Ayata (1991) Esmer (1999) Article 19
3.2. Medical and sexual control over body		Article 17
<i>4. Property and service rights</i>		
4.1. Hold and dispose of property and services		Article 35
4.2. Choice of residence	In choice of residence the roles played by informal relation networks/hemşerilik/social network / family and kinship ties	Dubetsky (1977), Erder (1996a, 1996b), Baştuğ (1976), Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu (1998), Ayata-Ayata (2000), Article 23
4.3. Choice of occupation	-In finding a job the roles played by informal relation networks/hemşerilik/social network / family-kinship ties -Informal relation networks of the urban poor (in finding a job or residence)	Dubetsky (1977), Erder (1996a, 1996b), Baştuğ (1976), Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu(1998) Erder (1998), Işık-Pınarcıoğlu (2001), Article 18, 48
<i>5. Organizational rights</i>		
5.1.Employee organizing 5.2.Corporate organizing 5.3.Political party organizing	-Organizations at workplace/ patron-client relations (employment based on region or sect) -being organized (association/ party/union,NGOs), citizen movements (Saturday mothers, farmers, peasants in Bergama)	Dubetsky (1977) Erder (1996a, 1996b) Ünsal (1998) Öncü and Koçan (2005), Uğur (1998), Articles 33, 51, 69
<i>B. Political Rights</i>		
<i>1. Personal rights</i>		
1.1. Enfranchisement of the poor, gender groups, ethnic/racial groups, age categories and immigrants	-citizenship status of the Republican woman -voting behaviour of women	Kadıoğlu(1996) İlkkaracan and İlkkaracan (1998), Article 67
1.2. Rights to run and hold office		Article 67

1.3. Rights to form and join a political party	-rate of membership to political parties	Ünsal (1998), Article 68
<i>2. Organizational rights</i>		
2.1. Political lobbying	-patronage policies of political parties, clientalism -voting behaviour in relation to class and religion	Heper (1998), Ünsal (1998) Özbudun (1976)
2.2. Political fund raising	-budgetary transfers to political parties (capital-intensive partisanship and propaganda)	Ünsal (1998)
2.3. Legislative and administrative consultation		
2.4. Political bargaining		
<i>3. Naturalization rights:</i>		
3.1. Right to naturalize upon residency		Article 66
3.2. Right to information on naturalization process		
3.3. Refugee rights		
<i>4. Oppositional rights:</i>		
4.1. Minority rights to equal and fair treatment	Non-Muslim minorities	Soner (2005)
4.1. Political information and inquiry		Article 74
4.3. Social movement and protest rights	Participation to collective petition and protests	Esmer (1999), Kalaycıoğlu (1998), Art.34
<i>C. Social Rights</i>		
<i>1. Enabling and preventive rights:</i>		
1.1. Health services	Role of social network in access to health services	Erder (1996a, 1996b), Güneş-Ayata (1991), Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu (1998), Article 56
1.2. Family allowances		
1.3. Personal and family counseling		Article 41
1.4. Physical rehabilitation		

2. <i>Opportunity rights</i> 2.1. Education 2.2. Educational assistance for special groups	-role of family-kinship ties in reaching education facilities -“building schools is the duty of the state” -education of girls	Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu (1998), Erder (1996b), İlkaracan and İlkaracan (1998), Article 42
3. <i>Distributive rights:</i>		
3.1. Old age pensions		Article 60
3.2. Public assistance		Article 61
3.3. Unemployment compensation		
4. <i>Compensatory rights:</i>		
4.1. Work injury insurance		
4.2. War injury pension		
4.3. War equalization		
4.4. Rights infringement compensation		
<i>D. Participation Rights</i>		
1. <i>Labor Market Intervention rights:</i> 1.1. Labor market information programs 1.2. Job placement programs	-roles of informal relations network/ <i>hemşerilik</i> / social network/ family-kinship ties in finding jobs and being informed about jobs	Dubetsky(1977), Erder(1996a, 1996b), Baştuğ (1976), Rittersberger-Tılıç and Kalaycıoğlu (1998), Articles 49, 50, 55
2. <i>Firm and bureaucracy rights:</i>		
2.1. Job security rights		
2.2. Workers councils or grievance procedure rights		
2.3. Client participation in bureaucracy or self-administration	-relations with local administrations - lack of a local organization model in which citizens can participate in decision making process	Erder(1996) Ünsal (1998)
2.4. Affirmative action and comparable worth		
2.5. Collective bargaining rights		Article 53
3. <i>Capital Control rights:</i>		

3.1. Codetermination rights		
3.2. Wage earner and union investment funds		
3.3. Capital escape laws		
3.4. Anti-trust laws		
3.5. Regional investment and equalization programs	-Kurds living in the Southeastern region where they experience insecure access to land, income, education, health, possessions, state resources	İçduygu, Romano, Sirkeci (1999)

APPENDIX B: ANKARA PILOT SURVEY

1. QUESTIONNAIRE FORM

Cinsiyeti:

Yaşı:

Oturduğu semt:

Memleketi:

Memleketi Ankara değilse kaç yıldır Ankara'da oturuyor:

Meslek / Şu anda Yaptığı iş:

Eğitim Düzeyi:

1. Yurttaş kelimesi size neleri çağrıştırıyor? Aklınıza ilk gelen fikirleri/tanımları/örnekleri söyler misiniz?
2. Türkiye'de yurttaş olmak desem size neleri çağrıştırır?
3. Kendinizi yurttaş olarak (yukarıdaki tanım /kavram/örneklere göre) görüyor musunuz?
4. Türkiye'de yaşayan bir yurttaş olarak ne gibi haklarınızın olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?
5. Türkiye'de yaşayan bir yurttaş olarak ne gibi sorumluluklarınızın olduğunu düşünüyorsunuz?
6. Sizce devletin temel görevleri nelerdir?
7. Devletten neler bekliyorsunuz?
8. Peki sizce devlet bireylerden neler bekleyebilir? Beklemeli?
9. Şimdiye kadar hiç haksızlığa uğradınız mı? Ne gibi? Açıklayınız? Bir örnek veriniz.
10. Evetse, bu durumda nasıl davrandınız? Neler yaptınız?
11. Çevrenizdeki insanlara yönelik olarak haksızlık olduğunu düşündüğünüz olaylar, davranışlar oldu mu? Bu durumda ne yaptınız?
12. Şimdiye kadar herhangi bir toplumsal olay hakkında topluluk içinde fikir beyan ettiniz mi? Ve buna ilişkin bir eylemde / davranışta bulundunuz mu? (genel gidiş, siyaset, eğitim ve sağlık altyapısı, vergi kanunu, özelleştirme, kentlere göç, askere

gitmek istemeyenler, gecekondular sorunu, altyapı sorunları, kız çocuklarının okutulması, medyanın görevleri, televizyon programları, çevre sorunları)

13. Evetse, ne gibi? (toplu dilekçe, gösteri yürüyüşü, fax çekme, Meclise yürüme, ilgililere telefonla şikayet etme)

14. Böyle bir davranışta bulunmadıysanız, neden?

15. Şimdiye kadar hiç bir soruna çözüm üretmeyi düşündünüz mü? Denediniz mi? Sonuç ne oldu? Nerelere başvurduunuz? Neler oldu?

16. Sorunların bireyler tarafından çözülebileceğini düşünür müsünüz? Siz toplumsal sorunlara çözüm için neler yapabilirsiniz? (genel gidiş, siyaset, eğitim ve sağlık altyapısı, vergi kanunu, özelleştirme, kentlere göç, askere gitmek istemeyenler, gecekondular sorunu, altyapı sorunları, kız çocuklarının okutulması, medyanın görevleri, televizyon programları, çevre sorunları) Nerelere başvurursunuz? Neler olur?

2. PERSONAL PROFILES OF INTERVIEWEES IN ANKARA PILOT SURVEY

	Gen-der	age	Neighbour-hood	Birth place	Years	Occupation/job	education	other
1	K	21	Emek	Ankara		student	university	
2	E	22	Küçükesat	Batman	4	student	university	Kurd
3	K	23	Çayyolu	Gaziantep	5	Engineer-private company	university	
4	K	24	Yukarı Dikmen	Çorum	11	housewife	Primary school	
5	E	24	Dikmen	Germany	15	Taxi driver (at a taxi company)	High-school	
6	E	26	Yukarı Dikmen	Çorum	23	Taxi driver (at a taxi company)	Left at middle school	
7	E	26	Sincan	Kars	24	Cleaning personnel (public sector)	Left at high school	Kurd
8	K	29	Balgat	Ankara		Civil engineer-public	master	
9	E	31	Keçiören	Rize	20	Accountant (private)	High-sch.(Open Un.)	
10	E	32	Aktepe-Kören	Ankara		Police officer	High-sch.(Open Un.)	
11	E	32	Balgat	Ankara		Architect (private sector)	master	Alevi
12	K	33	Yıldız	Zonguldak	21	Public officer	High-sch.(Open Un.)	
13	K	35	Mamak	Çorum	35	Beauty expert	High-school	Alevi
14	E	35	Sokollu	Kırıkkale	31	News agent	High-school	
15	E	36	Demetevler	Ankara		Peddler (fruits-vegetables)	Middle school	
16	E	37	Bahçelievler	Ankara		Statistician-public	university	
17	K	37	Küçükesat	Pazar-Rize	37	Public officer	master	
18	E	37	Keçiören	Burdur	14	Public officer	High-school	
19	K	38	Yukarı Dikmen	Tokat	17	housewife	Primary school	
20	K	38	Yukarı Dikmen	Yozgat	17	Daily cleaner (currently unemployed)	literate	

21	E	38	Sincan	Çorum	23	Office boy	Middle school	
22	E	38	Yıldız	Yozgat	22	Operator in a taxi company	Primary school	
23	E	40	Batıkent	Sivas	40	Lamp manufacturer	High-school	
24	K	40	Bahçelievler (janitor flat)	Sivas	18	housewife	literate	Alevi
25	K	40	Yenimahalle	Bursa	26	Statistician-public	Master degree	
26	E	40	Dikmen	Ankara		Police –deputy chief	university	
27	K	42	İlker mah. - Dikmen	Yozgat	20	Baby sitter-cleaner	Left at primary 3 rd grade	Alevi
28	K	42	Bahçelievler (janitor flat)	Sivas	18	housewife	Girls Vocational School	Alevi
29	K	43	Keçiören	Ankara		Janitor-public	High-school	
30	E	43	Dikmen	İstanbul	19	Tourism business (private airlines)	university	
31	E	43	Balgat	Ankara-Gölbaşı		Janitor-private sector	Primary school	
32	K	44	Sincan	Yozgat	35	Janitor-cleaner-private sector	Primary school	
33	K	45	Bahçelievler	Bursa	30	Engineer-public	university	
34	E	48	Keçiören	Kulu-Konya	25	Taxi driver (at a taxi company)	Middle school	Kurd
35	E	52	Yukarı Dikmen	Çorum	23	Retired janitor-public	Primary school	
36	K	56	Çankaya (janitor flat)	Çorum	24	Not working (used to be a daily cleaner)	Left at primary 4th	
37	E	56	Çankaya	İstanbul	28	Retired Naval Major -manager in private company.	university	
38	K	58	Yukarı Dikmen	Yozgat	17	housewife	illiterate	
39	K	64	Konutkent	Ankara	21	Retired craftsman	Primary school	Worked in Germany
40	K	65	Aşağı Ayrancı	İnegöl-Bursa	41	Retired teacher	Teacher School for Girls	

APPENDIX C: QUESTIONNAIRE FORM OF THE AFP PROJECT

TÜRKİYE’DE DEVLET-BİREY İLİŞKİSİ VE YURTTAŞLIK KAVRAMININ ALGILANMASINA YÖNELİK PİLOT ANKET UYGULAMASI

Bu çalışma ODTÜ Sosyoloji Bölümü’nde öğrencilerle beraber yapılacak bir araştırma dersinin saha araştırması bölümünü gerçekleştirmek için yapılmaktadır. Çalışmanın konusu Ankara, İstanbul ve İzmir’de farklı sosyo-ekonomik kesimlerde vatandaş olabilmenin varolan koşullarının ve bu konudaki düşüncelerin araştırılmasına yöneliktir.

Anketörün ismi:

Anket No:

Anket tarihi:

Anketin yapıldığı Şehir:

Anketin Yapıldığı Semt:

Konuşulan Kişilerle İlgili Sosyo - Demografik Bilgiler

1. Doğum yeri: Köyü..... İlçesi..... İli.....
2. Aslen nerelisiniz? Köyü..... İlçesi..... İli.....
3. Ankara'ya ne zaman yerleştiniz (Yılı)?
4. Şu anda oturmakta olduğunuz semt:
5. Hanede kaç kişi yaşıyorsunuz
6. Kaç çocuğunuz var?
7. Aile Tablosu

Yakınlık derecesi	Yaş	Cinsiyet	Eğitim Durumu (son mezun olduğu okul)	İş (işteki statüsü)	Gelir
Kendisi					

*Evde yaşayan kişiler tabloya sığmazsa formun altına ilave edebilirsiniz.

8. Sizin veya ailenizin herhangi bir sosyal güvenceniz var mı? Hangisi?

Babası annesi evde yaşamayanlar için:

9. Babasının eğitim durumu:

10. Babasının işteki statüsü:

11. Annesinin eğitim durumu:

12. Annesinin işteki statüsü:
13. Şu anda çalıştığınız işi nasıl buldunuz? Kim ya da hangi kurumdan yardım aldınız?
14. Şu anda oturduğu ev kimin: 1. Kendinin 2. Kira 3. Anne-Babanın
4. Akrabanın 5. Lojman 6. Diğer
15. Şu anda oturduğu evin durumu: 1. Apartman dairesi 2. Gecekondu 3. Müstakil
16. Kiracı ise: oturduğunuz evi nasıl buldunuz?
17. Ne kadar kira ödüyorsunuz?
18. Ev sahibi olanlara: Evinizi kiraya verseniz kaç k kiraya verirdiniz?
19. Evinizin: 1. Evin İçinde şebeke suyu V Y
2. Yasal hattan gelen elektrik V Y
3. Kanalizasyon, atık su sistemi V Y
4. İskan ruhsatı V Y
5. Deprem sigortası V Y
6. Depreme karşı alınmış önlemler V Y
20. Evinin sahibi olanlar için: Emlak vergisi öder misiniz? E H
Hayırsa, Neden?
21. Evinizde hangisi var?

ARAÇLAR	EVET	HAYIR
Bilgisayar		
Çamaşır makinesi		
Bulaşık makinesi		
Birden fazla tv		
Elektrik süpürgesi		
Kamera		
Video/VCD/DVD (hangisi varsa açık olarak yazın)		
Otomobil		

Örgütlenme

22. İş dışında en çok kimlerle konuşur, vakit geçirirsiniz?

1.
2.
3.

23. Kendinizin/ Çocuğunuzun eğitimiyle ilgili olarak neler yaparsınız? Çocuğunuzun eğitimiyle ilgili karar verirken veya sorun yaşarsanız kime / hangi kuruma başvurursunuz?

24. Kendinizin/ Çocuğunuzun sađlıkıla ilgili bir sorunu olduđunda neler yaparsınız?
Önce kime ya da hangi kuruma danıřırsınız?
25. Kendi işinizde sorun yařadıđınızda kime danıřırsınız?
26. Çocuđunuza iş bulmak için neler yaparsınız?
27. Ailenizde bazı kararlar nasıl alınır? Beraber, Eřim karar verir, Ben karar veririm
1. tatil
2. çocukların eđitimi
28. Ailenize karřı sorumluluklarınız nelerdir? Nedenleri?
29. Her hangi bir derneđe/odaya/sendikaya üye misiniz? Hangisi?
30. Bu kurumdan nasıl haberdar oldunuz?
31. Üye olduđunuz kurumun toplantılarına/etkinliklerine düzenli olarak katılır mısınız?
32. Bu kurumdan neler beklersiniz? Sizce üye olduđunuz bu kurumun/ derneđin / sendikanın yararları nelerdir?
33. Çeřitli parti/sendika ya da grupların protesto gösterileri hakkında ne düşünöyorsunuz?
34. Bu tür gösteri veya yürüyüşlere katılır mısınız? E H
Evetse, Hangi durumda?
- Beni ilgilendiren bir konu hakkında ise katılırım E H
- Beni bizzat ilgilendirmese de katılırım E H
35. Mahallenizde oturan insanlar arasında her hangi bir sorun çıkarsa nasıl çözölür?

Çevresel duyarlılık

36. Komşunuzun evine hırsız girdiđini farkederseniz ne yaparsınız?
37. Komşunuzun ciddi ailevi sorunları varsa (karısını dövüyorsa) ne yaparsınız?
38. Sokakta bir kadının sözlü ya da fiziksel tacize maruz kaldıđına řahit olsanız ne yaparsınız?
39. Mahkeme önlerinde, tatbikatlarda, hapishanelerde yařanan linç olaylarını nasıl karřılıyorsunuz? Sizce haklı sebepleri olabilir mi?
40. Kapkaçılılık olayları hakkında ne düşünöyorsunuz?

41. Sizce bu olaylar neden yoğunlaştı?

42. Sizce kapkaççılık olayları nasıl önlenir?

Siyasal haklar ve yükümlülükler

43. Sizce toplumda İnsanların sosyal güvencesi olması önemli midir? Neden?

44. Sizce bu sosyal güvence hangi gereksinmelerinizi karşılamalı?

45. Peki, şu anda Türkiye’de varolan sosyal güvence sistemi tüm gereksinmeleri karşılıyor mu? E H

46. Hayırsa, neden?

47. Vergi numaranızı biliyor musunuz? (**Anketör:** Kişinin numarayı ezbere bilmesi değil, almış ve kullanıyor olması sorulacak)

48. Yeni kimlik numaranızı aldınız mı? E H

49. Sizce bu yeni kartlar / numaralar ne için gerekli?

50. İkametgahınız şu anda oturduğunuz mahallede mi? E H

51. En son ikametgah kağıdını (a) ne zaman
b) ne için aldınız?

52. Sizce muhtarın temel işlevleri nelerdir?

53. Sizce vali ile belediye başkanı arasında ne fark vardır?

54. Belediye seçimlerinde oy verirken nelere dikkat edersiniz?

55. Belediyenizden memnun musunuz? (**Anketör:** ilçe veya Büyükşehir. kendisi hangisini referans alıyorsa belinin. Ayrı ayrı söylüyorsa ayrı ayrı yazın).

-Evetse, memnun olduğu yönleri:

1.....

2.....

56. Hayırsa, neden?

1.....

2.....

57. Belediyeden neler beklersiniz?

58. Bugüne kadar, hiç belediyeye dilekçe yazıp bir talepte bulundunuz mu? E H

Evetse, a) Hangi nedenle?

b) Sonuç ne oldu?

59. Sizce, insanların toplumda beraber yaşamaları için gerekli olan **kurallara uymaları** nasıl sağlanabilir? İnsanlar kendileri bu konuda neler yapabilir? Devlet bu konuda neler yapabilir? (**Anketör: Bu soruda altı çizilecek öge: kurallara uymanın çeşitli yollarıdır**)

Siyasal katılım:

60. Siyasetle ilgili gelişmeleri nereden öğreniyorsunuz?

61. Siyasi partilerin temel işlevi nedir, ne olmalıdır?

62. Oy verirken nelere dikkat edersiniz?

63. Sizce, diğer insanlar oy verirken nelere dikkat ediyor?

64. Geçen seçimlerde hangi partiye oy verdiniz? 1995
1998

65. Gelecek seçimlerde hangi partiye oy vermeyi düşünüyorsunuz? Değişim varsa neden?

66. Siyasi partilerden kişisel beklentileriniz nelerdir?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

67. Siyasi partilerden ülke için beklentileriniz nelerdir?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

Medya

68. Siz haberlerinizi hangi televizyon kanalından takip etmeyi tercih edersiniz? Neden?

69. Hangi gazeteyi okur /takip edersiniz? Neden?

BUNDAN SONRA SİZE AŞAĞIDAKİ TABLOLARDAN BAZI CÜMLELER OKUYACAĞIM. LÜTFEN BU CÜMLELERDEKİ FİKİRLERİ VEYA BİLGİLERİ ONAYLAYIP ONAYLAMADIĞINIZI BELİRTİR MİSİNİZ? KARARSIZ KALIRSANIZ AYRICA BELİRTEBİLİRSİNİZ.

(ANKETÖR DİKKAT: EVET / HAYIR CEVAPLARI İÇİN BİR NEDEN DE VERİLİRSE MUTLAKA MÜLAKAT FORMUNA BU BİLGİLERİ NOT EDİNİZ... AYRICA CEVAPLAYANA TABLOLARIN BAŞLIKLARINI DA OKUYUN. ŞİMDİ SİZE "bireyin devlete karşı sorumlulukları nelerdir ile ilgili cümleler okuyacağım" GİBİ)

TABLO 1. BİREYİN DEVLETE KARŞI SORUMLULUKLARI NELERDİR?

ITEM	Evet	Kararsızım	Hayır
İnsanların muhtara kayıtlı olması gereksiz bir angaryadır.			
Asayişle ilgili bir sorunla karşılaştığımda hemen polisi ararım.			
Vatandaşın çalıştığı sürede emeklilik primlerini düzgün yatırması gereklidir.			
Ailede bir kişinin sigortalı olması yeterlidir.			
Mahallede, sokakta vs. yolda bir bozukluk vs. olduğunda belediyeye haber vermek gerekir.			
Çöp ve çevre temizliği vergisini zamanında öderim.			
Fahri trafik müfettişliği uygulaması iyidir.			
İnsanların oy vermeme hakkı olmalı ve oy vermeyen kişi cezalandırılmamalıdır.			

TABLO 2. BİREYİN TOPLUMSAL KURALLAR KARŞISINDAKİ SORUMLULUKLARI NELERDİR?

ITEM	Evet	Kararsızım	Hayır
Yol boşsa kırmızı ışıkta geçilebilir.			
Araba kullanırken veya yolcu iken kemer takarım.			
İnsanların özel hayatının korunmasına dikkat etmeyen programları seyretmem.			
Kamusal hizmetler alırken hatalı gördüğüm bir durum/tavır olursa şikayet için kurumdaki bir üst amire başvururum.			
Farklı inanışlara sahip olan ailelerin çocukları aynı sınıfta okuyabilirler.			
Bankalarda sıra numarası alma uygulamasını çok gerekli buluyorum.			

TABLO 3. DEVLETİN SORUMLULUKLARI NELERDİR?

ITEM	Evet	Kararsızım	Hayır
Eğitim ücretsiz olmalıdır.			
Sağlık hizmetlerinde kapsam alanı herkesi içine alacak biçimde genişletilmelidir.			
Devlet yeşil kart uygulaması ile muhtaç kişilere yeterli sağlık güvencesi sağlıyor.			
Ülkemizde toplu konut politikaları gelişmiştir.			
Çeşitli kurumlarda iş takip ederken tanıdıklarım yardımcı olurlar.			
Varolan seçim sisteminde herkese eşit oy hakkı sağlanamamaktadır.			
Haklı nedenleri varsa kapkaç, hırsızlık gibi bazı suçlar affedilebilir.			
Haklı nedenleri olsa da vergi kaçırma ve devlete karşı işlenmiş suç affedilemez.			
İnsanların fikirlerini ifade etme özgürlüğü olmalıdır.			
Depremde vatandaşa en büyük yardımı devlet kurumları sağladı.			

TABLO 4. TOPLUMDA DİĞER KİŞİLERİN SORUMLULUKLARI NELERDİR?

ITEM	Evet	Kararsızım	Hayır
Büyük iş sahipleri vergilerini düzgün olarak öderler.			
Çalışanların sigorta primleri düzgün ödenmiyor.			
Trafikte herkes kırmızı ışıkta geçiyor.			
Elektrik çok pahalı olduğundan çoğu insan komşuları ile ortak kullanıyor.			
Bir malı ucuza almak için satış fişi almamayı herkes kabul edebilir.			
Akrabalarımızdan birisi vergisini ödemezse onu uyarırız.			
Ailelerde birisine gelen özel bir mektup diğer aile üyeleri tarafından açılabilir.			
Büyük kentlere göç edenler yüzünden yaşam zorlaştı.			
Kimse kurallara saygı göstermiyor.			

SON SÖZ: LÜTFEN UNUTMAYIN

70. TÜRKİYE'DE NELERDEN MEMNUNSUNUZ? İYİ VE GÜÇLÜ YÖNLER NELERDİR?

1.....

2.....

3.....

71. TÜRKİYE'DE KARAR VERİCİ KONUMDA OLSAYDINIZ EN ÖNCELİKLİ OLARAK NELERİ DEĞİŞTİRİRDİNİZ?

1.....

2.....

3.....

72. EN SON OLARAK SİZE MEZHEBİNİZİ SORABİLİR MİYİZ?

ANKETÖR: DİKKATLE CEVAPLAYIN :

-ANKET YAPILDIĞINDA KONUŞULAN KİŞİ İLE YALNIZ OLMAYA GAYRET EDİN. OLAMADI İSE LÜTFEN BURAYA YAZIN.

-ANKETİN YAPILDIĞI MEKANIN ÖZELLİKLERİ NELERDİ?

EV

DÜKKAN

İŞYERİ

SOKAK

- ANKETİN UYGULANMASI İLE İLGİLİ OLUMSUZLUKLAR VEYA ZORLUKLAR OLDU MU? NE GİBİ?

- KONUŞULAN KİŞİ İLE İLGİLİ, ÖZEL OLARAK BELİRTMEK İSTEDİĞİNİZ GÖRÜŞLERİNİZ NELERDİR?

APPENDIX D: COMPARISON OF THE AFP PROJECT RESULTS AND ANKARA PILOT SURVEY WITH JANOSKI'S CLASSIFICATION OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
I. Legal Rights		
1. Procedural Rights:		
1.1. Access to courts and counsel		
1.2. Rights to contract		
1.3. Equal treatment under the law	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “We have no rights at all. Those in the upper classes have (rights) but those in lower classes do not have (any). As a simple citizen if I happen to deal with the police they will treat me as a second class citizen.” - “In Turkey there is no right, no law, but there is struggle. If you are backed up you can get your rights.” - “We have no rights at all. There is right if you have power. Everything depends on money and your connections. The destitute has no power.” - “There isn’t right to have a dignified life, nor to be equal.” - “They oppress the impoverished, but do not touch the rich.” 	
1.4. Rights of aliens to immigrate and citizens to emigrate		-Life became difficult in metropolitan cities because of emigrants. (76%)
2. Expressive Rights:	- “We have freedom of expression.”	- People should have freedom of expression. (97%)

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
2.1. freedom of speech		
2.2. freedom of religion	- "There is freedom of belief."	- Children of families with different beliefs can attend to the same class at school. (95%)
2.3. choice of friends, companions		- I spend my spare times with friends at the neighbourhood, school mates, family and neighbours.
2.4. right to privacy		- I do not watch TV programs that disregard people's privacy. (70%) - A private letter should not be opened by other embers of the family. (89%)
3. Bodily control right		
3.1. freedom from assault and unsafe environment	- "There is right to security." (2) - "We have rights but they are not implemented. We have right to security, but nobody feels secure."	- Lynch cannot be approved under any case(44%); depends on the circumstances (21%); can be based on just causes (12%) - I do not approve purse-snatching (54%), can be prevented if the state improves the economy (45%)
3.2. medical and sexual control over body		
4. Property and service rights		
4. 1. hold and dispose of property and services		- I make complaints to the superior officer if I come across with an unjust/incorrect attitude during public service. (%80)
4.2. choice of residence	- "There is right to shelter." (3) - The place where I live (janitor's flat) is dark, only after 6.30 pm. We go out to the park to take some air. I also would like to look out through the window while sitting at my home."	
4.3. choice of occupation	- "There is right to work." - "There are lots of rights but no jobs." - "Even you get education there is no job."	- I found my job with the help of acquaintances, relatives (%20), individually (%15); I set up my own business (%13); found through the public

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
		agencies (%11); I set up business with the support of the family (%2). - What do you do to find a job to your child: ask to friends, relatives (%42); S/he should find herself/himself (I provided good education)(%17); I find myself (%5); apply to a mediating agency (%2); we cannot do anything (%1,5).
5. Organizational rights 5.1. employee organizing		- 2.6% of the respondents are members of a trade union.
5.2. corporate organizing		- 12% of the respondents are members of an occupational organization.
5.3. political party organizing		- 5% of the respondents are members of a political party or an association.
II. Political rights		
1. Personal rights: 1.1. enfranchisement of the poor, gender groups, ethnic/racial groups, age categories and immigrants	- “We have no right at all. The vote we use does not mean anything.”	- The existing election system cannot ensure the right to equal vote. (51%) - People should have the right not to vote and those not voting should not be penalized. (65%)
1.2. Rights to run and hold office		
1.3. rights to form and join a political party		- 5% of the respondents are members of a political party or an association.
2. Organizational rights:		
2.1. political lobbying		
2.2. political fund raising		
2.3. legislative and administrative consultation		- When you have problems in a workplace whom do you ask advice? boss, manager (22%); myself (19%); family (14%); a more experienced friend

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
		(12%); an expert of the subject (4%); relatives, friends (2%)
2.4. political bargaining		-
3. Naturalization rights:		
3.1. right to naturalize upon residency		
3.2. right to information on naturalization process		
3.3. refugee rights		
4. Oppositional rights:		
4.1. Minority rights to equal and fair treatment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “You do not have the right to give the name to your child that you desire.” - “I am treated as a potential criminal since I was born in the East.” - “There were soldiers treated badly because they were Kurds.” 	
4.2. political information and inquiry rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “There is right to acquire information.” - “There is right to get news.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Where do you learn political developments?: TV (94%); newspapers (65%); talk among people (7.7%); magazines (7.4%); internet (6.7%); political party (2.8%)
4.3. social movement and protest rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Public officers do not have the right to release a formal statement nor to demonstrate.” - “Public servants, workers march, what will they get? I believe that nothing will change [if I protest something]” - “Public servants, workers protest in the name of us as well, so why do you I protest?” - “I never do anything (marches, protest etc.) against the state.” - “I do not believe that protest acts serve anything. In 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 64% of respondents are in favour of protest demonstrations of political parties, unions or groups; 10% do not approve such movements; 13% believe nothing will change as a result of these protests. - 26% of respondents have participated in a march or demonstration; 72% have never participated in such actions. - 27% say “if such a protest is of direct interest to me then I will take part” 8% will participate even

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	<p>addition to not changing the situation it puts me in a difficult position.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Nothing will change (by protesting), and on top of it I am left as beaten.” - “Protests will solve nothing. I am also afraid that quarrels may happen during the protests.” - “I want to participate in marches but the police intervene, then lots of events happen, I am scared.” 	<p>if the protest does not directly concern them.</p>
III. Social Rights		
<p>1. Enabling and preventive rights: 1.1. health services</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “I feel as if I have no rights at all. I have deficiencies in obtaining economic, education and health services. I could not provide good education to my children because of material scarcities. In public hospitals (SSK) doctors do not take care of you, I should go to private doctors.” - “The citizen has no rights; s/he cannot exercise any of his/her social or health service rights. - “I don’t think that I have any rights at all. One cannot exercise the rights to education, health etc. if he does not have money. In Turkey it is always money that matters.” - “I believe that some of our rights are restricted (naming your child, adequate health service, and material rights as a descent salary or transportation benefit)” - “I don’t think that I have many rights. Education and health services are not sufficient. But solidarity between people is good.” 	

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “I have rights to education, health, to travel; freedom of expression and religion; right to shelter; to inquiry; to work.” - “I have rights to education, health, communication, culture, security, justice, transportation, to infrastructure facilities as roads, water, and electricity.” - “I believe that every citizen living in Turkey deserves conditions to reach a certain level of education, health, shelter and nourishment.” - “Virtually health and education services are free of charge but they are not implemented properly.” - “We have rights but not adequate. We cannot exercise our right to health services. It is our right to expect that taxes we pay should return to us as services.” - “There is right to health but it is difficult to consult a doctor particularly for our children.” - “I have all rights but I cannot exercise. Especially in hospitals they do not look at your face.” 	
1.2. family allowances		
1.3. personal and family counseling		<p>- If I have difficulties in taking decisions concerning the education of child or if I encounter problems regarding his education I consult to: his school (teacher, director) (30%); myself and my spouse (21%); psychological advisors of the school (8%); consultancy agencies of private schools (6%); experienced friends (4.4%) Ministry of Education (4%); to the elderly (3.6%)</p>

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
1.4. physical rehabilitation		
2.1. pre-primary education 2.2. primary and secondary education 2.3. higher education 2.4. vocational education 2.5. educational assistance for special groups	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “I feel as if I have no rights at all. I have deficiencies in obtaining economic, education and health services. I could not provide good education to my children because of material scarcities. In public hospitals (SSK) doctors do not take care of you, I should go to private doctors.” - “I don’t think that I have any rights at all. One cannot exercise the rights to education, health etc. if he does not have money. In Turkey it is always the money that talks” - In Turkey only 5-10% of the population have the right to a dignified life, the rest 90% are in their service. There is no social security, education facilities are not sufficient. (Even if the child is successful s/he cannot continue education because of the lack of material resources.)” - “I don’t think that I have many rights. Education and health services are not sufficient.” - “I believe that Turkish citizen can exercise all kind of rights: such as the rights to travel, dwelling, education, communication.” - “I have rights to education, health, to travel; freedom of expression and religion; right to shelter; to inquiry; to work.” - “I have rights to education, health, communication, culture, security, justice, transportation, to infrastructure facilities such as roads, water, and electricity.” - “We have the rights of freedom / relative equality 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If I have difficulties in taking decisions concerning the education of child or if I encounter problems regarding his education I consult to: his school (teacher, director) (30%); myself and my spouse (21%); psychological advisors of the school (8%); consultancy agencies of private schools (6%); experienced friends (4.4%) Ministry of Education (4%); to the elderly (3.6%) - Education should be free of charge. (87%)

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	<p>with reference to ability and knowledge/ free education/ social security/ shelter/ security.”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “In Turkey the citizens have the rights to education, travel, petition, and freedom of the press, right to get news.” - “I believe that every citizen living in Turkey deserves conditions to reach a certain level of education, health, shelter and nourishment.” - “There is the right to education but I could not get any education.” - “Virtually health and education services are free of charge but they are not implemented properly.” - “Rights are abundant but there is no job. My daughter passed the entry exam of high school but we cannot afford the registration fee.” - “Children have right to education but I could not have them registered yet [because of the fee].” 	
<p>3. Distributive rights: 3.1. Old age pensions</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “What rights do we have? Those who rule us take everything for themselves. My son is at home, unemployed, I am 56 years old, and how can we subsist with my husband’s retirement salary? The place where I live (janitor’s flat) is dark, only after 6.30 pm. We go out to the park to take some air. I also would like to look out through the window while sitting at my home. The citizen is complaining. Before it was not like that, in the first years of our arrival to Ankara we used to sustain easily.” - In Turkey only 5-10% of the population have the 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - It is important that people in a society have social security. (97%) - Social security is important in old age. (34%) - Everybody one day may need to have social security. (17%) - Social security is significant for social welfare and societal integrity. (14%) - Social security is important for having a dignified life.(11% - Social security is the essential function of the state. (8.5%) - If one has a social security he will get involved in

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	right to a dignified life, the rest 90% are in their service. There is no social security, education facilities are not sufficient. (Even if the child is successful s/he cannot continue education because of the lack of material resources.)” - There is right to social security.”	incorrect events. (5%) - Social security should cover retirement needs. (10%) - The present social security system does not correspond to the requirements. (92%) this is because of economic situation, lack of coordination and corruption; there is an unjust and unfair system.
3.2. public assistance		- The state does not provide adequate health insurance to the person in need through the green card application. (%65)
3.3. unemployment compensation	- “I think that we have no rights. Especially as a janitor (office boy/tea man) no rights at all, we have to accept everything. No value is attached to the human being. Unlike in Europe nothing is in order. When they decide to fire someone they say “do not come tomorrow” and unemployment benefit is not granted.”	
4. Compensatory rights: 4.1. work injury assistance		
4.2. war injury pension		
4.3. war equalization		
4.4. rights infringement compensation		
IV. Participation Rights		
1. Labor market intervention rights: 1.1. Labor market information programs		- I found my job with the help of acquaintances, relatives (%20), individually (%15); I set up my own business (%13); found through the public agencies (%11); I set up business with the support

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
		of the family (%2). - What do you do to find a job to your child: ask to friends, relatives (%42); S/he should find herself/himself (I provided good education)(%17); I find myself (%5); apply to a mediating agency (%2); we cannot do anything (%1,5).
1.2. Job placement programs		Same as the previous item
1.3. Job creation services	- “Even if you are educated there is no job.” “Rights are many but there is no job.”	Same as the previous item
2. Firm and bureaucracy rights: 2.1. Job security rights	- “At the end of the month five minutes before leaving they called me and asked me not to come the day after. (works a tea-woman/ cleaner in a private company) When I return to work in Monday to pack up my things my superior (who was in holiday) told me that I was not going anywhere. That is how I could continue to work here; otherwise I have nothing to do. Where can I apply, I don’t have any rights. How I fight with this huge holding? They can prepare an official record stating that I acted against the administration and they can fire me anyway.” - “In workplaces there is only injustice. It is not certain when they fire you. I am glad if I could end up the workday.”	
2.2. workers councils or grievance procedure rights		
2.3. client participation in bureaucracy or self-administration		

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
2.4. affirmative action and comparable worth		
2.5. collective bargaining rights	- “As a police officer I do not have right to collective bargaining.”	
3. Capital control rights: 3.1. codetermination rights		
3.2. wage earner and union investment funds		
3.3. capital escape laws		
3.4. anti-trust laws		
3.5. regional investment and equalization programs		
Other rights according to the survey results	<p>- “right to live in Turkey”</p> <p>- “I have rights but I do not exercise them. For example I do not run after social security, I want to work in the public agencies just because of easy access to health insurances. I hate the infrastructure works on the streets which result in a terrible traffic jam and difficulties in walking. I have a right to object but I do nothing.”</p>	<p>- Expectations from the local administrations: services like infrastructure, roads, collection of garbage, education; putting the city in order, facilitating the city life, security, a peaceful life in the city; honest and moral service; not acting politically; friendly service and social activities.</p> <p>- Expectations from political parties: solution to economic problems; employment opportunities; preventing poverty; increasing the standards of living; providing assistance when required; honesty, preventing corruption; education; securing stability; serious performance; offering solutions and policies; ensuring social peace; solving social problems; democratization; ensuring to live in a peaceful country; listening to the people; working for the citizen; securing equality; taking positive steps in the EU process; strengthening the place of Turkey in the international order; protecting moral</p>

Citizenship Rights according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Rights in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
		values.
Other comments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “I believe that I have all kinds of rights.” - “I believe that I have all kinds of rights, but I cannot exercise some of them.” - “I have all the constitutional rights, but there are problems in implementation.” - “I believe that I have all kinds of rights. But it is important to exercise these rights. One should not abuse the rights by exercising them for his own interests.” - “Of course we have rights.” - “We have rights to everything but we cannot exercise them. There are no facilities, for example there isn’t any playground for children (in my neighbourhood).” - “We have many rights but I don’t know if we deserve them. I do not work, but I externally pay insurance premiums. There is right to education but I could not get any education.” - “We have all sorts of freedoms. These freedoms may sometimes be restricted because of individual mistakes in institutions. As long as you behave like a gentleman and know your place you can exercise your rights.” - “Right are not granted when you asked for, you do not choose, the ruling power chooses.” - “We have no rights.” - “I cannot find any rights. Everywhere there are waiting lines (e.g.hospitals).” 	

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
I. Legal Obligations		
1. Interpersonal obligations: 1.1. Respect other's rights to liberty, free speech, religion and property	- "People should have the right to express their ideas."	- Children of families with different beliefs can attend to the same class at school. (95%) - People should have freedom of expression. (97%)
1.2. Respect laws of contract, association and equal treatment		
2. Organizational duties: 2.1. Organizational duty to promote the general welfare	- "I do my best in areas which can contribute to my motherland." - "It is a responsibility to promote the welfare of the country (in all areas such as economic, sociological, psychological) starting from the family." - "It is a duty to work for social development (welfare of the country)." - "It is a duty for everyone to work honestly in his /her job and to contribute individually to increasing the growth rate and productivity."	
2.2. respect individual rights	- "I have the duty to respect people." - "I have the duty to respect everyone's rights." (2) - "I believe that I have a responsibility of not disturbing anyone." - "I have the responsibility to draw the borderlines of rights and liberties."	- People should respect each other to ensure the compliance with the rules made for living together in a society. (21%) - I believe that taking numbers for being served in a bank is a necessary regulation.(90%)
2.3. Respect laws duly made by government	- "I have the duty to respect the laws." (2) - "I have the duty to respect the rules"	- Even if the road is clear one should not cross/drive while the traffic light is red. (76%) - I fasten my belt while driving or sitting in a car.

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
		(88%) - Everybody crosses while the traffic light is red. (39%) - No one respects the rules. (79%) - People should respect each other to ensure the compliance with the rules made for living together in a society. (21%) - To ensure the compliance with the rules; the state should educate people (30%); the state should make necessary legislation (9%); the state should be fair (8%); the state should assure the social welfare (5%).
3. Enforcement and implementation obligations: 3.1. provide resources for the legal system	- “paying taxes, not evading taxes”	- I pay garbage and environment tax on time. (86%) - Owners of large businesses do not pay their taxes properly. (73%) - If one of our relatives does not pay his/her taxes we warn him/her. (53%)
3.2. Assist in assuring the domestic tranquility (militias)	- “It is a duty to object to any kind of opinion and action which violate the indivisible integrity of the country.” - “It a duty to protect the indivisibility of the fatherland and its territorial integrity.” - “Not to be a traitor is a citizenship duty.”	- If I witness on the street a woman’s being harassed verbally or physically I intervene or at least I try. (44%)
3.3. respect and cooperate with police in assuring legal rights	- “I do not make a complaint to the police if there is noise in the neighbourhood or if someone shoots off after a match. One day my children might do the same thing, why should I complain? If there isn’t a direct threat to myself I don’t call the	- When I face/witness a problem regarding public order I call the police. (82%) - If I notice the breaking of a thief into the house of a neighbour I call the police. (75%) -

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	police.”	
II. Political Obligations		
1. Interpersonal obligations: 1.1. vote and participate in politics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “It is my duty to vote.” - “It is a duty to elect the political power which I believe to secure citizenship rights.” - “We should vote so that good persons should come to the top.” - “It is a duty to vote but it should be done consciously.” - “We have no duty, we vote.” - “What duty can I have, I am poor. I vote.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 10 % of respondents did not vote in 1995 and 1998 elections. - The existing election system cannot ensure the right to equal vote. (51%)
1.2. Be informed and exercise the franchise wisely	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “It is a duty to try to evaluate the developments by keeping track of actual events - “It is a duty to know whom to vote by making good analyses as an electorate.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While voting in local elections I pay attention to: the candidate (his record of corruption) (35%); the performance (24%); the party (10%); capacity to provide service (9%); the ideology, view of the candidate (7(%); the candidate and his party (4%); the program, performance and the party (1%). - While voting in general elections I pay attention to: the ideology of the party (25%); performance (25%); the candidate (15%); the party (11%); capacity to govern the country (9%); its respect to laws (4%); the past history of the party (2%); its promises (2%). - While voting political parties other people decide according to: their habits (21%); personal interests (16%); the ideology (11%); promises of the party (<i>halk iki lafa kaniyor</i> -People are fooled by a few words) (10%)

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
		- Where do you learn political developments?: TV (94%); newspapers (65%); talk among people (7.7%); magazines (7.4%); internet (6.7%); political party (2.8%)
1.3. Respect democracy and not make unreasonable demands		-64% of respondents are in favour of protest demonstrations of political parties, unions or groups; 10% do not approve such movements; 13% believe nothing will change as a result of these protests.
2. Organizational duties: 2.1. Cooperate with other groups in the operation of politics		
2.2. follow political laws and regulations		
3. Enforcement and implementation obligations: 3.1. provide resources to protect and operate democratic system	- “paying taxes, not evading taxes”	- I pay garbage and environment tax on time. (86%) - Owners of large businesses do not pay their taxes properly. (73%) - If one of our relatives does not pay his/her taxes we warn him/her. (53%)
3.2. Protect nation from threats by active service in the military (draft)	- “military service” - “Since the state does not feel any responsibility toward the citizen I do not feel myself responsible to the state. But since the state is poor I believe that doing military service -even though you are not paid- is a duty.”	
3.3. Protest and overthrow governments that violate rights	- “It is a duty to follow (oversee) the rulers, and react against incorrect applications/regulations.” - “Public servants, workers march, what will they	- 64% of respondents are in favour of protest demonstrations of political parties, unions or groups; 10% do not approve such movements;

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	<p>get? I believe that nothing will change [if I protest something].”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Public servants, workers protest in the name of us as well, so why do I protest?” - “I never do anything (marches, protest etc.) against the state.” - “I do not believe that protest acts serve anything. In addition to not changing the situation it puts me in a difficult position.” - “Nothing will change (by protesting), and on top of it I am left as beaten.” - “Protests will solve nothing. I am also afraid that quarrels may happen during the protests.” - “I want to participate in marches but the police intervene, then lots of events happen, I am scared.” 	<p>13% believe nothing will change as a result of these protests.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 26% of respondents have participated in a march or demonstration; 72% have never participated in such actions. - 27% say “if such a protest is of direct interest to me then I will take part” 8% will participate even if the protest does not directly concern them.
III.Social Obligations		
1. Enabling and preventive duties: 1.1. Pursue prudent health care		- One of my responsibilities toward my family is to take care of the health and education of my children. (4%)
1.2. Raise a loving family	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “It is a duty to raise a cultured, educated child who is beneficial to the fatherland and nation.” - “It is a duty to be a good family, to raise a good (both morally and educationally) child.” 	- My responsibilities toward my family are: to raise a good child (18%); to prepare a good future for my child (6%); to take care of the health and education of my children. (4%)
1.3. Maintain a safe and clean environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “It is a duty to protect the resources of the country.” - “It’s a duty to protect the country and the nature.” 	
2. Opportunity obligations:	- “It’s a responsibility to send the child to school but	- One of my responsibilities toward my family is to

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
2.1. Pursue education to best of one's ability	there is no money. (The school asks for money every month, what makes it a public school?) - "It is a duty to raise a cultured, educated child who is beneficial to the fatherland and nation."	take care of the health and education of my children. (4%)
2.2. Pursue career to the benefit to society	- "It's a duty to keep working on the path from individual towards the society." - "It's a duty to work for social development (general welfare)." - "It is a duty for everyone to work honestly in his /her job and to contribute individually to increasing the growth rate and productivity."	
2.3. Tolerate social diversity		- Children of families with different beliefs can attend to the same class at school. (95%)
3. Sustenance/economic obligations: 3.1. Recipients of unemployment or public assistance should look for work		
3.2. Respect other's social rights and the need for transfer payments	-	
4. Enforcement and implementation obligations: 4.1. provide resources for social rights	- "Paying taxes is a duty." - "Paying electricity and water fees is a duty." - "We pay electricity and water fees but the state does not fulfill its duties toward us."	- I pay garbage and environment tax on time. (86%) - Citizens should regularly pay the retirement premiums while they continue to work. (94%) - The premium insurances of workers are not paid regularly. (76%) - As the electricity charge is quite high, many people use it jointly with their neighbours. (%31)
4.2. Help less fortunate by	- "Since I see myself belonging to the fortunate	

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
voluntary government and association service	<p>minority I feel responsible against those who live in worse conditions.”</p> <p>- “I can help backward people. I can teach reading-writing, but I do not, either because it seems to as if “I talk in circles” or because of selfishness, and I do not want to. I and others like me can help less fortunate but we do not do.”</p>	
IV. Participation Obligations		
<p>1. Labor market obligations:</p> <p>1.1. Duty of those receiving services to actively pursue work</p>	<p>- “My responsibilities toward myself are to work and shelter.”</p> <p>- “It’s a duty to do one’s best in performing his/her job.”</p> <p>- “performing one’s work in compliance with the laws”</p> <p>- “It is a duty for everyone to work honestly in his /her job and to contribute individually to increasing the growth rate and productivity.”</p>	
<p>1.2. Duty of employers to cooperate with government and unions to provide programs</p>		
<p>2. Firm and bureaucracy obligations:</p> <p>2.1. Ensure equity and productivity in the organization</p>	<p>- “It’s a duty to do one’s best in performing his/her job.”</p> <p>- “working productively is a duty”</p>	
<p>2.2. Safeguard firm competitive information</p>		
<p>2.3. Respect all groups in participatory process</p>	-	

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
3. Capital Participation obligations: 3.1. Protect and promote the economy	- “Preventing corruption is the responsibility of both the state and the citizens.”	
3.2. Provide for capital funds through savings		
4. Enforcement and implementation obligations: 4.1. Provide resources for programs	- Paying taxes	
4.2. Invest in national industries		
Other duties/responsibilities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “being honest” - “I think we should know our history so that we can represent our country abroad properly and can discuss historical facts when necessary.” - “Protecting the state. If the state declines you will as well, the state belongs to us.” - “Things I will do (even education) should be directed toward this country and its people. But because of the corrupt practices I think I’ll feel stupid in the future if I fulfill my duties such as paying taxes.” - “not to say ‘never mind, I do not care’ (<i>‘bana dokunmayan yılan bin yaşasın’ anlayışı yanlış</i>), citizen should insist on his rights” - “to love the Republic of Turkey” - “to live in accordance with our mores and traditions, according to whatever we learnt from our parents.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The municipality should be informed if there is a problem in the neighbourhood or on the street. (92%) - Being registered to the mukhtar (the elected head of a neighbourhood) should not be seen as drudgery. (85%) - It is not enough to have only one insured person in the family. (%85)

Citizenship Duties according to the classification of Janoski	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the Ankara Pilot Survey	Citizenship Duties/obligations in Turkey according to the Results of the AFP Project Survey
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Respecting the flag, the official representatives of the state such as the President and the Prime Minister.” 	
<p>Other comments</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “I do not feel myself responsible at all. I try to do my best to give least and take the most.” - “<i>böyle başa böyle tıraş</i> [I have no duties toward such a state that does not fulfill its duties], they already tax everything.” - “I have no responsibilities; it is my father-in-law who takes care of everything.” - “If everyone does his job properly we will not be in such a situation.” - “We cannot fulfill our duties, the state does not fulfill its duties toward us either, I have no confidence at all. - “The individual should obey the state, fulfill its duties, and the state should fulfill its duties toward us.” - “The state expects us to support it. But we support if it works properly. Since the state does not protect us and our property it does not have the right to expect anything from us.” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If I were the decision maker in Turkey, I would, first of all: improve the economic situation (53%); change the education system (41%); ensure a fair income distribution (18%); improve health services (17%); prevent unemployment (17%); improve the judiciary system (13%); try to achieve democratization (11%).

APPENDIX E: QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS FOR CITIZENSHIP

ODTÜ Sosyoloji Bölümü'nde doktora öğrencisiyim. Türkiye'de, farklı meslek gruplarından kişilerin yurttaşlığı nasıl algıladıkları konusunda bir tez çalışması yapmaktayım. Anketteki sorular, bilgi ölçmeye yönelik olmayıp tamamen kişisel görüş ve düşüncelerinizi öğrenmek amacını taşımaktadır. Cevaplarınız yalnızca tez çalışmasında kullanılacak olup kesinlikle gizli tutulacaktır.
Zaman ayırıp cevapladığınız için çok teşekkür ediyorum.

KİŞİSEL BİLGİLER

Üye olduğu kuruluş:

() TÜSİAD () MÜSİAD () TÜRK-İŞ () HAK-İŞ () hiçbiri

Cinsiyeti:

Doğum yeri:

Medeni Durumu:

Oturduğu semt ve şehir:

Babasının işi/mesleği:

Annesinin işi/mesleği:

Yaşı:

Eğitim durumu:

Varsa çocuk sayısı:

Kaç yıldır bu şehirde oturuyor:

Babasının eğitim durumu:

Annesinin eğitim durumu:

Mesleği/ İşi:

Askerse:

Rütbesi:

Sınıfı:

Çalıştığı kurum:

Bürokratsa:

Ünvanı:

Emrindeki eleman sayısı:

Çalıştığı kurum:

İşverense:

Şirketinde kaç kişi çalışıyor:

Çalıştığı iş kolu:

Kaç yıldır işveren:

İşçiyse:

Çalıştığı işyerinde kaç kişi çalışıyor:

Çalıştığı iş kolu:

İşyerindeki statüsü:

Aşağıda yurttaşlık haklarıyla ilgili görüş ve ifadeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümlelerin her birini okuyunuz ve o cümlenin sizin görüşünüzü ne ölçüde yansıttığını cümlelerin yanındaki uygun harfi daire içine alarak belirtiniz.

I. YURTTAŞLIK HAKLARI NELERDİR?

A. MEDENİ (KİŞİSEL) HAKLAR

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Kanunlar karşısında tüm yurttaşlar eşittir.	a	b	c	d	e
Milletvekilleri ve bazı kamu görevlilerinin dokunulmazlık hakkı olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
İnsanların her konuda fikirlerini özgürce ifade etmeleri sakıncalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Vatandaşın güvenliğini sağlamak devletin temel görevidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Evlilikte edinilen mal varlıklarında kadınla erkeğin eşit oranda hak sahibi olması çok doğru bir uygulamadır.	a	b	c	d	e
İdam cezasının kaldırılmasını doğru buluyorum.	a	b	c	d	e
Türkiye’de yaşayan her vatandaş devletin üst kademeleri de dahil olmak üzere her türlü meslekte yükselme şansına sahip olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Türkiye’de yaşayan yabancı göçmenlere karşı sert tedbirler alınmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
İstanbul gibi büyük metropollere diğer illerden yapılan göçlere sınırlama getirilmelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
İş yaşamında kadın ve erkek her konuda eşit haklara sahip olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Özel hayatın gizliliğini koruma hakkına saygı duymayan televizyon programlarını onaylamıyorum.	a	b	c	d	e

B. SİYASİ HAKLAR

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Tüm yurttaş tercihleri Meclis'te temsil edilebilmelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Siyasi partilere üye olmanın hiçbir faydası yoktur.	a	b	c	d	e
Milletvekili olmak isteyen herkesin eşit oranda seçilme hakkı olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Siyasi partilerin karar alma organlarında belli sayıda kadın partili bulunmasına özen gösterilmelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Sığınmacılara mülteci statüsü verilmemesi doğru bir uygulamadır.	a	b	c	d	e
Toplumsal sorunlara çözüm getirebilmenin tek yolu aktif olarak siyasetle uğraşmaktır.	a	b	c	d	e
Çocuğa koyulacak isimler devletin kurallarına göre belirlenmelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Devletin her alandaki uygulamalarından vatandaşın haberi olması, bilgilendirilmesi şarttır.	a	b	c	d	e
Türkçe dışındaki ana dillerde özel dersanelerde eğitim hakkı olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Gönüllü örgütlere üye olarak tepkilerimi doğru yerlere iletebilirim.	a	b	c	d	e
Protesto gösteri ve yürüyüşlerinin hiçbir soruna çözüm getireceğine inanmıyorum.	a	b	c	d	e

C. SOSYAL HAKLAR

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Devletin sağlık kurumlarından tüm yurttaşlar ücretsiz olarak faydalanabilmelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Devlet yalnızca sosyal güvencesi olan yurttaşlara ücretsiz sağlık hizmeti vermelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Eğitimin tüm kademeleri ücretsiz olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Tüm yurttaşlara eşit eğitim fırsatı verilmelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Devletin eğitim kurumları yeterli olduğu için özel okullara ihtiyaç yoktur.	a	b	c	d	e
Vatandaşların sağlık ve emeklilik konularında sosyal güvenceye kavuşmalarını sağlamak devletin temel görevlerindedir.	a	b	c	d	e
Devlet işsizlik sigortası sağlamak zorunda değildir.	a	b	c	d	e
Devlet yurttaşlarına ucuz toplu konut sağlamakla yükümlüdür.	a	b	c	d	e
Tüm kesimlerde çalışanların toplu sözleşme, sendikalaşma ve grev hakkı olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Kamu yatırımlarının dağılımı bölgeler arası eşitsizliği giderecek şekilde olmalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e

Aşağıda yurttaşlık ödevleriyle ilgili görüş ve ifadeler yer almaktadır. Lütfen cümlelerin her birini okuyunuz ve o cümlenin sizin görüşünüzü ne ölçüde yansıttığını cümlelerin yanındaki uygun harfi daire içine alarak belirtiniz.

II. YURTTAŞLIK ÖDEVLERİ NELERDİR?

A. MEDENİ (KİŞİSEL) ÖDEVLER

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Bireylerin birbirlerinin haklarına saygı göstermesi en temel yurttaşlık görevidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Farklı fikirleri de olsa başkalarının düşüncelerini özgürce ifade etmelerini desteklerim.	a	b	c	d	e
İşimi dürüst ve iyi bir şekilde yapmamın ülke refahına önemli katkısı olacağına inanırım.	a	b	c	d	e
Komşumun farklı bir dine mensup olması beni rahatsız etmez.	a	b	c	d	e
Yol boş olduğunda kırmızı ışıkta geçerim.	a	b	c	d	e
Devletin sık af çıkarması, yasalarla getirilen cezaların caydırıcı özelliğini ortadan kaldıracağı için sakıncalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Vergi affı uygulamaları doğru değildir.	a	b	c	d	e
Asayişle ilgili bir sorunla karşılaştığımda hemen polisi ararım.	a	b	c	d	e
Ülkede huzuru sağlamak için polise yardımcı olmak ve işbirliği yapmak yurttaşlık görevidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Vergi ödememek topluma karşı bir suçtur.	a	b	c	d	e

B. SİYASİ ÖDEVLER

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Seçimlerde oyumu kullanırım.	a	b	c	d	e
Oyumu vermeyi düşündüğüm parti başkanının açıklamalarını dikkatle dinler, analiz ederim.	a	b	c	d	e
Oy kullanmayanlar cezalandırılmamalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Toplu gösteri ve yürüyüşlere katılanlar devlete karşı iyi niyetli yurttaşlar değildir.	a	b	c	d	e
Askerlik yapmayı ilke olarak reddedenlerin (vicdani retçiler) haklı sebepleri olabilir.	a	b	c	d	e

C. SOSYAL ÖDEVLER

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Koruyucu sağlık tedbirlerine uymaya özen göstermek bir yurttaşlık ödevidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Sokakta yürürken etrafta çöp kutusu bulamazsam elimdeki çöpleri yere atmamda bir sakınca yoktur.	a	b	c	d	e
Erkek çocuğun eğitimi olması kız çocuğun eğitimi olmasından her zaman daha iyidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Çocuklarını ilköğretim okullarına göndermeyen ailelere para cezası uygulanması gereklidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Maddi durumu elverişli tüm yurttaşların eğitime destek kampanyalarına katılarak devlete yardımcı olmaları şarttır.	a	b	c	d	e
İşveren, çalışanların sigorta primlerini yatırmıyorsa haklı nedenleri olabilir.	a	b	c	d	e
Kaçak elektrik kullanmak suç olmamalıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Yolsuzlukları önlemek yalnız devletin değil, yurttaşların da sorumluluğudur.	a	b	c	d	e
Mahallede yolda çukur varsa/ su borusu patlarsa belediyeye haber veririm.	a	b	c	d	e
Benden daha az şanslı olanlara gönüllü öğretmenlik/ öğretmenlik gibi faaliyetlerle yardımcı olmaya çalışırım.	a	b	c	d	e

Aşağıdaki cümlelerde Türkiye'nin Avrupa Birliği'ne (AB) üye olması halinde yurttaşlık hak ve ödevlerinin nasıl etkileneceğine ilişkin görüşlere yer verilmiştir. Lütfen cümlelerin her birini okuyunuz ve o cümlenin sizin görüşünüzü ne ölçüde yansıttığını cümlelerin yanındaki uygun harfi daire içine alarak belirtiniz.

III. AVRUPA BİRLİĞİ ÜYELİĞİ VE YURTTAŞLIK

	Hiç katılmıyorum	Katılmıyorum	Ne katılıyorum, ne katılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
AB'ye üyelik Türkiye'de yurttaşlık haklarını olumlu yönde etkileyecektir.	a	b	c	d	e
Türkiye, AB üyesi olursa devletin yurttaşlara karşı daha eşit ve adil davranacağını düşünüyorum.	a	b	c	d	e
AB üyesi olmanın bir yurttaş olarak bana hiçbir faydası olacağına inanmıyorum.	a	b	c	d	e
AB'ye girersek dini değerlerimiz zayıflayacaktır.	a	b	c	d	e
AB üyesi ülke yurttaşları, ifade ve inanç özgürlüğü konusunda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yurttaşlarından daha şanslıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
AB'ye girersek askerin siyasi alandaki rolü kısıtlanacağı için daha sivil bir toplum oluruz.	a	b	c	d	e
Türkiye'de bir tüketici olarak AB üyesi ülke vatandaşlarının sahip olduğu tüm haklara sahibim.	a	b	c	d	e

Aşağıdaki cümleler, Türkiye’de yurttaşlık hak ve ödevleriyle ilgili görüşleri ifade etmektedir. Lütfen cümlelerin her birini okuyunuz ve o cümlenin sizin görüşünüzü ne ölçüde yansıttığını cümlelerin yanındaki uygun harfi daire içine alarak belirtiniz.

IV. TÜRKİYE’DE YURTTAŞLIK HAK VE ÖDEVLERİ NELERDİR?

	Hiç katılmı- yorum	Katılmıyo- rum	Ne katılıyo- rum, ne ka- tılmıyorum	Biraz katılıyorum	Tamamen katılıyorum
Türkiye’de yaşayan bir yurttaş olarak hiçbir hakkım olmadığını düşünüyorum.	a	b	c	d	e
Her konuda fikirlerimi özgürce ifade edebilirim.	a	b	c	d	e
Torpilim, nüfuzlu bir tanıdığım yoksa bu ülkede hiçbir işimi halledemem.	a	b	c	d	e
Yurttaş olarak bazı haklarım var ama yeterli değil.	a	b	c	d	e
Herhangi bir konuda polise başvurmam gerekse, kim olduğuma bakmaksızın bana mutlaka yardımcı olacaklarına inanırım.	a	b	c	d	e
Her şeyi devletten beklememek gerekir.	a	b	c	d	e
Anayasaya göre her türlü temel hakkım var, ama uygulamada problem çıkıyor.	a	b	c	d	e
Yurttaşlık haklarının olup olmaması ekonomik ve sosyal statüyle doğrudan bağlantılıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Mevcut sosyal güvenlik sistemi tüm ihtiyaçları karşılamaktadır.	a	b	c	d	e
Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti yurttaşının her türlü temel hak ve hürriyetini korumaktadır.	a	b	c	d	e
Devlet okullarında verilen eğitim yeterlidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Bütçeden sağlık hizmetlerine ayrılan pay yetersizdir.	a	b	c	d	e
Eğitim ve sağlık hizmetleri tümüyle devletin sorumluluğundadır, yurttaşlardan herhangi bir katılım beklenmemelidir.	a	b	c	d	e
Vergi ödemek dışında devlete karşı hiçbir yükümlülüğüm yok.	a	b	c	d	e
Devlet konut politikası geliştiremediği için hazine arazisine gecekondular yapanları haksız bulmuyorum.	a	b	c	d	e

Trafikte kuralları ihlal edersem, ceza ödemek yerine trafik polisiyle anlaşmaya çalışırım.	a	b	c	d	e
Beni ilgilendirmedığı sürece haksızlıklara karşı çıkmam.	a	b	c	d	e
Pek çok insanın kayıtdışı sektörde vergi vermeden çalışmasının temel sebebi, devletin yeterli iş sahası açamamasıdır.	a	b	c	d	e
Bankaların denetlendiğine güvenmediğim için tasarruflarımı döviz/altın olarak evde saklıyorum.	a	b	c	d	e
Devlet dairelerinde işimi halletmek için rüşvet vermek zorunda kaldığım oldu.	a	b	c	d	e

V. DEVLETİN GÖREVLERİ NELERDİR?

Aşağıda belirtilen konulardan devletin görevleri arasında olduğunu düşündüğünüz 5 maddeyi öncelik sırasına göre numaralandırınız. Devletin görevi olarak kabul etmediğiniz maddelerin başına (X) işareti koyunuz.

- () iş sahaları açarak işsizliği önlemek
- () yolsuzlukları önlemek
- () gerekli altyapı yatırımlarını yaparak özel sektörün önünü açmak
- () vergiyi adaletli ve düzenli toplamak
- () torpil mekanizmasını kaldırmak
- () vatandaşın can ve mal güvenliğini sağlamak
- () yurttaşların temel hak ve özgürlüklerini korumak
- () dil, din, ırk ayrımı yapmadan tüm yurttaşlara eşit davranmak
- () yargı organlarının bağımsız çalışmasını sağlamak
- () şeffaf ve paylaşımcı bir yaklaşımla uygulamaları hakkında vatandaşları bilgilendirmek
- () eğitim, sağlık ve emeklilik gibi sosyal hizmetlerden tüm yurttaşların yararlanmasını sağlamak
- () yoksullukla mücadele etmek
- () ucuz konut yapmak
- () yurtdışında ülkeyi iyi temsil etmek
- () vatanın bölünmez bütünlüğünü korumak
- () dışa bağımlılığı azaltmak için tedbirler almak

I am a Ph.D. student at the Department of Sociology in METU. I am preparing a thesis on the citizenship perception of people from different occupational groups in Turkey. The survey is not intended to measure the level of knowledge; it solely aims to understand your personal opinions and views. Your responses will only be used in the thesis study under strict confidentiality.
Thank you very much for your time and effort.

PERSONAL PROFILE

Member of: () TÜSİAD () MÜSİAD () TÜRK-İŞ () HAK-İŞ () none

Gender:

Age:

Place of birth:

Education:

Civil status:

Number of children if any:

Resident in (city):

Years of residence in the current city:

Profession/occupation of father:

Education of father:

Profession/occupation of mother:

Education of mother:

Profession/occupation:

For retired military officers:

Rank:

Class:

Institution from which he retired:

Year of retirement:

For bureaucrats:

Title:

Number of personnel under his/her authority:

Employing ministry/institution:

For employers:

Number of personnel in his/her company:

Sector of economic activity:

Employer for how long:

For workers:

Number of personnel in the company:

Sector of economic activity

Employment status:

The following sentences reflect several views and opinions on citizenship rights. Please read each of the sentences and circle the option which reflects your view the most.

I. WHAT ARE THE CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

A. CIVIL (LEGAL) RIGHTS

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
All the citizens are equal before the law.	a	b	c	d	e=5
The deputies and certain public officials should have the right to immunity.	a=5	b	c	d	e
It is not appropriate that people express all their opinions freely.	a=5	b	c	d	e
The state's major duty is to ensure the security of its citizens.	a	b	c	d	e=5
It is absolutely right that both spouses have an equal right to the assets acquired during the marriage.	a	b	c	d	e=5
In my view, it is right to abolish capital punishment.	a	b	c	d	e=5
All citizens living in Turkey should have an opportunity to get recruited to and promoted in all kinds of jobs.	a	b	c	d	e=5
Strict and robust measures should be taken against the foreign immigrants in Turkey.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Immigration to metropolitan cities like Istanbul from other provinces should be restricted.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Males and females should have equal rights in all spheres of the business life.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I do not approve TV programs disrespecting the right to the confidentiality of private lives.	a	b	c	d	e=5

B. POLITICAL RIGHTS

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
All the political choices of citizens should be represented in the Parliament.	a	b	c	d	e=5
There is no use in political party membership.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Any willing citizen should have a right to stand for deputy elections.	a	b	c	d	e=5
Particular attention should be paid to ensure participation of a certain number of female members in the decision making bodies of political parties.	a	b	c	d	e=5
It is appropriate practice not to grant refugee status to the asylum seekers.	a=5	b	c	d	e
The only way to tackle social problems is active involvement in politics.	a=5	b	c	d	e
One should decide to name his/her child in accordance with the rules of the state.	a=5	b	c	d	e
The citizens must be informed about the practices of the state in all realms.	a	b	c	d	e=5
The right to get education in mother languages other than Turkish in private classes should be secured.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I can transmit my demands to the relevant bodies through membership to voluntary associations.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I do not believe that protest, manifestations or marches may provide solutions to any problems.	a=5	b	c	d	e

C. SOCIAL RIGHTS

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
All the citizens should have free (of charge) access to the health facilities of the state.	a	b	c	d	e=5
The state should provide free health service only to the citizens with social security.	a=5	b	c	d	e
All levels of education should be free of charge.	a	b	c	d	e=5
All the citizens should be provided an equal opportunity for education.	a	b	c	d	e=5
Since the education institutions of the state are sufficient, there is no need for private schools.	a=5	b	c	d	e
It is one of the major duties of the state to provide social security (in terms of health and pension rights) to the citizens.	a	b	c	d	e=5
The state is not obliged to provide unemployment benefit.	a=5	b	c	d	e
The state is obliged to provide low-cost mass housing to its citizens.	a	b	c	d	e=5
All the workers should have the rights to collective bargaining, unionization and strike.	a	b	c	d	e=5
The public investments should be made in order to tackle interregional inequalities.	a	b	c	d	e=5

Some sentences expressing views and opinions about citizenship duties are presented below. Please read each of the sentences and circle the option which reflects your view the most.

II. WHAT ARE THE CITIZENSHIP DUTIES

A. CIVIL (LEGAL) DUTIES

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
Respecting each other's rights is the most basic citizenship duty of the individuals.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I support that the other people, even if their thoughts are different than mine, express themselves freely.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I believe the fact that performing my job in an honest and proper way will contribute to the country's welfare.	a	b	c	d	e=5
It does not disturb me to have a neighbour of a different religion.	a	b	c	d	e=5
If the road is clear, I cross/drive the street while the traffic light is red.	a=5	b	c	d	e
It is not appropriate that the state grants frequent amnesty since such a practice bypasses the preventive function of the sanctions.	a	b	c	d	e=5
Tax amnesties are not appropriate.	a	b	c	d	e=5
When I face/witness a problem regarding public order I call the police.	a	b	c	d	e=5
It is a citizenship duty to help and cooperate with the police to ensure the peace and rest in the country.	a	b	c	d	e=5
It is a crime against the society not to pay the taxes.	a	b	c	d	e=5

B. POLITICAL DUTIES

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
I vote in the polls.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I listen the speeches of the chairperson of the political party for whom I intend to vote and analyze them.	a	b	c	d	e=5
Those not voting should not be penalized.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Those participating in public manifestations or marches do not have good intentions against the state.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Those rejecting compulsory military service (conscientious objectors) might have their fair reasons.	a=5	b	c	d	e

C. SOCIAL DUTIES

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
It is a citizenship duty to comply with preventive health measures.	a	b	c	d	e=5
If I cannot find a litter-box while walking on the street it is not inappropriate to throw the litter away.	a=5	b	c	d	e
It is always preferable to provide education to the male offspring than to his female sibling.	a=5	b	c	d	e
It is necessary to impose monetary penalties to the families not sending their children to primary school.	a	b	c	d	e=5
All the citizens with adequate economic means should help the state by contributing to campaigns for supporting education.	a	b	c	d	e=5
Those employers who do not pay the social security premiums of their employees might have good reasons.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Using illegal electricity and thus not paying should not be considered as a crime.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Preventing corruption is a responsibility not only of the state but the citizens as well.	a	b	c	d	e=5
If there is a hole on the street or the water pipe explodes in my neighbourhood I contact the Municipality.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I try to help those who are less fortunate than me by participating in voluntary actions such as teaching or instructing.	a	b	c	d	e=5

The sentences below contain views and opinions concerning the possible effects of Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU) on citizenship rights and duties. Please read each of the sentences and circle the option which reflects your view the most.

III. EU ACCESSION AND CITIZENSHIP

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
Accession to the EU will have a positive impact on the citizenship rights in Turkey.	a	b	c	d	e=5
If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, I think the state will provide fairer and more equal treatment to the citizens.	a	b	c	d	e=5
I do not believe that the EU membership will provide any benefits to me as a citizen.	a=5	b	c	d	e
If we access to the EU, our religious values will weaken.	a=5	b	c	d	e
Citizens of the EU member states are luckier than the citizens of Turkey in terms of freedom of expression and of religion.	a	b	c	d	e=5
If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, since the role of the military on the political arena will be restricted civil society will become stronger.	a	b	c	d	e=5
As a consumer in Turkey, I have all the rights that a citizen of an EU member state has.	a=5	b	c	d	e

The following sentences reflect several views concerning the general practice of citizenship rights and duties in Turkey. Please read each of the sentences and circle the option which reflects your view the most.

IV. GENERAL PRACTICE OF CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN TURKEY

	Strongly disagree	disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	agree	Strongly agree
As a citizen living in Turkey, I think I do not have any rights at all.	a	b	c	d	e
I can express all my thoughts freely.	a	b	c	d	e
If I do not have a push (backing) or a notable acquaintance I cannot make anything work in this country.	a	b	c	d	e
I have got some rights as a citizen but they are not adequate.	a	b	c	d	e
If I need to apply to the police for some reason, I believe that they will definitely help me regardless of who I am.	a	b	c	d	e
One should not expect everything from the state.	a	b	c	d	e
I have got all the fundamental rights according to the Constitution but there are problems in implementation.	a	b	c	d	e
Whether one enjoys the citizenship rights is directly related to her/his economic and social status.	a	b	c	d	e
The current social security system covers all the needs.	a	b	c	d	e
The Republic of Turkey protects all fundamental rights and liberties of its citizens.	a	b	c	d	e
The education provided in public schools is adequate.	a	b	c	d	e
The share allocated to health services from the national budget is inadequate.	a	b	c	d	e
Health and education services are totally in state's responsibility, one should not expect any contribution from the citizens.	a	b	c	d	e
I have got no obligations to the state except for paying my taxes.	a	b	c	d	e
Since the state couldn't have developed a housing policy, I do not think that the squatter housing built on treasury land is an unfair practice.	a	b	c	d	e

If I violate the traffic rules, I try to make a deal with the police rather than paying the penalty.	a	b	c	d	e
I do not object to unfair practices unless they are of direct interest to me.	a	b	c	d	e
The basic reason for people to work in the informal sector without paying taxes is the fact that the state does not provide adequate employment.	a	b	c	d	e
Since I do not trust that the banks are properly supervised I keep my personal savings in foreign currency/gold at home.	a	b	c	d	e
It happened to me to offer a bribe in a public office to solve my problem.	a	b	c	d	e

V. WHAT ARE THE DUTIES OF THE STATE?

Please number 5 of the following items that you consider as the top five duties of the state. Numbering should be done according to the priority level, i.e. 1 is the most important, 5 the least important. Please also mark the items -if any- that you do not consider as a state duty with (X).

- () to fight unemployment by creating employment opportunities
- () to prevent corruption
- () to facilitate the functioning of the private sector by making the necessary infrastructure investments
- () to collect the taxes on a fair and regular basis
- () to abolish the push (backing) mechanism
- () to safeguard the citizens' rights to life and property
- () to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of the citizens
- () to treat all the citizens on an equal basis regardless of language, religion or race
- () to ensure the independency of judicial bodies
- () to inform the citizens of its practices with a transparent and sharing manner
- () to secure all the citizens' access to social services like education, health and pension rights
- () to fight poverty
- () to provide low-cost housing
- () to represent the country properly on international fronts
- () to protect the indivisible unity of the homeland
- () to take measures with a view to reduce dependency on foreign sources

**APPENDIX F: SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
SURVEY SAMPLE GROUPS**

Table F.1: Gender distribution of the sample groups (*)

gender	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
male	293	74.7	66	90.4	77	70.0	50	100	486	77.8
female	99	25.3	7	9.6	33	30.0	0	0	139	22.2
Total	392	100	73	100	110	100	50	100	625	100

(*) Percentages for each sample group are calculated with respect to sample group totals.

Table F.2: Age distribution of the sample groups

Age groups	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
18-25	38	9.8	1	1.4	0		0		39	6.3
26-35	154	39.6	11	15.3	4	3.6	0		169	27.2
36-45	168	43.2	23	31.9	60	54.5	4	8.0	255	41.1
46-55	29	7.5	24	33.3	42	38.2	6	12.0	101	16.3
56-65	0		9	12.5	4	3.6	21	42.0	34	5.5
65-84	0		4	5.6	0		19	38.0	23	3.7
Total	389	100	72	100	110	100	50	100	621	100

Table F.3: Distribution of the sample groups according to education level

Education Level*	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Literate	1	0.3	0		0		0		1	0.2
Primary	72	18.5	3	4.1	0		0		75	12.1
Secondary	52	13.4	1	1.4	0		0		53	8.5
High sch.	213	54.8	15	20.5	0		0		228	36.7
University	50	12.9	41	56.2	70	63.6	43	86.0	204	32.8
Post-grad.	1	0.3	13	17.8	40	36.4	7	14.0	61	9.8
Total	389	100	73	100	110	100	50	100	622	100

(*) Classified according to the latest school that the person graduated. Thus if a person left the secondary school at second grade his education level was recorded as a primary school graduate.

Table F.4: Marital status of the sample groups

Marital status	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Single	66	16.8	4	5.6	10	9.1	1	2.0	81	13.0
Married	324	82.7	65	90.3	96	87.3	49	98.0	534	85.6
Divorced	0		0		4	3.6	0		4	0.6
widowed	2	0.5	3	4.2	0		0		5	0.8
Total	392	100	72	100	110	100	50	100	624	100

Table F.5: Distribution of the sample groups according to number of siblings (*)

No. of siblings	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1	76	25.9	11	16.9	33	37.1	6	12.8	126	25.5
2	134	45.7	33	50.8	48	53.9	34	72.3	249	50.4
3	58	19.8	14	21.5	6	6.7	7	14.9	85	17.2
4	19	6.5	6	9.2	1	1.1	0		26	5.3
5	4	1.4	0	0	1	1.1	0		5	1.0
6	2	0.7	1	1.5	0		0		3	0.6
Total	293	100		100	89	100	47	100	494	100

(*)The percentages are calculated according to the total numbers of persons who are married with children. Married persons without children (36 in the total sample) and divorced or widowed persons with children (5) are not included in the total.

Table F.6: Distribution of the sample groups according to birthplace

Geographical region	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Mediterranean	9	2.3	5	6.9	9	8.2	7	14.3	30	4.8
Aegean	10	2.6	5	6.9	12	10.9	7	14.3	34	5.5
Marmara	95	24.4	12	16.7	8	7.3	17	34.7	132	21.3
Inner Anatolia	118	30.3	24	33.3	47	42.7	5	10.2	194	31.3
Southeast	12	3.1	4	5.6	3	2.7	0		19	3.1
East Anatolia	42	10.8	9	12.5	9	8.2	4	8.2	64	10.3
Blacksea	84	21.6	12	16.7	22	20.0	9	18.4	127	20.5
Abroad (*)	19	4.9	1	1.4	0				20	3.2
Total	389	100	72	100	110	100	49	100	620	100

(*) Germany (9), Bulgaria (10) and Austria (1)

Table F.7: Distribution of the sample groups according to place of residence

Geographical region(*)	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Mediterranean	0		11	15.1	0		0		11	1.8
Aegean	9	2.3	1	1.4	0		0		10	1.6
Marmara	192	49.0	18	24.7	3	2.7	0		213	34.1
Inner Anatolia	114	29.1	30	41.1	107	97.3	50	100	301	48.2
Southeast	8	2.0	4	5.5	0		0		12	1.9
East Anatolia	24	6.1	5	6.8	0		0		29	4.6
Blacksea	45	11.5	4	5.5	0		0		49	7.8
Total	392	100	72	100	110	100	49	100	620	100

(*) The cities where the respondents live in these regions are as follows: Adana and Antalya in the Mediterranean Region; Denizli and İzmir in the Aegean Region; Balıkesir, Bursa, İstanbul, Kocaeli and Tekirdağ in the Marmara Region; Ankara, Karaman, Kayseri, Konya and Nevşehir in the Inner Anatolia Region; Diyarbakır, Gaziantep and Urfa in the Southeastern Anatolia Region; Elazığ and Malatya in the East Anatolia Region; Rize, Samsun and Zonguldak in the Blacksea Region.

Table F.8: Distribution of the sample groups according to education level of the father

Education Level	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Illiterate	8	2.2	4	5.8	2	1.9	0		14	2.4
Literate	17	4.7	1	1.4	4	3.7	0		22	3.8
Primary	247	67.7	24	34.8	44	41.1	13	30.2	328	56.2
Secondary	31	8.5	8	11.6	11	10.3	6	14.0	56	9.6
High school	54	14.8	11	15.9	15	14.0	12	27.9	92	15.8
2 yr college	0		0		2	1.9	0		2	0.3
University	7	1.9	18	26.1	23	21.5	12	27.9	60	10.3
Post-grad.	1	0.3	3	4.3	6	5.6	0		10	1.7
Total	365	100	69	100	107	100	43	100	584	100

Table F.9: Distribution of the sample groups according to the education level of the mother

Education Level	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Illiterate	53	14.8	12	17.9	13	12.0	2	4.9	80	14.0
Literate	16	4.5	2	3.0	6	5.6	2	4.9	26	4.5
Primary	245	68.6	31	46.3	51	47.2	27	65.9	354	61.8
Secondary	19	5.3	7	10.4	8	7.4	2	4.9	36	6.3
High school	23	6.4	10	14.9	16	14.8	6	14.6	55	9.6
University	1	0.3	5	7.5	12	11.1	2	4.9	20	3.5
Post-grad.	0		0		2	1.9	0		2	0.3
Total	357	100	67	100	108	100	41	100	573	100

Table F.10: Distribution of the sample groups according to the occupation of the father

Occupation (*)	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Armed Forces	1	0.4	3	5.1	3	3.3	11	26.8	18	4.3
Legislators, senior officials and managers	0		0		6	6.7	0		6	1.4
Professionals	1	0.4	10	16.9	14	15.6	0		25	6.0
Technicians and associate professionals	36	15.8	14	23.7	24	26.7	16	39.0	90	21.5
Clerks	15	6.6	0		1	1.1	0		16	3.8
Service workers and shop & market sales workers	0		0		0		0		0	
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	44	19.3	6	10.2	12	13.3	2	4.9	64	15.3
Craft and related trades workers	123	53.9	13	22.0	29	32.2	12	29.3	177	42.3
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	3	1.3	0		1	1.1	0		4	1.0
Elementary occupations	0		0		0		0		0	
<i>Employers</i>	0		13	22.0	0		0		13	3.1
<i>Unemployed</i>	5	2.2	0		0		0		5	1.2
<i>Housewife, domestic labor</i>	0		0		0		0		0	
Total	228	100	59	100	90	100	41	100	418	100

(*)The classification is based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-88) which is used by the Turkish Institute of Statistics as well. The original classification has 10 major groups (for detail of the groups see <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/class/isco.htm>) which corresponds to the first 10 categories in the above table. The last three categories of 'employers', 'unemployed' and 'housewives and domestic labor' were added for the purposes of this study. We are aware that 'employer' is a vague category but some respondents filled in the questionnaires in that way without mentioning the position (director, manager) or the sector (craft and related trades) of the employer, thus an additional category is reserved for employers as such.

Table F.11: Distribution of the sample groups according to the occupation of the mother

Occupation	workers		employers		bureaucrats		Retired military off.		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Armed Forces	0		0		0		0		0	0
Legislators, senior officials and managers	0		0		2	1.9	0		2	0.4
Professionals	0		1	1.5	4	3.8	0		5	0.9
Technicians and associate professionals	6	1.8	5	7.6	10	9.5	3	7.5	24	4.3
Clerks	0		0		0		0		0	
Service workers and shop & market sales workers	0		0		0		0		0	
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers	3	0.9	0		0		0		3	0.5
Craft and related trades workers	9	2.6	0		2	1.9	1	2.5	12	2.2
Plant and machine operators and assemblers	0		0		0		0		0	0
Elementary occupations	1	0.3	0		0		0		1	0.2
<i>Employers</i>	0		0		0		0		0	0
<i>Unemployed</i>	0		0		0		0		0	0
<i>Housewife, domestic labor</i>	323	94.4	60	90.9	87	82.9	36	90.0	506	91.5
Total	342	100	66	100	105	100	40	100	553	100

APPENDIX G: WITHIN SAMPLE COMPARISONS FOR THE SAMPLES OF WORKERS AND EMPLOYERS

In this appendix total scores of workers and employers are re-analyzed in terms of within sample groups. As previously explained in the Methodology Chapter the samples of unionized workers and employers were composed of respondents from different organizations. Of 392 workers 285 are members of the Türk-İş Trade Union Confederation and the remaining 107 are members of the Hak-İş Trade Union Confederation.

The sample of employers comprises three different groups of employers: 32 members of MÜSİAD, 19 members of TÜSİAD and 22 independent employers (non-members of any professional association) which add up to a total of 73. It should be remarked that none of the sub-groups of employers is large enough to make up a representative sample of its own and the following analysis should not be considered as measuring differences between MÜSİAD, TÜSİAD and other employers. It aims only to understand whether membership to a professional organization (of different visions) has any effect on employers' perception of citizenship.

G.1. Analyses of Sub-groups of Workers

The descriptive statistics of Turk-İş and Hak-İş member workers given below displayed mean values for citizenship rights that are very close to each other.

Table G.1: Mean Total Scores of Citizenship Rights for Workers

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Türk-İş member workers	83.97	8.31	246
Hak-İş member workers	82.36	8.67	92
Total workers sample	83.53	8.44	338

The ANOVA results for mean scores of citizenship rights of sub-samples of workers supported that there was not a statistically significant difference between members of the two unions at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(1, 336) = .446, p = 0.119$].

When the mean total scores for citizenship duties were checked it was observed that the members of Turk-İş and Hak-İş Unions had almost identical responses.

Table G.2: Mean Total Scores of Citizenship Duties for Workers

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Türk-İş member workers	87.38	7.37	252
Hak-İş member workers	87.31	7.04	90
Total workers sample	87.36	7.27	342

The ANOVA results for mean scores of citizenship duties of sub-samples of workers similarly yielded that there was not a statistically significant difference between Türk-İş members and Hak-İş members at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(1, 340) = .006, p = 0.938$].

The same analyses were conducted for differences between total scores of citizenship duties and of rights, and for the scores of EU membership and citizenship items. None of these statistics indicated that mean scores of Türk-İş member workers were significantly different from those of Hak-İş member workers. Thus, it can be concluded that as far as the survey sample is considered the workers of the two unions shared undifferentiated perceptions of citizenship.

G.2. Analyses of Sub-groups of Employers

The mean scores together with the standard deviation and number of observation for total scores of citizenship rights calculated on the bases of survey responses of MÜSİAD members, TÜSİAD members and other employers who are not members of any professional association are presented in the following table.

Table G.3: Mean Total Scores of Citizenship Rights for Employers

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
MÜSİAD member employers	75.60	7.56	25
TÜSİAD member employers	79.94	7.82	17
Independent employers	82.75	7.09	20
Total employers sample	79.10	7.99	62

The mean scores for sub-groups of employers ranged between around 76 and 83 implying the existence of differences between employer groups. To understand whether the difference is statistically important an ANOVA was carried out. The ANOVA results for mean scores of citizenship rights of sub-samples of employers evidenced that there was a statistically significant difference between the three groups of employers at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(2, 59) = 5.220, p = 0.008$]. The large effect size (0.15), calculated using eta squared, indicates a large actual difference in mean rights scores between the groups. According to the post-hoc comparisons the sub-sample of independent employers was different from that of MÜSİAD members but they did not differ significantly from TÜSİAD members. Post-hoc tests did not reveal a significant difference between means of TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD members' scores for citizenship rights.

Since the sub-groups of employers manifested differentiating perceptions on citizenship rights as a whole, the three elements (civil, political and social) of rights should be explored to find out the source of differences between groups.

The mean scores for civil, political and social elements of citizenship rights of employer sub-groups displayed some differences as illustrated in the table below. In order to make comparisons between elements all scores were indexed to 100.

Table G.4: Mean Total Scores of Civil, Political and Social Citizenship Rights for Employers

	Sub-samples of employers	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
Civil rights	MÜSİAD members	64.91	10.34	29
	TÜSİAD members	80.97	8.19	18
	Indept. employers	77.86	12.41	21
	Total employers	73.16	12.66	68
Political rights	MÜSİAD members	81.93	10.62	29
	TÜSİAD members	89.68	11.72	19
	Indept. employers	87.24	8.64	21
	Total employers	85.68	10.77	69
Social rights	MÜSİAD members	82.07	11.09	29
	TÜSİAD members	71.75	16.19	18
	Indept. employers	81.82	13.70	22
	Total employers	79.30	13.95	69

The results illustrate that in terms of civil and political rights TÜSİAD member employers had the highest mean values within the sample. This can be interpreted as an indication that TÜSİAD members had more expectations of civil and political rights than the MÜSİAD members and other independent employers of the survey sample. As far as the social rights are concerned MÜSİAD members seemed to be the group who expected more compared to the other two sub-groups.

ANOVA results for mean scores of civil citizenship rights of sub-samples of employers supported that there was a statistically significant difference between the three groups of employers at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(2, 65) = 15.926, p = 0.000$]. Post-hoc comparisons indicated that the sub-sample of MÜSİAD members differed from the two other groups. The actual difference calculated by eta squared (0.33) was of large size. The means of civil rights for TÜSİAD members and those for independent employers did not differ significantly.

According to the ANOVA results for mean scores of political citizenship rights there was again a statistically significant difference between the three groups of employers at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(2, 66) = 3.536, p = 0.035$]. But this time the actual difference (0.10) was medium-sized. Post-hoc tests showed that the mean scores for political rights of MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD members were significantly different from each other. The mean values of independent employers' scores did not vary from the other groups of employers.

As to social citizenship rights, the ANOVA tests once more pointed to the presence of a statistically significant difference between means for social citizenship scores of the three sub-groups of employers at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(2, 66) = 3.871, p = 0.026$]. The actual difference was again of medium size ($\eta^2 = 0.10$). Similar to the results of political rights, according to the post-hoc comparisons the mean scores for political rights of MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD members were significantly different from each other. The mean values of independent employers' scores did not vary significantly from the other groups of employers.

In consequence, the statistical results demonstrated that the sample of employers had differing perception levels in terms of all three elements of citizenship rights. The differences were notably between the sub-samples of MÜSİAD and TÜSİAD member employers. Only for civil citizenship rights, MÜSİAD members, in addition to the TÜSİAD members differed from the independent employers as well. In the next chapter the item level analyses will break down the origins of these differences.

To find out if there is any differentiation in perception of citizenship duties within the sample of employers the same statistical instruments are applied. (Table G.5)

Table G.5: Mean Total Scores of Citizenship Duties for Employers

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
MÜSİAD member employers	86.90	6.46	29
TÜSİAD member employers	88.06	5.60	16
Independent employers	89.32	7.34	22
Total employers sample	87.97	6.57	67

The similar mean values of the scores for total duties of employer groups leads us to presuppose that the employers did not differ significantly from each other. ANOVA tests provided the statistical evidence that there was not a statistically significant difference between the means of total scores of citizenship duties for the three employer groups at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(2, 64) = 0.849, p = 0.433$]. Thus, in contrast to citizenship rights, MÜSİAD members, TÜSİAD members and other independent employers did not have varying perceptions regarding citizenship duties.

The same analyses were conducted for differences between total scores of citizenship duties and of rights. The ANOVA and post-hoc tests showed that there was no statistically significant difference between means of duty-right differences for the three sub-groups of employers [at $p < 0.05$ level: $F(2, 55) = 2.593, p = 0.084$]. In terms of total rights and duties all sub-groups of employers manifested a duty-surplus perception of citizenship which was the case for the total sample of employers.

However, since there were differentiations between the means of citizenship rights elements for sub-groups, in order to see whether there are any changes in the perceived balance of duties and rights the means of sub-groups for civil, political and social elements of duties were calculated as well. The results of mean scores for three

elements of citizenship rights and duties are put together in the following table to facilitate comparisons.

Table G.6: Mean Total Scores of Civil, Political and Social Citizenship Duties and Rights for Employers

	civil		political		social	
	duties	rights	duties	rights	duties	rights
MÜSİAD members	90.24	64.91	80.16	81.93	86.21	82.07
TÜSİAD members	93.61	80.97	77.06	89.68	87.50	71.75
Independent employers	92.84	77.86	80.68	87.24	90.11	81.82
Total employers	91.90	73.16	79.57	85.68	87.75	79.30

As stated previously -and to be seen from the above table- the sample of total employers had a perception of duty-surplus in terms of civil and social elements of citizenship, and a perceived balance of right-surplus for political citizenship. The table reveals that the same balance perception for civil, political and social elements of citizenship rights and duties was valid for all three groups of employers. Hence, despite differences between the means values of civil, political and social citizenship rights, as far as the balance between rights and duties are concerned MÜSİAD members, TÜSİAD members and independent employers shared the same perception.

To complete the comparison of employer groups the descriptive statistics for the scores of EU membership and citizenship items were also checked. As the following table displays there are some differences between mean scores of sub-groups of employers. According to the results while TÜSİAD members were the most pro-EU group, the employers who are not members of any professional association seemed to be the least supportive of EU. Nevertheless, they can all be considered to highly supportive of the EU membership.

Table G.7: Mean Total Scores of EU Membership and Citizenship Items for Employers

	Mean	Standard deviation	N (number of observations)
MÜSİAD member employers	76.22	12.61	31
TÜSİAD member employers	89.37	8.25	18
Independent employers	70.00	15.16	22
Total employers sample	77.63	14.43	71

According to the results of the ANOVA test the mean scores of EU accession for sub-groups of employers were statistically different at the $p < 0.05$ level [$F(2, 68) = 12.076$, $p = 0.00$]. The actual difference was of large size [eta squared=0.26]. Post-hoc comparisons based on Tukey test indicated that mean scores for TÜSİAD

members were significantly different from those of MÜSİAD members and of independent employers. The item level evaluation is performed below to clarify the issues about Turkey's EU membership where the sub-groups disaccorded.

G.3. Within-Sample Results of the Sample of Employers for European Union Membership and Citizenship Items

The item level frequency distributions for sub-groups of the employer sample are displayed in the following table.

Table G.8: Percentages for employer sub-groups who agree (or strongly agree) with EU membership and citizenship items

Item		MÜSİAD members	TÜSİAD members	Indept. employer
EU1	Accession to the EU will have a positive impact on the citizenship rights in Turkey.	80.7	88.9	81.9
EU2	If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, I think the state will provide fairer and more equal treatment to the citizens.	80.7	88.9	77.3
EU3	I believe that the EU membership will provide some benefits to me as a citizen.*	61.3	100.0	72.8
EU4	If we access to the EU, our religious values will not be affected negatively.*	58.1	100.0	90.9
EU5	Citizens of the EU member states are luckier than the citizens of Turkey in terms of freedom of expression and of religion.	80.7	88.9	50.0
EU6	If Turkey becomes a full member to the EU, since the role of the military on the political arena will be restricted civil society will become stronger.	87.1	83.3	36.3
EU7	As a consumer in Turkey, I do not have all the rights that a citizen of an EU member state has.*	61.3	83.4	40.9

As the table indicates TÜSİAD member employers are the most pro-EU group and MÜSİAD member employers are the most preoccupied group concerning religious values. On the other hand, the independent employers had considerable reservations about the improvement of the civil society as a result of restricting the political power of the military. In addition, most of them thought that they had the same consumer rights as the EU citizens had.

APPENDIX H: TURKISH SUMMARY

Bu çalışma, yurttaşlık kavramına yurttaşlar açısından yaklaşmakta ve yurttaşlığın haklar ve ödevler çerçevesinde nasıl algılandığını ölçmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Yurttaşların görev ağırlıklı mı, yoksa haklara öncelik veren bir yurttaşlık anlayışına mı sahip olduklarının ortaya konulması çalışmanın özünü oluşturmaktadır. Bu amaçla yurttaşlık hakları ve ödevlerine ilişkin göstergeleri içeren bir ankette yola çıkarak bir yurttaşlık algılaması ölçeği geliştirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Yurttaşlığa ilişkin algılamalar, yalnızca toplam hak ve ödevler üzerinden değil, aynı zamanda yurttaşlığın medeni (sivil veya yasal), siyasi ve sosyal unsurları açısından ele alınmıştır. Ayrıca, Türkiye'deki yurttaşlık tartışmalarında Avrupa Birliği üyelik sürecinin önemine yapılan vurgudan hareketle, AB'ye tam üyeliğin yurttaşlık uygulamalarına muhtemel etkilerini görmek amacıyla da bir ölçek oluşturulmuştur. Anket çalışması, 392 sendikalı işçi, 73 işveren, 110 bürokrat ve 50 emekli subay olmak üzere toplam 625 kişilik bir örneklem grubuna uygulanmıştır. Ayrıca, ölçek çalışmasının sonuçlarını zenginleştirmek ve detaylandırmak gayesiyle toplam 19 işçi, işveren, bürokrat ve emekli subaylarla odak grup görüşmeleri ve mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Araştırma sonuçlarına göre; toplam hak ve ödev ilişkisi açısından bakıldığında örneklemdaki tüm meslek gruplarının görev ağırlıklı bir yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsedikleri görülmüştür. Öte yandan, siyasi ve sosyal hak ve ödevlere ilişkin algılamalar, meslek gruplarına göre farklılık göstermektedir.

Günümüzün modern dünyasında yurttaşlık, genel olarak, bireyin bir ulus-devletin üyesi olarak haklar ve ödevlerle çerçevesi çizilen hukuki statüsüne işaret eder. Ancak yurttaşlık 'dinamik bir kimlik' olduğu için (Faulks, 2000) yurttaşlığın iki temel unsuru olan statü ve üyelik tanımları sürekli bir değişim içerisindedir. Özellikle 1990'lardan bu yana yaşanmakta olan ve postmodernleşme ve küreselleşme olarak tanımlanan toplumsal, siyasi ve ekonomik gelişmelere paralel olarak modern yurttaşlığın anlamı ve sınırları çeşitli açılardan sorgulanmaktadır. Bir yandan uluslar

arası sınırlar belirsizleştikçe, ulus devlet, hak ve ödevleri belirleyen tek yetkili kurum olma özelliğini kaybetmeye başlarken öte yandan; etnik, cinsiyet ve dinsel kökenlerinden ötürü kendilerini modern yurttaşlıktan dışlanmış hisseden gruplar kimlik temelli hak taleplerinde bulunarak yurttaşlığın tanımının genişletilmesi gereğini giderek daha çok dile getirmeye başlamışlardır.

Türkiye de 1980'lerin son yıllarından beri yurttaşlık alanında, uluslararası gelişmelere benzer tartışmalara sahne olmaktadır. Kadınlar, Kürtler, İslami gruplar ve Aleviler daha önce özel alanla sınırlı kalan cinsiyet, etnik ve dinsel temelli kimlik taleplerini artık kamusal alanda da telaffuz etmeye başlamışlardır (Kadıoğlu, 2005). Ayrıca 1999 Helsinki Zirvesi'nde Avrupa Birliği'nin Türkiye'ye adaylık statüsü tanıma kararıyla birlikte farklı bir yola giren Türkiye-AB ilişkilerinin de yurttaşlık kavramının sorgulanmasına önemli etkileri olmaya başlamıştır.

Dolayısıyla son 15–20 yıldır yurttaşlık, sosyal bilimlerin en önemli çalışma konularından birini oluşturmaktadır. Ancak, yurttaşlık çalışmalarında genel olarak yurttaşlığın yapısal veya kurumsal niteliği üzerinde durulmakta ve yurttaş tarafı ihmal edilmektedir (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; İçduygu, 2005). Türkiye'ye ilişkin yurttaşlık çalışmalarında da bu eksiklik gözlemlendiği için bu tez çalışması, yurttaşlığı yurttaşların gözüyle değerlendirmeyi amaç edinmektedir.

Çalışmanın kuramsal altyapısı belirlenirken sosyolojik yaklaşımlara ağırlık verilmiştir. Yurttaşlık çalışmalarına göre, Fransız ve Sanayi Devrimleri'nin toplumsal ve siyasi bir sonucu olarak ortaya çıkan yurttaşlık modernleşmeyle yakından ilişkilidir. Bu nedenle, klasik sosyolojide, yurttaşlık, dolaylı olarak, modern toplumların değişen toplumsal düzen ve istikrar temellerini açıklamayı hedefleyen toplumsal düzen kuramları içinde ele alınmaktadır. Bu kuramlara göre modern sanayi toplumları toplumsal düzen ve istikrarı, genel bir değerler sistemi ve yurttaşlık gibi bireyi topluma bağlayan bir dizi kurumla sağlamaktadır. Bu tartışmanın diğer ucunda ise toplumsal değişim veya çatışma kuramları ya da daha yaygın deyişle Marksist kuram yer almaktadır. Marksist geleneğe göre ise birbiriyle rekabet eden ve çatışan toplumsal sınıfların varlığından ötürü modern toplumların tam anlamıyla istikrar

içinde olması mümkün olmadığı için, ‘eşit üyelik statüsü’ olarak tanımlanan yurttaşlık, kapitalist üretim tarzının eşitsizliklerini maskeleyemeye çalışan ve burjuva devlet aygıtının yok olmasıyla ortadan kalkacak olan geçici bir kurumdan başka bir şey değildir (Heater, 2004b). Bu çalışmada, yurttaşlık toplumsal bir üyelik olarak toplumsal düzen kuramları çerçevesinde ve özellikle Durkheim’in modern toplumlarda iş bölümünün önemine ilişkin analizleri açısından ele alınmakla birlikte, Marksist gelenekte yer alan Gramsci ve Althusser’in hegemonya ve devlet aygıtlarına ilişkin yaklaşımlarından da faydalanılmıştır. Zira bu düşünürlerin devlet ve sivil toplum kavramlarıyla ilgili çalışmaları, devlet-yurttaş ilişkisinde devletin rolünü farklı bir yönden değerlendirmeye imkân sağlamaktadır.

Ancak, tüm yurttaşlık çalışmalarında başlangıç noktası olarak görülen T.H. Marshall’ın yurttaşlık analizi bu çalışma için de temel referans niteliğindedir. İngiltere’de yurttaşlığın gelişimini medeni, siyasi ve sosyal haklar açısından değerlendiren Marshall, sosyal refah devletinin oluşumu neticesinde yurttaşlığın medeni ve siyasi haklardan oluşan içeriğinin genişletilip sosyal hakları da kapsamına almasıyla kapitalist piyasanın getirdiği eşitsizliklerin yurttaşlık statüsüyle azaltılabileceğini savunmuştur. Bu sebeple, Marshall’ın yaklaşımının toplumsal düzen ve Marksist kuramlar arasında bir köprü niteliği taşıdığı ileri sürülmektedir (Turner, 1993). Marshall’ın yaklaşımı çeşitli açılardan eleştirilmekle birlikte özellikle üç unsurlu (medeni, siyasi ve sosyal hak ve ödevler) yurttaşlık formatı önemini korumakta olup bu çalışmada da yurttaşlık algılaması bu unsurlar üzerinden değerlendirilmiştir.

Yurttaşlık kavramını insanın doğası ve bireyler arası bağlar açısından ele alan felsefi yaklaşımlara göre iki ideal model veya kategori tanımlanmaktadır: *liberal* ve *cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık* (Oldfield, 1994). 17. yüzyılın sonlarında ortaya çıkan, kapitalizm ve ulus-devletin gelişimiyle doğrudan bağlantılı olan liberal yurttaşlık anlayışı, hakların bireyden kaynaklandığını, bireyin topluma ve devlete göre önceliği olduğunu ve devletin temel işlevinin bu doğal hakları sağlamak ve korumak olduğunu savunur. Bu sebeple liberal yurttaşlık yaklaşımı, yurttaşlığı hukuki bir statü olarak algılamakta ve haklara öncelik vermektedir. Yurttaşlardan yalnızca vergi

ödemek ve tehditlere karşı devleti savunmak şeklinde temel ödevleri yerine getirmeleri beklenmektedir. Ancak liberal anlayışın medeni, siyasi ve sosyal haklara aynı şekilde yaklaşmadığı belirtilmelidir. Genel olarak liberal gelenekte medeni ve siyasi hakların önceliği bulunmakla beraber, sosyal haklar açısından liberal gelenek içinde farklı tutumlar bulunmaktadır. Neoliberal yaklaşıma göre sosyal adaleti sağlamak amacıyla devletin sağladığı sosyal haklar, piyasa mekanizmasına müdahale ederek bireyi bağımlı hale getirmektedir. Öte yandan, T.H. Marshall ve takipçilerinin savunduğu sosyal-liberal (veya eşitlikçi liberal) yaklaşım sosyal haklar olmadığı takdirde yurttaşlığın tam anlamıyla gerçekleştirilemeyeceğini savunmaktadır.

Diğer taraftan, temeli Aristo'nun siyasi düşüncelerine dayanan cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışı, yurttaşların ancak kamusal alanda yurttaşlık ödevlerini yerine getirerek yurttaş olabileceklerini savunur. Yurttaşlık bireye verilen bir statü olmanın aksine, sadece bir topluluğun üyelerine atfedilmiş bazı patrikleri kapsar. Ortak toplumsal çıkarların bireysel çıkarların üstünde olduğunu ileri süren bu anlayışa göre ödevler önceliklidir ve ancak ödevlerin yerine getirilmesiyle toplumsal düzen ve istikrar sağlanabilir.

17. yüzyıldan itibaren Batı dünyasında baskın olan yurttaşlık anlayışı liberal modeli esas alıyordu, ancak 1980'li yıllarda liberal görüşün bireysel haklara fazla önem verdiği ileri sürülerek cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışına ilgi duyulmaya başlanmış ve topluluğun önemini vurgulayan bu yeni anlayış 'toplulukçuluk' (*communitarianism*) olarak kuramsallaşmaya başlamıştır. Bu yaklaşıma göre birey; ortak değerleri, kuralları ve amaçları olan bir topluluk içinde şekillenir, bu nedenle topluluğun her üyesi bu amaçları kendi amacı olarak benimser ve topluluğun idamesi için gerekli olan kuralları yerine getirir. Toplulukçu yurttaşlık anlayışı, cumhuriyetçi anlayışın modern şekli olarak nitelendirilebileceği için bu çalışmada, Türkiye'de yurttaşlık algılamasının liberal mi yoksa cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modeline mi dayandığı ölçülmeye çalışılmıştır.

Yukarıda da bahsedildiği gibi 1990'lardan sonra yaşanan gelişmelerle birlikte modern yurttaşlığın kapsamının genişletilmesi gerektiği tartışılmaya başlanmıştır.

Çeşitli grupların kimlik temelli hak talepleri doğrultusunda modern yurttaşlığın Marshall'ın modelinde sunduğu yurttaşlık hakları dışındaki hakları da içine alacak şekilde genişletilmesi gerektiği ileri sürülerek küresel yurttaşlık, anayasal yurttaşlık, çokkültürlü yurttaşlık gibi farklı yurttaşlık kavramları önerilmektedir. Bu tartışmaları da göz önüne alarak, yurttaşlık algılaması ölçeğinde kullanmak üzere haklar ve ödevlerin çerçevesini belirlemek amacıyla yurttaşlık hak ve ödevlerine ilişkin çalışmalar gözden geçirilmiştir. Thomas Janoski (1998) tarafından yapılan bir çalışmada yer alan ayrıntılı hak ve ödev listeleri bu çalışma için temel bir kaynak niteliği taşımaktadır. Janoski çalışmasında Marshall'ın üçlü yurttaşlık modelini kullanmış ancak hakların çerçevesini kimlik temelli grup haklarını da içine alacak şekilde genişletmiştir. Türkiye'de de grup haklarına yapılan vurgu göz önüne alınarak Janoski'nin madde bazında sunduğu hak ve ödev listeleri araştırmanın çıkış noktasını oluşturmaktadır.

Türkiye'de yurttaşlığın gelişimine bakıldığında, devlet kurma ve ulus inşa sürecinde yurttaşlığın yalnızca bir hukuksal statü değil, aynı zamanda toplumu modern, rasyonel ve laik bir hale dönüştürmede toplumsal ve kültürel bir araç olarak kullanıldığı görülmektedir (Kahraman, 2005). Devlet kurma, ulus inşa etme ve yurttaşlığın oluşturulması Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son yıllarında başlayan modernleşme çabalarıyla iç içe gelişmiştir. 1923'te Cumhuriyet'in ilanını takiben, devletin temel misyonu çağdaş uygarlık seviyesine yükselmek olarak belirlenmiş ve bu amaca ulaşmak için halkın aydınlatılması ve dolayısıyla, reformların yukardan empoze edilmesi anlayışı benimsenmiştir (Heper, 1985). Böylelikle Türk ulusunun inşası için bir dizi tedbir alınmış ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yurttaşlığının çerçevesi Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası'nın 1931 yılında benimsediği milliyetçilik, laiklik, halkçılık, cumhuriyetçilik, devletçilik ve inkılâpçılık ilkeleriyle çizilmiştir (Kadıoğlu, 1999). Halkçılık ilkesi Ziya Gökalp'in solidarizm veya ulusal dayanışmaya ilişkin görüşlerinin bir yansıması olarak değerlendirilebilir. Durkheim'in toplumsal dayanışmayla ilgili fikirlerinden etkilenen Gökalp de bir meslek ahlakına göre hareket eden profesyonel meslek gruplarının (*corporations*) ulusal dayanışmayı sağlamadaki önemine işaret etmiştir. Halkçılık ilkesi de Türk toplumunun birbiriyle çatışan toplumsal sınıflar yerine uyum içinde ortak bir amaca hizmet için çalışan ve

iş bölümüne uygun olarak oluşturulmuş meslek gruplarından oluştuğunu kabul etmektedir. Aslında, tüm ilkelere ‘Türk ulusunun kültürüne dayalı, Batı uygarlığını benimseyen ve İslamiyeti bir vicdan meselesi olarak algılayan bir Türk devleti kurulmasını’ (Mardin, 1981) savunan Gökalp’in devlet düşüncesinin izlerini görmek mümkündür. Sonuç olarak Türkiye Cumhuriyeti devleti, iktisadi olarak devletçilik ilkesini benimseyen, halkçılık ve milliyetçi dayanışmaya dayalı bir toplumsal örgütlenme anlayışına sahip ve ‘çağdaş medeniyetler seviyesine ulaşmayı’ hedef edinen cumhuriyetçi, laik bir devlet olarak tasarlanmıştır. Ayşe Kadioğlu’nun deyimiyle ‘milletini arayan bu devletin’ çağdaşlaşma iradesini benimsemiş yurttaşları oluşturması gerekiyordu. Dolayısıyla, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yurttaşlığı devlet aydınları tarafından yukarıdan belirlenmiş ve 1908’den bu yana vatandaşlık eğitimini kapsamlı bir şekilde araştıran Füsun Üstel’in belirttiği gibi ‘makbul’ yurttaş profili ‘medenilik’ ve ‘yurtseverlik’ eksenleri üzerinde inşa edilmek istenmiştir (Üstel, 2004). Medeni ve yurtsever yurttaşın davranışlarının arka planına egemen olan cumhuriyetçi ve laik bir ahlak anlayışıdır. Bu ahlak anlayışı yurttaşın yalnızca kamusal değil aynı zamanda özel alanını da düzenleyen ve denetleyen bir sistematik sunar. Böylelikle, yurttaşlık hak ve özellikle de görevler pratik ve söyleminin oluşturduğu bir toplumsal roller bütünüdür yanısıra, ‘iyi yurttaş’ın varlığı için gerekli olduğu düşünülen ahlaki nitelikler/değerler bütününe de işaret eder (Üstel, 2004: 175).

1990’lardan itibaren devlet-merkezli bu yurttaşlık anlayışı çeşitli grupların kimlik-fark temelli hak talepleriyle sorgulanmaya başlamıştır. 1999’da AB’nin Türkiye’ye adaylık statüsü tanınması ve bu sürecin gerektirdiği demokratikleşme talepleri de resmi yurttaşlık anlayışının tartışılmasına katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu taleplere cevap olarak “toplumsal ilişkilerin çokkültürlü ve çoğulcu yapısını kucaklayacak ve bu yapı içinde farklı kimlikler arasında ‘ortak bir dil’ yaratacak” çokkültürlü anayasal vatandaşlık bir çözüm olarak önerilmektedir (Keyman, 2008).

Türkiye’de yurttaşlığın gelişimi incelendikten sonra yurttaşlık hak ve ödevleriyle ilgili çalışmalar değerlendirilmiştir. Bu çalışmalarda ele alınan haklar ve ödevler ile 1982 Anayasası’nda yer alan hak ve ödevler Janoski tarafından önerilen hak ve

ödevlerle karşılaştırılarak bir araya getirilmiş ve ölçek çalışmasında kullanılacak olan göstergelerin kuramsal hatları belirlenmiştir.

Yukarıda özetlenen kuramsal yaklaşımlar çerçevesinde yurttaşlık algulamalarını ölçmek amacıyla bir araştırma tasarlanmıştır. Daha önce de ifade edildiği üzere, yurttaşların Cumhuriyet'in ilk yıllarında belirlenen ve görevlere ağırlık veren cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modelini mi benimsedikleri, yoksa son yıllardaki tartışmalar doğrultusunda haklara öncelik veren bir liberal yurttaşlık anlayışına sahip olduklarının tespit edilmesi araştırmanın temel gayesini oluşturmaktadır. Tutum ve davranış ölçmede yaygın olarak kullanılan ölçüm aracı ölçekleme (scaling) çalışmasıdır, ancak mevcut bir yurttaşlık hak ve ödevleri ölçeği bulunmadığı için bu çalışmanın yöntem açısından başlıca hedefi haklar ve ödevler arasındaki ilişkiyi ölçmek amacıyla yurttaşlık hakları ve ödevleri ölçeklerinin geliştirilmesidir.

Araştırmada farklı toplumsal grupların yurttaşlık algulamalarının ölçülmesi amaçlanmış ve örneklem toplumun farklı katmanlarından meslek grupları temelinde belirlenmiştir. Orta ve üst-düzey yönetici bürokratlarla emekli subaylar devlet alanının; sendikalı işçiler kamu alanının ve işverenler de piyasa alanının temsilcileri olarak seçilmiştir. Hak ve ödevlere ilişkin göstergeleri belirlemek için önce Ankara'da 40 kişiyle yüz yüze görüşmeler yoluyla bir pilot çalışma yapılmıştır. Bu pilot çalışmanın, daha önce yapılan bir yurttaşlık çalışmasının sonuçları ile Janoski'nin hak ve ödev listeleri ve Türkiye'deki haklara ilişkin çalışmalar kullanılarak bir anket formu hazırlanmıştır (Ek E). Ankette medeni (yasal), siyasi ve sosyal hak ve ödevlere ilişkin maddeler yanında AB üyeliğinin yurttaşlık üzerine muhtemel etkilerine ölçmek amacıyla oluşturulacak AB üyeliği ve yurttaşlık ölçeği için de bir bölüm bulunmaktadır. Ayrıca, Ankara pilot çalışmasından elde edilen bulgulardan yola çıkarak Türkiye'de yurttaşlık uygulamalarıyla ve devletin görevleriyle ilgili birer bölüm de anket formuna konulmuştur. Anket 392 sendikalı işçi (Türk-İş ve Hak-İş üyeleri), 73 işveren (TÜSİAD ve MÜSİAD üyeleri ile bağımsız işverenler), 110 orta ve üst düzey yönetici bürokrat ile 50 emekli subay olmak üzere toplam 625 kişiye uygulanmıştır. Anket çalışması, Eylül 2004 ve Eylül 2006 arasındaki iki yıllık sürede tamamlanmıştır.

Güvenilirlik testleri yapılarak bazı maddeler çıkarılmış ve sonuç olarak yirmişer maddelik yurttaşlık hakları ve yurttaşlık ödevleri ölçekleri ile 7 maddelik AB üyeliği ve yurttaşlık ölçeği oluşturulmuştur. Daha sonra, ölçek sonuçlarını desteklemek ve zenginleştirmek amacıyla sendikalı işçiler, bürokratlar ve emekli subaylarla odak grup görüşmeleri ve işverenlerle mülakatlar yapılmıştır. Aralık 2006-Ocak 2007 döneminde gerçekleştirilen nitel çalışmalarla 19 kişinin detaylı görüş ve fikirlerine ulaşılmıştır.

Nicel ve nitel araştırmaların sonuçları beş ayrı bölümde sunulmuştur. Önce yurttaşlık algılamaları medeni, siyasi ve sosyal unsurlar açısından incelenmiş, sonra da toplam hak ve ödevler üzerinden genel yurttaşlık algılamalarına ilişkin sonuçlar tartışılmıştır. Yurttaşlığın üç unsuruyla ilgili algılamalar değerlendirilirken ilk önce her bir unsurun toplam hak ve ödevleri arasındaki ilişki, ortalama toplam skorlar, varyans analizleri (ANOVA) ve *post-hoc* karşılaştırma testleri kullanılarak irdelenmiş, daha sonra, tüm hak ödevler madde bazında, anket katılımcılarının cevaplarının yüzde dağılımı ve odak grup görüşmeleri ile mülakatlardan elde edilen bulgular ışığında incelenmiştir. Toplam hak ve ödevler açısından genel yurttaşlık algılamalarının değerlendirmesinde ise ortalama toplam skorlar, ANOVA ve *post-hoc* testler yanında anketin son iki bölümünde yer alan Türkiye’de yurttaşlık uygulamaları ile devletin görevlerine verilen cevapların yüzde dağılımlarından faydalanılmıştır. Sonuçlarla ilgili son bölüm, AB üyeliği ve yurttaşlık ölçek sonuçlarını toplam skorlar ve madde düzeyinde ele almaktadır.

Yurttaşlık hakları ölçeğinde medeni haklarla ilgili olarak 8 madde yer almaktadır: kanunlar karşısında eşit muamele hakkı (milletvekilleri ve kamu görevlerinin dokunulmazlık hakkı); ifade özgürlüğü; evlilikte edinilen malların eşler arasında eşit dağılımı; idam cezası (yaşama hakkı); her tür meslekte yükselmede eşit olma hakkı; yabancı göçmenlerin oturma ve çalışma hakkı; yurtiçinde göç etme hakkı ve iş hayatında kadın-erkek eşitliği. Yurttaşlık ödevleri ölçeğinde yer alan 8 madde de şöyledir: başkalarının ifade özgürlüğüne saygı; iş ahlakı; başkalarının dini inançlarına saygı; trafik kurallarına uyma; genel ahlak (yasalara uyma ödevi); vergi

afları; polise yardımcı olma ve vergi ödeme. Medeni haklar ve medeni ödevlerin toplam skorlarına bakıldığında, tüm meslek gruplarının ödevlere haklara kıyasla daha çok ağırlık verdiği görülmüş ve tüm örneklemin yurttaşlığın medeni unsurları itibariyle görev ağırlıklı cumhuriyetçi anlayışı benimsediği sonucuna varılmıştır. Medeni hakların madde düzeyindeki sonuçları itibariyle meslek grupları arasında bazı farklılıklar bulunmakla beraber tüm gruplar medeni ödevleri yüksek oranlarda onaylamıştır. Genel olarak tüm gruplar, meslekte yükselme eşitlik hakkı; evlilikte edinilen malların dağılımında eşitlik hakkı ve iş hayatında cinsiyet eşitliği konularına büyük önem verirken kanunlar karşısında eşit muamele; yurtdışında göç hakkı ve ifade özgürlüğü haklarına aynı önemi atfetmemişlerdir. Odak grup görüşmeleri ve mülakatlar sırasında da katılımcılar, özellikle ifade özgürlüğüne ilişkin olarak ‘devletin çıkarları, ulusal çıkarlar, Türkiye’nin içinde bulunduğu şartlar’ gibi pek çok koşul öne sürmüşlerdir.

Siyasi yurttaşlık hakları ölçekte şu 5 madde ile tanımlanmıştır: Mecliste siyasi temsil hakkı; kadınların partilerin karar alma organlarına katılma hakkı; çocuğuna istediği ismi verme hakkı; devletin uygulamalarından haberdar edilme hakkı ve Türkçe dışındaki anadillerde özel dersanelerde eğitim hakkı. Siyasi yurttaşlık ödevleri de 4 madde ile ifade edilmiştir: seçimlerde oy kullanma; bilinçli oy kullanma (siyasi parti başkanlarını dinleyip analiz etme); oy kullanmayanların cezalandırılması ve askerlik hizmeti (vicdani retçilerin haklı olup olmadığı). Toplam siyasi hak ve ödev skorları itibariyle; işçiler, işverenler ve bürokratlar siyasi haklara siyasi göreve nazaran daha fazla ağırlık verirken emekli subaylar siyasi görevlere ağırlık vermektedir. Bu sebeple siyasi unsurlar açısından, emekli subayların yine görev-ağırlıklı cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsedikleri; ancak diğer grupların hak-tanımlı liberal anlayışa sahip oldukları sonucuna varılmıştır. Fakat madde düzeyindeki sonuçlara bakıldığında, işverenlerin çocuğa isim verme, devletin uygulamalarından haberdar edilme ve Türkçe dışındaki anadillerde özel dersanelerde eğitim hakkına diğer gruplara kıyasla daha fazla ağırlık verdiği gözlenmiştir. Diğer bir ifadeyle, işverenler etnik grupların kültürel hakları ile şeffaf devlet uygulamalarına diğer gruplara göre daha fazla önem atfetmektedir. Öte yandan, odak grup görüşmeleri mülakatlar esnasında, işçiler dışındaki katılımcılar ulusun birliği, ülkenin bütünlüğü, toplum

düzeni, kurallara uymanın ve görevleri yerine getirmenin önemi gibi cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık değerlerine göndermelerde bulunmuşlardır.

Yurttaşlık hakları ölçeğinde yer alan sosyal haklar ise şu 7 madde ile tanımlanmıştır: devletin sağlık, eğitim, sosyal güvenlik, işsizlik sigortası, ucuz konut sağlaması; işçilerin toplu sözleşme, sendikalaşma ve grev hakları ile kamu yatırımlarının bölgelerarası eşitsizliği azaltacak şekilde dağıtılması. Sosyal ödevler de 8 madde ile ifade edilmiştir: ailelerin çocuklarına cinsiyet ayrımı yapmadan eğitim sağlaması; maddi durumu elverişli olan yurttaşların eğitime maddi destek vermeleri; kaçak elektrik kullanılmaması; yolsuzluğu önlemede devlete yardımcı olunması; altyapıyla ilgili sorunlardan yerel yönetimlerin haberdar edilmesi; gönüllü faaliyetlere katılarak daha az şanslı yurttaşlara yardımcı olunması ve işverenlerin işçilerinin sosyal sigorta primlerini yatırması. Sosyal haklar ve ödevlerin toplam skorlarına bakıldığında; işçilerin sosyal haklara öncelik verdiği, diğer grupların ise sosyal görevlere, haklara kıyasla daha fazla ağırlık verdiği gözlenmiştir. Bu sonuca dayanarak işçilerin sosyal liberal bir anlayışın sahip oldukları, bürokrat ve emekli subayların cumhuriyetçi modeli benimsedikleri ifade edilmiştir. İşverenler de bürokrat ve emekli subaylar gibi sosyal görevlere ağırlık verdikleri halde piyasa çıkarlarından ötürü neoliberal yurttaşlık anlayışına sahip oldukları ileri sürülmüştür. Madde bazındaki sonuçlara göre, işçiler tüm haklara en fazla önem veren grup olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Sağlık ve eğitim hizmetlerinin ücretsiz olması ve devletin ucuz konut sağlaması konularında bürokratların bazı çekinceleri olduğu gözlenirken; işverenler işsizlik sigortası ve işçilerin toplu sözleşme, sendikalaşma ve grev haklarını tümüyle onaylamamıştır. Ayrıca, işverenlerin eğitime maddi destek ve sosyal sigorta primlerinin yatırılmasına ilişkin sosyal ödevlere diğer gruplara nazaran daha az onay verdikleri görülmüştür. Odak grup görüşmeleri ve mülakatlardan da benzer sonuçlar elde edilmiştir.

Toplam hak ve ödevler arasındaki ilişki açısından ele alındığında ise, genel yurttaşlık algılamasının tüm örneklem grupları açısından görev ağırlıklı olduğu, tüm grupların cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsediği gözlenmiştir.

Ölçek çalışmasıyla yurttaşlık algılamaları toplam haklar ve ödevler açısından ve medeni, siyasi ve sosyal yurttaşlık unsurları açısından liberal ve cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modellerine göre belirlenirken, nitel çalışmalardan elde edilen bulgular bu iki modelin alt kategorileri olarak tanımlanabilecek algılamaları da ortaya çıkarmıştır. Odak grup ve mülakatlar katılanların detaylı görüşleri hem aynı meslek grubu içinde farklı yurttaşlık algılamalarının var olabileceğini, hem de ideal-standart modeller olan liberal ve cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modellerinin farklı alt kategorilerinin ayrıştırılabileceğini göstermiştir. Cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışının yurttaşlardan kayıtsız şartsız sadakat, özveri ve ödevlere adanmışlık beklediği en talepkâr formu Füsun Üstel'in kavramlaştırmasıyla 'yurtsever ve militan' cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık olarak tanımlanabilir. Daha az talepkâr formu ise J.S. Mill'in yaklaşımıyla 'aydınlanmış' (enlightened) cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık olarak ifade edilebilir. Bu forma göre yurttaşların tüm bireysel çıkarlarından fedakârlık etmeleri beklenmemekle beraber toplumun iyiliği veya ortak çıkarlara öncelik vermesi beklenir. Öte yandan, liberal-bireyci yaklaşımda medeni ve siyasi haklara öncelik verilirken, sosyal haklara ilişkin tutumlarına göre neoliberal veya sosyal liberal alt kategoriler ortaya çıkabilmektedir.

Bu değerlendirmeler ışığında, nitel çalışmalarda yer alan katılımcılardan toplumun refahı, ortak çıkarlar, kamu düzeni, toplumun huzuru gibi kavramlara özel önem atfedenlerin 'aydınlanmış' cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını paylaştıkları ileri sürülebilir. Ortak çıkarlara bireysel özgürlüklere göre daha fazla önem vermekle beraber hem görevlere hem de haklara karşı sorgulayıcı bir tutum sergileyen bürokratların bu kategoride yer aldıkları ileri sürülebilir.

İkinci olarak, ortak çıkarlara önem vermenin yanında ulusun birlik ve bütünlüğü, ulusal çıkarlar, 'Türkiye üzerine oynanan oyunlar', 'Türkiye'nin içinde bulunduğu şartlar' gibi koşullar öne sürerek bireysel özgürlüklerin sınırlandırılmasını savunan katılımcıların 'yurtsever ve militan' cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsedikleri söylenebilir. Emekli subayların çoğunluğu ve işverenlerden birisi bu kategoride sayılabilir.

Üçüncü olarak, ulusal veya toplumsal çıkarlara kıyasla kişisel haklar ve özgürlüklere daha fazla önem veren katılımcıların liberal-bireyci yurttaşlık anlayışına sahip oldukları ifade edilebilir. İşçilerin bazılarını bu kategoriye sokmak mümkündür. Sosyal yurttaşlık açısından ise sosyal haklara önem veren tüm işçilerin sosyal liberal bir yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsedikleri söylenebilir.

Dördüncü olarak, bireysel haklara dini bir bakış açısıyla önem veren ve MÜSİAD üyesi olan işverenin 'dindar liberal' olarak tanımlanması mümkün görünmektedir. Bu işverene göre bireyler Allah'ın kulları oldukları için bireylerin davranışlarını devletle ilişkilerine göre değil Allah'ın emirlerine göre değerlendirmek gerekir. Allah her şeyin üstünde olduğu için devlete hiçbir öncelik atfetmediği ileri sürülebilir.

Diğer taraftan, AB üyeliği ve yurttaşlık Bu ölçekte yer alan maddelerle anket katılımcılarının AB üyeliğinin şu konulardaki etkisine ilişkin görüşleri ölçülmeye çalışılmıştır: genel olarak yurttaşlık haklarına; devletin yurttaşlara karşı davranışına; yurttaşlara bireysel fayda sağlamada; toplumun dini değerleri üzerinde; askerin politik alandaki etkisini azaltarak sivil güçlenmesine. Ayrıca, AB yurttaşlarının Türkiye Cumhuriyeti yurttaşlarına göre daha fazla ifade ve inanç özgürlüğüne ve daha fazla tüketici haklarına sahip olup olmadıkları konusundaki görüşleri sorulmuştur. Ölçek sonuçlarına bakıldığında, tüm grupların Türkiye'nin AB üyeliğinin yurttaşlık uygulamaları üzerinde olumlu etkisi olacağına inandıkları gözlenmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, çalışmanın üç temel bulgusu olduğu ifade edilebilir. İlk olarak, toplam hak ve ödevler açısından genel yurttaşlık algılamasına bakıldığında tüm yurttaşlar görev ağırlıklı cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını benimsemektedir. İkinci olarak, siyasi yurttaşlık unsurlarına göre işverenler en liberal anlayışa sahip grup olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Üçüncü olarak da, sosyal yurttaşlık itibarıyla işçiler sosyal haklara öncelik sosyal liberal bir anlayışı benimsemişlerdir.

İlk bulgunun örneklemin özelliğinden özellikle de yüksek eğitim düzeylerine sahip bireylerden oluşan bir örneklem olma özelliğinden kaynaklandığı ileri sürülebilir. %37'si lise, %43'ü üniversite ve üstü düzeyden mezun olan örneklemin Türkiye ortalamalarının çok üstünde bir eğitim düzeyine sahip olduğu belirtilmelidir. Formel eğitimin resmi yurttaşlık ideolojisinin yurttaşlara benimsetilmesindeki önemi Gramsci ve Althusser'in kavramlarıyla açıklanabilir. Gramsci'ye göre bir sınıfın hegemonya oluşturması için siyasi ve ekonomik güç kullanımı yanında ideoloji yoluyla diğer grupları ikna etmesi ve kolektif bir irade oluşturması gerekir. Bu kolektif iradenin oluşturulup yaygınlaştırılmasında okullar, kiliseler ve iletişim araçları gibi hegemonya aygıtlarından faydalanılır. Althusser de Gramsci'nin fikirlerini geliştirerek devletin aygıtlarını zorlayıcı (coercive) ve ideolojik aygıtlar olarak ayırtmıştır. Bu yaklaşımlar çerçevesinde, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin kuruluş yıllarında ulus inşası ve toplumsal düzenin yalnızca politik ve ekonomik güç kullanımıyla değil, aynı zamanda laik milliyetçi devlete karşı görevlerle tanımlanan yurttaşlık anlayışını tüm yurttaşların benimsemesi sağlanarak gerçekleştirilmeye çalışıldığı ifade edilebilir. Bu süreçte ortak veya kolektif irade 'çağdaş medeniyetler seviyesine ulaşmak' olarak belirlenmiş ve ideal yurttaş da Türk modernleşmesinin birleştirici söylemiyle şekillendirilmeye çalışılmıştır. Halkı bu ortak amaca yöneltmek amacıyla cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modeli temelinde bazı temel haklar verilmiş ama yurttaşların bireysel özgürlükler yerine ulusal çıkarlara, haklar yerine ödevlere ve bireysel özerklik yerine devlet egemenliğine öncelik vermesi istenmiştir (Keyman and İçduygu, 2005). Bu sebeple, cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modelinin Althusser'e göre devletin en etkili ideolojik aygıtı olan eğitim sistemiyle yaygınlaştırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Araştırmanın örneklem grubunu oluşturan bireylerin eğitim seviyeleri düşünüldüğünde, eğitim aygıtı yoluyla sürekli yeniden üretilen cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık anlayışını benimseyecek kadar uzun süre formel eğitim aldıkları ileri sürülebilir.

Dolayısıyla, örneklem grubunun eğitim seviyesinin yüksek oluşunun, toplam hak ve ödevler açısından genel yurttaşlık algılamasının görev ağırlıklı cumhuriyetçi modeli benimsemelerinde etkili olduğu ifade edilebilir.

Siyasi yurttaşlık unsurlarıyla ilgili olarak işverenlerin daha liberal bir anlayış sergilediklerinin ifade edildiği ikinci bulguya bakıldığında, bu sonucun iş çevrelerinin demokratikleşme talepleriyle ilgili olduğu belirtilebilir. Örnekleme oluşturan işverenlerin çoğunluğunu TÜSİAD ve MÜSİAD üyesidir ve bu kuruluşlar 1990’lardan itibaren demokratikleşme ve bireysel hakların iyileştirilmesi taleplerinde bulunmaktadır. İşverenlerin diğer gruplara göre özellikle ağırlık verdikleri siyasi hakların etnik grupların kültürel hakları ve devletin şeffaflaşmasına ilişkin olması bu işadamları derneklerinin raporlarında öne çıkardıkları konularla da örtüşmektedir.

İşçilerin sosyal haklara ağırlık vermesiyle ilgili son bulgunun ise Türkiye’de eğitim, sağlık, sosyal güvenlik gibi bazı hizmetlerin topluma ya da piyasaya ve aileye terk edilmesi sonucunda bu hizmetlerin bir kesiminin hızla ticarileşmeye başlamasıyla ilgili olduğu söylenebilir. Bu ticarileşme olgusuna üst ve üst orta gelir grupları kolaylıkla uyum gösterebilmişken sadece mevcut kamu kaynaklarına ve imkânlarına bağımlı olan orta ve alt orta gelir grubu aynı kolalıklarla uyum sağlayamamıştır (Erder, 1998). Örneklem grubunda yer alan işçilerin de diğer gruplara göre daha alt gelir seviyelerinde oldukları bu sebeple devletin sağladığı sosyal haklara daha fazla sahip çıktığı ileri sürülebilir. Fakat sosyal yurttaşlık asıl olarak refah devleti politika ve uygulamaları çerçevesinde incelendiği için bu çalışmada bu konunun ayrıntılarına girilmemiştir.

Tekrarlamak gerekirse, araştırma sonuçlarına göre toplam hak ve ödevler açısından tüm meslek grupları görev ağırlıklı cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modelini benimserken siyasi ve sosyal unsurlar itibariyle yurttaşlığın meslek grupları arasında farklı algılandığı görülmüştür. Türkiye’deki yurttaşlık tartışmalarında 1990’lardan itibaren cumhuriyetçi yurttaşlık modelinin kimlik temelli hak taleplerinde bulunan gruplar tarafından sorgulanmaya başlandığı ifade edilmektedir. Araştırma bulguları da işçi, bürokrat ama özellikle işverenlerin siyasi haklara ağırlık verdiğini ortaya koyarak bir anlamda bu tartışmaları ampirik olarak desteklemektedir. Özetle, bu çalışma yurttaşlığı yurttaş açısından ele alarak ve yurttaşlık algılamalarında kullanılmak üzere hak ve ödevler ölçekleri geliştirerek yurttaşlık çalışmalarına katkıda bulunmaya çalışmıştır.

APPENDIX I: CURRICULUM VITAE

PERSONAL INFORMATION

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EDUCATION

Degree	Institution	Year of Graduation
MS	METU Industrial Engineering	1989
BS	METU Industrial Engineering	1985
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2003-Present	Undersecretariat of Treasury	Treasury Expert
1999-2003	GAP Administration	Expert and Coordinator
1998-1999	Undersecretariat of Treasury	Department Head
1997-1998	Undersecretariat of Treasury	Treasury Expert
1992-1996	Turkish Embassy in Brussels	Assist. Econ.Counsellor
1990-1992	Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign.Trade	Foreign Trade and Treasury Expert
1986-1990	Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign.Trade	Foreign Trade and Treasury Assist.Expert

FOREIGN LANGUAGES

Advanced English, Fluent French

PUBLICATIONS

1. Çilingir, Canan and Fıđlalı, Ayřegöl (1989) "Secondary Task Method for the Assessment of Mental Work Load", Çukurova Üniversitesi, MPM 2.Ulusal Ergonomi Kongresi, Ankara: MPM Yayınları: 379
2. Fıđlalı, Ayřegöl (1991) "Türkiye'de Dıřticaret Esneklikleri ve Trend Analiziyle Tahmin Denemesi", *Hazine ve Dıřticaret Dergisi*, Sayı:9, 1991/2